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HISTORY OF EUROPE

FROM THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

IN M.DCC.LXXXIX.

TO THE RESTORATION OF THE BOURBONS

IN M.DCCC.XV.

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, F.R.S.E.

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HISTORY OF EUROPE.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM THE OPENING OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN TO THE
BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR.—JAN.—OCT. 1805.

"THE world," said Napoleon, "believe me the enemy of peace; but I must fulfil my destiny. I am forced to combat and conquer in order to preserve. You must accomplish something new every three months in order to captivate the French people. With them, whoever ceases to advance is lost."¹ Continual progress, fresh successions of victories, unbounded glory, were the conditions on which he held the throne. He knew well that the moment these failed, his authority would begin to decline. With him, therefore, constant wars and evident advances towards universal dominion, were not the result merely of individual ambition, or dictated by an insatiable desire to extend the boundaries of France; they were the necessary consequence of the circumstances in which he was placed, and the temper of the times in which he lived. They arose inevitably from a military conqueror arriving at the supreme direction of a nation when it was heated by the pursuit of revolutionary ambition. As this system, however, required a continual sacrifice of the rights and interests of other nations, in order to feed the vanity and gratify the passions of one, it involved in itself, like every other irregular indulgence, whether in nations or indivi-

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1805.

1.

Necessity to which Napoleon was exposed of constant war.

¹ Dum. xi.
81. De Staël,
Dix Ans
d'Exil, 15.

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1805.

duals, the principles of its own destruction. He fell at last, not because he opposed, but because he yielded to the evil spirit of his times; because, instead of checking, he fanned the flame of revolutionary ambition, converted by his genius into that of military conquest; and continually advanced before a devouring fire, which precipitated him in the end upon the snows of Russia and the rout of Waterloo.

But although well aware that it was on such perilous conditions, and such alone, that he held the throne, no man knew better than Napoleon the importance of concealing their existence from the eyes of mankind, and representing himself as compelled on every occasion to take up arms in order to defend the dignity or independence of the empire. It was his general policy, accordingly, when he perceived that unceasing encroachments during peace had roused a general spirit of resistance to his ambition, and that a general war was inevitable, to make proposals of accommodation to the most inveterate of his enemies, in order to gain the credit of moderate intentions, and throw upon them the odium of actually commencing hostilities. In pursuance of this system, he was no sooner convinced, from the turn which his diplomatic relations with Russia and Sweden had taken, that a third coalition was approaching, than he made pacific overtures to the English government.¹ His letter on this subject, addressed, according to his custom, to the King of England in person, was of the following tenor:—

“Sire, my brother,—Called to the throne by Providence and the suffrages of the senate, the people, and the army, my first feeling was the desire for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity: they may continue their strife for ages; but will their governments in so doing fulfil the most sacred of the duties which they owe to their people? And how will they answer to their consciences for so much blood uselessly shed, and without the prospect of any good whatever to their subjects? I am not ashamed to make the first advances. I have, I flatter myself, sufficiently proved to the world that I fear none of the chances of war. It presents nothing which I have occasion to fear. Peace is the wish of my heart; but war has never been adverse to my glory. I

2.
But to disguise it he proposes peace to Great Britain.

1 Dum. xi.
83, 84.
Jan. 2.

3.
Letter to the King of England.

conjure your Majesty, therefore, not to refuse yourself the satisfaction of giving peace to the world. Never was an occasion more favourable for calming the passions, and giving ear only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. If that opportunity be lost, what limit can be assigned to a war which all my efforts have been unable to terminate? Your Majesty has gained more during the last ten years than the whole extent of Europe in riches and territory: your subjects are in the very highest state of prosperity: what can you expect from a war? To form a coalition of the Continental powers? Be assured the Continent will remain at peace. A coalition will only increase the strength and preponderance of the French empire. To renew our intestine divisions? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To wrest from France her colonies? They are to her only a secondary consideration; and your Majesty has already enough and to spare of those possessions. Upon reflection you must, I am persuaded, yourself arrive at the conclusion, that the war is maintained without an object; and what a melancholy prospect for two great nations to combat merely for the sake of fighting! The world is surely large enough for our two nations to live in it; and reason has still sufficient power to find the means of reconciliation, if the inclination only is not wanting. I have now at least discharged a duty dear to my heart. May your Majesty trust to the sincerity of the sentiments which I have now expressed, and the reality of my desire to give the most convincing proofs of it!"¹

The forms of a representative government would not permit the King of England to answer this communication in person; but Lord Mulgrave, the minister for foreign affairs, on the 14th January, addressed the following answer to M. Talleyrand:—"His Britannic Majesty has received the letter addressed to him by the chief of the French government. There is nothing which his Majesty has more at heart than to seize the first opportunity of restoring to his subjects the blessings of peace, provided it is founded upon a basis not incompatible with the permanent interests and security of his dominions. His Majesty is persuaded that that object can-

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1805.

¹ State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1805, 236.

^{4.}
Answer of the British government. Jan. 14.

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not be attained but by arrangements which may at the same time provide for the future peace and security of Europe, and prevent a renewal of the dangers and misfortunes by which it is now overwhelmed. In conformity with these sentiments, his Majesty feels that he cannot give a more specific answer to the overture which he has received, until he has had time to communicate with the continental powers, to whom he is united in the most confidential manner, and particularly the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wisdom and elevation of sentiments with which he is animated, and of the lively interest which he takes in the security and independence of Europe.”¹

¹ Dum. xi.
86. State
Papers, Ann.
Reg. 1805,
247.

5.

Great influ-
ence of the
French press
in his favour.

This reply, which in a manner disclosed the existence of a coalition against France, or at least of negotiations tending to such an end, completely answered the purpose of Napoleon. It both revealed to the subjects of his empire the necessity of extensive armaments, and gave them an opportunity of comparing what they deemed the pacific intentions and moderation of the Emperor with the projects of ambition which were entertained by the coalesced sovereigns. The press, which in his hands, as it invariably does in the hands of every despotic power, whether military or popular, had become the most terrible and slavish instrument in benighting mankind, resounded with declamations on the forbearance and wisdom of the youthful conqueror. The real causes of the war, the occupation of Italy, the invasion of Germany, the subjugation of Switzerland, were forgotten; and public opinion, formed on the only arguments the people were permitted to hear, prepared unanimously to support the ruler of France, in the firm belief that in so doing they were not following out any projects of offensive ambition, but preparing only for the maintenance of domestic independence.²

² Dum. xi.
89. De Staël,
ii. 282, Sur la
Rev. Franç.

6.

Speech of
Napoleon to
the senate.
Dec. 25, 1804.

This general delusion was increased by the eloquent and seducing expressions in which Napoleon addressed himself to the legislative body at the opening of the session in the close of the year 1804: “Princes, magistrates, soldiers, citizens!” said he, “we have all but one object in our several departments, the interest of our country. Weakness in the executive is the greatest of all misfortunes to the people. Soldier, or First Consul,

I have but one thought: Emperor, I have no other object—the prosperity of France. *I do not wish to increase its territory, but I am resolved to maintain its integrity.* I have no desire to augment the influence which we possess in Europe; but I will not permit what we enjoy to decline. *No state shall be incorporated with our empire;* but I will not sacrifice my rights, or the ties which unite us to other states.” Such were the expressions by which he blinded the eyes of his subjects at the very time that he was taking measures, as the event showed, for the incorporation of the Ligurian Republic with France, and the progressive extension of its dominion over the ecclesiastical states and the whole Italian peninsula. No man ever knew so well as Napoleon how, by the artful use of alluring expressions, to blind his people to the reality of the projects which he had in view; and none ever calculated so successfully upon the slight recollection and exclusive attention to present objects which have ever characterised that volatile people.¹

This session of the legislative body was distinguished by an important step in French finance, highly characteristic of the increased wisdom and milder administration by which that great department was now governed. This was the commencement of the system of *indirect* taxation, and the consequent diminution of that enormous load of direct burdens which, amidst all the declamations of the revolutionists, had been laid during the preceding convulsions upon the French people. It has been already mentioned,² that the territorial burdens of France during the progress of the Revolution had become enormous; the land-tax amounting to a full fifth of the whole profit derived from cultivation by the nation, and the inequality in the distribution of this burden being so excessive, that in many places the landowners paid thirty, forty, fifty, and even eighty per cent on their incomes.³ The enormity of the evil at length attracted the attention of the Emperor, and his sagacious mind at once perceived the superiority of taxes on consumption, which, confounded with the price of the articles on which they were laid, were hardly felt as a grievance, over an enormous direct payment from the proprietors to the government, which fell with excessive and intolerable severity upon a parti-

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XXXIX.
1805.

¹ Bign. iv.
163, 164.

7.
Commencement of indirect taxation in France, and flattering state of the finances.

² *Ante*, chap.
xxxv. § 5.

³ Duc de Gaeta, i. 196,
197.

Dec. 1804.

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1805.

cular class of society. Under his auspices, accordingly, a system of indirect taxes was organised, under the name of *Droits Reunis*, which soon came to form an important branch of the public revenue. In the very first year, though their amount was very inconsiderable, they enabled the government to diminish the territorial impost by 1,200,000 francs, or £48,000. The revenue, as laid before the Chambers, though not a faithful picture, exhibited a progressive increase in all its branches, and enabled the Emperor, without any loans, with the assistance only of the great contributions levied on Spain, Portugal, Italy, and other allied states, to meet the vast and increasing expenses of the year.¹* On the 31st December, a flattering exposition of the situation of the empire was laid before the Chambers by M. Champagny, the minister of the interior, and the intention announced of effecting constitutional changes in the Italian and Bavarian Republics, similar to that recently completed in the French empire. The splendid picture which these representations drew of the internal prosperity of France gave rise to the eulogium on Napoleon, which acquired a deserved celebrity at the time:—"The first place was vacant: the most worthy was called to fill it: he has only dethroned anarchy."²

Events of still greater moment were announced to the British parliament in the speech from the throne; and the negotiations which then took place were of the greater importance that they formed the basis on which, at the conclusion of the war, the arrangements at the Congress of Vienna were mainly formed. From the ground then taken, Great Britain, amid all the subsequent vicissitudes of fortune, never for one moment swerved. In the

* The income of France during the year 1804 was eighteen millions higher than in 1803, and was as follows:—

	Francs.	
Direct Taxes,	313,749,000, or	£12,550,000
Registers,	198,584,000, ...	7,950,000
Customs,	41,485,000, ...	1,700,000
Excise, first year,	3,895,000, ...	156,000
Post-Office,	10,471,000, ...	420,000
Lottery,	16,658,000, ...	660,000
Salt-tax,	3,220,000, ...	130,000

588,062,000, or £23,566,000

—DUC DE GAETA, i. 304.

¹ Duc de Gaeta, i. 196, 197, 215.
Bign. iv. 158, 159.

² State Papers, Ann. Reg. 1804, 284. Bign. iv. 68.

8.
Public announcement of the alliance with Russia in the King of England's opening speech to parliament. Jan. 15.

speech from the throne, the King of England observed, "I have received pacific overtures from the chief of the French government, and have in consequence expressed my earnest desire to embrace the first opportunity of restoring the blessings of peace, on such grounds as may be consistent with the permanent interest and safety of my dominions; but these objects are closely connected with the general peace of Europe. I have, therefore, not thought it right to enter into any more particular explanation without previous communication with those powers on the Continent with whom I am engaged in confidential intercourse and connexion with a view to that important object, and especially the Emperor of Russia, who has given the strongest proofs of the wise and dignified sentiments with which he is animated, and of the warm interest which he takes in the safety and independence of Europe."¹

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1805.

¹ Parl. Deb.
iii. 3.

It was not without foundation that Mr Pitt thus publicly announced the formation of political connections which evidently pointed to a third coalition. His ardent mind had long perceived, in the coldness which had taken place between France and Russia, and the almost open rupture with Sweden, the elements from which to frame a powerful confederacy against that formidable empire; and considerable progress, through his indefatigable efforts, had been made not only in arranging the basis of such a confederacy, but in obtaining the co-operation of the power whose aid was indispensable to its success, the cabinet of Vienna. Assured at length of the friendly disposition of the Austrian government, notwithstanding the caution and reserve which, from their exposed situation, they were compelled to adopt, Mr Pitt, four days after the meeting of parliament, presented a confidential communication to the Russian ambassador in London, in which the basis of the principles of the coalition was distinctly laid down. It was proposed—1. To reduce France to its former limits, such as they were before the Revolution; 2. To make, in regard to the countries rescued from France, such arrangements as, while they provide in the best possible manner for the happiness and rights of their inhabitants, may at the same time form a powerful barrier against it in future,

9.
Important negotiations with the Russian ambassador at London.

Jan. 19.

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XXXIX.

1805.

and for this purpose to incorporate the Low Countries with Prussia; 3. To unite the kingdom of Etruria to Tuscany, restore Lombardy to Austria, and annex Genoa to the kingdom of Piedmont; 4. To take measures for establishing a system of public right throughout Europe. "The first of these objects," continues the note, "is certainly the one which the views of his Majesty and of the Emperor (of Russia) would wish to be established, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the wishes which they have formed for the security and independence of Europe." The co-operation of Austria was alluded to in the same document; for it goes on to state—"His Majesty perceives with pleasure, from the secret and confidential communications which your Excellency has transmitted, that the views of the court of Vienna are perfectly in accordance with this principle, and that the extension which that court desires can not only be admitted with safety, but even carried farther with advantage to the common cause."¹

¹ Schoel, Rec. de Pièces Officielles, vii. 59. Bign. iv. 192, 193.

10.
Basis here assumed for the whole Revolutionary war.

But it is worthy of especial notice, that, even in this secret and confidential note, there is not a hint of either reducing the ancient limits of France, or imposing a government on it contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants; an instance of moderation in nations, suffering at the moment so severely under the ambition of that country, which is in the highest degree remarkable, and rendered the confederacy worthy of the glorious success which ultimately attended its exertions. The note, indeed, is the noblest monument of the prophetic wisdom, as well as impartial justice, with which Mr Pitt conducted the war against the Revolution. It is truly wonderful to see that great statesman thus early tracing the outline of the general policy of the great coalition which, ten years afterwards, effected the deliverance of Europe; and it is a memorable instance of national perseverance as well as moderation, to behold the same objects unceasingly pursued by his successors, during ten years of the most violent oscillations of fortune, and no severer terms at length imposed upon the vanquished than had been agreed to by their conquerors in the outset of the strife, and at the highest point of the enemy's elevation.*

* See Appendix A, Chap. xxxix.

About the same time a treaty was concluded between Russia and Sweden, for the avowed purpose of "maintaining the balance of power in Europe, and providing for the independence of Germany." Immediately afterwards, a Russian corps disembarked in Pomerania, to act in conjunction with the Swedish forces. This treaty proved a source of jealousy and disquietude to the Prussian cabinet, and the diplomatic relations between Berlin and St Petersburg soon assumed a spirit of hostility, which augured little good to the confederacy which England was striving to bring about between the great powers of Europe. Count Winzingerode was in consequence despatched to Berlin by the Emperor Alexander, to endeavour to induce the Prussian cabinet to enter into the designs of England and Russia; but notwithstanding the leaning of Baron Hardenberg, its chief minister, and the influence of the Queen, the old jealousy of Austria still prevailed, and Prussia persisted in that evident partiality to the French alliance which was destined to be rewarded by the catastrophe of Jena and partition of Tilsit.¹

The supplies voted in the British parliament for the service of the year, amounted to no less than £44,559,521 of war taxes, for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, exclusive of £4,534,000, as separate charges for England, besides £28,032,000 as permanent expenses, making a total of £77,125,521 yearly expenditure. The ways and means, including a loan of £20,000,000, amounted to £43,992,000 for Great Britain, and £3,500,000 for Ireland, besides a permanent revenue for both countries of £32,381,000; in all £79,873,000.* The new taxes imposed to meet the interest of the loan were no less than £1,560,000, consisting chiefly of additions to the salt duty, to the postage of letters, to the legacy duty, and to those levied on horses employed in husbandry, or in agricultural operations.²

The disturbed state of Ireland again rendered the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act indispensable, which accordingly passed both houses by a very large majority. Indeed, the continued anarchy of that beautiful island now began to spread among the thoughtful and observant in Great Britain a conviction, which subsequent events

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11.

Treaty between Russia and Sweden. And continued jealousy of Prussia towards Austria.

¹ Bign. iv.
194, 196, 197.

12.

Supplies for
1805.

² Parl. Deb.
iii. 551, 546,
and v. 23.

13.

Other parliamentary measures.

* See Appendix B, Chap. xxxix.

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¹ Suttie's
Reports,
Parl. Deb. v.
1. 210. App.
iii. 589.

have abundantly justified, that its people either had not received from nature the character, or had not reached by industry the stage of civilisation, requisite for the safe enjoyment of a free constitution ; and that the passions consequent on the exercise of its powers would permanently distract its inhabitants, and desolate its surface. In this session of parliament also, the report of the select committee upon the tenth and eleventh naval reports was printed, in regard to the treasuryship of the navy under the management of Lord Melville ; proceedings upon which the spirit of party immediately fastened with more than usual acrimony, and which were subsequently made the means of effecting the overthrow of the statesman who had elevated the British navy from a state of unexampled dilapidation to the highest point of its triumph and glory.¹

14.
Charges
against Lord
Melville.

The grounds of this charge against Lord Melville, which is a matter of more importance in the domestic history of Britain than in the general transactions of Europe, were, 1st. That he had applied the public money to other uses than those of the navy departments under his control, in violation of an express Act of parliament ; and, 2d, That he had connived at a system, on the part of the treasurer of the navy, of appropriating, for a time at least, the public money under his charge to his own uses : in consequence of which, if the public had sustained no actual loss, they had at least run a considerable risk, and been deprived of the profits arising from such temporary use, which should all have been carried to the public credit. They were brought forward, in a speech of distinguished ability and vehemence, by Mr Whitbread, a mercantile gentleman of great eminence in London, a perfect master of business and a powerful debater, who for long afterwards assumed a prominent place in the ranks of the Opposition in the House of Commons. Mr Pitt, without denying the facts detailed in the report, called the attention of the House to the real import of what was established in evidence, viz. that no loss had been sustained by the public, every shilling drawn out by the treasurer of the navy having been replaced in the hands of the bankers ;² and that it did not appear that Lord Melville had been aware of the private purposes of profit to which

² Parl. Deb.
ix. 255, 326
Ann. Reg.
1805, 67, 72.

that gentleman had applied the money, and most certainly had not derived one farthing of personal advantage from that irregularity.* After an animated debate, Mr Whitbread's resolutions were carried by the casting vote of the Speaker, the numbers being two hundred and sixteen on each side.

This was too important a blow against the administration of Mr Pitt, not to be followed up with the utmost vigour by the Whig party, and was felt most keenly by that minister. It led to various subsequent proceedings; and so vehement did the opinion of the public become in consequence of the incessant efforts made by the public press in their interest, to keep it in a state of agitation, that on the 6th May, Mr Pitt announced in parliament, that Lord Melville's name had been erased from the list of Privy Councillors: and the thanks of the House of Commons were voted to the commissioners who had prepared the report, "for the zeal, ability, and fortitude with which they had discharged the arduous duties intrusted to them." The noble lord had resigned his situation as First Lord of the Admiralty two days after the resolutions of the House of Commons were passed. These proceedings led to the impeachment of Lord Melville, in the following year, in the House of Peers, but he was acquitted by a large majority on all the charges, after a trial of great length and perfect impartiality; and in the interim, the nation, from whose services he had been removed, was saved from imminent danger and possible destruction by the memorable victory, to which his efforts as first Lord of the Admiralty had so mainly contributed, at Trafalgar.¹

This session of parliament was distinguished also by the commencement of those memorable debates on the removal of the existing disabilities from the Roman Catholics of Ireland, which continued, with little intermission, to agitate the legislature for five-and-twenty years. The question was argued with the utmost ability in both houses of parliament; and to a subsequent generation, which has witnessed the passing of the Catholic Relief

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15.

His impeachment and acquittal.

June 12, 1806.

¹ Ann. Reg. 1806, 86, 88, 127. Parl. Deb. iv. 602, 606.

16.

Commencement of the debates on the Catholic question. Argument of Mr Fox and Lord Grenville for the repeal of the Catholic disabilities.

* "I never," said Mr Whitbread, "charged Lord Melville with participating in the plunder of the public, because that had not appeared."—*Parl. Deb.* iv. 611.

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Bill, and is familiar with its effects, it is a matter both of interest and instruction to behold the light in which it was then viewed, and the arguments adduced for and against the measure by the greatest men of the age. On the one hand, it was argued by Mr Fox, Lord Grenville, and Mr Grattan, "That in considering the claims of the Roman Catholics to exemption from the disabilities under which they laboured, it is material to recollect that they do not form a small or inconsiderable sect, but compose three-fourths of the population of Ireland, and embrace, according to some, three, according to others, five millions of its inhabitants. It would indeed be a happy thing, if we were all united in religious as well as in political and constitutional opinions ; but that, unfortunately, cannot now be hoped for, and the question is, what is to be done under existing circumstances ? That parliament has long, too long, acted upon the distinction of religious faith, is indeed certain ; but in justice to the memory of King William it must be observed, that the system of exclusion did not commence with his measures, but arose in a subsequent reign, when the opinion unfortunately became prevalent that the Roman Catholics were the irreconcilable enemies of the Protestant Establishment of Ireland, and the Protestant Government of England ; and upon that assumption, without any proof, the step was taken of excluding them from all share in the constitution. Not content with this, means were devised, by penalties, proscriptions, and disabilities, to drive the whole Catholic peasantry from the island, or reduce them to the state of a poor, ignorant, and illiterate population.

17.
The comparative toleration enjoyed under George III. Reasons which induced its being only partial.

"Such was the state in which the Roman Catholics of Ireland were at the accession of his present Majesty ; and under his government the measures pursued have indeed been a contrast to the dark and bigoted system of his predecessors. Under his auspicious rule a system of progressive amelioration has been introduced, by measures which were the more effectual because they were gradual, which have by degrees reversed the whole former system. You have given them full toleration, and the benefits of education ; taken away those odious measures which produced the disunion of families ; restored the industry of the country, by granting to the people a participation in

the fruits of the soil, and allowed them a full share of its benefits, withholding from them only the exercise of the elective franchise. By these means the people have rapidly advanced in wealth, agriculture, commerce, and general civilisation: the magnanimity of Great Britain acknowledged the right of an independent government, and at length, in 1792, they were admitted to a full participation of all the privileges of British subjects, excepting those for which the present petition prays. Here, therefore, was a system of gradual relaxation introduced; and here for a time a stand was made: not because reasons existed which rendered it doubtful whether any further concessions should ever be made, but because there were many considerations which made it appear desirable that the last relaxations should not be made in the Irish parliament. That parliament had not arisen, like the British, from the wants and necessities of many centuries, but it was constituted at once, with the defined object of making the legislature a Protestant one, to the exclusion of three-fourths of the population. In these circumstances it was more than doubtful whether the sudden admission of Catholics into that legislature, founded as it would have been on a constituency embracing a great majority of persons of that persuasion, might not have endangered the Protestant interests of Ireland, and possibly its connexion with this country.

“ But that obstacle is now removed; the Irish members no longer form a separate assembly, but are merged in the general parliament of the empire; and the same prudential considerations which forbade the admission of Catholics into the Irish parliament, where they would have formed a dangerous majority, recommend their entrance into the British, where they can never exceed a small minority. It cannot be denied that the Catholics of Ireland conceived great hopes, that by the operation of the Union they would be relieved of their disabilities. No authorised assurance was ever given, no promise was made to them, that such a measure would result from that step: but still, by the arguments of those who supported it, and the course of reasoning both within doors and without doors, hopes were given that the subject of Catholic emancipation would be more favourably con-

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18.

Argument in
favour of fur-
ther relaxa-
tion, from the
Irish parlia-
ment having
now merged
in the Eng-
lish one.

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sidered than it had hitherto been ; and those who promoted the measure undoubtedly gave the Catholics to understand, that their claims would meet with the most impartial consideration from the United parliament. It is this pledge which you are now called upon to redeem : you are required not to concede Catholic emancipation, but to go into a committee to consider whether their demands can with safety be granted.

19.
The present
expediency of
that relaxa-
tion urged.

“Every government unquestionably has the power to impose restrictions and disabilities upon a particular and suspected class of its subjects : but it must ever be a question of expedience whether such power should be exercised or not. What valid objections can be now urged against the removal of religious disabilities ? We are not now to go back, in the nineteenth century, to a disquisition on the justice as well as expedience of the great principles of toleration. They are universally admitted : it lies with the opponents of emancipation to make out the exception of their case from the general rule. We are told that it is impossible for a Roman Catholic to be a loyal subject, and great pains have been taken to inculcate this doctrine. If true, this principle would lead to this result, that you must undo all that you have done, recall every concession you have made, and begin a crusade to drive the Catholics out of Ireland. But does history warrant the assertion that they bear this extraordinary character ? Have not Protestants and Catholics been equally mingled in the ranks of the disaffected ? And have not many bright examples of the loyalty and fidelity of the Popish priesthood and peasantry occurred, especially during the critical period of the American war ? Lamentable as were the disorders of Ireland at the close of the last century, yet it is now evident that they arose from causes foreign to their religion : from the heartburnings consequent on the unhappy system of middle-men, and the false relation of landlord and tenant, or the contagion of revolutionary principles from a neighbouring state : and the tranquil condition of three-fourths of the Catholic population for years past, may surely now plead as strongly in their favour as their former discontents could militate against them.

“The period has now arrived when one of two things

must be done with respect to Ireland. Either you must go back and restore the degrading and exclusive system of Queen Anne, or you must go on and conciliate the Catholics, by admitting them to a full participation in the blessings of the British constitution. No middle course is practicable. They have already received too much to be coerced by force: too little to be won by affection. They have got every thing, excepting the right to seats in parliament and eligibility to the higher offices in the army, the navy, and the law. It is in vain to say that such exclusion is not an injury. To many it is a most substantial disadvantage, because it deprives them of the just reward for their talents and exertions: to all it is a galling bar, a badge of servitude; and he knows little of human nature who is not aware that such vexatious restraints, though accompanied with little real hardship, are frequently productive of more violent heartburnings than serious personal injuries. If they came into this House, do you really believe they would attempt to overturn the hierarchy of the country? What could five or six, or indeed fifty or sixty Catholics do to accomplish such an object, in the midst of a Protestant legislature tenfold more numerous? Similar arguments were urged against the admission of Presbyterian members, but have they ever been found in hostility to the English Establishment? and has not, on the contrary, the removal of religious disabilities been the grand cause of the pacification and loyalty of the once distracted and rebellious inhabitants of Scotland?" Mr Pitt supported the claims of the Catholics generally, but lamented that they had been brought forward at that particular moment, under circumstances which left little, if any, hope of the question being satisfactorily adjusted.¹

On the other hand, it was strenuously argued by Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Sidmouth, Mr Perceval, and Lord Chancellor Eldon: "Independent of the obvious reasons against this measure at the particular time at which it is now pressed upon the country, there are other objections applicable to every time and to any circumstances under which this subject can be brought forward. In considering this question, it is indispensable to distinguish between toleration and the concession of political power. The first

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20.

The injury done to the Catholic population by the exclusive system.

¹ Parl. Deb. iv. 651, 653, 670, 834, 1014, 1020.

21.

Answers of Lord Hawkesbury, Sidmouth, and Eldon.

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should ever be granted in its fullest extent; the second should be withheld when the granting of it may endanger the other institutions of society. The Catholics have proved themselves, by their conduct in Canada and elsewhere, to be as loyal subjects in some places as the British empire can boast: but their present claims in Ireland do not relate to their condition as subjects, but to their title to political power. No system, it is true, can be considered as perpetual, and some power must every where exist capable of abrogating the laws of the state, according as circumstances may render necessary; but there are some landmarks between the governors and the governed *non tangenda non movenda*, except on the ground of the clearest expedience or the most overbearing necessity. The principles of the Revolution, as established by the Bill of Rights and Act of Settlement, have always been considered as of this description. That great and glorious change was not brought about by speculative opinion or the passion for visionary improvement; it was the result of necessity and experienced evils; and the great statesmen by whom it was effected had the courage to put to themselves the question, whether the inconvenience of having a king of a different religion from that established in the country, or the evil of breaking in upon the legal order of succession to the crown, were the greater calamity; and they decided in favour of the latter. Now, is it not a necessary consequence of this limitation of the crown to persons of the Protestant faith, that the immediate advisers, officers, and counsellors of the crown should be of the same persuasion? What would be more preposterous than in a government, where the law is above the crown, and has altered its channel of descent, to allow the ministers, the chancellor, the judges of the land, to be of the religion the most hostile to the Establishment?

22.
Argument
against emancipation from
the subordination of the
Catholics to a
foreign power.

“What would be the practical effect of a removal of the restrictions and limitations which our ancestors have adopted for the security of the constitution? There are many classes of Dissenters who differ from the Church of England as widely on doctrinal points, and more widely on ecclesiastical government, than the Roman Catholics; but the vital difference is, that they do not appeal to a foreign power for instruction or direction. It is this which

constitutes the grand distinction between the Roman Catholics and all other descriptions of Christians; and it is this which it is in a peculiar manner of importance to consider, in judging of their claims to political power. It is not their profession of a different faith which renders them dangerous; it is the submission to a foreign authority—the constitution of an *imperium in imperio*, only the more dangerous that it is founded on a spiritual basis, which all conscientious persons will ever prefer to any temporal authority. In the Catholic religion, above all others, the jurisdiction and authority of the priesthood interfere in a great part of the civil and domestic concerns of life. If religion and the state are distinct and at variance, and the Catholic is compelled to decide between them, he must decide for his religion and against the state. The question is not, whether Catholics may be loyal subjects—whether they should enjoy toleration, or obtain civil rights or civil liberty,—for all that they already have,—but whether they are to obtain *political power* of every description, when they refuse, and on the principles of their religion ever must refuse, to acknowledge the complete authority of the state.

“The practical effect of the extension of the elective franchise to the Catholics of Ireland has been, to produce in most of its counties something very nearly approaching to universal suffrage. It is the opinion of those best acquainted with the internal state of Ireland, that, if the doors of parliament are once thrown open to the Catholics, the influence of the priests will infallibly be exerted in favour of the Catholic candidates, and as certainly against the Protestants; and thus the influence of property would be operating on the one side, and that of religion on the other. Such a state of things would not only create much internal confusion and disorder, but it could not fail to operate most injuriously with respect to the lower orders of the people, who must unavoidably, and on many occasions, become the victims of these contending interests. The present condition of the Continent renders it in an especial manner inexpedient to make the proposed concessions at this time. Whoever contemplates the late extensions of the power of France, must be convinced that the Roman See is substantially under the power of Napoleon. The

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23.
The present
inexpediency
of further
concessions.

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Pope has been compelled to travel to Paris, a thing unheard of for ten centuries, to place a revolutionary crown on the head of that fortunate usurper ; and he looks, doubtless, for some considerable return for so extraordinary a mark of condescension. Can there be any doubt, therefore, of the complete dependence upon the French government in which he is placed ? and would it not be the height of madness in us, knowing Napoleon's inveterate hostility to this country, to weaken our means of resistance by the admission to political power of those who are necessarily subject to a power over which he has such a control ?

24.
Inefficiency
of all past
concession to
allay the dis-
contents of
the country.
It is rejected
by a large
majority.

“Mr Emmett and all the leaders of the Irish insurgents have declared, in their examinations before the Secret Committee of the Irish Lords, ‘that the mass of the people do not care a feather for Catholic emancipation ; neither did they care for parliamentary reform, till it was explained to them as leading to other objects which they did look to, particularly the abolition of tithes.’ It is evident, therefore, from their testimony, as well as from the reason of the thing itself, that the great body of the Catholics would not consider what you are now called upon to grant as any desirable boon or material concession. We are ready to give them every reasonable liberty or franchise, but not to surrender the state into their hands. The expectation that concession, as such, will lead to peace, is unfortunately contradicted by the whole history of Ireland, where it has invariably been found that yielding has induced disturbance and anarchy ; and the public peace has been preserved only by a severe code, which, how painful soever, was, in time past at least, indispensable. The severity of that code we deprecate as much as any of the advocates of the Catholics ; but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that under it Ireland enjoyed absolute tranquillity for nearly a century, and that since its relaxation it has been disgraced by two rebellions, and constantly been more or less the theatre of disturbance. Let us, therefore, seeing the results of the preceding parts of the experiment have been so doubtful, avoid rash innovations and shun additional changes. The future destiny of our country is not in our own hands : kingdoms may rise and fall, flourish or decay ;¹ but let us not be ourselves the instruments of that blow which may occasion our destruction, and recol-

¹ Parl. Deb.
iv. 674, 691,
695, 700, 783
803.

lect that it is only by a steady adherence to that system which we have received from our forefathers that we can hope to exist with safety, or to fall, if fall we must, with honour."

The motion to go into a committee on the Roman Catholic petition was negatived by a great majority in both Houses: in the Peers by one hundred and seventy-eight to forty-nine: in the Commons by three hundred and thirty-six to one hundred and twenty-four.¹

In forming an opinion on this subject, interesting from the principles which it embraces, and still more from the consequences to which they lead, it is impossible to deny that it is involved in extraordinary difficulty. Not theory, but experience, is the antagonist with which liberal principles have here to contend. How convincing soever the argument in favour of the complete removal of religious disabilities may be, and how pleasing soever the prospect of constructing a society in which opinion is as free as the air we breathe, and actual delinquency alone can impose disability, it is impossible to deny that the experiment, when put into practice, has, hitherto at least, signally failed. Catholic emancipation has at length been carried: but it has produced none of the benefits which its advocates anticipated, and realised many of the evils which its opponents predicted. When it is recollected that it was argued that concession to the Irish Catholics would only lead to additional demands; that the whole influence of the priests would be thrown on the popular side, and the peace of the country be perpetually disturbed by the conflict between numbers and property, it is impossible now to dispute the justice of the objections stated to the change; and melancholy experience has taught us that Mr Perceval's and Lord Hawkesbury's words were prophetic. Ireland has never been so distracted as since Catholic emancipation was granted: the total suspension of the constitution has in consequence for a time been forced as a measure of absolute necessity upon government: and, without stilling the waves of discontent in the Emerald Isle, that long-debated change has fixed the firebrand of discord in the British empire. Consequences so disastrous, so different from what they anticipated, have filled with astonishment the friends of

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¹ Parl. Deb.
v. 843, 1059.

25.
Reflections
on this sub-
ject. Total
failure of
Catholic
Emancipa-
tion to pacify
the country.

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toleration. Many have come to doubt whether its doctrines are in reality so well founded as abstract argument would lead us to suppose: others have settled into the belief that, however well founded in themselves, they were inapplicable to the circumstances of an old empire, essentially founded upon an opposite set of principles; and that, in the attempt to draw a tainted beam out of the edifice, the whole structure has fallen into ruins.*

26.
Causes of this
apparent
anomaly.

In truth, however, the total failure of Catholic emancipation affords no grounds for doubting, in the general case, the great principles of religious toleration; it only shows that other and deeper sources of evil were operating in Ireland, to which that measure, though founded in the abstract on just principles, could furnish no sufficient antidote: and that Great Britain is experiencing, in the endless difficulties consequent on the possession of that island, the same law of moral retribution of which France, ever since the Revolution, has furnished so memorable an example. When rightly considered, the state of that country is pregnant with political instruction; it shows that nations which commit injustice cannot escape punishment: and in its present wretchedness may be discerned additional grounds for that love of real freedom, and detestation of revolutionary ambition, the enforcement of which constitutes the great moral of the present times.

27.
The immense
confiscation
of land in for-
mer times.

I. The first circumstance which has left an incurable wound in Ireland, and through it in the whole British empire, is the enormous and unpardonable extent to which the confiscation of landed property had been carried in former times. Without referring to historical details, it is sufficient to observe that at least four-fifths,

* The following table exhibits the steady and rapid increase of crime in Ireland since the Catholic Relief Bill was passed:

	Committed.	Convicted.
1828, Catholic disabilities in force,	14,683	9,269
1829, Relief Bill passed in March,	15,271	9,449
1830,	15,794	9,902
1831, Reform agitation,	16,192	9,605
1832, Ditto,	16,036	9,759
1833, Tithe agitation begun,	17,819	11,444
1834, Coercion Act in force,	21,381	14,523

Thus the committals in Ireland had increased a half in six years after the disabilities were removed from the Catholics. When it is recollected that not a third part of the atrocious crimes in that country are ever made the subject either of committal or trial, it may safely be concluded, from this instructive table, that during that period crime has more than doubled over its whole extent.—See *Parl. Papers*, June 14, 1835.

probably five-sixths, of the soil of Ireland has, at different times, changed hands in this violent manner, and that the great majority of the persons on whom the forfeited estates have been bestowed were English soldiers of fortune, noble proprietors, or companies resident in Great Britain. The consequences of this spoliation have been to the last degree disastrous. As the forfeiture of property is the most cruel of all acts of injustice, because it extends to distant generations the punishment of the present, so it is the one of all others which most certainly leads to its own punishment. Invariably it leaves the seeds of undying animosity between the descendants of the oppressors and oppressed : between the owners of the soil and the peasantry who till their lands. Landed confiscation has been to Ireland what a similar deed of injustice was to France—a festering sore which has never been healed. In both countries restitution has become impossible, from the multitude of new interests which have been created : therefore, by both countries retribution must be endured.

II. The ghastly wound thus opened in Ireland by the barbarity of feudal injustice might, however, in the course of ages have been healed, as the evils of Norman confiscation were in Great Britain, were it not for another circumstance, of peculiar and lamentable malignity, which has continually kept it open. This is the unhappy bestowing of the estates upon persons resident in this country, and the consequent introduction of the system of middle-men and absentee proprietors into the neighbouring island. These evils necessarily flowed from the first great act of injustice ; for it was not to be supposed that English noblemen would leave their baronial palaces to dwell in the comparatively barbarous realm of Ireland ; and they soon found that, without middle-men interposed between them and the cultivators of the soil, they could not realise any thing whatever out of their possessions. Thence necessarily followed in close and rapid succession the interposition of a number of tenants, many holding their estates for a long tract of years, between the landlords and the peasantry ; the continual impoverishment of the rural cultivators, by the necessity of maintaining out of the produce of their labour such a multitude of

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28.
The vesting
of the for-
feited estates
in absentees.

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superiors ; and the ruinous right of the landlord to dis-train the effects of the sub-tenant for the arrears of rent due by his principal,—a privilege which, in its applica-tion to a country so situated, rendered the growth of agricultural capital impossible, and chained the people to habits of indigent existence and unlimited increase of population. The Irish landlords have long clung with blind tenacity to this blasting privilege, inconsistent with any degree of prosperity in their country, as the only means of realising any rents out of their tenantry ; a parallel case to the strong attachment of the holders of national domains in France to the revolutionary law of succession, the certain destroyer of any thing like general freedom in their country ; and another example of that law of nature which induces men, who have profited by the fruits of injustice, to adhere with infatuated obstinacy to the very institutions which are calculated to bring about its punishment.

29.
And total
unfitness of
the Irish at
present for a
free constitu-
tion.

III. The unhappy vicinity to Great Britain, and the supposed necessity of having a similar form of govern-ment and national representation for the two countries, however different their character and state of social advancement, has contributed still further to perpetuate the disorders of Ireland, and distract its indigent peas-antry by the passions and the ambition which centuries of freedom, and an extensive distribution of property, alone enable its more advanced neighbour to bear with safety. Experience has now placed it beyond a doubt that Ireland is not capable of bearing the excitement of, or disregarding the passions consequent on, a popular constitution. The state of civilisation to which she has arrived is not adequate to such a trial : the passions con-sequent on the unhappy wounds in her bosom are too strong to endure them without convulsions.* Could the

* The atrocious crimes over Ireland in the last months of 1832, three years after Catholic emancipation had passed, were at the rate of six thousand a-year. In the year immediately following the passing of the Coercion Act, they were, over the whole country, reduced three-fifths ; and in the county of Kilkenny, and a few other baronies where its extraordinary powers were put in force, they had been reduced from one thousand five hundred and sixty-one to three hundred and thirty a-year.—See *Parl. Report*, May 8, 1833, and May 14, 1834. “The dis-turbances of Ireland,” said Marquis Wellesley, while viceroy of that country in 1834, “have in every instance been excited and inflamed by the agitation of the combined projects for the abolition of tithes, and the destruction of the union with Great Britain. I cannot employ words of sufficient strength to express my solici-

wishes of philanthropy be granted, what Ireland should receive for half a century is a wise and humane, but despotic government, which, while encouraging every branch of industry, alleviating every source of suffering, aiding every opening to employment, should, at the same time, rigorously punish crimes in every rank, close every avenue to democratic ambition, and extinguish every hope of revolutionary elevation. It is thus, and thus only, that the apparently incurable disorders of her social condition could be removed; that habits of industry could become general; artificial wants and a higher standard of comfort reduce to due subjection the principle of population; and a foundation be laid in the growth of an opulent middle class in society, for the safe and pacific exercise of those powers which, when prematurely conceded, destroy in a short time the only durable foundation of real freedom.

IV. It was long ago observed by the great champion of religious freedom, Mr Locke, that the principles of toleration are not to be applied to those who hold that faith is not to be kept with heretics, or who arrogate to themselves any peculiar privilege or power in civil concerns, or acknowledge any foreign or alien ecclesiastical authority.* The distinction which he draws between toleration to those who merely differ from government in religious belief, and those who acknowledge a foreign spiritual authority, and are animated by an undying desire

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30.
Important
observations
of Mr Locke
on this sub-
ject.

tude that his Majesty's government should fix the deepest attention on the intimate connexion marked by the strongest characters in all these transactions, between the *system of agitation and its inevitable consequence, the system of combination leading to violence and outrage: they are inseparably cause and effect*: nor can I, after the most attentive consideration of the dreadful scenes passed under my view, by any effort of my understanding separate one from the other in that unbroken chain of indissoluble connexion." So strongly are the Irish themselves convinced of their inability to bear the excitement of a free constitution, at least in periods of agitation, that Mr Littleton, the Irish Secretary under Earl Grey's administration, stated in parliament, that he had never met with a single person of any shade of political opinion in Ireland, and he had mingled with all, who did not cordially approve of the Coercion Act of 1833, and earnestly wished for its renewal.—*Mirror of Parliament*, 19th July, 1834.

* Locke's words, which are very remarkable, are as follows:—"Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is, when men arrogate to themselves, and those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative, covered over with a precious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise, that princes may be dethroned by those who differ from them in religion, or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves; for these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth. But, nevertheless, we find those who teach the same things in other words. For what else do they mean who teach that no faith is to be kept with heretics? Their meaning is,

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to regain the lost possessions or ascendancy of the Catholic church, is in the highest degree important, and throws a precious ray of light upon the darkness with which the calamities consequent on Catholic emancipation have shrouded not only the prospects of the British empire, but the great principles of religious toleration itself. These calamities are not chargeable upon the doctrines of religious freedom abstractly considered; they are the fatal results of the combination of religious difference in the case of the Catholics, with the poisonous intermixture of ecclesiastical ambition, civil rancour, and political passion. The Catholics are dangerous, not merely because they profess different religious tenets, but because they belong to an ecclesiastical power which formerly numbered the British Islands among the brightest jewels of its mitre, and will never cease to labour to extirpate the faith which despoiled it of that ancient part of its heritage. Temporal passion, political ambition, revenge for injury, are here mixed up, in overwhelming proportions, with the abstract question of religious freedom.

31.
Dangerous
mistake in
giving the
Irish political
power.

Unlimited toleration the Irish Papists are clearly entitled to, and have long possessed; but to concede to them political power was the same error as it would have been in the Carthaginians to have permitted, on their shores, an armed and fortified settlement of Ro-

forsooth, that the privilege of breaking faith belongs to themselves, for they declare all that are not of their communion are heretics. These, therefore, and the like, who attribute unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox—that is, in plain terms, to themselves—any peculiar power or privilege above other mortals in the concerns of religion, or who, under pretence of religion, do challenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion; I say these *have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate*, as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion. For what do all these and the like doctrines signify, but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the government and possess themselves of the *estates and fortunes of their fellow-subjects*, and that *they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrates so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?*

“Again, that church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it do thereby, *ipso facto*, deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince; for by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be enlisted, as it were, for soldiers against his own government. Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the court and the church afford any remedy to this inconvenience, when both are subject to the absolute authority of the same person, who has not only influence to persuade the members of his own church to whatever he lists, but can enjoin it them on the pain of eternal fire.”—*First Letter on Toleration; Works*, vi. 46, 47.

mans : or for England to have allowed an intrenched camp of the soldiers of Napoleon to be constructed on the coast of Kent. The unjust spoliation of the church at the Reformation, has introduced an apple of discord between England and Ireland, which can never be removed. Nor is the comparatively inconsiderable number, at first, of such an organised band of aliens, any reason for despising its ultimate dangers : for such a body, by taking advantage of the divisions of the ruling power, and attaching itself to the malcontents in the bosom of the state, can almost always in the end attain a supremacy over both the contending factions. A few hundred English merchants appeared as suppliant settlers on the banks of the Ganges ; but no sooner did they gain the privilege, professedly for defence, of constructing forts and batteries, than they went on from one acquisition to another, till they had subjected a hundred millions of Hindoos to their dominion.

While the British parliament was occupied with these momentous discussions, and the British people, little conscious of the imminent danger which threatened them from the power of Napoleon, were eager in the pursuit of the abuses opened up in the tenth report of the Naval Commissioners, that great conqueror was busied with the twofold object of consolidating in all the affiliated republics his newly acquired authority, and directing the vast naval and military preparations destined for the invasion of this country. With the double view of attaining the former of these objects, and disguising the real designs by which he hoped to effect the latter, he introduced a change into the government of all the states dependent upon France ; placed on his head the iron crown of Lombardy ; and surrendered himself, in appearance, to the magnificent fêtes by which the impassioned people of Italy celebrated the supposed era of their regeneration. But during the whole time his eyes were fixed on the shores of the Channel ; and the minutest movements of the navies of France, Spain, and Holland, which were all to co-operate in the expedition, as well as of the vast army destined for his immediate command,¹ were regulated by his indefatigable activity,

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32.
Measures of
Napoleon at
this period.

¹ Norv. ii.
365, 367.
Dum. xi. 140,
141.

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33.
Change of
government
in Holland.

while he was to appearance engaged only in the pomp and magnificence of an imperial progress.

Holland was the first of the independent republics which underwent the change consequent on the assumption of the crown by Napoleon. The continuance of the Republican régime in that country was altogether at variance with the institutions which he proposed to establish in all the states subjected to his control; but as it appeared too violent a transition to make so old a commonwealth pass at once from democracy to monarchy, an intermediate preparatory state was imposed upon it by the Emperor. The whole powers of the constitution were by this change vested in a single magistrate, who, to conciliate the patrician party, was styled the Grand Pensionary. This new constitution, forged at Paris, the great manufactory of institutions of that description, was prepared by the French government, with the aid of M. Schemmelpennick, the Dutch ambassador at that capital,—a respectable man, who rapidly entered into the views of the Emperor, and was rewarded with the office of Grand Pensionary himself. The Dutch, incapable of resistance, yielded to this as they had done to all the preceding changes. The democrats were indignant at beholding a single governor concentrate in his hands all the powers of government; but the Orange party were secretly gratified at seeing so effectual a curb imposed on their revolutionary antagonists; and augured better things of this constitution than they had done of any which had before been forced upon their country. The new constitution, accepted on the 22d March by the legislative body, soon received the sanction of the great majority of the inhabitants.¹

March 22.
April 30.
¹ Bign. iv.
199, 200.34.
And assumption of the
iron crown of
Lombardy by
the French
Emperor.

More important changes soon after ensued in the Italian states. The original design of Napoleon was to have erected the Italian Republic into a separate kingdom, and placed his brother Joseph on the throne: and this choice was highly agreeable to the Cisalpines; but that prince declared he would not accept it, unless the Emperor would give the new kingdom that without which it could not exist, a tract of sea-coast and a harbour in the Mediterranean, and relieve it

from the burdensome tribute of 25,000,000 francs (£1,000,000) yearly paid to the French government. These conditions by no means answered the views of Napoleon, and therefore he changed his design, and resolved to place the crown of Lombardy on his own head, and send his son-in-law, Eugene Beauharnais, to Milan, to govern the kingdom in quality of viceroy. This design was first opened to Count Melzi and a deputation of the Italian Republic, who attended at Paris on occasion of the coronation of Napoleon as Emperor of France. Their consent was without difficulty obtained; and it having been arranged that the proposal should appear to come from the Italians themselves, Count Melzi, in a studied harangue, delivered in presence of the French senate, called upon Napoleon to establish a monarchical form of government and hereditary succession, as the only means of averting the evils with which their infant institutions were threatened. He then read aloud the fundamental articles of the Act of Settlement, by which Napoleon, Emperor of France, was declared King of Italy, with the right of succession to his sons, natural or adopted, and male heirs.¹

On the following day the Emperor appeared in great pomp in the senate, and conferred on his sister Eliza the principality of Piombino. The Act of Settlement of the Italian crown was then read; the members of the deputation took the oath of fidelity to their new sovereign, and he declared, "That he accepted, and would defend, the iron crown; and that even during his lifetime he would consent to separate the two crowns, and place one of his natural or adopted sons upon the throne as soon as the British, French, and Russian troops have evacuated respectively Malta, Naples, and the Ionian Islands." This great change was proclaimed with due solemnity at Milan on the 31st of March, when Eugene Beauharnais, who had already assumed the command of the army, acted as viceroy, and received the homage of the principal authorities. On the same day the new constitution of the kingdom was promulgated by an imperial and royal decree. The former and singular establishment of three colleges of electors, consisting of proprietors, men of letters, and men of business, was kept up in the new kingdom;² but in

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March 13.
¹ Bot. iv.
152, 153.
Bign. iv. 199
202. Dum.
xi. 133, 134.

35.
Napoleon
assumes the
crown of
Lombardy.

March 31.

² Pot. iv. 154,
156. Dum.
xi. 137, 138.

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36.
His journey
into Italy.

April 2.

every other respect its institutions were an exact copy of those established in the French empire.*

The better to conceal the great designs which he was at this time bringing to maturity for the concentration of his land and sea forces for the invasion of Great Britain, Napoleon resolved to proceed to Italy, and dazzle the world by the splendour of the ceremonies attendant on his assumption of the iron crown of Charlemagne. For this purpose he set out for Turin, by the route of Fontainebleau and Lyons, corresponding daily with the minister of marine, and retiring from the magnificence of entertainments and the reception of adulatory addresses to direct the minutest details of the great armament which he was collecting in every harbour, from the Texel to Cadiz, and from Brest to Venice, for this grand expedition. Nothing leaves so strong an impression of the vast ability and indefatigable activity of his mind, as the study of the numerous minute and lucid orders which he addressed during every day of this journey to the minister of marine, and the admirable sagacity with which almost all the conceivable chances of those numerous squadrons were calculated and provided for by his all-seeing intellect.† But while these were the objects of his secret meditation, very different were the occupations in which to external appearance he was engaged. At Lyons he inspected the rising manufactures of that city, upon which the five pacific years of his

* Napoleon on this occasion made the following speech in the senate:—"Powerful and great is the French empire, but greater still is our moderation. We have in a manner conquered Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Germany; but in the midst of such unparalleled success we have listened only to the counsels of moderation. Of so many conquered provinces, we have retained only that one which was necessary to maintain France in the rank among nations which she has always enjoyed. The partition of Poland, the provinces torn from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the European colonies, have, in a manner, turned the balance against us. To form a counterpoise to such acquisitions we must retain something, but we keep only what is useful and necessary. Great would have been the addition to the wealth and resources of our territory, if we had united to them the Italian Republic: but we gave it independence at Lyons; and now we proceed a step further, and solemnly recognise its ultimate separation from the crown of France, deferring only the execution of that project till it can be done without danger to Italian independence."—BORRA, iv. 157.

† This correspondence is to be found entire in General Mathieu Dumas's work, having been put into his hands by the Duchess Decrés, widow of the minister of marine, to whom it was addressed.—See DUMAS, xi. 195, 286.—*Pièces Just.* It leaves no doubt whatever as to the reality of Napoleon's designs for the invasion of this country, and the extraordinary combination of chances which alone prevented them from being carried into effect.

government, and the exclusion of British manufactures from the Continent in consequence of the war, had already diffused an extraordinary degree of prosperity. In crossing Mont Cenis, he surveyed the great works in progress for the formation of the magnificent road which now traverses that mountain. At Turin he relinquished the royal palace to the Pope, who had reached that place on his return to Rome, and lodged in the Castle of Stupinigi, a country residence of the kings of Sardinia, which had been splendidly fitted up for his reception. He there received accounts of the successful passage of the Straits of Gibraltar by the Toulon squadron, and its junction with the Spanish fleet of Admiral Gravina at Cadiz, of which the details will immediately be given. Overjoyed at this intelligence, he moved on with alacrity to Asti and Alexandria, and at the latter place seemed wholly engrossed with the immense fortifications in progress round its walls, destined to render it one of the greatest fortresses in the world.¹

A splendid pageant had for some time been in preparation at the field of Marengo. Thirty-four battalions and seven squadrons were assembled on that memorable plain, to imitate the manœuvres of the battle which had given it immortality; while the Emperor and Empress, seated on a lofty throne which overlooked the whole field, were to behold, in mimic war, the terrible scenes of which it had once been the theatre. The day was bright and clear; the soldiers, who from daybreak had been on their ground, impatiently awaited the arrival of the hero; and shouts of acclamation rent the sky when he appeared with the Empress, in a magnificent chariot drawn by eight horses, surrounded with all the pomp of the empire, and ascended the throne, before which the manœuvres were to be performed. Many of the veterans who had been engaged in the action were present, among whom the soldiers in an especial manner distinguished Marshal Lannes, who had borne so large a portion of the brunt of the Imperialist attack in that terrible strife. After the feigned battle was over, the soldiers defiled before the Emperor, upon the most distinguished of whom he conferred, amidst the loud acclamations of their comrades, the crosses and decorations of the Legion of Honour. The

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¹ Bot. iv.
156, 160.
Dum. xi. 141,
145. Bign.
iv. 217.

37.
Splendid
pageant on
the field of
Marengo.
May 5.

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splendid equipments of the men, the proud bearing of the horses, the glitter of gold and steel which shone forth resplendent in the rays of the declining sun, and the interesting associations connected with the spot, produced an indelible impression on the minds of the spectators, and contributed not a little to fan the military spirit among the indolent youth of Italy, whom Napoleon was so desirous to rouse to more manly feelings prior to the great contest with Austria, which he foresaw was approaching.¹

¹ Bot. iv. 157,
161. Dum.
xi. 141, 147.
Bign. iv. 217,
218.

38.
Napoleon
enters Milan.

May 8.

On the day following, the Emperor continued his journey, passed the Po at Mezzona Costa amidst the shouts of a prodigious concourse of people, and proceeded to Pavia, where he received the adulatory addresses with which the learned men of Italy lauded the dispenser of its wealth and influence. His triumphal entry into Milan took place on the 8th; and, amidst the fêtes and rejoicings which preceded his coronation, the designs were formed for the greater part of those splendid public edifices which now adorn that beautiful city, and have consoled its inhabitants for all the sacrifices they were obliged to make during the remainder of the war to the ambition of their sovereign. Then were projected the gorgeous additions to the cathedral, which now shoots up its hundreds of marble pinnacles and thousands of white statues, pure as the driven snow, in glittering splendour, into the clear blue heaven; the chaste design of the arch of the Simplon; the noble sweep of the amphitheatre; and the other works which, unhappily for the arts, were in part left incomplete at the fall of Napoleon. A fortnight was devoted to the reception of congratulatory addresses from the foreign and Italian potentates; among which were in an especial manner noticed those from the King of Naples and the King of Prussia, two powers, particularly the latter, whose neutrality was of essential importance in the great struggle which was approaching. The better to testify his good understanding with Prussia, the Emperor, at the reviews of the troops, wore the decorations of the black and red eagle, sent to him on the occasion by Frederick William.²

² Bign. iv.
219, 220.
Bot. iv. 160,
165. Personal
Observation.

After reposing a thousand years in the treasury of Monza, the iron crown of Charlemagne was brought forth

to encircle the brows of Napoleon. On the 26th May the ceremony of the coronation was conducted with the utmost magnificence, in the cathedral of Milan. The dresses, the decorations, the ornaments, were even more sumptuous on this occasion than on the preceding one, how splendid soever, at Paris. First came forth, from a side entrance, the Empress Josephine, dressed in gorgeous habiliments, dazzling with the lustre of diamonds. She was received with loud acclamations. But the lofty aisles shook with thunders of applause when, a few minutes after, the Emperor appeared, arrayed in his imperial robes, bearing on his head the imperial diadem, and in his hands the crown of Charlemagne and the sceptre of justice. The Cardinal Caprara officiated instead of the Pope on the occasion; Napoleon placed the iron crown on his own head, pronouncing at the same time the historical words, *Dio me la died: guai a chi la tocca*.* He afterwards, as at Paris, himself crowned Josephine, who knelt at the high altar at his feet. The magnificence of the dresses, the matchless beauty of the women, the inimitable strains of the music, and the admirable decorations of the cathedral, in all of which the refined taste of the Italians shone forth in the most conspicuous manner, combined to form a scene surpassing even the far-famed coronation in the preceding year at Notre Dame. Te Deum was afterwards sung, according to the ancient custom of the kings of Lombardy, in the Ambrosian church. Fireworks, fêtes, and illuminations closed the day; and nothing was omitted which could captivate the ardent imaginations of the Italians, or flatter the pleasing illusion that the days of national independence had at length arrived, and the reign of Tramontane authority ceased for ever.¹

Among the numerous congratulatory addresses presented on this occasion to the Emperor, not the least remarkable was that from the King of Naples, couched in the warmest terms of flattery and adulation. At that very time, however, Napoleon had intercepted a secret correspondence of Queen Caroline with the Imperial cabinets of Vienna and St Petersburg, which left no doubt of the understanding of that court with the enemies of France,

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39.

Is crowned
with the iron
crown of
Charle-
magne.

¹ Bot. iv. 165,
167. Dum.
xi. 149, 151.
Bign. iv. 220.

40.

Adulatory
addresses
from Naples
and Genoa.

* "God has given it me: beware of touching it."

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and he in consequence, in his answer to the address, gave way to one of those sallies of passion to which he was occasionally subject, and which, to so contemptible an enemy, and for the deeds of a high-spirited queen, was in a peculiar manner unworthy of his character. A more important deputation was soon after received from the senate of Genoa; and the terms in which the Doge addressed the Emperor, left no doubt as to the important alterations in the political situation of that republic which were soon to take place. "In regenerating the people of this country," said that chief magistrate, "your Majesty has contracted the obligation to render it happy: but this cannot be done unless it is governed by your Majesty's wisdom and valour. The changes which have taken place around us have rendered our insulated situation a source of perpetual disquietude, and imperiously call for a union with that France, which you have covered with imperishable renown. Such is the wish which we are charged to lay at your Majesty's feet. The reasons on which it is founded prove sufficiently that it is not the result of any external suggestion, but the inevitable consequence of our actual situation."¹

¹ Dum. xi.
151, 153.
Bign. iv. 221,
222.

41.
Napoleon's
reply to the
latter body.

Napoleon replied in words, memorable as containing the death-warrant of one of the oldest and most distinguished republics of modern Europe. "Circumstances have frequently compelled me, within the last ten years, to interfere in your internal situation. I have constantly endeavoured to introduce peace, and contribute to the spread of those liberal principles which alone could restore to your government that splendour with which it formerly was surrounded; but I am now convinced of your inability to accomplish by yourselves any thing worthy of your ancient renown. Every thing has changed. The new maritime code which the English have adopted, and compelled the greatest part of Europe to recognise; the right which they have assumed of blockading places not in a state of siege, which in effect is nothing else than a right to annihilate at their pleasure the commerce of every other people; the continual ravages of your coasts by the corsairs of Barbary: all conspire to render your insulated existence to the last degree precarious. Return, therefore, to your own country. I

shall shortly follow you there, and put the seal to the union which my people and you have contracted. The barriers which separate you from the remainder of the Continent shall, for the common good, be removed, and things restored to their natural situation."¹ The secret motive of Napoleon is here conspicuous. The annexation of Genoa to France was a part of his general maritime system, and suggested by his inveterate hostility to this country.

A few days afterwards a decree appeared, formally incorporating the Ligurian Republic with the French empire, and dividing its territory into three departments; those of Genoa, Montenotte, and the Apennines. Shortly after, the ancient standard of the Republic was taken down in all the forts and vessels, and the tricolor hoisted in its stead. Thus was the French territory, for the first time, fairly extended beyond the Alps, a large surface of sea-coast added to its dominion, its frontiers advanced far into the Apennines, and brought to adjoin the Tuscan states; while one of the oldest republics in Europe, which for fourteen hundred years had maintained a separate existence, often illustrated by great and heroic actions, sank unheeded into the arms of death. Napoleon's secret motive for this act of rapacity, like most of the actions of his life, was the unextinguishable desire with which he was animated of subverting the power of Great Britain. This distinctly appeared from his letter to the Arch-Chancellor of that Republic, on the advantages to be derived from this acquisition.^{2*}

Before quitting the capital of Milan, Napoleon presided at the opening of its Legislative Assembly, and laid the

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¹ Dum. xi.
154, 155.
Bign. iv. 230.

42.

Incorporation of Genoa with France, and Napoleon's secret designs in that step. June 9.

Aug. 11.
² Dum. xi.
155, 156.
Martens, vii.
685.

* "My sole reason for uniting Genoa to the empire was the obtaining the command of its naval resources; and yet the three frigates which its port contains are not yet armed. Genoa will never be truly French till it furnishes six thousand sailors to my fleets. It is neither money nor soldiers which I wish to extract from it. Sailors, old sailors, are the contribution which I require. You must establish a naval conscription there. It is in vain to talk of governing a people without occasioning frequent discontent. Do you not know that, in matters of state, *justice means force* as well as virtue? Do you think I am so sunk in decrepitude as to entertain any fears of the murmurs of the people of Genoa? The only answer I expect or desire to this despatch is, *sailors, ever sailors*. You are sufficiently acquainted with my resolution to know that this desire is not likely to be ever diminished. Think of nothing in your administration, dream of nothing, but sailors. Say whatever you please in my name; I will consent to it all, provided only that the urgent necessity of furnishing sailors is expressed with sufficient force."—BIGN. v. 78.

So tenacious was Napoleon on this subject, and so provident was that great

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43.

Eugene appointed viceroy of Italy, and great improvements in his kingdom.

foundation of those great improvements in its social institutions which have survived the transitory sovereignty of their author. The annual expenses of the kingdom were fixed at a hundred million francs, or £4,000,000; the military establishment cost thirty millions, the civil only six; and a very considerable portion of the revenue was allotted to the departments, to be laid out in canals, bridges, and other works of public ornament or utility. The Code Napoleon was introduced, which still continues, from its experienced utility, to regulate the decisions of its courts of law, notwithstanding the change of government: the order of the Iron Crown was instituted, and the authority and powers of the Viceroy, Eugene Beauharnais, were defined by an express statute. Napoleon, after having received as King the oath of allegiance of his son-in-law as Viceroy, pronounced a discourse which terminated with these words, sufficiently expressive of the military direction which he was so anxious to give to the ambition of Italy: "I have given fresh proofs of my desire to further, by every means in my power, the happiness of the Italian people. I trust that, in their turn, they will endeavour to occupy in reality the place which they have already obtained in my mind; and they will never do so till they are persuaded that military virtue is the chief bulwark of nations. The time has now come when the brilliant youth, who now waste the best years of their lives in the indolence of great cities, should cease to fear the fatigues and the dangers of war."¹

Notwithstanding the heavy burdens with which they were oppressed under the government of Napoleon, and the unexampled calamities with which it closed, the Italians were highly satisfied with his administration,

conqueror of the future at this period of his government, that he wrote shortly after to the same minister when on the eve of setting out for the Rhine: "To secure victories we must think only of defeats. Never lose sight of the chance of my army in Italy being compelled to fall back on Alexandria, nay, on Genoa. Let the artillery, the arsenal, the magazines, be there in a condition to stand a siege." Again, from Strasburg, on 1st October: "Never lose sight of the provisioning of Genoa. I must have there at least three hundred thousand quintals of wheat. My war projects are vast; but in the midst of them all never lose sight of Genoa. Even if besieged, still remain at your post there. Take such measures that in no event can you run short of corn. Say boldly on all occasions that Genoa is indissolubly united to France. Repeat that the man who, on their mountains, dissipated the hosts of Austria and Sardinia with thirty thousand men, is not now likely to yield to the menaces of the coalition when he has three hundred thousand in the centre of Germany." —BIGN. v. 79, 80.

¹ Dum. xi. 157, 159.
Bign. iv. 223, 224. Martens, viii. 310.

Sept. 16, from St Cloud.
Oct. 1, from Strasburg.

and still look back with fond regret to the *Regno d'Italia* as the brightest period of their modern existence. Part of this, no doubt, is to be ascribed to the expenditure and animation consequent on the presence of the Viceregal Court at Milan, and the natural gratification which the people experienced at the elevated position which, as subjects of Napoleon, they occupied in the theatre of Europe. But still more was owing to the wisdom and moderation of Eugene's internal administration, and the admirable principles of government which he received from the sagacity and experience of Napoleon. In the management of the kingdom of Italy, he followed the maxims which deservedly gave, and so long preserved to the Romans, the empire of the world. Unlike the conquered states of the other European monarchies, the inhabitants of Lombardy felt the foreign yoke only in the quickened circulation of wealth, the increased vent for industry, the widened field for exertion. Honours, dignities, emoluments, all were reserved for Italians: hardly a magistrate or civil functionary was of foreign birth. Every where great and useful undertakings were set on foot: splendid edifices ornamented the towns; useful canals irrigated the fields: if the burdens of the people were heavy, they had at least the gratification of perceiving that a large portion of their produce was reserved for domestic objects, and that they received back, in the rewards of industry, a part of what they had rendered to the service of the state. In the satisfaction arising from this judicious system of government, they forgot that the heavy tribute of a million sterling yearly was remitted to Paris, and that the higher situations in the army were exclusively occupied by Frenchmen: a system under which the soldiers of Italy came to perform glorious actions before the close of the war, and which seems to be the only method by which a temporary revival, even of the military spirit, can be communicated to nations enervated by the long enjoyment of peace, and the establishment for centuries of the refinements of civilisation.¹

Still keeping his eyes fixed on the shores of the Channel, and corresponding daily with his minister of marine for the regulation of all the squadrons destined to co-operate in the English expedition, Napoleon visited the other

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44.

Popularity of
Napoleon's
government
in Italy, and
great works
which he
undertook.

¹ Bign. iv.
226. Dum. xi.
147, 149.

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45.

His progress
through the
Italian cities.

towns of the north of Italy. Verona, Mantua, Parma successively felt the animating influence of his presence, and in each he left some lasting mark of the grandeur of his conceptions, and the minute attention which he paid to the wants and interests of his subjects. At Bologna he received a deputation from the Republic of Lucca, complaining of the vexatious dominion of the oligarchy under whose influence they had fallen ; and to whom he promised a government, in the person of his sister Eliza, which should be completely in harmony with the institutions of the other states in northern Italy ; veiling thus, as he always did, his projects for the advancement and elevation of his family under an air of regard for the public welfare ; and affecting the greatest deference for the public choice, when he was in effect depriving the people of all influence either in the election of their government or the administration of affairs.¹

¹ Bot. iv.
170, 171.46.
Magnificent
fêtes at
Genoa.

At length, on the 30th June, he made a triumphal entry into Genoa, and celebrated the union of that city with France by fêtes and rejoicings of unparalleled magnificence. At the gates of the city he was received by the magistrates, with the keys: "Genoa, named the Superb from its situation" said they, "is now still more so from its destination: it has thrown itself into the arms of a hero ; jealous in many ages of its liberties, it is now still more so of its glory ; and therefore it places its keys in the hands of one above all others capable of maintaining and increasing it." In the principal church of the city he received the oaths of allegiance of the leading inhabitants, amidst the thunder of artillery from the overhanging forts, batteries, and the vessels in the harbour ; and then commenced the fêtes, which, in splendour and variety, exceeded any thing seen in Italy in modern times. All that Eastern imagination had fancied, all that poetic genius has ascribed to fairy power, was realised on this memorable occasion. The singular and romantic situation of the city ; its blue sea and cloudless skies ; its streets of marble and gorgeous domes ; its embattled shores and overhanging forts ; its proud palaces surmounting one another in gay theatric pride, and lovely bay, glittering with the sails of innumerable barks, were peculiarly fitted to give animation and lustre

to the spectacles. Splendid, above all, were the fireworks and illuminations at night; spreading from the Lanterne on the west to the extremity of the Mole on the east, seeming to ascend to heaven in the mountains above, and to descend to the deep in the reflection of the water beneath. Never, in the proudest days of its greatness, amidst the triumphs of Doria or the glories of La Meloria, did Genoa present so magnificent a spectacle as in these the last of its long existence. It was amidst the roar of artillery and the blaze of illumination that this venerable republic descended into an unhonoured tomb. Such is modern Italian patriotism!¹

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¹ Bot. iv. 172,
176.

The same period witnessed the extinction of the Republic of Lucca; the promises of Napoleon were fulfilled. It was bestowed, as a separate appanage, along with Piombino, on his sister, the Princess Eliza. Thus was fulfilled the saying of Napoleon nine years before, that the days were passed in which republics could be swallowed up by monarchies! Finally, he put the last hand to the organisation at this time of Italy, by a decree, after his return to Paris, incorporating the states of Parma and Placentia with the French empire, under the title of the twenty-eighth military division. His ascendancy in Italy was now complete: Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, and Placentia were incorporated with the empire: he reigned at Milan by the title of King, and in Lucca and Tuscany though the ephemeral governments of the Princess Eliza and the King of Etruria.²

47.
Extinction of
Lucca, and
incorporation
of Parma and
Placentia
with France.

² Bot. iv. 176.
Bign. iv. 236,
237. Martens,
vii. 681.

These prodigious strides towards universal dominion did not escape the notice of the other powers of Europe. The resolution of Russia and England was already fixed; but the temporising policy of the cabinet of Vienna, desirous to gain time, and prepare for those redoubtable blows which they well knew, in the event of hostilities, would be in the first instance directed against themselves, rendered it necessary during the first part of the year to delay the rupture. The rapid advances of Napoleon in Italy, however, at length roused the indignation of the Austrian nobility. M. Winzingerode, the Russian ambassador, daily found the cabinet more inclined to adopt his views as to the necessity of a general and combined effort to arrest the common danger; and at length the

48.
Increasing
jealousy of
Austria, and
change in its
ministry.

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XXXIX.

1805.

June, 1805.

¹ Dum. xi.
160, 164.49.
Treaty offensive and defensive between Russia and England, and its objects.
April 11.

force of general opinion became so great, that it produced a change in the cabinet, and total alteration in the external policy of government. The illustrious President of the Council, M. Cobentzel, who had long been at the head of the pacific party, resigned, and was succeeded by Count Baillet Latour; and Prince Schwartzenberg received the situation of Vice-President of the Aulic Council. This change was decisive: the war party was now predominant; and it was only a question of time and expedience when hostilities should be commenced.¹

Russia and England, more removed from the danger, and therefore more independent in their resolutions, had proceeded considerably farther in the formation of a coalition. On the 11th April a treaty was signed at St Petersburg, which regulated the terms and the objects of the contracting parties, and the forces they were respectively to employ in carrying these into execution. The preamble set forth, "As the state of suffering in which Europe is placed demands immediate remedy, their Majesties have mutually determined to consult upon the means of putting a stop thereto, without waiting for fresh encroachments on the part of the French government. They have agreed in consequence to employ the most speedy and efficacious means to form a general league of the states of Europe, and to engage them to accede to the present concert." The forces to be employed, independent of those furnished by England, were fixed at five hundred thousand men; and the objects of the league are declared to be, "1. The evacuation of the country of Hanover and of the north of Germany. 2. The establishment of the independence of the Republics of Holland and Switzerland. 3. The re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, with as large an augmentation of territory as circumstances will admit. 4. The future security of the kingdom of Naples, and the complete evacuation of Italy, including the island of Elba, by the French forces. 5. The introduction of an order of things into Europe which may effectually guarantee the security and independence of the different states, and present a solid barrier against future usurpations.² To enable the different powers who may accede to the coalition to bring forward the forces respectively required of them, Eng-

² Parl. Deb. vi. App. 2 to 5. Martens, viii. 330.

land engages to furnish subsidies, in the proportion of £1,250,000 sterling for every 100,000 of regular troops sent into the field."

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By separate articles, signed between England and Russia only, it was agreed that the objects of the alliance should be attempted as soon as 400,000 men could be ready for active service; of which Austria was expected to furnish 250,000, Russia 115,000, and the remaining 35,000 were to be supplied by Hanover, Sardinia, and Naples. By another separate article, Russia engaged to march forthwith an army of 60,000 men to the frontiers of Austria and 80,000 to those of *Prussia*, "to be able to co-operate with the said courts in the proportions established by the treaty, and to support them respectively, in case they should be attacked by France;" and that, independently of the 115,000 men to be engaged in active operations, the Emperor of Russia should keep bodies of reserve and of observation upon his frontiers. The advantages of the treaty, so far as subsidies were concerned, were to be extended to Austria and Sweden, if in the course of the year 1805 they brought their forces into action; the Emperor of Russia agreed, if necessary, to bring 180,000 men into the field, on the same conditions as to supplies as the original 115,000; and the contracting parties bound themselves to make common cause against any power which should unite with France in the contest which was approaching. Finally, a separate article of great importance settled the ultimate objects of the coalition, and the intentions of the allies in regard to the states which they might rescue from the dominion of France, in a manner alike consistent with good faith, justice, and moderation.^{1*}

50.
Subsequent articles of agreement; and provision for extending the treaty to Austria, Sweden, &c.

¹ Parl. Deb. vi. App. 5 to 10. Separate articles. Martens, vii. 332.

* "The Emperor and King being disposed to form an energetic concert, with the sole view of ensuring to Europe a solid and lasting peace, founded upon the principles of justice, equity, and the law of nations, are aware of the necessity of a mutual understanding at this time with regard to those principles on which they will act as soon as the events of the war may render it necessary. These principles are, *in no degree to control public opinion in France*, or in any other countries where the combined armies may carry on their operations, *with respect to the form of government which it may be proper to adopt*; nor to appropriate to themselves, till a peace should be concluded, any of the conquests made by one or other of the belligerent parties; to take possession of the towns and territories which may be wrested from the common enemy, in the name of the country or state to which they of right belong; and in all other cases in the name of all the members of the league; and, finally, to assemble at the termination of the war a general congress, to discuss and fix the provisions of the law of nations on a more definite basis than has been possible heretofore, and to ensure their observance by a federative system founded upon the situation of the different states of Europe."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. App. 6, 7.

They disclaim all intention to control the French in the choice of their government.

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1805.

51.

At length the
accession of
Austria to
the alliance
is obtained.

Notwithstanding the definite terms of this treaty, considerable difficulty existed, and delay was incurred, in arranging the terms of the Austrian co-operation. Not that the cabinet of Vienna was backward in its disposition to forward the objects of the coalition, but that the deplorable state of its finances rendered it impossible for the empire to bring any considerable forces into the field till they had received large subsidies from Great Britain, and that it was highly inexpedient to commence hostilities till these had arrived, as the exposed situation of their territories rendered it certain that they would be the first objects of attack. At length, however, by the indefatigable efforts of Mr Pitt on the part of England, and M. Novosiltzoff on the part of Russia, these difficulties were overcome, and the cordial co-operation of Austria to the alliance was obtained. The Austrian minister at St Petersburg, Count Stadion, forcibly represented the dilapidated state of the imperial finances, and insisted on a subsidy of £3,000,000, one-half to be immediately paid, in order to bring the troops into the field, and the other by monthly instalments after the campaign had commenced.¹ These terms were at length agreed to by the British ambassador, it being stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should forthwith embody a force of not less than three hundred and twenty thousand men, and that the advance to be made by Great Britain, under the name of *première mise en campagne*, or preliminary payment, should be made on this calculation.² On the same day a treaty was concluded between Russia and Austria; and active negotiations ensued between the Aulic Council and the Russian war minister relative to the measures to be pursued in the prosecution of their joint hostilities.³

¹ Count
Stadion's
note.
Aug. 9.

² Lord G.
L. Gordon's
answer.
Aug. 9.

³ Parl. Deb.
vi. 11, 17.
Martens, viii.
330.

52.

Sweden also
is included.

Much less difficulty was experienced in arranging the terms of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Sweden, which had already, by the treaty of 3d December, 1804, evinced a desire to range itself under the banners of England. By a convention, concluded at Helsingborg on the 31st August, 1805, it was provided that England should pay monthly £1800 for every 1000 men who co-operated in the common cause; and as the garrison of Stralsund was taken at 4000 men, who were not included in the subsidy, the periodical payment for them amounted to £7200.

By a subsequent convention, signed at Bekcagsog, 3d October, 1805, the number of Swedish troops to be employed in Pomerania was fixed at 12,000 men, for whom England was to pay at the rate of £12, 10s. per annum for each man, besides five months' subsidy in advance, as outfit for the campaign, and £50,000 to put Stralsund in a respectable state of defence.¹ Thus, by the effects of the incessant advances of Napoleon towards universal dominion, and the genius and influence of Mr Pitt, were the discordant elements of European strength again arrayed, notwithstanding the terror inspired by former defeats, in a firm coalition against France, and a force assembled amply sufficient, as the event has proved, to have accomplished the deliverance of Europe, if ignorance or infatuation had not directed them when in the field. Diplomacy had done its part; War was now required to complete the undertaking. Mr Pitt might then have said with Wallace, when he had assembled the Scottish Peers on the field of Falkirk, "Now, gallants! I have brought you to the ring; dance as you may."

It was still, however, a great object, if possible, to engage Prussia in the alliance; and, for this purpose, M. Novosiltzoff was despatched to Berlin, and the successive annexations of Genoa, Parma, and Placentia, to France, gave him great advantages in the representations which he made as to the necessity of opposing a barrier to its future progress. Fearful of the strife which was approaching, and apprehensive of being cast down from the position which she occupied in the shock of such enormous powers, Prussia made the most energetic efforts to avert the collision, and for this purpose the cabinet of Berlin despatched M. Zastroff, aide-de-camp to the King, to St Petersburg. Under the mediation of Prussia, a negotiation between the courts of Russia and France took place, which for three months averted the commencement of hostilities, but led to no other result. Neither party was sincere in the desire for an accommodation; and if either had, the pretensions of the opposite powers were too much at variance to render a pacification possible. France was resolutely determined to abandon none of its acquisitions on the Continent, alleging as a reason that they were necessary to form a counterpoise

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1805.

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. App. 18,
24. Martens,
viii. 350.

53.
Prussia in
vain endea-
vours to
mediate.
July 10.

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1805.

¹ Bign. iv.
258, 269.
Dum. xii. 92,
95.

to the vast increase of territory gained by Russia in the East, by Austria in Italy, and by England in India; and the Emperor Alexander replied, with reason, that recent events had too clearly demonstrated that the acquisitions of France were out of all proportion to those of the other powers, a fact of which the necessity of a general coalition to form a barrier against its ambition afforded the clearest evidence.¹ *

54.
Prussia per-
sists in her
neutrality,
from the hope
of getting
Hanover.

Notwithstanding all the efforts of England and Russia, however, it was found impossible to overcome the leaning of Prussia towards the French interest. The real secret of this partiality was, not any insensibility to the dangers to be apprehended to the independence of Germany from the power of France, on the part of the cabinet of Berlin, or its able director, Baron Hardenberg, but the effect of the glittering prize which her ministers had long coveted in the electorate of Hanover. The Prussian government could never divest itself of the idea that, by preserving a dubious neutrality, and reserving their interposition for the decisive moment, they might without danger add that important acquisition to their dominions. In effect, Napoleon, well aware of this secret bias, withdrew, in the close of July, twelve thousand men from the Hanoverian states; and the Prussian ministers then dropped hints as

July 31.

Manifesto of
France in the
Moniteur.

* The real points in dispute between France and Russia will be better understood from the following extract from the *Moniteur* at this period, than the reserved and formal style of diplomatic notes. "What have France and Russia to embroil each other? Perfectly independent of each other, they are impotent to inflict evil, but all-powerful to communicate benefits. If the Emperor of France exercises a great influence in Italy, the Czar exercises a still greater over Turkey and Persia. If the cabinet of Russia pretends to have a right to affix limits to the power of France, without doubt it is equally disposed to allow the Emperor of the French to prescribe the bounds which it is not to pass. Russia has partitioned Poland: it is but fair that France should have Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine. It has seized upon the Crimea, the Caucasus, and the northern provinces of Persia; can it deny that the right of self-preservation gives France a title to demand an equivalent in Europe? Do you wish a General Congress in Europe? Let every power begin by restoring the conquests which it has made during the last fifty years. Let them re-establish Poland, restore Venice to its Senate, Trinidad to Spain, Ceylon to Holland, the Crimea to the Porte, the Caucasus and Georgia to Persia, the kingdom of Mysore to the sons of Tippoo Saib, and the Mahratta states to their lawful owners, and then the other powers may have some title to insist that France shall retire within her ancient limits. It is the fashion to speak of the ambition of France. Had she chosen to preserve her conquests, the half of Austria, the Venetian states, the states of Holland and Switzerland, and the kingdom of Naples, would have been in her possession. The limits of France are in reality the Adige and the Rhine. Has it passed either of these limits? Had it fixed on the Salza and the Drave, it would not have exceeded the bounds of its conquests." It is not difficult to trace the hand of Napoleon in these able remarks.—*Moniteur*, 18th July, 1805; and DUMAS, xii. 96, 97.

to "the revival of the King's wishes as to Hanover," and at length openly broached the project of taking provisional possession of that electorate, "as the union of the continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty to Prussia is of such consequence to that monarchy, that it can never relinquish the prospect of gaining such an acquisition provided it can be done without compromising the character of his Majesty." There was the real obstacle. The King of Prussia, notwithstanding all the immediate advantages of the acquisition, was stung with the secret reproaches of conscience at the idea of thus appropriating the possessions of a friendly power, at the very moment when that power was making such efforts, without the idea of selfish recompense, for the deliverance of Europe.¹

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1805.

Aug. 9.

¹ Bign. iv.
268, 272.

The struggles of conscience, however, became daily weaker. The king at length put the question to his ministers, "Can I, without violating the rules of morality, without being held up in history as a prince destitute of faith, depart, for the acquisition of Hanover, from the character which I have hitherto maintained?" The woman that deliberates is lost. It was easy to see in what such contests between duty and interest would terminate. Before the middle of August, the Prussian cabinet intimated to the French minister at Berlin their willingness to conclude a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the French government, on the footing of the annexation of Hanover to their dominions; and Duroc was forthwith sent from Paris by Napoleon to conclude its terms, and arrived there on the 1st September. Subsequent unforeseen events prevented the treaty being signed, and saved Prussia from this last act of cupidity and infatuation; but in the meanwhile the precious moments were lost. The French forces were enabled to pour in irresistible multitudes, through the Prussian dominions, upon the devoted host at Ulm; and the battle of Austerlitz overthrew the independence of Germany, and exposed Prussia, unaided, to the mortal strokes of the French Emperor.² By such combinations of selfishness and folly was Napoleon aided in his project of elevating France to supreme authority in Europe, and for such wretched objects was that sincere alliance of all

55.

And at length agrees to the French alliance on condition of obtaining that electorate.

Aug. 14.

Sept. 1.

² Bign. iv.
268, 273.

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56.
Napoleon
repairs to
Boulogne, to
superintend
the English
expedition.

Aug. 3.

1 Bign. iv.
277.

57.
Immense
force collect-
ed on the
coasts of the
Channel for
that object.

Correspondence
between France
and Prussia on
the subject of
Hanover.

its powers long prevented, which would at any time have opposed an effectual barrier to his progress!*

Threatening as was the present state of the Continent, Napoleon was not one whit diverted by it from his projected descent upon Great Britain. On the contrary, it only furnished an additional reason for pushing the preparations for that great undertaking with additional vigour; he being well aware that if England was destroyed, the Continental coalition would soon fall to pieces, and that a blow struck on the banks of the Thames would more effectually attain this object than one either in the basin of the Danube, or on the shores of the Vistula. For this purpose, shortly after his return from Italy, he repaired to the camp at Boulogne, there to inspect in person the vast military force arrayed on the shores of the Channel, and to direct the distant movements of the fleets, by which he hoped to obtain, for a time at least, the mastery of the seas, and the means of safely disembarking that mighty host within a few days' march of London.¹

The army which Napoléon had now assembled for this great enterprise was one of the most formidable, in point of numerical strength, and beyond all question the most perfect in point of military organisation, which had ever been brought together since the days of the Roman legions. It amounted to 114,000 combatants, 432 pieces of cannon, and 14,654 horses, assembled in the camps at St Omer, Bruges, Montreuil, and Boulogne, besides 12,000

* The Prussian ministers having demanded a frank statement of the intentions of Napoleon in the event of such an alliance, the following note was presented by the French minister to Baron Hardenberg:—"The peace of the Continent will be the fruit of the alliance between France and Prussia. It will be enough for this purpose for Prussia to say, that she makes common cause with France in any war which may have for its object to change the present state of Italy. What danger can Prussia fear, when the Emperor engages to support it with eighty thousand men against the Russians; when it will have for auxiliaries Saxony, Hesse, Bavaria, Baden, the Emperor engaging to obtain for the king the possession of Hanover, while his allies will only be called on to guarantee the present state of Italy? The Emperor offers Hanover, absolutely and without any condition; and the king may judge from that whether or not he is disposed to be generous towards his German allies." The Prussian minister replied: "It is with the most lively gratitude that the king has received the proposition made by the intervention of the French minister. He experiences the greatest satisfaction at the proposal made to *exchange the electorate of Hanover for a guarantee of the present state of Italy*, in order to avert a war on the Continent, and lead towards peace with England. His Majesty is desirous to see the independence of Switzerland established, as well as that of Holland, and the part of Italy not allowed by Prussia to France. If on these subjects his Imperial Majesty will explain himself in a positive manner, the king will enter with pleasure into the details necessary for a definitive arrangement."—See BIGNON, iv. 271, 272.

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at the Texel and Helvoetsluys, 10,000 on board the combined fleet, and the like force at Brest, ready to embark in the squadron of Admiral Ganteaume; in all, 146,000 men in the highest state of discipline and equipment. The stores of ammunition, warlike implements, and provisions collected, were on an unparalleled scale of magnitude, and amply evinced the reality of the design which the Emperor had in view. Each cannon had 200 rounds of ammunition; the cartridges were 13,000,000; the flints, 1,200,000; the biscuits, 2,000,000; the saddles, 10,000; and 5,000 sheep were ready to accompany the army in its embarkation. Provisions for the immense multitude for three months had been collected: the hospital arrangements were perfect; and 2293 vessels, capable of transporting 160,000 men and 6000 horses, of which 1339 were armed with above 3500 pieces of cannon, independent of the artillery which accompanied the army, awaited, in the harbours of Boulogne, Etaples, Ambleuse, Ostend, and Calais, the signal to put to sea.^{1*}

¹ Dum. xii. 33, 37, and Tables opposite p. 304. Jom. ii. 66, 68.

During its long encampment on the shores of the Channel, this great army had been organised in a different manner from any that had yet existed in modern Europe.

* The composition of this vast armament around Boulogne was as follows: it is one of the most curious records of the age of Napoleon.

Infantry, . . .	76,798
Cavalry, . . .	11,640
Cannoniers, . . .	3,780
Waggoners, . . .	3,780
Non-combatants, . . .	17,476
Total, . . .	113,474
Gun-boats, . . .	1,339
Transport vessels, . . .	954
Which would carry, . . .	161,215 men
and horses, . . .	6,059
Guns mounted on armed vessels, . . .	3,500
Horses, . . .	7,394
Fusils (spare,) . . .	32,837
Cartridges, . . .	13,000,000
Flints, . . .	1,268,400
Biscuits (rations,) . . .	1,434,800
Bottles Brandy, . . .	236,230
Tools, . . .	30,375
Saddles, . . .	10,560
Field-pieces, . . .	432
Rounds of ammunition, . . .	86,400
Loads of hay, . . .	70,370
Do. oats, . . .	70,370
Sheep, . . .	4,924

—See DUMAS, xii.; *Tables*, 1, 2, 3, fronting p. 304.

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1805.

58.

Its admirable
organisation
and equip-
ment.

It is a curious circumstance, that the genius of Napoleon, aided by all the experience of the revolutionary wars, reverted at last to a system extremely similar to that of the Roman legions ; and to the vigour and efficiency of this organisation, which has never since been departed from, the subsequent extraordinary successes of the French armies may in some degree be ascribed. At the commencement of the Revolution, the divisions of the army, generally fifteen or eighteen thousand strong, were hurried, under the first officer that could be found, into the field ; but it was soon found that there were few generals capable of skilfully directing the movements of such considerable masses of troops ; while, on the other hand, if the divisions were too small, there was a want of that unity and decision of movement which was requisite to ensure success. Selecting a medium between these two extremes, Napoleon adopted a double division. His army was divided, in the first instance, into corps composed of from twenty to thirty thousand men each, the direction of which was intrusted to a marshal of the empire. Each of these corps had, in proportion to its force, a suitable allotment of field and heavy artillery, its reserve, and two or three regiments of light cavalry ; but the heavy cavalry and medium horse, or dragoons, were united into one corps, and placed under the command of one general.¹

¹ Dum. xii.
401, 406.
Jom. Vie de
Nap. ii. 57,
58.

59.

Organisation
of the Impe-
rial Guard.

The organisation of the Imperial Guard was precisely the same, with this difference only—that it was considered as the reserve of the whole army, and as such more immediately under the command of the Emperor himself. Each corps was formed into four or five divisions, varying in strength from five to seven thousand men, commanded by generals of division, who received their orders from the general of the corps. The troops in these divisions always remained under the same officers ; the divisions themselves belonged to the same corps ; no incorporation or transposition, excepting in cases of absolute necessity arising from extraordinary casualties in war, disturbed the order established in the camps. In this way the generals came to know their officers, the officers their soldiers ; the capacity, disposition, and qualities of each were understood. An *esprit de corps* was formed, not only

among the members of the same regiment, but among those of the same division and corps; and the general of division took as much pride in the precision with which the regiments under his orders performed their combined operations, or the marshal in the perfection of the arrangements of the corps under his direction, as the captain of dragoons did in the steadiness with which his men kept their line in a charge, or the sergeant in the cleanness of the appointments of the little subdivision intrusted to his care.¹

The camps in which the soldiers were lodged, during their long sojourn on the shores of the Channel, were characterised by the same admirable system of organisation. They were laid out, according to the usual form, in squares intersected by streets, and composed of barracks constructed on a uniform plan, according to the materials furnished by the country in which they were situated. At Ostend they were formed of light wood and straw; at Boulogne and Vimireux, of sharp stakes cut in the forest of Guenis, supported by masonwork. These field barracks were extremely healthy: the beds of the soldiers, raised two feet above the ground, were composed of straw, on which their camp blankets were laid; the utmost care was taken to preserve cleanliness in every part of the establishment. Constant employment was the true secret both of their good health and docile habits. Neither officers nor soldiers were ever allowed to remain any time idle; when not employed in military evolutions, they were continually engaged either in raising or strengthening the field-works on the different points of the coast, or levelling down eminences, draining marshes, or filling up hollows, to form agreeable esplanades in front of their habitations, and where their exercises were performed. The different corps and divisions vied with each other in these works of utility or recreation: they even went so far as to engage in undertakings of pure ornament; gardens were created, flowers were cultivated, and, in the midst of an immense military population, the aspect of nature was sensibly improved.²

Satisfied with their lot in this great encampment, the soldiers were singularly tractable and obedient. Constantly occupied and amused by the spectacle of sea-

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1805.

¹ Dum. xii.
401, 411.
Jom. ii. 58.

60.
Nature of the
camps in
which the
soldiers were
lodged.

² Dum. xii.
25, 26.

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XXXIX.

1805.

61.

Rapid improvements in the character and habits of the army.

fights, or frequent reviews and mock battles, they neither murmured at the exactions of a rigid discipline, nor experienced the usual monotony and languor of a pacific life in camps. The good effects of distributing the corps into divisions were here soon rendered conspicuous. The general commanding each division became not only personally acquainted with all his officers, but had an opportunity of correcting any thing defective in the discipline of the men ; and the soldiers, from constant exercises and the habit of acting together in large masses, acquired a degree of precision in the performance of manœuvres on a great scale, which never before had been equalled in the French armies, and embraced every thing that was really useful or suitable to the French character in the discipline of the Great Frederick.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
29, 32.

62.

Ample powers intrusted to the Marshals of corps and Generals of divisions.

No man knew better than Napoleon, from his own experience, as well as from the calamities which an obstinate adherence to the opposite system had inflicted upon his opponents, that the general-in-chief, especially if far removed from the theatre of operations, cannot with advantage prescribe the details of subordinate movements. In his campaigns, consequently, each marshal received *general* instructions as to the line of operations which he was to adopt, and the end to which his efforts were to be directed ; but he was left entirely master of the means by which these objects were to be attained ; and although Napoleon was frequently extremely minute in his directions to his lieutenants, yet he always left them a general discretion to adopt them or not, according to circumstances ; and a commander, in his estimation, would have committed a serious fault if he had followed the letter of his instructions when a change of circumstances called for a deviation from them. The same system of confidence was established between the marshal and his generals of division, to all of whom a certain discretionary power in the execution of orders was intrusted ; a confidence for the most part well deserved by the ability and experience of those officers. In one respect only the changes of Napoleon at this period were of doubtful utility, and that was in virtually suppressing the *état majeur*, or general staff,² by enacting that the rank of colonels in it should be

² Jom. ii. 58,
60. Dum. xii.
408, 412.

abolished ; an ordinance which, by closing the avenue of promotion, at once banished all young men of ability from that department, and degraded what had formerly been the chief school of military talent into a higher species of public couriers.

But though Napoleon left to each officer, in his own sphere, those discretionary powers which he knew to be indispensable, it is not to be supposed that he was negligent of the manner in which their several duties were discharged, or that a vigilant superintendence was not kept up, under his direction, of all departments in the army. On the contrary, he exercised an incessant and most active watchfulness over every officer intrusted with any service of importance in the vast army subject to his orders. Nothing escaped his vigilance : continual reports addressed to headquarters informed him how every branch of his service was conducted ; and if any thing was defective, an immediate reprimand from Berthier informed the person in fault that the attention of the Emperor had been attracted to his delinquency. Continual and minute instructions, addressed to the generals, commissaries, and functionaries of every description connected with the army, gave to all the benefit of his luminous views and vast experience. With the extension of his forces, and the multiplication of their wants, his powers appeared to expand in an almost miraculous proportion ; and the active superintendence of all, which seemed the utmost limit of human exertion when only fifty thousand men required to be surveyed, was not sensibly diminished when five hundred thousand were assembled. Above all, the attention of the Emperor was habitually turned to the means of providing for the subsistence of his troops ; a branch of service which, from the prodigious extension of his forces, and the rapidity with which he moved them into countries where no magazines had been formed, required, in an extraordinary degree, all the efforts of his talent and reflection. To such a length was this superintendence of the Emperor carried, that it was a common saying in the army, that every officer who had any thing of importance to perform imagined that the Imperial attention was exclusively directed to himself : while, in fact, it

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1805.

63.

And vigilant
watching to
which they
were sub-
jected.

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XXXIX.

1805.

¹ Dum. xii.
411, 413.

was divided among several hundreds, perhaps thousands, who stood in a similar predicament. By this unexampled vigilance, seconded by the great abilities of the officers and generals under his command, the army destined for the invasion of England acquired a degree of perfection, in point of discipline, organisation, and military habits, unprecedented since the days of the Roman legions.¹*

64.
Organisation
of the flotilla.

The arrangements connected with the flotilla were as extraordinary and perfect as those of the land forces. It was divided into as many subdivisions as there were sections in the army; and all the stores, baggage, and artillery were already on board; so that nothing remained but the embarkation of the men. The French genius, adapted beyond that of any other people in Europe for the organisation of large bodies, shone forth here in full lustre. Such was the perfection to which the arrangements had been carried, that not only every division of the army, but every regiment and company, had a section of the flotilla allotted to it; and the point and vessel of embarkation was assigned to every man, horse, gun, and carriage in that prodigious array. Every man in the army, down to the lowest drummer, knew where he was to embark, on board what vessel, and where he was to station himself while on board; and, from constant practice, they had arrived at such precision in that most difficult branch of their duty, that it was found by experiment that a corps of twenty-five thousand men, drawn up opposite the vessels allotted to them, could be completely embarked in the short space of ten minutes.²

² Ney's
Mem. ii. 256,
260. Dum.
xii. 35, 37.

The object of Napoleon in this immense accumulation

Vast extent of
his correspondence
with his
officers.

* Ample evidence of the truth of these observations exists in the correspondence of the Emperor, still preserved in the archives of Paris, or in the custody of his generals, and which, if published entire, would amount to many hundred volumes. From the valuable fragments of it published in the appendices to General Mathieu Dumas, and the works of General Gourgaud and Baron Fain on the campaigns of 1812, 1813, and 1814, as well as the letters of Napoleon contained in Napier's Account of the Peninsular War, some idea may be formed of the prodigious mental activity of the man who, amidst all the cares of empire, and all the distraction of almost incessant warfare, contrived, during the twenty years that he held the reins of power, to write or dictate probably more than the united works of Lope de Vega, Voltaire, and Sir Walter Scott. His secret and confidential correspondence with the Directory, published at Paris in 1819, from 1796 to 1798 only, a work of great interest and rarity, amounts to seven large closely printed volumes; and his letters to his generals during that time must have been at least twice as voluminous.

of gun-boats and armed vessels, was not to force his way across the Channel by means of this novel species of naval force, but merely to provide transports for the conveyance of the troops, and withdraw the attention of the enemy, by their seeming adaptation for warlike operations, from the quarter from whence the force really intended to cover the descent was to be obtained. The problem to be solved was, to transport one hundred and fifty thousand men in safety to the shores of Kent; and no man knew better than Napoleon that to engage in such an enterprise while the English were masters of the sea was a vain attempt. From the beginning, therefore, he resolved not to hazard the embarkation till, by a concentration of all his naval forces in the Channel, while the English fleets were decoyed to distant parts of the world, he had acquired, for the time at least, a decided command of the passage. The great object, however, was to disguise these ultimate designs, and prevent the English government from adopting the means by which they might have been frustrated. For this end it was that the Boulogne flotilla was armed, and the prodigious expense incurred of constructing fifteen hundred warlike vessels, bearing several thousand pieces of cannon. Not one of these guns was meant to be fired; they were intended only as a veil; the real covering force was assembled at Martinique, and was to return suddenly to Europe, while the British squadrons were despatched to distant points to succour their menaced colonial possessions. The stratagem, thus ably conceived, was completely successful. Not one person in the British dominions, except the sagacious Admiral Collingwood, penetrated the real design; the French fleets returned in safety from the West Indies to the European latitudes, leaving Nelson three weeks' sail in the rear; and when the Emperor was at Boulogne, in August 1805, at the head of one hundred and thirty thousand men, sixty ships of the line were assembled in the Bay of Biscay, where the united British squadrons did not amount to much more than half that force.^{1*}

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1805.

65.

His secret
projects for
effecting the
passage.

¹ Jom. ii. 70.
Napoleon in
Month. ii. 20,
21. Las
Cases, ii. 277,
280.

* The following valuable note, written by Napoleon at the time of his leaving the camp at Boulogne, in September 1805, explains fully the particulars of this great project:—

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1805.

66.

Various ac-
tions with the
British
cruisers off
Boulogne.

Towards the success of this profound design, it was of importance to accumulate as much as possible of the flotilla at Boulogne; and in the prosecution of this object many actions took place between the English cruisers and the vessels advancing round the coast, which answered the double purpose of habituating the sailors to naval warfare, and perpetuating the illusion that it was by means of the armed force of the flotilla that the descent was to be effected. The vigour and boldness of the British cruisers knew no bounds in their warfare against this ignoble species of opponents, when coasting along under cover of the numerous batteries by which the coast was guarded. But, notwithstanding all their efforts, the success achieved, from the impossibility of getting sufficiently near the enemy, was more than counterbalanced by the severe loss of life sustained in those perilous services. The most important of these was a series of actions from the 17th to the 19th July, when the Dutch flotilla, under the command of Admiral Verhuel, accomplished the passage from Dunkirk to Ambleteuse, near Boulogne. They were annoyed almost the whole way by the English vessels, under the

“What was my design in the creation of the flotilla at Boulogne?”

Autograph note
which he has
himself left on
the subject.

“I wished to assemble forty or fifty ships of the line in the harbour of Martinique, by operations combined in the harbours of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest; to bring them suddenly back to Boulogne; to find myself in this way, during fifteen days, the master of the sea; to have one hundred and fifty thousand men encamped on the coast, three or four thousand vessels in the flotilla, and to set sail the moment that the signal was given of the arrival of the combined fleet. That project has failed. If Admiral Villeneuve, instead of entering into the harbour of Ferrol, had contented himself with joining the Spanish squadron, and instantly made sail for Brest and joined Admiral Gantheaume, my army would have embarked, and it was all over with England.

“To succeed in this object, it was necessary to assemble one hundred and fifty thousand men at Boulogne; to have there four thousand transports, and immense *materiel*, to embark all that, and nevertheless to prevent the enemy from divining my object. It appeared scarcely practicable to do so. If I had succeeded, it would have been by doing the converse of what might have been expected. If fifty ships of the line were to assemble to cover the descent upon England, nothing but transport vessels were required in the harbours of the Channel, and all that assemblage of gun-boats, floating batteries, and armed vessels was totally useless. Had I assembled together three or four thousand unarmed transports, no doubt the enemy would have perceived that I awaited the arrival of my fleets to attempt the passage; but by constructing praams and gun-boats, I appeared to be opposing cannon to cannon; and the enemy was in this manner deceived. They conceived that I intended to attempt the passage by main force, by means of my flotilla. They never penetrated my real design; and when, from the failure of the movements of my squadrons, my project was revealed, the utmost consternation pervaded the councils of London, and all men of sense in England confessed that England had never been so near its ruin.”—*See the original in DUMAS, xii. 315, 316, and Napoleon in MONTHOLON, iii. App. 384.*

command of Sir Sidney Smith, and Captain Owen in the *Immortalité* frigate; but the weight of the attack was reserved for the rounding of Cape Gris Nez. The British ships approached within musket-shot, and poured in their broadsides with great effect into the French vessels as they were weathering that dangerous point; but such was the vigour of the fire kept up by the batteries arranged on the cliffs under Marshal Davoust, that they were unable to prevent the flotilla from reaching the place of their destination with very little loss. The rapid and incessant cannonade both by the batteries on shore and the English cruisers, and the vivid interest excited among an immense crowd of spectators from the neighbouring camps by the passage of the flotilla through such a perilous defile, formed together a brilliant spectacle, which awakened the most animating feelings among the military and naval forces of France.¹

While the Emperor, on the heights of Boulogne, was actively engaged in reviewing the different corps of his army, and inspecting the immense preparations for the expedition, the different squadrons of his empire were rapidly bringing on the great crisis between the naval forces of the two countries. Early in the year, Napoleon took advantage of the open hostilities which had now ensued between England and Spain, to conclude at Paris a secret convention for the combined operation of the squadrons of both countries; and the important part there allotted to the fleets of Spain leaves no room for doubt that their co-operation had been foreseen and arranged with Napoleon long before the capture of the treasure frigates, and that that unhappy event only precipitated the junction of the Spanish forces, already calculated on by Napoleon for the execution of his great design. By this convention it was stipulated that the Emperor should provide at the Texel an army of 30,000 men, and the transports and vessels of war necessary for their conveyance; at Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, and Havre, 120,000 men, with the necessary vessels of war and transports; at Brest, 21 ships of the line, with frigates and smaller vessels, capable of embarking 30,000 men; at Rochfort, 6 ships of the line and 4 frigates, with 4000 men; at Toulon, 11 ships of the line and 8 frigates,

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1805.

¹ Dum. xli.
42, 48.
James, iii.
434, 440.

67.
Operations of
the combined
fleets of
France and
Spain to
second the
enterprise.
Jan. 4.

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XXXIX.

1805.

¹ Dum. xi.
96, 97.

having 9000 land troops on board ; and Spain, in return, bound herself to have 30 ships of the line and 5000 men ready, and provisioned for six months, in the harbours of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagená—in all 38 French ships of the line and 30 Spanish, and 170,000 men, all to be employed in the invasion of England.¹

68.
Measures of
defence by
the English
government.

But their destination was as yet kept secret, it being provided “that these armaments shall be maintained and destined to operations on which his Majesty reserves the explanations for a month, or to the general charged with full powers to that effect.” When it is recollected that the fleets of Spain composed nearly a half of the naval forces thus assembled by Napoleon for the great object of his life, and that without this addition his own would have been totally inadequate to the undertaking, no doubt whatever can remain that their co-operation had for years before been calculated on by his far-seeing policy ; and this must increase the regret of every Englishman, that, by the unhappy neglect to declare war before hostilities were commenced, Great Britain was put formally in the wrong, when in substance she was so obviously in the right. The English government, after the breaking out of the Spanish war, lost no time in taking measures to meet the new enemy which had arisen. Sir John Orde, with five ships of the line, commenced the blockade of Cadiz ; Carthagená also was watched ; and a sufficient fleet was stationed off Ferrol. But still these squadrons, barely equal to the enemy’s force in the harbours before which they were respectively stationed, were totally unequal to prevent its junction with any superior hostile fleet which might approach ; and thus, if one division got to sea, it might with ease raise the blockade of all the harbours, and assemble the combined armament for the projected operations in the Channel. This was what in effect soon happened.²

² Ann. Reg.
1805, 219,
221. Dum.
xi. 97, 99.

69.
The Toulon
and Rochfort
squadrons
put to sea.
Jan. 11.

Napoleon, anxious for the execution of his designs, sent orders for the Rochfort and Toulon squadrons to be put to sea. On the 11th January the former of these fleets, under the command of Admiral Missiessy, set sail, and made straight for the West Indies, without meeting with any English vessels. The Toulon squa-

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1805.

Jan. 15.

dron put to sea about the same time; but having met with rough weather, it returned to Toulon considerably shattered in four days after its departure.* The Rochfort fleet was more fortunate: it arrived at Martinique on the 5th February, and after having landed the troops and ammunition destined for that island, made sail for the British island of Dominica, where the admiral landed four thousand men, under cover of a tremendous fire from the line-of-battle ships. General Prevost, the governor, who had only five hundred regular troops in the island, immediately made the best dispositions which the limited force at his command would admit to resist the enemy. He retired deliberately, disputing every inch of ground, to the fort of Prince Rupert, in the centre of the island; and the French commander, not having leisure for a regular siege, re-embarked and made sail for Guadaloupe, after destroying the little town of Roseau. He next proceeded to St Kitt's and Nevis, in both of which islands he levied contributions and burned some valuable merchantmen; after which he embarked, without attempting to make any impression on the military defences. The arrival of Admiral Cochrane with six sail of the line having rendered any further stay in the West Indies dangerous, Admiral Missiessy returned to Europe, after throwing a thousand men into Santa Domingo, and compelling the blacks to raise the siege of that place, and regained Rochfort in safety in the beginning of April, to await another combination of the French and Spanish squadrons.¹

Feb. 22.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1805, 219,
221. Jom.
ii. 71. Dum.
xi. 110, 113,
123.

The successful issue of this expedition excited the greatest alarm in Great Britain, from the evidence which it afforded of the facility with which, notwithstanding the utmost vigilance of the blockading squadrons, the enemy's fleets might leave and regain their harbours, and carry terror into her most distant colonial possessions. But it was far from answering the views of Napoleon, who had prescribed to his admiral a much more extensive set of operations; viz. to throw succours into Martinique and Guadaloupe, take possession of St Lucie and Domi-

70.
Alarm they
excite in
Great
Britain.

* "These gentlemen," said Nelson, when he heard of this unexpected return, after having gone to Malta in search of the enemy, "are not accustomed to a Gulf of Lyons gale. We have buffeted them for twenty-one months, and not carried away a spar."—SOUTHEY'S *Life of Nelson*, ii. 214.

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1805.

¹ Dum. xiii
205. Pièces
Just.

nica, regain Surinam and the other Dutch colonies, put the few remaining strongholds of St Domingo in a respectable state of defence, and make himself master of St Helena. The instructions for this expedition are dated by the Emperor from Strasburg, September 29, 1804, shortly before his coronation. Strange combination in his destiny, to have contemplated the capture of the rock of St Helena on the eve of his coronation, as he had the reduction of the island of Elba at the period of his being created First Consul for Life!¹

71.
The com-
bined fleet
steer for the
West Indies.
March 30.

More important results followed the next sortie of the enemy, which took place on the 30th March, from Toulon.

On that day Admiral Villeneuve put to sea with eleven ships of the line and eight frigates, while Nelson, who purposely remained at a distance to entice the enemy from the protection of their batteries, was at anchor in the Gulf of Palma, and made straight for Carthagena, with the intention of joining the Spanish squadron of six sail of the line in that harbour; but finding them not ready for sea, the French fleet passed the Straits of Gibraltar, raised the blockade of Cadiz, from whence Sir John Orde retired to unite with the Channel fleet off Brest, and formed a junction with the Spanish ships in that harbour, and one French sail of the line which was lying there. Increased by this important accession to the amount of eighteen ships of the line and ten frigates, the combined fleet, having on board ten thousand veteran troops, set sail on the following day for the West Indies.

April 10.

² South. Nel-
son, ii. 217,
218. Dum.
xi. 124, 128.

About the same time the Brest squadron, under Admiral Gantheaume, consisting of twenty-one ships of the line, put to sea, and remained three days off the isle of Ushant before they retired to their harbour, on the approach of Admiral Cornwallis with the Channel fleet, which only amounted to eighteen.²

72.
Uncertainty
of Nelson.
He at length
follows to the
West Indies.
April 4.

Meanwhile Nelson was in the most cruel state of anxiety. He was bearing up from the Gulf of Palma for his old position off Toulon, when on the 4th April he met the *Phœbe* brig with the long-wished-for intelligence that Villeneuve had again put to sea, and when last seen was steering for the coast of Africa. Upon this he immediately set sail for Palermo, under the impression that they had gone to Egypt; but, feeling assured by the 11th,

from the information brought by his cruisers, that they had not taken that direction, he instantly turned and beat up, with the utmost difficulty, against strong westerly winds, to Gibraltar; devoured all the while by the utmost anxiety lest before he could reach them the enemy might menace Ireland or Jamaica. In spite of every exertion he could not reach the Straits till the 30th April, and even then the wind was so adverse that he could not pass them, and was compelled to anchor in Mazari bay, on the Barbary coast, for five days.* At length, on the 5th May, he received certain information that the combined fleet had made for the West Indies, and amounted to eighteen sail of the line and ten frigates. Nelson had only ten sail of the line and three frigates; his ships had been at sea for nearly two years; the crews were worn out with fatigue and watching; and anxiety had so preyed upon his naturally ardent mind, that his health had seriously suffered, and his physician had declared an immediate return to England indispensable to its recovery. In these circumstances this heroic officer did not an instant hesitate what course to adopt, but immediately made signal to hoist every rag of canvass for the West Indies. "Do you," said he to his captains, "take a Frenchman a-piece, and leave all the Spaniards to me. When I haul down my colours I expect you to do the same, but not till then."¹†

The combined fleet had above thirty days the start of Nelson; but he calculated, by his superior activity and seamanship, upon gaining ten days upon them during the passage of the Atlantic. In fact Villeneuve reached

CHAP.
XXXIX.
1805.

1 South. ii.
216, 219, 220
Ann. Reg.
1805, 225.

73.
Searches in
vain for the
enemy there.

* On this occasion, Nelson wrote to Sir Alexander Ball, at Malta—"My good fortune, my dear Ball, seems flown away. I cannot get a fair wind, nor even a side-wind. Dead foul! But my mind is fully made up what to do when we leave the Straits, supposing there is no certain account of the enemy's destination. I believe this ill luck will go far to kill me; but as these are times for exertion, I must not be cast down, whatever I may feel."—SOUTHBY, ii. 217.

† The uncertainty as to the destination of Nelson's squadron filled Napoleon, whose mind, not less than that of his great opponent, was anxiously intent on the result of the momentous events now in progress, with the utmost disquietude. On the 9th June 1805, immediately before leaving Milan, he wrote to the minister of marine:—"We cannot discover what has become of Nelson: it is possible that the English have sent him to Jamaica; but I am of opinion that he is still in the European seas. It is more than probable that he has returned to England to revictual, and place his crews in new vessels, for his fleet stands greatly in need of repairs, and his squadron must be in very bad condition." Even Napoleon's daring mind could not anticipate Nelson's heroic passage of the Atlantic in these circumstances, in pursuit of a fleet nearly double his own.—DUMAS, xi. 169.

Simultaneous
anxiety of
Napoleon as to
Nelson's desti-
nation.

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1805.

June 7.

¹ South. ii.
222, 223.
Dum. xii. 1,
6.

74.
Combined
fleet had re-
turned to
Europe. Its
secret orders.
May 28.

Martinique on the 14th May, while Nelson arrived at Barbadoes on the 4th June; but in the interim the allied squadrons had done nothing except capturing the Diamond Rock, near Martinique, by a few ships detached for that purpose, which was reduced, after a most gallant resistance on the part of the small British force by which it was occupied. Overjoyed at the discovery that the enemy were in those seas, and that all the great British settlements were still safe, Nelson, without allowing his sailors any rest, instantly made sail for Trinidad, thinking that the French fleet had gone to attempt the reduction of that colony; and so far was he misled by false intelligence, that he cleared his fleet for action on the evening of the 7th June, hoping to render the mouths of the Orinoco on the following day as famous in history as those of the Nile. But when morning broke not a vessel was to be seen, and it was evident that the British fleet had, by erroneous information, accidentally or designedly thrown in their way, been sent in an entirely wrong direction. Had it not been for this circumstance, and had Nelson acted upon his own judgment alone, he would have arrived at Port Royal just as the French were leaving it, and the battle would have been fought on the same spot where Rodney defeated De Grasse five-and-twenty years before; but as it was, the opportunity was lost, and the greatest triumph of the British navy was reserved for the European seas.¹

In truth, the combined fleet had sailed from Martinique on the 28th May, and instantly made sail for the north; having been joined while there by Admiral Magon with two additional ships of the line, which raised their force to twenty line-of-battle ships. This reinforcement also brought the last instructions of Napoleon, dated Pavia, 8th May 1805, which were to raise the blockade of Ferrol, and join the five French ships of the line, and ten Spanish, which awaited them in that harbour; make sail from that to Rochfort, join the five ships of the line under Missiessy at that place; and with the whole united squadrons, amounting to forty ships of the line, steer to Brest, where Gantheaume awaited them with twenty-one. With this formidable fleet, which would have greatly over-matched any force the British government could muster

in the Channel, was Villeneuve to proceed to Boulogne, and cover the passage of the flotilla. His instructions were to shun a battle unless it was unavoidable, and if it was so to bring it on as near as possible to Brest, in order that the fleet of Admiral Gantheaume might take a part in the engagement. "The grand object of the whole operation," said Napoleon, "is to procure for us a superiority for a few days before Boulogne—masters of the Channel for a few days, a hundred and fifty thousand men will embark in the two thousand vessels which are there assembled, and the expedition is concluded." Every contingency was provided for: the chance of the fleets going round about was foreseen; and stores of provisions were collected both at Cherbourg and the Texel, in the event of the general rendezvous taking place in either of these harbours.¹

Hitherto every thing had not only fully answered, but even exceeded Napoleon's expectations. The design he had so long had in contemplation had never been penetrated by the British government. On the contrary, Nelson was in the West Indies; he had been decoyed to the mouths of the Orinoco when the French admiral was returning to Europe with twenty sail of the line, eighteen days in advance of his indefatigable opponent, while the English squadrons which blockaded Ferrol and Rochfort were totally inadequate to prevent the junction of the combined fleet with the vessels of war in those harbours. Villeneuve had sailed on the 28th May from Martinique: and on the 13th June, Nelson, on arriving at Antigua, for the first time received such intelligence as left no doubt that the combined fleet had returned to Europe. Disdaining to believe what the gratitude of the delivered colonists led them to allege, that the enemy had fled at the mere terror of his name before a fleet not half their amount, he immediately suspected some ulterior combination, but without being able to penetrate what it was; and instantly despatched several fast-sailing vessels to Lisbon and Portsmouth in order to warn the British government of the probable return of the whole fleets of the enemy to Europe. To this sagacious step, as will immediately appear, the safety of the British empire is mainly to be ascribed. Nelson himself, without allowing

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1805.

¹ See the orders in Dum. xi. 247, 254. Pièces Just.

75.

Entire success hitherto of Napoleon's design, which is penetrated by Nelson.

May 28.

June 13.

CHAP.
XXXIX.

1804.

July 18.
 1 Ann. Reg.
 1805, 228,
 229. South.
 ii. 224, 225.
 Dum. xii. 6,
 7.

his sailors a moment's rest, set sail the very same day for Europe, and on the 18th July reached Gibraltar; having, from the time he left Tetuan bay, twice crossed the Atlantic, and visited every one of the Leeward Islands, with a fleet which had been two years at sea, in seventy-eight days;* an instance of vigour and rapidity of naval movement unparalleled in the annals of the world.¹ †

76.

Energetic
 measures of
 the, Admir-
 alty when
 they received
 his des-
 patches.

Great was the despondency in the British islands at the intelligence of a fleet of such strength having proceeded to the West Indies, where it was well known no English force at all capable of resisting it was to be found; and the Admiralty, in the midst of the general alarm, took the most energetic measures to avert the danger, by instantly ordering every man and ship that could be got in readiness to sea, and despatching Admiral Collingwood with a squadron of five ships of the line to cruise off Gibraltar, and act as circumstances might require. That sagacious officer, alone of all the British chiefs, penetrated the real design of Napoleon; and on the 21st July, while yet the combined fleet had not been heard of on its return from the West Indies, wrote to Nelson that he was convinced they would raise the blockade of Ferrol, Rochfort, and Brest, and with the united force make for the British islands. His penetration was so remarkable, that his letter might almost pass for a transcript of the secret instructions of Napoleon, at that time in the possession of Villeneuve.² ‡

Meanwhile Villeneuve returned to Europe as rapidly

* From April 30th to July 18th.

† On the day following, Nelson landed at Gibraltar, being the first time he had quitted the Victory for two years.

‡ His words are—"July 21, 1805.—We approached, my dear Lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object which they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, *make the round of the bay, and taking the Rochfort people with them, appear off Ushant, perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more.* This appears a probable plan; for unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to a chance of loss, which I do not believe Buonaparte would do without the hope of an adequate reward. The French government never aims at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies *was to take off the naval force,* which proved the great impediment to their undertaking."

COLLINGWOOD'S *Memoirs*, i. 145, 146.—The history of Europe does not contain a more striking instance of political and warlike penetration.

2 South. ii.
 224, 225.
 Collingwood,
 i. 145.

Extraordinary
 penetration of
 Collingwood as
 to the enemy's
 design.

as adverse winds would permit, and on the 23d June he had reached the latitude of the Azores. Napoleon, who by this time had returned to St Cloud from Italy, despatched orders to the fleet at Rochfort to put to sea and join Admiral Gantheaume off the Lizard Point; or, if he had not made his escape from Brest, to make for Ferrol and join the combined fleet there. He literally counted the days and hours till some intelligence should arrive of the great armament approaching from the West Indies—the signal for the completion of all his vast and profound combinations. But meanwhile, one of the brigs despatched by Nelson from Antigua on the 13th June had outstripped the combined fleet, and by the rapidity of its passage fixed the destinies of the world. The Curieux brig, sent on this important errand, arrived at London on the 9th July, having made the passage from Antigua in twenty-five days; and instantly the admiralty despatched orders to Admiral Stirling, who commanded the squadrons before Rochfort, to raise the blockade of that harbour, join Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and cruise with the united force off Cape Finisterre, with a view to intercept the allied squadrons on their homeward passage towards Brest. These orders reached Admiral Stirling on the 13th July. On the 15th he effected his junction with the fleet before Ferrol, and Sir Robert Calder stood out to sea, with fifteen line-of-battle ships, to take his appointed station and wait for the enemy.¹

The event soon showed of what vital importance it was that the Curieux had arrived so rapidly in England, and that the admiralty had so instantaneously acted on the information communicated by Lord Nelson. Hardly had Sir Robert Calder, with his squadron united to that of Admiral Stirling, reached the place assigned for his cruise, about sixty leagues to the westward of Cape Finisterre, when the combined fleet of France and Spain hove in sight, consisting of twenty line-of-battle ships, a fifty-gun ship, and seven frigates.* The weather was so hazy, that the two

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XXXIX.

1805.

77.

The combined fleet is outstripped by the British brigs with the despatches.

July 9.

July 15.

¹ Dum. xii.
16, 19. Ann.
Reg. 1805,
229. James,
iv. 1, 2.

78.

Sir Robert Calder's action.

July 22.

* Yet, strange to say, our naval historians seem insensible to the vital importance of this junction of the squadrons blockading Rochfort and Ferrol. Mr James observes, "Thus was the blockade of two ports raised, in which at the time were about as many ships ready for sea as the fleet which the blockading squadrons were to go in search of. The policy of this measure does not seem

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fleets had approached very closely before they were mutually aware of each other's vicinity. But as soon as the British admiral descried the enemy, he made the signal for action, and bore down on the hostile fleet in two columns. Some confusion, however, took place in consequence of the necessity under which the English squadron lay of tacking before they reached the enemy, which, combined with the foggy state of the weather, brought the two fleets into collision in rather a disorderly manner; and when they got into close action, several vessels in both fleets were exposed to the attack of two or three opponents. The superiority of the British, however, was soon apparent, notwithstanding the preponderance of force on the part of the enemy. Before the action had continued four hours, two of the Spanish line-of-battle ships, the *St Raphael* and *Firme*, were compelled to strike their colours; while the *Windsor Castle*, in the English fleet, was also so much injured as to render it necessary to put her in tow of the *Dragon*. Darkness separated the combatants; and the British fleet, carrying with them their prizes, lay to for the night to repair their injuries, and prepare for a renewal of the action on the following day.¹

The loss sustained by the British was very small, amounting only to thirty-nine killed, and one hundred

¹ James, iv.
7, 9. Dum.
xii. 51, 52.

² James iv. 2.

very clear. If the squadron did not, like the *Rochfort* one, take advantage of this circumstance and sail out, it was only because it had received no orders."² Is it not evident, that unless this junction of the blockading squadrons had taken place, the combined fleet would have successively raised the blockade of both harbours, and stood on with five-and-thirty sail of the line for Brest?

Napoleon, whose penetrating eye nothing escaped, viewed in a very different light the concentration of the English blockading squadrons at this critical period. On the 27th July 1805, he wrote in these terms to the minister of marine:—"The English squadron before *Rochfort* has disappeared on the 12th July. It was only on the 9th July that the brig *Curieux* arrived in England. The admiral could never have decided in twenty-four hours what movements to prescribe to its squadrons. Even if they had, it is not likely their orders could have reached the squadron before *Rochfort* in three days. I think the blockade must have been raised, therefore, by orders received before the arrival of the *Curieux*. On the 15th July that squadron effected its junction with that before *Ferrol*; and on the 16th or 17th they set out in virtue of anterior orders. I should not be surprised if they had sent another squadron to strengthen that of *Nelson*, and to effect the destruction of the combined fleet; and that it is these fourteen vessels before *Ferrol* which form that squadron. They have taken with them frigates, brigs, and corvettes, assuredly either to keep a look-out, or seek the combined fleet." It is interesting at the same moment to see the sagacity of Collingwood penetrating the long-hidden designs of the French Emperor, Napoleon's foresight divining the happy junction of the fleets before *Rochfort* and *Ferrol* under Sir Robert Calder, and the rapid decision of the admiral, so much beyond what he conceived possible, which proved the salvation of England.—See DUMAS, xii. 19-20.

and fifty-nine wounded ; that of the French and Spaniards to four hundred and seventy-six ; and no ship except the Windsor Castle was seriously damaged on the English side. Neither fleet showed any decided inclination to renew the action on the following day. At noon the combined fleet approached to within a league and a half of the British, who were drawn up in order of battle, but Villeneuve made signal to haul to the wind on the same tack as the British ; that is, to decline the engagement for the present, as soon as he saw that the English fleet stood firm : and night again separated the hostile squadrons. On the day after, Sir Robert Calder stood away with his prizes towards the north, justly discerning, in the danger arising from the probable junction of Villeneuve with the Rochfort and Ferrol squadrons, the first of which was known to have put to sea, a sufficient reason for falling back upon the support of the Channel fleet or that of Lord Nelson ; and Villeneuve, finding the passage clear, stood towards Spain, and, after leaving three sail of the line in bad order at Vigo, entered Ferrol on the 2d August.¹

Of the importance of this, perhaps the most momentous action ever fought by the navy of England, no further proof is required than is furnished by the conduct of Napoleon, narrated by the unimpeachable authority of Count Daru, his private secretary, and the very eminent author of the History of Venice. On the day in which intelligence was received from the English papers of the arrival of Villeneuve at Ferrol, Daru was called by the Emperor into his cabinet. The scene which followed must be given in his own words.—“Daru found him transported with rage ; walking up and down the room with hurried steps, and only breaking a stern silence by broken exclamations. ‘What a navy !—what sacrifices for nothing !—what an admiral ! All hope is gone. That Villeneuve, instead of entering the Channel, has taken refuge in Ferrol ! It is all over : he will be blockaded there.——Daru, sit down and write.’ The fact was, that on that morning the Emperor had received intelligence of the arrival of Villeneuve in that Spanish harbour ; he at once saw that the English expedition was blown up, the immense expenditure of the flotilla lost for

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79.

The two fleets
separate
without de-
cisive success.1 James, iv
17. Vict. et
Conq. xvi.
143. Dum.
xii. 53.

80.

Vast impor-
tance of this
action. Na-
poleon's con-
duct on re-
ceiving the
intelligence.
Aug. 11.

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a long time, perhaps for ever ! Then, in the transports of a fury which would have entirely overturned the judgment of any other man, he adopted one of the boldest resolutions, and traced the plans of one of the most admirable achievements that any conqueror ever conceived. Without a moment's hesitation, or even stopping to consider, he dictated at once the plan of the campaign of Austerlitz ; the simultaneous departure of all the corps from Hanover and Holland to the south and the west of France, their order of march, duration, their lines of conveyance, and points of rendezvous ; the surprises and hostile attacks which they might experience, the divers movements of the enemy. Every thing was foreseen : victory rendered secure on every supposition. Such was the justice and vast foresight of that plan, that over a base of departure two hundred leagues in extent, and lines of operations three hundred leagues in length, the stations assigned were reached according to this original plan, place by place, day by day, to Munich. Beyond that capital, the periods only underwent a slight alteration ; but the places pointed out were all reached, and the plan as originally conceived carried into complete execution." ¹

¹ Dupin, Force Navale de l'Angleterre, i. 244. Dum. xii. 119, 120. Bign. iv. 296-7.

81.
It totally defeats his well-laid designs.

Nothing can portray the character of Napoleon and the importance of Sir Robert Calder's victory more strongly than this passage. He well knew how imminent affairs were in his rear ; that Russia was advancing, Austria arming ; and that unless a stroke was speedily struck on the Thames, the weight of Europe must be encountered on the Danube. It was to anticipate this danger, to dissolve the confederacy by a stroke at its heart, and conquer, not only England, but Russia and Austria, on the British shores, that all his measures were calculated ; and they were arranged so nicely, that there was barely time to carry the war into the enemy's vitals to anticipate his being assailed in his own. Finding this first project defeated by the result of Sir Robert Calder's action, he instantly took his line ; adopted the secondary set of operations when he no longer could attempt the first ; and prepared to carry the thunder of his arms to the banks of the Danube, when he was frustrated in his design of terminating the war in the British capital.

While such immense consequences were resulting from the action of the 22d July, the gallant officer who, with a force so far inferior, had achieved so decisive a success, was the victim of the most unmerited obloquy. The first intelligence of the defeat of the combined fleet by so inconsiderable an armament was received over all England with the utmost transports of joy; and the public expectation was wound up to the very highest pitch by an expression in the admiral's despatches, which pointed to an intention of renewing the battle on the following day, and the statement every where made by the officer who brought the intelligence, that a renewal would certainly take place.* When, therefore, it was discovered that the hostile fleets had not again met, that the British admiral had stood to the northward, rather avoiding than seeking an encounter, and that Villeneuve had reached Ferrol in safety, where he lay unblockaded with thirty ships of the line, these transports were suddenly cooled, and succeeded by a murmur of discontent, which was worked up to a perfect paroxysm of rage upon finding that, in consequence of these circumstances, Napoleon, in the official accounts published in his admiral's name on the occasion, claimed the victory for the French arms.^{1†}

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82.

Cruel injustice to which Sir Robert Calder was meanwhile subjected.

¹ James, iv. 18. Ann. Reg. 1805, 230, 231.

* The public discontent, which terminated so cruelly for Sir Robert Calder, was in a great degree owing to the unfortunate suppression of part of his despatches in the accounts published by the admiralty. The passage published was in these words:—"The enemy are now in sight to windward: and when I have secured the captured ships, and put the squadron to rights, I shall endeavour to avail myself of any further opportunity that may offer to give you a further account of these combined squadrons." The suppressed paragraph was this:—"At the same time, it will behove me to be on my guard against the combined squadrons in Ferrol, as I am led to believe that they have sent off one or two of their crippled ships last night for that port; therefore, possibly I may find it necessary to make a junction with you immediately off Ushant with the whole squadron."² Had this paragraph been published after the former, it would have revealed the real situation of the British admiral, lying with fourteen ships of the line fit for action, in presence of a combined squadron of eighteen, hourly expecting a junction with two others, one of fifteen, and the other of five line-of-battle ships. In these circumstances, no one can doubt that to retire towards the Channel fleet was the duty which the safety of England, with which he was charged, imperatively imposed on the British admiral. It is the most pleasing duty of the historian thus to aid in rescuing from unmerited obloquy the memory of a gallant and meritorious officer; and it is the greatest consolation, next to the inward rewards of conscience, of suffering virtue, when borne down by the torrent of popular obloquy, to know that the time will come when its character will be reinstated in the eyes of posterity, and that deserved censure be cast upon the haste and severity of present opinion, which in the end seldom fails to attend deeds of injustice.

² James, iv. 17

† The accounts published by Napoleon, in the name of Villeneuve, of the action, were entirely fabricated by the Emperor himself. In his despatch to the minister of marine of 11th August, after noticing the accounts in the English newspapers which claimed the victory, Napoleon said, "The arrival of Ville-

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83.
Sir Robert
Calder is
brought to a
court-mar-
tial.

The consequence was, that, after having continued a short time longer in the command of the fleet, Sir Robert was compelled to retire and demand a court-martial, which, on the 26th December, severely reprimanded him for not having done his utmost to renew the engagement on the 23d and 24th July : though the sentence admitted that his conduct had not been owing either to cowardice or disaffection. Thus, at the very time that a public outcry, excited by the vehemence of party ambition, was chasing from the helm of the admiralty the statesman whose admirable arrangements had prepared for the British navy the triumph of Trafalgar, the fury of ignorant zeal affixed a stigma on the admiral whose gallant victory had defeated the greatest and best arranged project ever conceived by Napoleon for our destruction, and finally rescued his country from the perils of Gallic invasion. Such, in its first and hasty fits, is public opinion ! History would indeed be useless, if the justice of posterity did not often reverse its iniquitous decrees. *

84.
Nelson re-
turns to Eng-
land.
July 24.

Aug. 15.

Aug. 17.

1 South. ii.
225, 230.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 230.

Meanwhile Nelson, having taken in water and other necessary supplies at Tetuan, stood for Ceuta on the 24th July : and having heard nothing of the combined fleet, proceeded to Cape St Vincent, rather cruising in quest of intelligence than following any fixed course. He then traversed the Bay of Biscay, and approached the north of Ireland ; and, finding the enemy had not been heard of there, joined Admiral Cornwallis off Ushant on the 15th August. No news had been obtained of the enemy ; and on the same evening he received orders to proceed with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 17th, and at length heard of the action of 22d July, and entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol. He was hailed with unbounded demonstrations of gratitude and joy in England ;¹ the public having followed with intense anxiety

neuve at Corunna will overturn all their gasconades, and in the eyes of Europe will give us the victory ; that is no small matter. Instantly write out a narrative of the action, and send it to M. Maret. *Here is my idea of what it should be,*" and then follows the fabricated account.—DUMAS, xii. 343 ; *Pièces Just.*

* Let us hear what the French writers say of this proceeding :—" Admiral Calder," says Dupin, " with an inferior force, meets the Franco-Spanish fleet ; in the chase of it he brings on a partial engagement, and captures two ships. He is tried and reprimanded, because it is believed that, had he renewed the action, he would have obtained a more decisive victory. What would they have done with Calder in England, if he had commanded the superior fleet and had lost two ships in avoiding an engagement which presented so favourable a chance to skill and valour ?"—DUPIN'S *Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne*, ii. 17.

his indefatigable and almost fabulous adventures in search of the enemy, and deservedly awarded that consideration to heroic efforts in discharge of duty which is so often the reward only of splendid or dazzling achievements.

Napoleon's hopes of accomplishing the objects of his ambition were somewhat revived upon finding that Nelson had not joined Sir Robert Calder's squadron, and that the fleet in Ferrol was still immensely superior to that of the enemy. Accordingly he resumed his designs of invasion; on the 12th August transmitted orders to Villeneuve, through the minister of marine, to sail without loss of time from Ferrol, and pursue his route towards Brest, where Gantheaume was prepared to join him at a moment's warning;* and in two days afterwards he wrote a second letter, in still more pressing terms, absolutely enjoining the immediate sailing of the combined fleet. Sir Robert Calder had at this time effected a junction with Admiral Cornwallis off Brest, so that the sea was open to his adventure. On the 17th August, however, he was again detached, with twenty ships of the line, to cruise off Cape Finisterre. On the 11th, the combined fleet, amounting to twenty-nine sail of the line, having left several vessels behind them in a state not fit for service, stood out to sea, and at first took a north-westerly direction; but, having received accounts at sea from a Danish vessel that a British fleet of twenty-five ships of the line (Sir Robert Calder's) was approaching, Villeneuve, tacked about and made sail for Cadiz, where he arrived on the 21st, the very day on which he was expected at Brest. Admiral Collingwood, with four sail of the line, who lay before the former, was obliged to retire

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85.
Napoleon orders the combined fleet again to put to sea, but he makes for Cadiz instead of Brest.

Aug. 14.

Aug. 11.

Aug. 21.

* "Despatch instantly," wrote Napoleon, on the 12th August, to M. Decrès, "a messenger to Ferrol. Make Villeneuve acquainted with the news received from London. Tell him I hope that he is continuing his mission, and that it would be too dishonourable for the imperial squadrons to permit a skirmish of a few hours and an engagement with fourteen vessels to render abortive such great projects—that the enemy's squadron has suffered much—and that, on his own admission, his losses have not been very serious." And on the 14th August—"With thirty vessels, my admirals should learn not to fear four-and-twenty English; if they are not equal to such an encounter, we may at once renounce all hopes of a marine. I have more confidence in my naval forces; had I not, it would ruin their courage. If Villeneuve remains the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, at Ferrol, I will not complain; but if he remains an hour longer with a favourable wind, and only twenty-four line-of-battle ships before him—I require a man of superior character. The little energy of my admirals throws away all the chances of fortune, and ruins all the prospects of the campaign."—DUMAS, xii. 59, 67.

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¹ James, iv.
23, 27.Dum. xii.
63, 71.

on the approach of so overwhelming a force; but no sooner had they entered than he resumed his station, and with his little squadron gallantly maintained the blockade of a harbour where five-and-thirty hostile line-of-battle ships were now assembled.¹

Not anticipating such a departure on the part of the combined fleet from the prescribed operations, Gantheaume, on the 21st of August, stood out of Brest harbour with one-and-twenty ships of the line, and drew up in order of battle in Bertheaume roads. Admiral Cornwallis, whose squadron, after the large detachment under Calder, amounted only to fourteen, immediately moved in to attack them, and a distant cannonade ensued between the two fleets; but the French, who had no intention to engage in a general affair before the arrival of the combined fleet, did not venture out of the protection of their batteries, and the day passed off without any general action. In vain every eye was turned to the south, in the hopes of descrying the long-wished-for reinforcement—in vain Gantheaume counted the hours for the arrival of Ville-neuve with thirty ships of the line, chasing before him Calder with twenty. In that decisive moment the star of England prevailed; the action of the 22d July had saved his country, though it had proved fatal to its saviour. The combined fleet, weakened and discouraged, had sought refuge in Cadiz, not daring to encounter a second action; and the Brest squadron, after spending the day in anxious suspense, returned at night to their harbour.²

The intelligence of the arrival of the combined fleet at Cadiz put a final period to the designs of Napoleon against Great Britain, and all his energies were instantly turned to the prosecution of the war against Austria. His indignation appeared in an act of accusation which he drew up against Villeneuve, dictated by himself, in which the leading charges were, incapacity in the action of 22d July, and positive disobedience of orders, in afterwards steering with the combined fleet for Cadiz, instead of pursuing the prescribed route for Brest. But as it was of the utmost moment that his designs against the Imperialists on the Danube should as long as possible be disguised, the preparations for embarkation were continued with redoubled activity down to the last moment, and at the very time

86.

Gantheaume
in vain leaves
Brest to meet
them.
Aug. 21.² Dum. xii.
69, 70.

87.

Napoleon's
designs are in
consequence
entirely ruin-
ed, and he
sets off for
Paris.

when the Emperor was directing the contemplated movements across France and Germany to the shores of the Danube. Between the 23d August and 1st September, the troops were daily exercised at embarking and disembarking in the bay of Boulogne, and at length acquired the most extraordinary perfection in these difficult operations.* The cavalry and artillery were all stored in the appointed vessels; the Emperor's household and baggage were embarked; and the soldiers, in the utmost impatience, awaited the signal to step on board; when suddenly, on the 1st September, the Emperor set out at two o'clock for Paris, and orders were issued to the whole of this mighty armament to defile by different routes towards the Rhine.¹

The circumstances which induced this sudden change of resolution, were not merely the destruction of all the projects for the naval campaign by the entry of Villeneuve into the harbour of Cadiz. Matters had also come to a crisis on the Continent of Europe; and the time had now arrived when, as the coalition could not be dissolved on the shores of Britain, it required to be anticipated on the banks of the Danube. From the moment that Napoleon put on his head the iron crown of Charlemagne, in direct violation of the treaty of Luneville, which had provided for the independence of the Cisalpine Republic, and incorporated Genoa, Parma, and Placentia with his vast

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¹ Jom. ii. 101.
Dum. xii.
84, 127.
Ney, ii. 249,
265.

88.
Austria had
been making
hostile pre-
parations.

* The following passage from Marshal Ney's Memoirs contains some curious details on this subject:—"The instructions of the Emperor were so luminous, minute, and precise, as to give the inferior commanders nothing to do but follow them out specifically. To ascertain the time required for the embarkation, Marshal Ney distributed the gunpowder, caissons, artillery, projectiles, and stores on board the transports provided for that purpose, and he divided that portion of the flotilla assigned to him into subdivisions: every battalion, every company, received the boats destined for its use; every man, down to the lowest drummer, was apprised of the boat, and the place in the boat, where he was to set himself. At a signal given, infantry, cavalry, artillery, were at once put under arms, and ranged opposite to the vessels on board which they were respectively to embark. A cannon was discharged, and all the field-officers dismounted, and placed themselves at the head of their respective corps; a second gun was the signal to make ready to embark; a third, and the word of command, 'Colonels, forward!' was heard with indescribable anxiety along the whole line; a fourth, which was instantly followed by the word 'March!' Universal acclamations immediately broke forth; the soldiers in perfect order hastened on board, each to his appointed place; in *ten minutes and a half* twenty-five thousand men embarked. The enthusiasm of the troops knew no bounds: they thought the long-wished-for moment had arrived; but at the next signal the order to disembark was given, and they were made aware that the whole was only a feint to try the rapidity with which the movement could be performed. The relanding was completed nearly as rapidly as the embarkation; in *thirteen minutes* from the time the soldiers were on board, they were drawn up in battle array on shore."—NEY, ii. 260, 261.

Extraordinary
dexterity to
which the
troops had
arrived in
embarking.

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Aug. 12.

dominions, all hope of permanently preserving the peace of the Continent was at an end : and it was only a question of time and expedience when Austria should openly join her forces to those of the coalition. The assembly of all the armies of France on the shores of the Channel, the departure of the Emperor for Boulogne, and the embarkation of a considerable part of his forces, having impressed the Aulic Council with the belief that the military strength of the empire would soon be involved in that perilous undertaking, the moment appeared eminently favourable for the Imperialists to commence operations. General Chastelar, at the head of fifteen thousand men, entered the Tyrol, and began to organise the brave and hardy population of that province. Considerable bodies of workmen were employed in strengthening the fortifications on the Venetian frontier, and armaments already began to be formed on the Inn and the principal roads leading into Bavaria. These hostile preparations were immediately made the subject of angry contention between the cabinet of the Tuileries and that of Vienna ; and in several articles in the *Moniteur*, evidently flowing from the pen of Talleyrand, the question as to the balance of power in Europe, and the danger to be apprehended from the strength of France, was discussed with more openness than was possible amid the studied ambiguity of diplomatic correspondence.¹*

At length the mask was let fall on both sides. The concentration of the Austrian forces on the Adige and the

* The views of the opposite parties are well abridged in the following state papers which at this period passed between the two cabinets :—

“Let us come at once,” said Talleyrand, “to the bottom of the question. Austria wishes to take up arms in order to reduce the power of France. If such is her design, I ask you to consider, is it conformable to her real interests? Is she always to consider France as a rival, because she was so once; and is it not from a very different quarter that the liberties of Europe are now menaced? The time is perhaps not far removed when France and Austria united will be required to fight, not only for their own independence, but for the liberties of Europe and the principles of civilisation itself. In every war that may ensue between Russia and Austria on the one hand, and France on the other, Austria, whatever name she may assume, will speedily be found to be a principal in the strife; and she will be fortunate if, abandoned by an ally of whom she has experienced the inconstancy and caprice, she does not undergo the rudest strokes of fortune.

“What does France demand of Austria? Neither efforts nor sacrifices. The Emperor desires only the repose of the Continent. He is ever ready to make a maritime peace as soon as England will adhere to the treaty of Amiens. But as that is impossible, in the present temper of England, but by means of a maritime war, he desires to devote himself exclusively to it; and therefore he demands of Austria not to divert him from that great design,² and to enter into

¹ Bign. iv.
310, 319.
Dum. xii.
101, 111.

Angry note of
Talleyrand to
the cabinet of
Vienna.

Note, Aug. 5.
Talleyrand to
Cobentzel.

Inn, and the general warlike activity which pervaded the Imperial dominions, left no doubt that a contest was approaching; while, on the other hand, the whole forces of Napoleon were, unknown to Austria, converging, over the whole line from the Elbe to the Pyrenees, towards the Danube. In these circumstances it was of the highest importance to both sides to secure the co-operation of the lesser states of Germany, and especially of Bavaria, whose dominions lay directly between the hostile powers, and would in all probability be the first theatre of hostilities. The court of Munich, accordingly, was warmly urged, both by France and Austria, to side with them in the contest; and the Elector, long uncertain, hesitated between the two parties, and even entered into diplomatic connexions with both—the common resource of weak states when threatened with destruction by the collision of powerful neighbours, and hardly to be reproached as a fault when it is the result of necessity. On the one hand, it was represented by the French party that Austria was the old and hereditary enemy of Bavaria—that she had already solicited the cession of a portion of her territory; that there could be no doubt that she coveted her possessions as far as the Lech; and that the Elector had therefore every thing to hope from an alliance with Napoleon, and as much to fear from exposure to the rapacity of the Emperor. On the other hand, it was strongly urged by the old aristocratic party, that all these advantages were merely apparent;¹ that the alliance with France was a connexion with a revolutionary

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89.

Both parties warmly assail the court of Munich with proposals for alliance.

¹ Bign. vi.
320, 323.
Dum. xii.
210, 211.

no engagement which may disturb the harmony which now prevails between the two empires."

It was replied on the part of Austria on the 3d September, "That the cabinet of Vienna was both willing and anxious to put an end to the dangers which threatened Europe by a sincere and earnest mediation; but that, to do this with any prospect of success, it was indispensable that the faith of treaties should be religiously observed, and that he who violated them was the real aggressor. The treaty of Luneville carefully stipulated the independence of the Italian, Helvetic, and Batavian Republics. Every state should respect the independence of those which adjoin it, no matter whether they are strong or weak; and it is the violation of this duty by the French government, which imposes upon other states the necessity of coalescing to oppose a barrier to its aggressions. Austria is arming, but not with a hostile intention, and solely with the design of maintaining the existing peace with France, as well as the equilibrium and repose of Europe. Even should war become inevitable, she solemnly declares that the courts of Austria and Russia have bound themselves to interfere in no respect in the internal affairs of France; to make no change on the established possessions or relations in Germany; and to respect the integrity of the Ottoman empire. Great Britain has the same intentions, and is desirous to be regulated by the same moderate principles in re-establishing her pacific relations with the French empire."²

Their reply.

² Note by
Austria, Sept.
3. Dum. xii.
109, 110.

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state which threatened the subversion of all the institutions of society, and that, when menaced by such a catastrophe, the only prudent course was to adhere to the head of the Germanic body, whose interests, it might be relied on, would always be opposed to such innovations.

90.
It finally joins
France.

It was sufficiently difficult to determine which course to adopt between such opposing considerations; but, in addition to them, the Elector had other and more anxious causes for solicitude on this occasion. His eldest son was at Paris, in the power of Napoleon; the fate of the Duc d'Enghien was still recent; and his paternal fears were strongly excited by the perils which he might run if the French Emperor were irritated by decided hostilities. Vacillating between such opposite dangers, the Elector, on the 24th August, agreed to the substance of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France, but delayed the signature of the treaty on various pretences, anxious to gain time in these critical circumstances, and it was not finally signed till the 23d September, at Wurtzburg. Meanwhile, the Austrians, having some suspicion of such an understanding, summoned the Elector in a peremptory manner, on the 6th September, to unite his forces to their own. They were met by the most urgent entreaties to be allowed to remain neutral; and as this was refused, the Elector, on the 8th, despatched a letter to the Emperor, promising, if neutrality was impossible, to unite his forces to his own. In the night following, however, being overcome with terrors for his son, he secretly departed with his family to Wurtzburg; the Bavarians retired into Franconia to join the French forces; and on the same day the Austrians crossed the Inn.¹

¹ Bign. iv.
220, 323.
Dum. xii.
210, 211.

91.
The Austrians cross the
Inn. Forces
on both sides.

The preparations of Napoleon were on a scale proportioned to the magnitude of the contest in which he was engaged, and the immense forces which the allies were preparing to employ against him. Mr Pitt had conducted the negotiations for the formation of a coalition with the most consummate ability: every difficulty had been removed, every jealousy softened: Austria and Russia stood forth prominent in the fight; and hopes were even entertained, that if disaster did not attend the first efforts of the coalition, Prussia might be induced to unite her forces to those of the other allies in support of the freedom of

Europe. In Italy and Germany, no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men were preparing to act against France, among whom were one hundred and sixteen thousand Russians, advancing by forced marches through Poland towards the Bavarian plains. Their arrival, however, could not be calculated upon for at least two months to come : and in the mean time the Austrian army, which had just crossed the Inn, eighty thousand strong, stood exposed to the first strokes of Napoleon. Thirty thousand Imperialists, under the Archduke John, were already assembled in the Tyrol : and the Archduke Charles, at the head of fifty-five thousand of the best troops of the empire, was preparing to exert his great talents on the Italian plains. It could not be concealed, that the forces of the coalition would ultimately become superior ; and that France had much to dread from the prospect of having to combat with the single resources of the empire against Europe in arms on the Rhine. Every thing, therefore, depended on secrecy of combination and celerity of movement ; and in both these qualities Napoleon was unrivalled.¹*

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To meet this immense force, and destroy part before the remainder could advance to its support, was the object of Napoleon, and in its prosecution he displayed even more than his wonted energy and ability. The army of England on the shores of the Channel, the forces in Holland, the troops in Hanover, were forthwith formed into seven corps, under the command of so many marshals of the empire : their united numbers amounted to one hundred and ninety thousand men ; a force amply sufficient to crush the Imperialists in Germany, if the whole could be brought simultaneously into action before the Russians advanced to the support of the former.² The army of Italy was thirty-

¹ Dum. xii.
131, 138.
Jom. ii. 97.

92. .
The army of
England
marches from
Boulogne to
the Rhine.

² Dum. xii.
136.

* The forces of the coalition were thus disposed when hostilities commenced by the passage of the Inn :—

In Bavaria and Upper Austria, under the Archduke Ferdinand,	90,000
Reserve under the Emperor Francis, forming at Vienna,	30,000
First Russian army crossing Poland,	56,000
Second Russian army, under the Emperor Alexander,	60,000
Austrians in Tyrol,	30,000
Austrians in Italy, under Archduke Charles,	55,000
Russians and Swedes in Pomerania,	30,000

351,000

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five thousand strong, besides fifteen thousand in the Neapolitan territories ; and the troops of Bavaria and the lesser German states, whose aid might be relied on, amounted to twenty-four thousand ;—so that France could open the campaign with two hundred and seventy thousand men.*

93.
Immense preparations of
Napoleon.

But these forces, considerable as they were, formed but a part of the preparations of the Emperor. On the 23d September, he repaired to the senate, and submitted two propositions to the legislature, which were forthwith adopted. The first was a levy of eighty thousand conscripts from the class who were to become liable to military service in 1806—a sufficient proof that France was already anticipating her military resources ; the second, the re-organisation of the National Guard, throughout the whole extent of the empire. But in thus reviving this Republican institution, the Emperor was careful to organise it on a different footing from that on which it had been based during the days of democratic equality. “It is important,” said he, “that the officers of the National Guard should be *named by the Emperor* ; every species of force ought to emanate from the supreme authority : all our institutions should be in harmony ; and a single uniform direction be given to whoever commands the force of the armed citizens.” Subsequent decrees arranged the details of this re-organisation. Every man in good health was required to serve, from the age of twenty-one to that of sixty ; ten companies formed a cohort, and several cohorts, according to the locality, a legion. Those only in the departments of the frontier, from Geneva to Calais, were called into active service, and arranged into four corps, commanded by General Rampon, Marshal Lefebvre, Marshal Kellerman, and General D’Abbeville.¹

Sept. 23.

¹ Dum. xii.
?37, 238.
Bign. iv.
330.

The Emperor adjourned the meeting of the senate by the following address, which sufficiently indicated the urgent state, in his estimation, of public affairs, and

* The French forces were thus disposed :—

Grand Army, divided into seven corps, under Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Augereau, with the cavalry under Murat, and guard under Mortier,	196,472
Army of Italy,	34,674
Army of Naples,	15,000
Electoral troops,	23,815

269,960

announced that he had no alternative but to conquer or die:—"The eternal objects of the enemies of the Continent are at length accomplished; the war is renewed in the heart of Germany; Austria and Russia have united themselves to England. A few days ago, I hoped that the peace of the Continent would not be disturbed: menaces and grounds of umbrage alike found me immovable: but the Austrian army has crossed the Inn; Munich is invaded; the Elector of Bavaria is chased from his capital; all my hopes have vanished. Senators! when, in conformity with your wishes, I placed the imperial crown on my head, I undertook to you and to all the citizens of France the obligation to maintain it pure and inviolate. Magistrates, soldiers, citizens, all equally desire to preserve our country from the influence of England, which, if it once prevailed, would lead only to the burning of our fleets, the filling up of our ports, the ruin of our industry. I have kept all the promises which I have made to the French people: they have made no engagement with me which they have not more than fulfilled. Frenchmen! your Emperor will do his duty; the soldiers will do theirs; you will do yours."¹

Previous to setting out for Boulogne, Napoleon issued several decrees for the disarming of the flotilla, and the laying up in ordinary what was kept, for future and distant operations. The artillery was removed from the greater part of the armed vessels and all the transports; such part of it as could be accommodated in the harbour of Boulogne was kept there, the remainder dispersed through the harbours of the Channel. The English, too well satisfied at this dislocation of so formidable a force, made no attempt to hinder its dispersion; and soon of all that vast assemblage of vessels hardly enough remained at Boulogne to transport thirty thousand men. A reserve of twenty thousand men alone remained on the heights above the harbour, under the command of General Brune, designed at once to keep up alarm on the coasts of Britain, and form a reserve in case of disasters befalling the grand army. Thus terminated this extraordinary armament, the greatest assemblage of military and naval forces ever made in modern times, contrived with the utmost skill, conducted with the most profound dissimulation, which

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94.

His address
to the senate.

¹ Bign. iv.
330, 331.
Dum. xii.
237, 238.

95.
Entire break-
ing up of
the arma-
ment at
Boulogne.

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¹ Dum. xii.
127, 129,
142, 143.
Jom. ii. 87,
89.

entirely deceived the vigilance of the mighty nation against which it was directed, and failed at last rather from a casual combination of circumstances, and the intrepidity of an admiral whom England punished for his achievement, than from any inadequacy in the means employed to attain the vast object which her enemy had in view.¹

Determined, however, not entirely to lose the fruit of his naval armaments, Napoleon, before setting out for the grand army, issued directions for the fleet at Cadiz to put to sea and proceed to Toulon, in order to be ready to act as occasion might require on the shores of Italy. This instruction was accompanied by the appointment of Admiral Rosilly to the command of the combined fleet in lieu of Villeneuve, who was directed to surrender the command to him on his arrival—a measure which led to events of the greatest importance, by rendering the disgraced admiral desperate, and prompting him to make the ill-omened sortie which terminated in the disaster of Trafalgar. But, after bringing the fleet round to Toulon, the successor of Villeneuve was to break it down into several detached cruising squadrons, the chief of which was one to take possession of and cruise near St Helena! Strange fatality, which appeared to attach him, on the eve of so many of the greatest events of his life, to the destined scene of his exile and death!²

An important change occurred at this period, highly characteristic of the decline of revolutionary fervour, and a return to the ordinary ideas of civilised life. This was the restoration of the Gregorian calendar, and abolition of the barbarous nomenclature of the Revolutionary era, which for twelve years had been in use in France—a change prescribed by the Emperor in a decree issued shortly before he set out for Strasburg.³

Meanwhile the British government directed all their efforts to form a powerful fleet to blockade the combined squadrons in the harbour of Cadiz. Independent of the twenty ships of the line which had been detached from the Channel fleet by Admiral Cornwallis, and the four which Admiral Collingwood had under his command off the Isle of Leon, seven more were got together in Portsmouth and Plymouth; and Nelson, who had

96.

The combined fleet is ordered nevertheless to sail from Cadiz.

² Dum. xii.
145, 149.

97.

Restoration of the Gregorian calendar.
July 9.

³ Dum. xii.
151.

98.

Increase of the British blockading force before Cadiz.

retired to his house at Merton to recruit his exhausted strength, again volunteered his services to resume the command, repaired to Portsmouth, and hoisted his flag on board the *Victory* of ninety guns. Even during the few weeks of his retirement, his thoughts perpetually ran on the combined fleets, and he was constantly impressed with the idea, that they were destined to receive their death-blow from his hand. In these generous sentiments he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, who, notwithstanding the ardour of her attachment, constantly urged him to sacrifice every private consideration at the call of public duty.* He was vividly impressed, however, with the presentiment that he would fall in the battle which was approaching, and before he left London called at the upholsterer's, where the coffin which Captain Hallowell had given him, made of the wreck of the *L'Orient*, was deposited, desiring that its history might be engraven on its lid, as it was highly probable he would want it on his return. On the night on which he left Merton, he wrote a few lines in his journal, highly descriptive of the elevated feeling and manly piety which formed the leading features of his character.† With difficulty he tore himself, on the beach at Portsmouth on the following morning, from the crowd who knelt and blessed him as he passed; and the last sounds which reached his ears from that loved land which he was never again to see, were the enthusiastic

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Sept. 14.

Sept. 14.

¹ South. ii.
234, 237.

* When Captain Blackwood, on his way to London with despatches, called at Merton one morning early, Nelson, the moment he saw him, exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall yet have to beat them. Depend upon it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing." At length his anxiety became so excessive, that he resolved, notwithstanding all the remonstrances of his physicians, to volunteer his services to resume the command, which were, of course, gladly accepted by the Admiralty. In this resolution he was strongly supported by Lady Hamilton, with that feeling of generous ardour which has so often animated her sex in similar circumstances when influenced by romantic attachment. "Nelson," said she, "however we may lament your absence, offer your services; they will be accepted, and you will gain a quiet heart by it. You will gain a glorious victory, and then you may return here and be happy." He looked at her with tears in his eyes—"Brave Emma! good Emma! If there were more Emmas there would be more Nelsons."—SOUTHEY, ii. 232.

† "Friday night, Sept. 13, half-past ten.—I drove from dear, dear Merton, where I left all which I hold dear in this world, to go to serve my King and country. May the great God whom I adore enable me to fulfil the expectations of my country; and if it is his good pleasure that I should return, my thanks will never cease being offered up to the throne of his mercy. If it is his good Providence to cut short my days upon earth, I bow with the greatest submission, relying that he will protect those so dear to me whom I leave behind. His will be done!"—SOUTHEY, ii. 235.

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cheers of his countrymen, who never ceased to strain their aching eyes toward his vessel till it vanished from their sight.

99.
Enthusiastic
reception of
Nelson by
the fleet.

Nelson's reception in the fleet off Cadiz was as gratifying as his departure from England: the yards were all crowded with hardy veterans, anxious to get a sight of their favourite hero, and peals of acclamation shook the ships when he was seen on the quarterdeck of the *Victory* shaking hands with his old captains, who in transports of joy hastened on board to congratulate him on his arrival. No one from that moment entertained a doubt that the fate of the combined fleet was sealed, if they should venture from their harbour. So great was the terror of his name, that, notwithstanding the positive orders to sail for Toulon which he had received, *Villeneuve* hesitated to obey when he heard of his arrival; and in a council of war it was resolved not to venture out unless they were at least one-third superior to the enemy. Informed of this circumstance, Nelson carefully concealed his real strength from his opponents; stationed his fleet out of sight, about sixty miles to the westward of Cape St Mary's, with a chain of repeating frigates to inform him of the motions of the enemy, while, at the same time, the blockade of the port was rigorously enforced, so as to render it probable that ere long they would be compelled to sail, from the impossibility of finding supplies in the vicinity of Cadiz for so great a multitude. Forty sail of the line were now assembled in that harbour, of which thirty-three were ready for sea; and as Napoleon, never contemplating the return of the combined fleet to Cadiz, had made no magazines of provisions in that quarter, though ample stores had been collected at Rochfort, Brest, and the harbours of the Channel, the want of provisions was soon severely felt.¹

¹ South. ii.
237. Dum.
xiii. 174, 177.

100.
His stratagem
to induce the
enemy to
leave the
harbour.
Oct. 15.

Still, however, the council of war which *Villeneuve* had summoned to his assistance declined to undertake the responsibility of an engagement, and Nelson, to overcome their irresolution, had recourse to a stratagem, which was crowned with the most complete success. Having received, on the 15th October, information that he would soon be joined by six sail of the line from England, he ventured on the bold step of detaching Admiral Louis

with a like force to Gibraltar for stores and water; thus maintaining the blockade with only twenty-two line-of-battle ships, in presence of thirty-three newly equipped and ready for action. In these critical circumstances, Nelson was not without some feelings of anxiety lest the Carthagenas or Rochfort squadrons should join the enemy and increase their already formidable superiority; yet even then he had the generosity to allow Sir Robert Calder, who was obliged to go home to demand a court-martial, to proceed thither in his own ninety-gun ship, which could ill be spared at such a crisis. Fortunately the promised reinforcements arrived, and in single vessels, so as not to attract the notice of the enemy; and Nelson, whose anxiety for the approaching combat had now risen to the very highest pitch, again found himself at the head of seven-and-twenty ships of the line.¹

Deceived by this stratagem as to the real strength of the enemy—aware that Napoleon was desirous of concentrating his principal naval resources in the Mediterranean, and apprehensive that, if he any longer delayed his departure, Admiral Rosilly might assume the command, and deprive him of the fair opportunity which now presented itself of covering his former failures by the defeat of England's greatest hero, Villeneuve at length resolved upon putting to sea and risking a battle. Early on the 19th October, accordingly, the inshore frigates made signal that the enemy were coming out of the harbour; and at two o'clock in the afternoon, that they were fairly at sea, steering for the southeast. Overjoyed at this intelligence, Nelson instantly gave the signal to chase in the same direction; and though they were not got sight of on the following day, yet, so well were their motions watched by the frigates on the outlook, that the British admiral was made acquainted with every tack which they made, while he himself studiously kept out of view, lest, upon seeing the number of his vessels, they should return to Cadiz harbour. At length, at daybreak on the 21st, their whole fleet was descried, drawn up in a semi-circle, in close order of battle, about twelve miles a-head; and Nelson, who had previously arranged the order of attack with his worthy second in command, Collingwood, and fully explained it to the officers of the fleet,² made

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Oct. 19.
1 South. ii.
237, 242.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 233,
234. Dum.
xiii. 174, 177

101.
Which is
completely
successful.
Oct. 19.

2 James, iv.
39. South.
ii. 240, 246.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 234,
235. Dum.
xii. 175, 177.

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signal to bear down in two lines perpendicularly upon the enemy. He had twenty-seven sail of the line and four frigates; they thirty-three line-of-battle ships and seven frigates, four of the former being three-deckers; and four thousand marksmen were dispersed through the fleet, who unhappily took too effectual aim in the battle which followed.*

102.
Dispositions
on both sides.

Nelson's plan of attack was, to bear down upon the enemy in double columns, and thus break the line in two places at once. In this way he thought it was most likely that each ship would be brought speedily into close action with its antagonist, and the greatest chance of decisive success be obtained. Villeneuve's instructions, as the English lay to windward, were to lie in close order and await the attack. The fleet was divided into two lines, so arranged, that at the interstices of each two vessels in the front line, the broadside of one in the second presented itself: a combination as well imagined as can be conceived, to meet the anticipated British manœuvre of breaking the line. The front line, commanded by Villeneuve himself and Admirals Alava and Dumanoir, consisted of twenty-one line-of-battle ships: twelve under Admirals Gravina and Magon formed the second. Collingwood, in the *Royal Sovereign*, led the first column of the British, followed closely by the *Belleisle* and *Mars*; Nelson himself, in the *Victory*, headed the second, immediately after whom came the *Temeraire* and the *Neptune*. When the lines were completely formed, and the ships bearing rapidly down on the enemy, so that it was evident an engagement was inevitable, Nelson retired to his cabin and wrote the following prayer:—"May the great God whom I worship

* In communicating his plan of attack to Collingwood, Nelson, who was altogether destitute of professional jealousy, wrote—"I send you my plan of attack as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in; but it is to place you perfectly at ease respecting my intentions, and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into execution. We can, my dear Coll., have no little jealousies. We have only one great object in view, that of annihilating our enemies and getting a glorious peace for our country. No man has more confidence in another than I have in you, and no man will render your services more justice than your very old friend, Nelson and Bronte." Nelson said to his captains, "that knowing his precise object to be that of a close and decisive action would supply any deficiency of signals; and in case they could not be seen or understood, no captain can do wrong who places his ship alongside that of an enemy." So impressed were these noble veterans with the grandeur of the plan of attack proposed to them, that many of them shed tears in his presence.—SOUTHEY, ii. 243, 244.

grant to my country, and for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory, and may no misconduct in any one tarnish it; and may humanity after victory be the predominant feature in the British fleet! For myself individually, I commit my life to Him that made me, and may his blessing alight on my endeavours for serving my country faithfully. To Him I resign myself and the just cause which is entrusted me to defend." Noble sentiments to be uttered by such a leader on such an occasion, and worthy to be engraven on the hearts of all who, like him, are called to the glorious duty of defending the cause of freedom and religion against the efforts of tyrannic power! ¹

Never did the ocean exhibit a grander spectacle than was presented by the British fleet bearing down on the combined squadrons, at noon on the 21st October, a few leagues to the northwest of CAPE TRAFALGAR. A long swell was setting into the Bay of Cadiz; our ships, crowding all their canvass, moved majestically before it, with light winds from the southwest. Right before them lay the mighty armament of France and Spain, the sun shining full on their close-set sails, and the vast three-deckers which it contained appearing of stupendous magnitude amidst the lesser line-of-battle ships by which they were surrounded. The British sailors, however, admired only the beauty and splendour of the spectacle, and, never doubting of success, observed to each other. "What a fine sight yonder ships would make at Spithead!" Nelson, when he appeared on the quarterdeck, wore his admiral's frock-coat, bearing on his left breast four stars, the insignia of the different orders with which he was invested: the officers on board lamented such a display, which it was evident would expose him to certain death from the enemy's marksmen; but they knew it was in vain to remonstrate, as his resolution was taken, and he had before been heard to say, "In honour I gained them, and in honour I will die with them." He was in good spirits, but calm and sedate; not in that exhilaration with which he had entered into battle at the Nile and Copenhagen: it was evident that he neither expected nor wished to survive the action. He asked Captain Blackwood what he should deem a victory?

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¹ Collingwood's Memoirs, i. 162. James, iv. 41, 49. South. ii. 246, 247. Dum. xiii. 183.

103.
Magnificent aspect of the fleets as they approached each other. Oct. 21.

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That officer answered he should consider it a glorious result if fourteen were taken; but Nelson replied, he should not be satisfied with less than twenty. He then made signal for the British fleet to prepare to anchor at the close of the day; and when it was given, asked the captain whether he did not think there was another wanting. After musing awhile, he fixed what it should be; and the signal appeared at the mast-head of the *Victory*, the last he ever made, which will be remembered as long as the British name shall endure: "ENGLAND EXPECTS THAT EVERY MAN WILL DO HIS DUTY." It was received by a rapturous shout throughout the fleet, which already rung the knell of those of France and Spain, although their seamen were brave and experienced, and animated with the utmost enthusiasm for the combat which was approaching. "Now," said Nelson, "I can do no more; we must trust to the Great Disposer of all events, and the justice of our cause. I thank God for this great opportunity of doing my duty."¹

¹ James, iv.
45, 47.
South. ii. 252,
253. Dum.
xiii. 185, 186.

104.
Order in
which the
English
fleet bears
down.

Nelson led thirteen ships of the line in the *Victory*; Collingwood fourteen in the *Royal Sovereign*: but such was the superior sailing of the latter vessel, that she speedily distanced all her competitors, and was already near the enemy's line when the last vessels in the column were still six miles distant; and as Nelson steered two points more to the north than Collingwood, in order to cut off the enemy from retreat to Cadiz, the other column was first engaged.* Far ahead of all the rest of the fleet was the *Royal Sovereign*, which, with all sails set, steered right into the centre of the enemy's line, and was already enveloped in fire, when the nearest vessels, notwithstanding their utmost efforts, were still more than two miles in the rear. Collingwood's guns were all double-shotted, and by long previous practice he had brought the training of his men to such perfection, that they could fire three well-directed broadsides in three minutes and a half. On the morning of the battle he was in unusual spirits, conversing cheerfully with his officers. "Now, gentlemen," said he,

* Nelson, in bearing down, made signal when the ships entered into action to cut away their canvass, in order that no hands might be lost in furling the sails. The loss to the fleet in a few minutes was nearly £200,000; but to this admirable piece of foresight much of the early success was owing.

"let us do something to-day which the world may talk of hereafter." * "See," said Nelson, "how that noble fellow Collingwood carries his ship into action!" while Collingwood, well knowing what would be passing in the breast of his commander and friend, at the same time observed, "What would Nelson give to be here!" When Villeneuve beheld the manner in which the hostile fleet was bearing down upon his line, he remarked to those around him that all was lost. In passing the Santa Anna, the Royal Sovereign gave her a broadside and a half into her stern, tearing it down and killing and wounding four hundred of her men: then wheeling rapidly round, she lay along-side of her so close, that the lower yards of the two vessels were locked together, and the muzzles of their guns literally touched each other.¹

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¹ Collingwood, i. 168, 169, 172, 173. South, ii. 257.

The Spanish admiral, Alava, seeing that it was the intention of the Royal Sovereign to engage him to leeward, had brought all his strength to the starboard side; and such was the weight of his metal that his first broadside made the Royal Sovereign heel two streaks out of the water. A furious combat now ensued between the two first-rates; but such was the rapidity and precision of the Royal Sovereign's fire, that the discharges of the Spaniard rapidly became weaker and weaker; and it was expected by the English that she would be compelled to strike before another British ship had got into close action. This disgrace, however, was prevented by the San Justo, Indomptable, Fougueux, and San Leandro, which grouped round the Royal Sovereign when they saw their admiral's danger, and assailed her on all sides by such a vehement cross-fire that their balls frequently struck each other above the deck of the English vessel. Regardless of his danger, Collingwood continued for twenty minutes pouring his broadsides into his first-rate

105.
Battle of Trafalgar.
Heroic conduct of Collingwood.

* The classical reader will recollect the last words of Hector in his combat with the heaven-defended Achilles:—

"Νῦν αὖτέ με μοῖρα κηράνει.
Μὴ μὲν ἀσπουδαί γε καὶ ἀκλειῶς ἀπολοίμην,
'Αλλὰ μίγα ῥέξας τι καὶ ἴσσομένοισι πυθίσθαι." †
Iliad, X, 505.

How identical is the heroic spirit in similar circumstances in all ages of the world!

† " 'Tis true I perish, yet I perish great:
Yet in a mighty deed I shall expire:
Let future ages hear it, and admire!"

Pope.

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¹ James, iv.
49, 52. Col-
lingwood, i.
172, 174.
South. ii. 257.
Dum. xiii.
201, 204.

antagonist, and with such effect that she at length returned his fire only by a single gun, at long intervals from each other. Still, with a firmness worthy of the Spanish character, the admiral continued the contest, relying on the assistance of his friends, who now clustered round the English vessel so closely that she was entirely hid from the remainder of the fleet. The sailors in the other English vessels coming up, watched with intense anxiety the opening of the smoke, which at length showed the British flag waving unconquered in the midst of the numerous ensigns of France and Spain by which it was surrounded.¹

106.
Nelson next
breaks the
line.

Meanwhile Nelson, burning with anxiety, was crowding all sail to reach the scene of danger, and as he approached within a mile and a half's distance, single shots were fired from different vessels in the enemy's line, some of which fell short, and others went over, until at length one went through the Victory's main topgallant sail. A minute or two of awful silence ensued, during which the Victory continued to advance, when all at once the whole van of seven or eight ships opened a concentric fire upon her, of such severity as hardly ever before was directed at a single ship. At this awful moment the wind, which had long been slight, died away to a mere breath, so that the Victory advanced still more slowly, ploughing majestically through the waves, unable from her position to return a single shot. Presently a ball knocked away the wheel—every man at the poop was soon killed or wounded—the spars and rigging were falling on all sides—while the crew, with their lighted matches in their hands, stood at their guns, long waiting, with the coolness which discipline alone can give, the signal to return the fire. At this moment, Nelson's secretary, Mr Scott, was killed by his side. "This is too warm work, Hardy," said he, "to last long," as he continued with his captain, amidst the scene of destruction, his accustomed slow walk in the centre of the vessel. He at first steered for the bows of the Santissima Trinidad, which he imagined bore the French admiral, though his flag was not yet hoisted: but as the Victory approached, the enemy closed up,² and presented so compact a front that it was impossible to find an

² James, iv.
54, 59. Dum.
xiii. 204, 206.
South. ii.
259, 262.

entrance, and Nelson directed Captain Hardy to steer for the opening between the Temeraire and Bucentaure.

At one o'clock the Victory, as she passed slowly and deliberately through, poured her broadside, treble-shotted, into the Bucentaure, with such terrible effect, that above four hundred men were killed or wounded by the discharge. While listening with characteristic avidity to the deafening crash made by their shot in the French hull, the British crew were nearly suffocated by the clouds of black smoke which entered the Victory's port-holes, and Nelson and Hardy had their clothes covered by the volumes of dust which issued from the crumbling wood-works of the Bucentaure's stern. In advancing, the Victory received a dreadful broadside from the French Neptune, but, without returning a shot, passed on to the Redoubtable, with which she grappled, and commenced a furious conflict, while with her other guns she engaged the Bucentaure and Santissima Trinidad. Captain Harvey, in the Temeraire, fell on board the Redoubtable on the other side, so that these three ships formed as compact a tier as if they had been moored together, their heads all lying the same way. The lieutenants of the Victory upon this depressed their guns, and diminished the charge, lest the shot should pass through and injure the Temeraire; and as every shot from the Victory set the Redoubtable on fire, the British sailors stood with buckets of water in their hands, and extinguished the flames in the enemy's decks as they arose, lest they should involve both ships in destruction.

After the first discharge, the Redoubtable closed her lower-deck ports, and fired from them no more, fearing that she would be boarded from the Victory. Seeing this, and thinking she had struck, Nelson twice ordered the firing into her to cease; but her crew still kept up a murderous warfare from the decks and tops: and to this humanity he fell a victim. The sixty-eight pounders, indeed, on the Victory's forecastle, each loaded with five hundred musket-balls, soon cleared the Redoubtable's gangways; but a destructive fire was kept up from her fore and maintops, and as Nelson was walking on the quarterdeck, he was pierced by a shot from one of the French marksmen, not more than fifteen yards dis-

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107.

And engages
the enemy in
close combat.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1805, 235,
236. James,
iv. 54, 59.
South. ii. 259,
262. Dum.
xiii. 20, 406,
208.

108.

He is mor-
tally
wounded.

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tant. "They have done for me at last, Hardy," said he. "I hope not," said Hardy. "Yes," he replied; "my backbone is shot through." He was immediately carried below; but even then, such was his presence of mind, that he directed the tiller-rope, which had been cut away, to be replaced, and taking out his handkerchief covered his face and stars, lest the crew should be discouraged by the sight. The cockpit was crowded with wounded and dying men; he insisted that the surgeon should leave him and attend to those to whom he might be useful, "For to me," said he, "you can do nothing." All that could be done was to fan him with paper, and give him lemonade to assuage his burning thirst. As the action continued, however, several ships of the enemy began to strike; the crew of the Victory cheered as each successive flag was lowered, and at every hurrah a gleam of joy illuminated the countenance of the dying hero.¹

¹ South. ii.
263, 264.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 237.
James, iv. 61,
63.

Meanwhile the battle continued with unabated fury in all directions. At a quarter past two the Santa Anna struck to the Royal Sovereign, after an uninterrupted combat of two hours' duration; but the loss on board of the English ship was also very severe, and she was reduced to nearly as unmanageable a state as her gigantic opponent. During the latter part of the action Collingwood took his men off the poop, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed; but he long after remained there, fearless of death himself. At length, descending to the quarterdeck, he visited the sailors, enjoining them not to fire a shot in waste; looking himself along the guns to see that they were properly pointed, commending particularly a negro gunner, who, while he stood beside him, fired ten times directly into the opposite port-hole of the Santa Anna. Captain Harvey of the Temeraire, when engaged in close combat with the Redoubtable, perceived the Fougueux of seventy-four guns preparing to board his ship on the other side. He allowed the enemy to come within a hundred yards, and then poured in a broadside with such tremendous effect that she fell a perfect wreck aboard of the English vessel, and was soon after carried, with little resistance, by boarding.² The other British vessels, as they successively came into

109.
Details of the
action in
other quar-
ters.

² James, iv.
75, 80.
South. ii. 270.
Dum. xlii.
208. Colling-
wood, i. 174.

action, engaged in close combat the nearest ships of the enemy; and when the arrival of the remote parts of the columns had reduced the great odds against which the leading line-of-battle ships had at first to contend, the wonted superiority of the English soon became apparent.

Before three o'clock ten ships of the line had struck. The fire on the poop of the *Victory* from the tops of the *Redoubtable* was so tremendous, that for a time it was almost deserted, upon which the French made a vigorous attempt to board; but they were quickly repulsed by the crew of the English vessel rushing up from below and engaging them at the muzzles of the muskets. Shortly after, the *Temeraire*, having wafted nearer, poured in her whole broadside upon the crowded decks of the Frenchman with such effect that two hundred men were swept away by the discharge. By degrees, however, the marksmen in the tops of the *Redoubtable* were picked off by the *Victory's* marines; and at length her whole masts and rigging fell across the *Temeraire's* bows, which, forming a bridge of communication between the two combatants, she was boarded and taken possession of by the crew of the English vessel, which thus had the glory of capturing an antagonist on the right and left. Never had a ship been more gallantly defended: out of six hundred and forty-three men who composed her crew, only five-and-thirty reached the English shores.* Shortly after, the *Bucentaure*, which had never recovered the first broadside of the *Victory*, struck her colours, with *Villeneuve* on board; and the masts of the *Santissima Trinidad*, which had been exposed to a tremendous raking fire from the *Victory*, *Neptune*, *Leviathan*, and *Conqueror*, fell with a tremendous crash, and she was taken possession of, when wholly disabled, by a boat from the *Prince*.¹

While victory was thus every where declaring for the British arms, Nelson was lying in the cockpit in the utmost anxiety to hear the details of the battle. As Captain Hardy could not for above an hour leave the

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110.
Victory every where declares for the British.

¹ James, iv. 75, 89. South. ii. 270, 271. Ann. Reg. 1805, 236, 237. Dum. xiii. 208, 209. Vict. et Cong. xvi. 170. 175. Collingwood, i. 174.

111.
Nelson's last hours and death.

* The marksman who had wounded Nelson did not escape. Shortly after the latter fell, the storm of balls was so severe that an old quartermaster, who had seen the man fire, and two midshipmen, alone were left on the *Victory's* poop. The two midshipmen kept firing, and he supplied them with cartridges. The old quartermaster pointed to the man who had fired the fatal shot, who wore a glazed hat and white frock. Both midshipmen then fired, and the man fell.—SOUTHEY, ii. 269, 270.

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deck, he repeatedly exclaimed, "Will no one bring Hardy to me? He must be killed: he is surely dead." At length he came down; they shook hands in silence. Hardy in vain strove to suppress his feelings at that painful moment. "Well, Hardy," said Nelson, "how goes the day with us?"—"Very well," replied Hardy; "ten ships have struck, but five of the van have tacked, and are coming down upon the Victory; but I have called two or three fresh ships round, and have no doubt we shall give them a drubbing."—"I hope," said Nelson, "none of our ships have struck?"—"There is no fear of that," replied Hardy.—"I am a dead man," then said Nelson; "I am going fast: it will be all over with me soon." Hardy then went up to the deck, but returned in about fifty minutes, and taking Nelson by the hand, congratulated him, even in the arms of death, on his glorious victory; adding that fourteen or fifteen of the enemy were taken. "That's well," replied Nelson, "but I bargained for twenty;" and then, in a stronger voice, added "Anchor, Hardy, anchor! Do *you* make the signal. Kiss me, Hardy," said he. Hardy knelt down and kissed his cheek. "Now, I am satisfied!" said Nelson; "thank God, I have done my duty!" His articulation now became difficult; but he was repeatedly heard to say, "Thank God, I have done my duty!" and expired at half-past four without a groan, leaving a name unrivalled even in the glorious annals of the English navy.¹

¹ Beattie's
Narrat. 46,
49. South. ii.
267, 270.

112.

Vast magni-
tude of the
victory.

The combined fleet now presented the most melancholy spectacle. In every direction were to be seen only floating wrecks or dismantled hulks. The proud armament, late so splendid, was riddled, shattered, and torn by shot. Guns of distress were heard on all sides; and in every quarter the British boats were to be seen hastening to the vessels which had surrendered, to extricate their crews from their perilous situation. Twenty ships of the line had struck, with Villeneuve, the commander-in-chief, and the Spanish admirals, Alava and Cisneros. One of them, the *Achille*, of seventy-four guns, had blown up after she surrendered; but nineteen ships of the line, including two first-rates, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of a hundred and thirty guns, and *Santa Anna*, of a hundred and twelve, were in the hands of the British,

and lay in mingled confusion alongside of their redoubtable conquerors. In this extremity Admiral Gravina, with nine ships of the line, forming the van of the combined fleet, stood away for Cadiz; and Admiral Dumanoir, with four French ships, took to flight, pouring his broadsides, as he passed, not only into the British ships, but the Spanish prizes which had struck their colours; a circumstance which, although probably unavoidable, from the confused way in which friend and foe were intermingled, contributed not a little to augment the irritation between the two nations, which this terrible disaster could not fail to produce. The British ships were too much occupied in taking care of their numerous prizes to be able to give chase; and Dumanoir stood out to the northward and got clear off, only, however, to fall into the hands of another squadron, and ultimately reach a British harbour.¹

It had been Nelson's dying instructions to Admiral Collingwood to bring the fleet to anchor; and it would have been well for that great and good man had this advice been followed, as he would have probably brought his nineteen noble prizes in safety to Spithead.* As it was, he deemed it an unnecessary precaution till nine at night, and the consequences proved eminently disastrous.† Early on the morning of the 22d a strong southerly wind arose, with squally weather, and a heavy swell set in from the Atlantic into the Bay of Cadiz. Notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the British, it was found impossible to keep the prizes in tow, or make the necessary repairs on their pierced and ruined sides to enable them to ride out the gale; and the consequence was, that most of them drifted their cables, and either foundered at sea or were wrecked on the coast. The crew of the *Algesiraz*

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¹ James, iv.
99, 102.
South. ii. 273,
274. Dum.
xiii. 228, 229.
Vict. et Conq.
xvi. 188, 192.

113.
Violent tem-
pest, and dis-
asters to the
forces after
it terminated.

* A practical proof of the benefit which might have been derived to the fleet and the prizes from attending to Nelson's dying instructions was afforded by the Defence. This vessel, with its prize the *San Ildefonso*, anchored, and rode out the gale in safety. The *Swiftsure* and *Bahama* prizes also anchored and were saved.—JAMES, iv. 130.

† In justice to Collingwood, however, it must be stated, that many high naval authorities are of opinion that if he had anchored immediately after the battle, the consequences might have been fatal to many of the British squadron, not one of which was lost by pursuing the opposite course; and that, when the signal to anchor was given at nine at night, many vessels, including the *Victory* itself, were incapable of obeying.—COLLINGWOOD, i. 191, 192, *Note*.

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Oct. 23.

rose upon the slender British guard which had her in possession, and escaped with her into Cadiz, where the authorities had the generosity to allow the English prize crew to return on their parole to their own fleet. Encouraged by this circumstance, Captain Kerjulien, the senior French officer in the harbour, put to sea with five sail of the line and five frigates, the only part of the combined fleet which was in a condition for service, in the hope of recapturing some of the dismantled hulls which were drifting about the coast. The British instantly formed in line of battle, covering such of the prizes as they still had in tow, and the French did not approach within gunshot; but their frigates succeeded in getting hold of the *Santa Anna* and *Nep-tune*, which drifted into their hands, and brought them into Cadiz. Many melancholy catastrophes happened during the storm. Among the rest the *Indomptable* was wrecked on the coast, having on board, besides her own, the survivors of the *Bucentaure's* crew, and above a thousand persons perished. Some of the prizes foundered in the gale; others were sunk by the British. Four only reached Gibraltar in safety. But the British took Admirals Villeneuve, Alava, and Cisneros, besides twenty thousand prisoners, including the land forces on board; and the combined fleet was almost totally annihilated, while their own loss was only sixteen hundred and ninety men killed and wounded. "Six-and-twenty ships of the line," says General Mathieu Dumas, "at Trafalgar or Cape Ortegal,* were compelled to strike their colours. It may truly be said that there were left only a few remnants of the fleet which two months before had filled England with alarm."¹ †

An interchange of courteous deeds took place between

¹ Dum. xlii.
230, 239.
James, iv.
123, 137.
Coll. i. 183,
184.

* The subsequent action with Sir R. Strachan.

† In the midst of this scene of ruin, Admiral Collingwood did not neglect the duty which he owed to the Supreme Disposer of all events. On the day after the battle, the following general order was issued to the fleet:—"The Almighty God, whose arm is strength, having of his great mercy been pleased to crown the exertions of his majesty's fleet with success, in giving them a complete victory over their enemies on the 21st of this month, and that all praise and thanksgiving may be offered up to the throne of grace for the great benefit to our country and to mankind, I have thought proper that a day should be appointed for a general humiliation before God, and thanksgiving for his merciful goodness, imploring forgiveness of sins, a continuation of his divine mercy, and his constant aid to us in defence of our country, liberties, and laws, without which the utmost efforts of man are nought."—COLLINGWOOD, i. 179.

the British fleet and the Spaniards at Cadiz. The magnitude of the disaster had extinguished all feelings of irritation, and brought the people into that state of sad exaltation which is nearly allied to generous emotion. Admiral Collingwood made an offer to send all the wounded Spaniards ashore; a proposal which excited the deepest gratitude in that high-spirited people, and was at the same time a seasonable relief to the British squadron, already sufficiently occupied with its own wounded, and the numerous prizes in their hands. In return, the Marquis of Solano, governor of Cadiz, sent to offer the English the use of the hospitals for their wounded, pledging the Spanish honour that they should be carefully attended to. When the storm after the action drove some of the prizes upon the coast, they declared that the English who were thus thrown into their hands should not be considered as prisoners of war; and the Spanish soldiers gave up their own beds to their shipwrecked enemies. Already was to be seen the commencement of that heartfelt alliance which was so soon destined to take place between these generous enemies; and it was amidst the tempests of Trafalgar that the feelings were produced which brought them to stand side by side at Vittoria and Toulouse.¹

No words can describe the mingled feelings of joy and grief, of exultation and melancholy, which pervaded the British empire upon the news being received of the battle of Trafalgar. The greatest naval victory recorded in the annals of the world had been gained by their arms. The dangers of invasion, the menaces of Napoleon, were at an end. Secure in their sea-girt isle, they could now behold without alarm the marshaled forces of Europe arrayed in hostility against them. In a single moment, from the result of one engagement, they had passed from a state of anxious solicitude to one of independence and security. Inestimable as these blessings were, they yet seemed inadequately purchased by the life of the hero by whom they had been gained. The feelings of grief were even more powerful than those of gratitude; and England, with the fleets of her antagonist sunk in the deep, seemed less secure than when, in presence of her yet unscathed

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114.
Courteous intercourse
with the
Spaniards at
Cadiz.

¹ Collingwood, i. 185, 190.
South. ii. 275, 276.

115.
Mingled joy
and grief in
Britain on
the occasion.

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116.
Honours
granted to
the family of
Nelson.

enemies, she was protected by the hero whose flaming sword turned every way.

Need it be added that all the honours which a grateful country could bestow were heaped upon the memory of Lord Nelson? His brother was made an earl, with a grant of £6000 a-year: £10,000 was voted to each of his sisters, and £100,000 for the purchase of an estate. A public funeral was decreed, and a monument by the nation in the place of his interment, St Paul's Cathedral. The principal cities of the empire vied with each other in erecting monuments and statues to his memory. Admiral Collingwood was made a baron, and received a pension of £2000 a-year; a grant which first raised that noble officer from the state of comparative dependence which is so often the lot of upright integrity. The remains of Nelson were consigned to the grave amidst all the pomp of funeral obsequies, in St Paul's, followed by a countless multitude of sorrowing spectators. The leaden coffin in which he was brought home was cut in pieces and distributed as relics through the fleet; and when at his interment his flag was about to be lowered into the grave, the sailors who assisted at the ceremony with one accord rent it in pieces, that each might preserve a fragment as long as he lived. Unbounded was the public grief at his untimely end. "Yet," in the words of his eloquent biographer, "he cannot be said to have fallen prematurely whose work was done; nor ought he to be lamented who died so full of honours, and at the height of human fame. The most triumphant death is that of the martyr; the most awful, that of the martyred patriot; the most splendid, that of the hero in the hour of victory: and if the chariot and horses of fire had been vouchsafed for Nelson's translation, he could scarcely have departed in a brighter blaze of glory."¹

¹ South. ii.
276, 280.
Coll. i. 214.

117.
Character of
that naval
hero.

Lord Nelson was the greatest naval officer of this or any other nation whose achievements have been recorded in history. The energies of an ardent and impetuous mind were in him wholly absorbed in patriotic feeling. Duty to his God, his King, and country, constituted the simple objects to which unrivalled powers and consummate genius were directed. Like all other great commanders, he took the utmost pains to make his officers

thoroughly acquainted beforehand with his general plan of operations, but entrusted them with full discretionary powers in carrying them into execution. He possessed the eagle eye which at once discerns the fitting movement, and the capacity for skilful combination which brings every power at his disposal simultaneously and decisively into action. Simple in his desires, enthusiastic in his character, he was alike superior to the love of wealth, the bane of inferior, and envy of others, the frailty of ambitious minds. Devotion to his country was in him blended with a constant sense of religious duty; and amidst all the license of arms he was distinguished from the first by an early and manly piety. In later years, when his achievements had marked him out as the great defender of Christianity, he considered himself an instrument in the hand of Providence to combat the infidel spirit of the Revolution, and commenced his despatch on the battle of the Nile by ascribing the whole to Almighty God. Too great to be fettered by rules, too original to condescend to imitation, he consulted his own inspiration only in all his mighty deeds, and in every instance left the stamp of native genius on the duties, whether elevated or humble, which he performed. His whole career, from his first entrance into the navy to the battle of Trafalgar, exhibited a pattern of every manly virtue. Bold in conception, cautious in combination, firm in execution, cool in danger, he was the most successful, because the most profound and intrepid, of leaders. If a veil could be drawn over the deeds perpetrated at Naples, his public character might be deemed without a fault: but no human being was ever yet perfect; and that alloy of frailty which has descended to all from our first parents, long concealed in him by the intensity of patriotic devotion, was at length revealed by the fascination of female wickedness.¹*

The battle of Trafalgar was soon followed by another victory, which at any other period would have excited the most lively satisfaction, but was hardly noticed in the transports consequent on that stupendous event. Admi-

¹ Dupin's
Voyages, iv.
66. Bretton,
iii. 463.

118.
Victory of
Sir R.
Strachan.

* The ultimate fate of the celebrated and bewitching Lady Hamilton, whose influence led Nelson into the cruel executions at Naples, which form the only blot on his character, was a remarkable instance of moral retribution. She died in France, many years afterwards, alone and unbefriended, in want of the common necessities of life.

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Nov. 4.

ral Dumanoir, who had escaped from the disaster at Cadiz, and crossed the Bay of Biscay in hopes of getting either into Rochfort or Brest harbours, fell in, on the 2d November, with the frigates of Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, who immediately made signal that a strange fleet was in sight. The British admiral instantly gave chase, which was continued two days and nights, during which the light of the moon rendered the enemy visible, until at length, at noon on the 4th November, the two squadrons were so near, that Dumanoir was obliged to lie to, and receive battle. The English fleet at first consisted of five ships of the line and four frigates; but during the chase one of the former was driven away by stress of weather, and in the action which followed four line-of-battle ships and four frigates alone were engaged. The French had four sail of the line only, and some of their guns were dismounted from the effects of the battle of Trafalgar. The battle began at noon, by each of the British line-of-battle ships engaging one of the enemy, and lasted with great vigour for four hours; when it terminated in the capture of every one of the French ships, but not till they were almost totally dismasted, and had sustained a loss of seven hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Crippled and dispirited as they were, it was not to be expected that the four French ships could have withstood the shock of four fresh English line-of-battle ships, supported by four frigates, who took an important part in the action; and the heavy loss which they sustained proves that they had not surrendered till the last extremity. Sir Richard Strachan brought his four prizes into harbour, which somewhat consoled the English for the absence of so many of those taken at Trafalgar; and their satisfaction was increased by the British loss being only twenty-four killed and a hundred and eleven wounded.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
232, 238.
James, iv.
154, 163.

119.
Reflections
on the deci-
sive nature of
these suc-
cesses.

It is observed by Mr Hume, that actions at sea are seldom, if ever, so decisive as those at land: a remark suggested by the repeated indecisive actions between the English and Dutch in the reign of Charles II.; but which affords a striking proof of the danger of generalising from too limited a collection of facts. Had he extended his retrospect further, he would have observed that the most decisive and important of all actions recorded in history

have been fought at sea. The battle of Salamis rolled back from Greece the tide of Persian invasion; that of Actium gave a master to the Roman world; that of Lepanto arrested for ever the dangers of Mahometan invasion in the south of Europe; and that of La Hogue checked, for nearly a century, the maritime efforts of the House of Bourbon. Equally important in its consequences as the greatest of these achievements, the battle of Trafalgar not only at once secured the independence of England and destroyed all Napoleon's hopes of maritime greatness, but annihilated for half a century the navies of France and Spain. The losses of the Moscow campaign were repaired in six months; even the terrible overthrow of Leipsic was almost forgotten in the host which was marshaled round the Imperial eagles at Waterloo. But from the shock of Trafalgar the French navy never recovered: and during the remainder of the war, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of Napoleon, no considerable fleet with the tricolor flag was ever seen at sea. Error frequently attends hasty or partial induction; but from a sufficiently broad and extensive view of human affairs, conclusions of general and lasting certainty may be formed.

It is stated by Napoleon, that a fleet of thirty ships of the line, with guns and complement of men complete, may be considered as corresponding at sea to an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men at land.¹ Judging by this standard, the battle of Trafalgar, which destroyed full twenty-five ships of the line and made prize of twenty, must be considered as equivalent to a victory where ninety thousand men out of one hundred and twenty thousand were destroyed. The annals of war exhibit no instance of such a success with land forces; it is double what even the bulletins claimed for Napoleon at Austerlitz, Jena, or Friedland. Even at Waterloo, where alone a blow approaching to that inflicted at Trafalgar was struck, the loss of the French has never been estimated at above forty thousand men. The loss by which that decisive victory was purchased on the side of the British alone, was nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine; on that of the allies, above twenty thousand: whereas the total loss of the English at Tra-

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120.

Comparison
of victories at
land and sea.

¹ Napoleon,
ii. 124.

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falgar was only sixteen hundred and ninety men : a smaller number than perished in many inconsiderable actions attended with little or no result in Spain.* This affords a striking instance how comparatively bloodless, when viewed in relation to the importance of the successes achieved, are victories at sea : and although the losses of the defeated party are much more severe, yet even they bear no sort of proportion to the enormous effusion of blood in land fights. Lord Collingwood estimates the killed and wounded at Trafalgar, where the French navy was in a manner annihilated, "at several thousands :"¹ while the Moscow campaign, where four hundred thousand men perished, was found insufficient to beat down the military power of Napoleon.

¹ Coll. i. 183,
184.

121.
Reflections
on the man-
œuvre of
breaking the
line.

The battle of Trafalgar affords a decisive proof that it is owing to no peculiar manœuvre, ill-understood by others, of breaking the line, that the extraordinary successes of the English at sea are owing, but that the superior prowess and naval skill of their sailors is alone the cause of their triumphs. In truth, the operation of breaking the line, whether at sea or land, is an extremely critical and hazardous one, and never will be attempted, or if attempted, succeed, but by the party conscious of and possessing greater courage and resources in danger than its opponent. From its superior sailing, and the lightness of the wind, the Royal Sovereign was in action at Trafalgar when the rear of the column was still six miles distant, and full a quarter of an hour before another British ship fired a shot : and the whole weight of the conflict, for the same reason, fell upon the twelve or fourteen British ships which first got into action, by whom six-sevenths of the loss was sustained.† So far from the French and Spanish fleets being doubled up and assailed by a superior force, the British fleet itself was doubled up ; and the victory was in fact gained by half its force, before the remainder got into action. The arrival of this remainder, indeed, gave those first engaged a decisive

* The loss at Talavera, out of 19,000 British, was 5000 : that at Albuera, 4500 out of 7500, and out of 16,000 who formed the storming columns at Badajoz, nearly 4000 lay on the breaches and in the ditches of that terrible fortress.

† "The total loss was 1690 ; of which 1452 belonged to fourteen out of the twenty-seven vessels of the fleet. With a few exceptions, the ships so suffering were in the van of their respective columns."—JAMES, iv. 111.

advantage, and enabled the ships which hitherto had borne up against such desperate odds to overwhelm in their turn their dispirited, and now outnumbered, opponents; but had they not been, from the first, superior, and greatly superior, to their antagonists, they must have been taken prisoners in the outset of the fray, and lain useless logs alongside of their captors when the rear of the columns was getting into action. Would any but a superior enemy have ventured to plunge, like Collingwood and Nelson, into the centre of their opponent's fleet, and, unsupported, single out the hostile admiral for attack, when surrounded by his own vessels? What would have been the fate of Alava and Villeneuve, of the Santa Anna and the Bucentaure, if they had thus engaged Collingwood and Nelson, the Royal Sovereign and the Victory, at the muzzle of their guns, in the middle of the English fleet, while three or four other hostile line-of-battle ships were pouring in their shot on all sides? Would they not have been compelled to strike their colours in ten minutes, before the tardy succeeding vessels could come up to their support?

In breaking the line, in short, whether at sea or land, the head of the column must necessarily be engaged with a vastly superior force, before the rear and centre can get up to its support; and if, from accidental causes, their arrival, as at Trafalgar, is long delayed, it may happen that this contest against desperate odds may continue a very long time—quite long enough to prove fatal to an ordinary assailant. The conclusion to be drawn from this is, not that Nelson, Duncan, and Rodney did wrong, and ran unnecessary hazard by breaking the line at Trafalgar, Camperdown, and Martinique—quite the reverse; they did perfectly right; but that it is the manœuvre suited only to the braver and more skilful party, and never can prove successful except in the hands of the power possessing the superiority in courage and prowess, though not in numbers. It will succeed when the head of the column can sustain itself against double or treble its own force until the centre or rear get up, but in no other circumstances. The case is precisely the same at land: the party breaking the line there runs the greatest risk of being overpowered, if not able to bear up against

122.

Which is safe only to the superior and braver naval power.

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superior forces, before support arrive from the rear ; and an antagonist who can trust his troops in line to resist the head of the column, will soon obtain a decisive advantage by assailing the attacking column on both flanks. This was what the Duke of Wellington felt he could do, and constantly did, with British troops ; and, accordingly, Jomini tells us that the system of attacking in columns and breaking the line never succeeded against the close and murderous fire of the English infantry. It was the same with the Russians. Napoleon's system of bringing an overwhelming force against one point, and there breaking the line, answered perfectly, as long as he was engaged with the Austrians, who laid down their arms or retired the moment they saw an enemy on their flank ; but when he applied it to the Russians, he soon found the attacking column fiercely assailed on all sides by the troops among whom it had penetrated ; and the surrender of Vandamme, with seven thousand men, in the mountains of Bohemia, in 1813, taught him that it is a very different thing to get into the rear of an army drawn from the north and one from the south of Europe.

It is frequently said by the French writers, that at this period the fate of Europe depended upon chance, and that, if the naval officers to whom Napoleon remitted to report on Mr Fulton's proposal for the navigation of vessels by steam had given a different opinion from that they gave, and that invention had been adopted at Boulogne, there can be no doubt that the invasion might have been successfully accomplished. There appears no solid ground for this opinion. Great discoveries, destined, like those of gunpowder, printing, and steam, in the end to change the face of the world, never come to maturity but by slow degrees. The sublimest genius, the most overwhelming power, is not able so far to outstrip the march of time, as to give to one generation the general use of a discovery destined by nature for another. Even if it were otherwise, and steam navigation could in a few years have been brought to perfection, or at least into common application, in the French navy, unquestionably the English would not have been idle ; the mighty engine would have yielded its powers in a corresponding degree to both sides, and their relative situations would have remained the same as before. If steamers would

123.

And on the
introduction
of steam into
naval war-
fare.

have enabled the flotilla, under all winds, to issue from Boulogne harbour, and attempt the passage of the Channel ; they would have enabled the English blockading squadrons at all seasons to maintain their station, and put it in their power to have sent in fire-ships, which would have carried conflagration and ruin into the crowded harbour. Propelled by this powerful force, one armed steam-ship, at dead of night, would have burst open the chains at the entrance of the basin, while succeeding ones, in rapid succession, carried flames and explosion into its forest of shipping. Gunpowder did not diminish the superiority of the English at sea. The victory of Nelson at Trafalgar was not more decisive than that of Edward III. at Sluys. The countrymen of Collingwood, who ventured unsupported into the midst of the combined fleet, need never fear the mechanical force which augments the facility of getting into close action, and increases the rapidity with which the different vessels of the squadron can be brought together to the decisive point.

But it is impossible to form an equally clear opinion as to the consequences which would have followed if Napoleon, with a hundred and thirty thousand men, had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kent. He has told us that he would have advanced direct to London, of which he calculated upon getting possession in four days ; and there he would instantly have proclaimed parliamentary reform, a low suffrage for the new voters, the downfall of the oligarchy, the confiscation of the property of the church, a vast reduction of taxation, an equitable adjustment of the national debt, and all the other objects which the revolutionary party in this country have ever had at heart, and the prospect of obtaining only one of which, five-and-twenty years afterwards, produced so extraordinary a change in the dominant multitude of the English people. It was Napoleon's constant affirmation, that the majority in number of the English nation was opposed to the war, which was maintained solely by the influence and for the purposes of the oligarchy ; and that, if he could once have roused the multitude against their rule, Great Britain would speedily have become so divided as to be no longer capable of resisting the power of France. "I would not," said he, "have attempted to subject Eng-

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124.
What if
Napoleon
had succeed-
ed in effecting
a landing ?
His designs if
he had done
so.

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1805.

¹ O'Meara,
i. 350, 469.

125.
And the probabilities of
their success.

land to France: I could not have united two nations so dissimilar. If I had succeeded in my project, I would have abolished the monarchy, and established a republic instead of the oligarchy by which you are governed. I would have separated Ireland from England, and *left them to themselves, after having sown the seeds of republicanism in their morale*. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, but would *have introduced a great reform*.”¹*

That the French Emperor would have been worsted in his attempt if England had remained true to herself, can be doubtful to no one who recollects that the British troops defeated the French in every encounter, without exception, from Vimeira to Waterloo, and that Napoleon himself said to Lord Whitworth there were a hundred chances to one against his success. But would she have remained true to herself under the temptation to swerve produced by such means? This is a point upon which there is no Briton who would have entertained a doubt till within these few years; but the manner in which the public mind has reeled from the application of inferior stimulants since 1830, and the strong partiality to French alliance which grew up when popular passion was powerfully excited by that change, has now suggested the painful doubt whether Napoleon did not know us better than we knew ourselves, and whether we could have resisted those methods of seduction which had proved fatal to the patriotism of so many other people. The spirit of the nation, indeed, then ran high against Gallic invasion; unanimity unprecedented existed

Democratic
changes which
he would have
instantly pro-
claimed.

* “I would have hurried over my flotilla,” said Napoleon, “with two hundred thousand men,” [it was only one hundred and thirty-eight thousand,] “landed as near Chatham as possible, and proceeded direct to London, where I calculated upon arriving in four days from the time of my landing. I would have proclaimed a republic, the abolition of the nobility and House of Peers, the distribution of the property of such of the latter as opposed me among my partisans; liberty, equality, and the sovereignty of the people. I would have allowed the House of Commons to remain, *but would have introduced a great reform*. I would have published a proclamation, declaring that we came as friends to the English, and to free the nation from a corrupt and flagitious aristocracy, and restore a popular form of government, a democracy; all which would have been confirmed by the conduct of my army, as I would not have allowed the slightest outrage to be committed by my troops. I think that, between my promises and what I would actually have effected, I should have had the support of a great many. In a large city like London, where there are so many canaille and so many disaffected, I should have been joined by a formidable body; and I would at the same time have excited an insurrection in Ireland. You would never have burned your capital; you are too rich and fond of money. How often have the Parisians sworn to bury themselves under the ruins of their capital rather than suffer it to fall into the hands of the enemies of

among the British people: but strong as that feeling was, it is now doubtful whether it would not have been supplanted, in a large portion of the nation at least, by a still stronger, and whether the sudden offer of all the glittering objects of democratic ambition would not have shaken the patriotism of a considerable portion of the British, as it unquestionably would of the great bulk of the Irish people.

No man can say how he would keep his senses under the application of some extraordinary and hitherto unknown stimulant, as if he were at once elevated to a throne, or saw the mountains fall around him, or the earth suddenly open beneath his feet. Even the warmest friend to his country will probably hesitate before he pronounces upon the stability of the English mind, under the influence of the prodigious excitement likely to have arisen from the promulgation of the political innovations which Napoleon had prepared for her seduction. If he is wise, he will rejoice that, in the providence of God, his country was saved the trial, and acknowledge with gratitude the inestimable obligations which she owes to the illustrious men whose valour averted a danger under which her courage indeed would never have sunk, but to which her wisdom might possibly have proved unequal. The true crisis of the war occurred at this period. It was the arm of Nelson which delivered his country from her real danger; thenceforth the citadel of her strength was beyond the reach of attack. At Waterloo she fought for victory; at Trafalgar for existence.

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Their probable result.

France, and yet it has twice been taken! The hope of a change for the better, and a division of property, would have operated wonderfully amongst the canaille, especially that of London. The canaille of all nations are nearly alike. I would have made such promises as would have had a great effect. I would have abolished flogging in the army, and promised your seamen every thing, which would have made a great impression on their minds. The proclamation that we came as friends to relieve the English from an obnoxious and despotic aristocracy, whose object was to keep the nation eternally at war, in order to enrich themselves and their families through the blood of the people; together with the proclaiming of a republic, the abolition of the monarchical form of government and the nobility, the declaration of the forfeiture of such of the latter as should resist, and the division of their possessions amongst the partisans of the revolution, with a general equalisation of property, would have gained me the support of the canaille, and of all the idle, profligate, and disaffected, in the kingdom." Thus far the Emperor Napoleon; to which it may be added, that, amidst the divisions and democratic transports consequent on these prodigious innovations, he would quietly have laid his grasp on Woolwich, Chatham, Portsmouth, and Plymouth, and smiled at his revolutionary allies on this side of the Channel when they called on him to redeem his pledges, further than spoliating some of the higher orders; and if they proved refractory, have marched a file of grenadiers into the chapel of St Stephen.—See O'MEARA, i. 349, 352.

CHAPTER XL.

CAMPAIGN OF AUSTERLITZ.

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1.
Steady progress of the
Austrian
empire.

THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE, which had long taken an active part in the European confederacy, and was now destined to stand in the front rank of the fight of nations, is a power which has slowly risen to greatness, without the aid of any extraordinary ability either in its sovereigns or its cabinet, by a succession of fortunate alliances on the part of its princes, and a constant adherence to prudent counsels on that of its government. The dukes of the house of Hapsburg, in former times, possessed merely the inconsiderable provinces of Upper and Lower Austria; they were surrounded by the more powerful kingdoms of Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia; and so far from it being probable that they would ever rise to the rank of a first-rate power, nothing presaged that they would be able to maintain their independence amidst those formidable potentates by whom they were environed. Austria has seldom been distinguished by extraordinary talent either in her statesmen or generals, until the glorious eras of Maria Theresa and the French Revolution. She was remarkable chiefly for the prudence of her counsels and the good fortune of her enterprises; and her institutions were not such as to call forth talent in the middle or lower classes of the state. Nevertheless she has steadily advanced in population, wealth, and political importance, and now stood forth as a first-rate power, alike formidable to the independence of the adjoining states, and valuable as a bulwark against the encroachments of French usurpation or Russian ambition.

Unlike France or England, the Austrian monarchy has

owed nothing to the homogeneous descent of its inhabitants. No one dominant race has in its provinces acquired a decided preponderance over the others, or communicated to the whole the impress of its character and the lustre of its name. Though the appellation of Austria has, from Vienna being the residence of its sovereigns, been generally applied to the whole empire; yet the inhabitants of the inconsiderable provinces which properly bear that name have neither conquered by force of arms, like the Romans, nor swayed by intellectual superiority, like the Greeks, the more distant, but larger and more powerful, provinces of the empire. The state has grown up to greatness, as the monarchy has added provinces to its crown, by the voluntary marriage of their sovereigns,* not the forced submission or gradual amalgamation of their inhabitants. Styria was acquired by legacy from Othokar VI. to Leopold I., hereditary archduke of Austria in 1192; Carniola by purchase, by Leopold II. in 1199. The crown of Bohemia, won for the dukes of Austria by marriage in 1527; that of Hungary, which became the brightest jewel in their diadem, by the same means at the same period; the duchy of Tyrol, which was the inheritance of the heiress of Tyrol, who married an archduke of the same fortunate house; the Flemish provinces, with Lorraine and Alsace, which became united to the Austrian crown by the marriage of Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold, to Maximilian, archduke of Austria, grandfather of Charles V.—form fully three-fourths of the magnificent Austrian dominions at this time. Galicia, acquired by the iniquitous partition of Poland in 1772 and 1794, and Lombardy and Venice, which fell to their lot in the division of the spoils of conquest in 1797 and 1815, are the only considerable provinces of the monarchy which have been won by force of arms. They do not constitute a fourth part of its extent or population; and contribute a still less proportion to its warlike or financial resources. The strength of the monarchy has been the result of marriage, and of marriage alone.

When the extraordinary embarrassment is considered which has been experienced by Great Britain in all periods of its history, from the alien blood and hostile passions of

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2.

Union of different races and nations which compose the monarchy.

* “Bella gerant alii; tu, felix Austria, nube.”

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3.

Remarkable
manner in
which the
Austrians
have held to-
gether their
empire.

Ireland—one only foreign portion of an otherwise compact and homogeneous empire—it becomes an interesting subject of inquiry, how the Austrian government has succeeded, through so many ages, in holding together the various provinces and multifarious races which compose its wide-spread empire. The fact of its being a military monarchy, maintained by the sword, and the Emperor's ruling, ostensibly at least, by his own will, will not explain the difficulty: for the sword itself is held by men of many races, provinces, and former separate dominions; many of whom were animated, at one period at least, by the fiercest religious passions; who have more than once revolted against the central government; and all of whom retain to this hour the strongest attachment to their national traditions. In reality, also, the government of Austria is not a despotism but an aristocracy, in which the practical direction of affairs is vested in a body of nobles, hardly three hundred in number, drawn from all the provinces of its vast dominions. How, then, has it happened, that while England, with its free government and representative institutions, has experienced such difficulty in restraining the national and religious passions of a single neighbouring island, Austria, with none of these advantages, has succeeded in stilling the rivalry of so many independent states, and attaching such ancient, powerful, and various nations in willing subjection to a foreign central government?

4.

Great national
reverses
which this
united spirit
has enabled
Austria to
withstand.

This circumstance will appear still more extraordinary when the striking vicissitudes of fortune which the Imperial dominions have undergone at various times are considered, and the numerous opportunities which successful external hostility or internal revolt have afforded to dismember and overturn the empire. No state in modern times has sustained such terrible reverses: none has been so frequently pierced to the heart by wounds apparently mortal: none has been so frequently driven to rest, as a last resource, on the patriotic spirit of its distant provinces. The dreadful insurrection of the Hungarian peasants in the sixteenth century, combined the horrors of the Jacquerie in France with the brutal atrocities of the insurrection of the boors in Germany. In the very infancy of its fortunes, the revolt of the Hussites in Bohemia brought into the vitals of

the state the terrible scourge of religious warfare ; nor was it soon appeased, for so strong was the party of the Protestants shortly after the Reformation, that nearly a half of the inhabitants of the Hereditary states were at one period numbered among the followers of Luther.¹ In the close of the seventeenth century, Vienna was besieged by three hundred thousand Turks, and owed its salvation only to the heroism of John Sobieski and the lances of the Poles. Fifty years afterwards, the same capital fell into the hands of the victorious French and Bavarians, and the unconquerable Maria Theresa sought refuge and found support only in the fidelity of the Hungarian nobility. In 1757, the steeples of Vienna were descried by the outposts of the Great Frederick from the plain of the March-field ; in 1797, they were seen by the videttes of Napoleon from the heights of the Simmering. Twice during the revolutionary war the Austrian capital was taken by the Republican forces ; the defeats the Imperial arms sustained during that terrible contest were so numerous as almost to defy enumeration. Yet from all these reverses, the state in the end has emerged, not only unscathed, but victorious ; and in the fidelity of her subjects, and the persevering character of her government, Austria, during four centuries, has found the means of rising superior to all the storms of fortune, and steadily advancing, until she has attained the very first rank among the powers of Europe.

What is, in an especial manner, worthy of notice—the secret of this strong principle of vitality and unbroken progress is to be found in the patriotic spirit of the Austrian people, and the strength of the bonds which unite the inhabitants of so many different, and once independent, provinces and kingdoms, to the Imperial government. It was in the attachment of the Hungarians that Maria Theresa found the means of defeating the formidable inroad of the French and Bavarians ; the steadiness of the Bohemians enabled Marshal Daun to repel the invasion of the Prussians when the standards of the Great Frederick were seen from the steeples of Vienna. But for the gallant spirit of the Hungarians, Austria would have sunk in 1805 under the shock of Austerlitz ; the devoted loyalty of the Tyrolese mainly rescued it from destruction after

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¹ Ranke's
History of
the Popes,
ii. 137.

5.

Which were
all overcome
by the steady
attachment
of the pro-
vinces.

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the disaster of Wagram in 1809. No country contains so great a variety of races, nations, and religions; none has found in them all such steady support in such terrible reverses.

6.
Reflections
on the oppo-
site state of
the British
empire.

This observation affords ample subject for serious reflection to the inhabitants of the British empire. Though vexed with incomparably less diversity of race or national rivalry, and enjoying a constitution which boasts, in a peculiar manner, the advantage of communicating to government the wishes of distant dependencies, and the impress of public opinion, England could hardly hope, if London and Portsmouth were taken by the victorious arms of the French or Russians, to find the means of reinstating its affairs and regaining the empire of the waves, in the loyalty of the Irish Catholics, the fidelity of the Canadian *habitans*, the attachment of the West Indian planters, or the steadiness of the East Indian rajahs. It is in vain to shut our eyes to these considerations: they are founded on facts of such long continuance and so momentous in their consequences, as to point evidently to some general law of nature, which will ere long force itself upon the observation of mankind. If they are at variance with our preconceived ideas, the candid inquirer after truth will rather suspect that these ideas are in part erroneous, than that results so opposite to the inferences from them should so long have taken place on so great a scale. And the conclusion which posterity will probably deduce from them is, that the inherent corruption of human nature is felt even more severely in popular than in aristocratic communities; that the government of the many by the many is often more selfish than that of the many by the few; that the tenacity to interest when one people rules another people, is generally greater than when one sovereign governs both; and that the effect of free institutions is rather to communicate a mighty impulse to human exertion, than to eradicate the seeds of evil in the multitude who constitute the ruling power.

Austria contains a surface of 33,901 square marine leagues, or 271,208 square miles, being twice and a half the superficies of the British Islands, which embrace 122,000. It is thinly peopled as a whole, as appears

from the census of 1834, by 35,047,533 inhabitants, and at the period of the French invasion in 1805, it could only boast of 27,500,000.* Its revenue now amounts to 150,000,000 florins, or 315,000,000 francs, (£12,600,000,) a sum, however, at least equivalent, if the difference in the value of money and in habit of living is considered, to eighteen millions sterling of British money. Before the commencement of the Revolutionary war, the revenues of Austria, which in 1770 amounted to 90,000,000 of florins, (£7,500,000,) had risen by the acquisitions made in Poland and elsewhere to 106,000,000, or £8,830,000. During the war, its revenue was increased by the imposition of several new taxes; and it sustained no diminution by the peace of Campo Formio, the Venetian States proving more than a compensation for the loss of the Low Countries.¹

At the peace of Luneville, the income of government amounted to 115,000,000 florins, or £9,500,000 sterling, a sum equal, at that time, to at least fifteen millions sterling in Great Britain; and with this revenue, which was the clear receipt of the treasury, independent of the expense of collection and several provincial charges, they were able to maintain an army of 300,000 men, including 50,000 magnificent cavalry. Like most of the other European states, Austria had been compelled during the difficulties of former years to have recourse to a

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7.

Superficial
extent, popu-
lation, and
revenue of
the Austrian
empire.

¹ Tchorbor-
ski, Finances
d'Autriche,
i. 7, 13.
Bign. ii. 270,
273.

8.

Situation of
Austria.
Statistical
details re-
garding that
monarchy.

* The population and superficial area of the several provinces of the Austrian empire stood thus, according to the census of 1834:—

	Superficial Area. sq. geog. leagues.	Population.	Population per square league.
Hungary,	11,620	11,404,330	878
Gallicia,	4,304	4,395,339	1,087
Bohemia,	2,649	4,001,852	1,532
Lombardy,	1,017	2,495,929	2,478
Moravia and Silesia,	1,339	2,110,141	1,582
Venetian Provinces,	2,132	2,079,588	979
Transylvania,	3,086	1,963,435	681
Austria Lower,	1,970	1,343,652	{ 1,105
Austria Upper,		846,982	
Styria,	1,110	923,882	793
Tyrol,	1,435	827,635	563
Carinthia, Carniola,	1,445	1,553,527	960
Dalmatia, and Littoral,			
Military Frontier,	1,695	1,101,281	552
	33,802	35,047,573	
	or 271,208 sq. miles.		

Of this population the military, on full or half pay, amount to 518,950—leaving a civil population of 34,528,583; the annual increase is 311,612, or about the same as the British Islands.—See *Census of 1834 for Austria*; MALTE BRUN, v. 726, 737; and vii. 282, 283; and vi. 592, 752; and TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 7

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paper currency; and the bank of Vienna, established by Maria Theresa in 1762, was the organ by which this was effected. It was not, however, a paper circulation convertible at pleasure into gold, but a system of assignats, possessing a forced legal currency; and government, in 1797, passed a regulation prohibiting any person from demanding exchange in coin for more than twenty-five florins, or two pounds sterling. During the course of the war, silver and gold almost entirely disappeared from circulation, and paper billets for two or three shillings assumed their place. A considerable portion of the smaller currency was in brass, which was issued at double its intrinsic value; and besides this, there were obligations of various sorts of the government to foreign provinces, bankers, and states. The debt in all was 200,000,000 florins (£16,600,000) in 1789; but at the conclusion of the war, in 1801, it amounted to triple that sum. The treasury had been reduced to the necessity of paying the interest in paper currency, and even compelling forced loans from its own subjects.¹

¹ Raymond and Roth, Stat. de l'Autriche, ii. 274, 285. Bign. ii. 270, 273.

9.
Diversity of surface and natural productions in its provinces.

The diversity of surface and natural features in this, as in all other countries through which the great stony girdle of the globe passes, proves an inexhaustible source at once of natural beauty, agricultural riches, and variety of productions. The Alps of the Tyrol and Styria, gradually branching off to those of Carinthia and Dalmatia on the one hand, and to the Carpathian range on the other, traverse nearly its whole extent, separated only by the valley of the Danube, which cuts as it were through this vast natural barrier, and rolls its volume of waters, swelled on either hand by the numerous torrents which descend from the mountain sides, to the Hungarian plains. This noble river is thirteen hundred miles in length, and receives the waters of sixty navigable streams. The clefts and hollows of this immense mountain range, exhibit on either side scenes of exquisite beauty, combining often the grandeur of Swiss or Tyrolese scenery with the close-cut pastures, rich vineyards, and golden harvests of Upper and Lower Austria. Immense woods of pine on all the elevated mountains at once adorn the landscape, and furnish inexhaustible supplies of fuel for the inhabitants; vast and fertile mea-

dows on the banks of the Danube nourish innumerable herds of cattle, and maintain admirable horses for the great establishments by which the imperial cavalry are mounted.* The sunny slopes are covered by vines of uncommon luxuriance and the richest flavour, while the spacious plains which stretch from the neighbourhood of the river to the foot of the mountains on either hand, bring to maturity noble crops of grain, rye, and potatoes, which maintain in rustic plenty the numerous and happy inhabitants.¹

These are the imposing and captivating features of Upper and Lower Austria, forming the strength and heart of the empire, and comprising by far the richest, best cultivated, and most prosperous part of the Imperial dominions in Germany. But besides the valley of the Danube, and its range of adjacent mountains, the Austrian sway stretches into Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and Italy, and, surmounting the crest of the mountains, has extended far on either side of their reverse slopes the domination of the Ostrogoths. Bohemia is a vast natural basin encircled by mountains, which at a remote period appears to have enclosed a great lake, before the Elbe burst through the barriers of the Erzgebirge, and opened through the precipices of the Saxon Switzerland a passage for the cooped-up waters to the German ocean. Its plains, peopled now by four millions of inhabitants, are entirely agricultural ;† but though the produce is

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¹ Malte Brun, v. 599, 724. Personal observation.

10.
General aspect of Bohemia, Moravia, Gallicia, and Hungary.

* Upper and Lower Austria contain—

	Arpents.	Population by Races.
Arable land, . . .	2,120,000	Germans, 2,109,180
Gardens, . . .	81,000	Slavonians, 7,050
Vineyards, . . .	79,000	Greeks, 366
Meadows, . . .	753,000	Armenians, 210
Mountain pastures, . . .	1,064,000	Jews, 1,575
Forests, . . .	1,830,000	
Waste lands, . . .	883,500	2,118,381

6,750,500

The Austrian arpent or joch is about two English acres.—See MALTE BRUN, v. 731, 732.

† Bohemia contains—

	Arpents.	Population by Races.
Arable land, . . .	3,828,500	Slavonians, 2,477,000
Gardens, . . .	86,000	Germans, 1,358,000
Vineyards, . . .	44,000	Jews, 60,000
Meadows, . . .	799,000	
Pastures, . . .	610,000	3,895,000
Forests, . . .	2,310,000	
Fish-ponds, . . .	132,700	

7,810,200.—MALTE BRUN, v. 728.

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great, the system of cultivation is rude, and human skill has done little to aid the beneficence of nature. The plains of Gallicia, containing four million three hundred and ninety-five thousand inhabitants, to the north of the Carpathian mountains, exhibit the rude agriculture, boundless forests, and general misery, which in every age have formed the characteristic of the Polish provinces. Silesia and Moravia, three-fourths of the inhabitants of which are of Slavonic origin, exhibit the same features of the Slavonic race, modified in some degree, in many places, especially Silesia, by the industry and perseverance of the Germans.* Hungary, containing upwards of eleven millions of inhabitants, presents an immense level surface interspersed with vast morasses, but abounding with natural agricultural riches, and capable of nourishing, in ease and affluence, at least four times its present population.† Transylvania, Illyria, and Dalmatia, separated from Austria and Hungary by vast ranges of wooded mountains, belong to a different region of the globe; they have borrowed the character of the Turkish provinces which they adjoin: while the Tyrol, Styria, and Carniola, bedded in the valleys of the Alps, recall to the enchanted traveller the sublimest features of Swiss scenery; and the plain of Lombardy transports him to the delicious sun, watered meadows, and golden harvests of Italy.¹

An empire of such extent, embracing so great a variety

* Silesia and Moravia contain—

	Arpents.	Population by Races.
Arable land, . . .	2,200,400	Slavonians, . . . 1,566,500
Gardens, . . .	58,000	Germans, . . . 477,000
Vineyards, . . .	51,000	Jews, . . . 34,000
Meadows, . . .	325,000	Gipsies, . . . 1,084
Pastures, . . .	429,000	
Forests, . . .	1,120,000	
Fish-ponds, . . .	41,800	
Waste lands, . . .	596,300	

4,821,500.—MALTE BRUN, v. 729.

† Hungary contains—

	Arpents.	Population by Races in 1829.
Arable land, . . .	4,897,218	Magyars, . . . 3,800,000
Gardens, . . .	638,767	Slavonians, . . . 4,760,300
Vineyards, . . .	911,176	Germans, Jews, &c. 2,023,701
Meadows and pastures, . . .	7,715,225	
Forests and marshes, . . .	8,942,740	
Fish-ponds, . . .	860,000	

23,965,126

—MALTE BRUN, vi. 761.

¹ Malte Brun, v. 593, 685. Personal observation. Turnbull's Austria, i. 61, 234.

of climates and geographical features, could hardly be expected to possess any uniform and well-defined national character, like the comparatively compact and homogeneous empires of France or England. But this diversity is rendered still more striking by the extraordinary difference in the character and disposition of the races who, at successive periods, have settled in these various provinces. The Ostrogoths, who have given their name, like the Anglo-Saxons in Britain, to the whole empire, settled in Upper and Lower Austria, and spread themselves on either bank of the Danube to the crest of the mountains; and in their blue-eyed, fair-haired, slow but honest and persevering inhabitants, are to be seen at this day the genuine characteristics of the Gothic race. The Bohemians, Moravians, and Gallicians are of a totally different character. In their swarthy visages, dark hair, fiery temperament, and comparatively volatile disposition, are to be traced the indelible features of the Slavonic family of mankind. Daring in war, ardent in disposition, impatient of control, attached to freedom, but averse to labour, and with little industry, the Hungarians have in every age betrayed the fierce disposition and warlike passions which made the Huns in former days the scourge of Europe. They have ever been the bulwark of the empire, and have been found combating with equal heroism, in different ages, their ancient enemies the Turks, seeking to subvert their religion, and their modern foes the French, striving to overturn the independence of their country. In the fiery spirit, admirable horsemanship, roving disposition, and predatory inclination of the Croats, Illyrians, and Transylvanians, it is easy to recognise the influence of Asiatic blood, and the prevalence of those habits which the children of Ishmael have communicated, in an apparently indelible manner, to all their descendants. The handsome countenances, dark hair, and piercing eyes of the Lombards, bespeak their Italian descent and the predominance of ancient blood; but in their unwarlike habits, pacific enjoyments, and ready submission to conquest, we seek in vain for the traces of the fierce settlers in Cisalpine Gaul, or the indomitable spirit of Roman virtue.

Drawn from so vast and varied a population, the Aus-

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11.

Variety of
races in
Austria.

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12.

Military re-
sources of the
empire.

trian army possesses within itself, if properly directed, the elements of almost every species of military virtue. In the steady valour and unconquerable energy of the Hungarians, the monarchy has in every age found the precious reserve to be brought forth, like the Old Guard of Napoleon, at the decisive crisis, and which has often, in circumstances apparently desperate, recalled victory to its standards. The Croatians, Pandours, and other warriors, from the military colonies on the Turkish frontier, furnish an inexhaustible supply of admirable light horse, scarce inferior to the Cossacks in activity and enterprise. The Tyrolese are unrivalled for their skill as marksmen, and their constant habit of shooting at targets, and in the mountains, qualifies them in a peculiar manner for the duty of tirailleurs. The native Austrian foot is respectable, and, when well led, will fight bravely, though they have not the fire or heroism of the Hungarian grenadiers. But their heavy cavalry, magnificently mounted, and having its officers drawn almost entirely from the nobility, contains some of the most brilliant corps in Europe. Bohemia, Moravia, and Gallicia furnish their proportion of hardy and zealous foot-soldiers for the ordinary regiments of the line. Thus the national character of the various provinces of the empire is adapted, in a remarkable manner, for the different services of the army; and, beyond all question, Austria has the means of raising within its own dominions an array of combatants second to none in Europe in martial vigour and efficiency. Yet the Imperial armies, down to the year 1813, were almost uniformly unfortunate; and although, on many occasions, they displayed devoted gallantry in the field, and on all evinced extraordinary patriotic spirit in preparation, yet this appeared rather in the perseverance with which reverses were surmounted, than the ardour with which success was sought or followed up. No nation ever sustained so many and such dreadful defeats: none has in the end emerged so often victorious from their shock. In the perseverance of the aristocratic body which directs the national councils, joined to the steady patriotic spirit of the people, is to be found the explanation of this remarkable circumstance.

The Austrian army consists of sixty-three regiments of

the line: twenty battalions of grenadiers, the corps of jagers of thirteen battalions, and the marine battalion on the Danube, numbering in all two hundred and ninety thousand combatants. The cavalry consists of eight regiments of cuirassiers, six of dragoons, seven of light horse, twelve of hussars, and four of hulans; in all, thirty-eight thousand men. The artillery, divided into five regiments of field artillery, one corps of bombardiers, and the garrison artillery, embraces twenty thousand more. In addition to this, the engineers, sappers, miners, &c. and waggon-train, amount to thirty-two thousand five hundred. In all, three hundred and eighty thousand combatants, nearly the whole of whom are in an excellent state of discipline and equipment. But this is by no means the whole military strength of the nation. The landwehr, established in all the provinces excepting Hungary, and the "Hungarian Insurrection of Nobles," which corresponds to it in that extensive kingdom, constitute an armed force of equal amount, which, when called out, gives the state a mass in all of seven hundred and forty thousand combatants. In the year 1814, when the patriotic spirit of the nation was drawn forth to the highest pitch, and its resources strained to the uttermost, nine hundred and seventy thousand men received pay in the armed force, regular and landwehr, of the nation—an astonishing number for an empire not at that period containing six and twenty millions of inhabitants; though not so great, in proportion, as in the same year was raised by the British islands, with a population only of eighteen millions.^{1*}

The military force which Hungary is required to furnish to the general support of the empire, is sixty-four thousand men, including seventeen thousand horse—a force very inconsiderable for a kingdom containing eleven millions of inhabitants, and which demonstrates that, in this respect at least, it has been very leniently dealt with. But on the frontiers of the whole monarchy towards Turkey, the military colonies are placed, the organisation of which is entirely warlike, for the purpose of defence

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13.
Composition
and strength
of the Austri-
an army.

¹ Turnbull's
Austria, ii.
283, 302.
Malte Brun,
v. 724.
Tchoborski,
Finances
d'Autriche,
ii. 341, 346.

14.
The military
colonies.

* Great Britain, in that year, had 1,053,000 men in arms; of whom 813,000 were drawn from the population of the British isles, not numbering then above 18,000,000 inhabitants.

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against the perpetual hostility of the Osmanlis, and which give rise to one of the most singular and interesting spectacles in Europe. The whole surface of this strip of land is divided into seventeen districts, each of which is termed a regiment, and in which the whole land is held by military tenure. The inhabitants of each holding are generally related by blood or marriage, and form what is called a "House Communion," which is subject to the rural and domestic control of one chief, usually the oldest of the family. Every male is trained to military service, and liable, from the age of eighteen to sixty, to be at any time called out for the public defence. When doing duty within the confines of their own regiment or district, they receive no pay, and feed themselves; the moment they pass that limit, their whole expenses fall on the crown. About fifty thousand of these hardy borderers are constantly embodied and in arms; but the total number liable to serve, and who may be called out on an emergency, exceeds two hundred thousand. Night and day, five thousand of them are constantly patrolling on guard along the Turkish frontier; and so closely do these videttes approach each other, and so perfect is the system of signals established by firing guns during the day, or lighting beacons at night, that upon the smallest incursion on any point of this immense frontier, above a thousand miles in length, the whole fifty thousand can be almost instantly assembled at their respective points of rendezvous, and in twenty-four hours two hundred thousand warriors are in arms! These military colonies embrace, at this time, above a million of souls, and their numbers are increasing so rapidly as to double in forty years; while in Upper Austria the duplication is once in a hundred and four years, and, on an average of the whole empire, once in fifty-one. The inhabitants on the military frontier, like the Gauchos of the Pampas in South America, are for the most part indolent and unruly in peace, negligent in their persons, and addicted to intemperance; but in war they are active and enterprising, and, being subjected to a rigid discipline, they make excellent soldiers when removed from home.¹

¹ Marmont's
Voyages, i.
79, 91. Turn-
bull's Aus-
tria, i. 8, and
277, 280.

The mode of obtaining men for the army varies in different parts of the empire. In the Italian provinces

all persons, noble or common, at the age of eighteen, are registered for military service, with a very few professional exemptions; and the *quotum* is selected from that list by the ballot. Substitutes, however, are allowed: the period of service is only for eight years; and there is no *landwehr* or army of reserve. In Tyrol the same system prevails. In the German provinces, all males, not noble or clerical, from eighteen to forty-five, are liable to be called on to serve either in the line or *landwehr*. Those in the first class, which embraces the young men from eighteen to twenty-eight, are liable to be balloted for the first service; those in the second, from twenty-eight to forty-five, for the *landwehr*. It is very rarely, however, that the ballot is resorted to for supplying vacancies in the line: in general, they are obtained with ease by voluntary enlistment, or selection of candidates by the local authorities or feudal lords—care being taken, as much as possible, to choose single men and younger sons, to whom it is usually an object of ambition to get into the service.* The period of service is fourteen years: after which the soldier is inscribed on the list of the *landwehr*, which is never called out except on urgent occasions; and if balloted for there, he is entitled to his discharge at the age of forty years. The articles of war and military code have remained the same since the days of Maria Theresa, when they were framed in the most enlightened spirit; but practical abuses frequently creep in from the aristocratic influence pervading the service, which, as is generally the case in such governments, all the efforts of those at the head of affairs are unable to eradicate. Every regiment has its “inhaber” or colonel proprietor, distinct from the colonel commandant, with whom the granting of all commissions of the first rank rests; but all subsequent promotions are made by the crown. Nobility is not a requisite to obtaining commis-

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15.

Mode of obtaining men for the army, and officers.

* So patriotic is the spirit of the people, that, when danger threatens the monarchy, no difficulty is ever experienced, even on the shortest notice, in obtaining, by voluntary enrolment, the requisite number of recruits for the public service. In the year 1805, on the eve of the battle of Austerlitz, orders were sent to Prague for the immediate levy of fifty thousand men in Bohemia. Before the evening of the day on which the order was received, summonses for the requisite numbers were despatched to each district and lordship; the levy was forthwith made; and, in seventeen days from the receipt of the orders, the whole 50,000 were ready armed, clothed, and equipped, at the depots in Bohemia and Moravia.—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 301, 302.

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¹ Turnbull's
Austria, i.
280, 293.

16.
The great
breeding
stations for
the cavalry.

sions, any more than in the English army; but as the spirit of the nation is essentially aristocratic, the officers are generally taken from that class; and the sons of the burghers and middle rank seek in preference situations in the innumerable civil offices under government, where they find themselves more comfortable, in contact only with persons in their own station of life, and often rise by good conduct to the highest eminence.¹

The great breeding establishments kept up by the Emperor for providing horses for the cavalry, are peculiar to Austria, and highly characteristic of the provident system of its administration. One of the most remarkable is that of Mezohegyes in Transylvania. An immense plain, fifteen leagues in circumference, containing eighty thousand acres of the finest grass, is there surrounded by a broad belt of wood, fenced in on the outside by a deep ditch. Two thousand acres in the interior are covered with thriving plantations, for shelter and warmth to the horses, and the whole remainder of the surface is devoted to the nourishment of the studs or their attendants. Three hundred and sixty ploughs are employed in the interior in raising grain and cultivating the land for the use of the horses. Formerly twenty thousand horses were assembled in this great establishment, which was one of the principal depots for mounting the cavalry; but contagious diseases were found to be prevalent in such an assemblage of animals, and it is now kept up only to furnish stallions and mares of the finest breeds for the use of the government and the country. One hundred and fifty of these noble animals are annually sent forth by this establishment, and serve to keep up the government stallions at the number of two thousand, which is deemed necessary to the public service. The arrangement is all military, and the attention paid to every department is so extreme, that the whole expense of the establishment is defrayed by the price obtained for the young horses, which are sold by auction after those for government and the public service have been selected. The military exchequer pays a hundred and twenty florins (£10) for the dragoon horses, and a hundred and forty florins for those of the cuirassiers;² and much of the vigour and efficiency of the imperial cavalry

² Marimont's
Voyages, i.
63, 73.

is to be ascribed to these noble establishments, in which the greatest care has been taken to combine the celerity and hardihood of Arab blood with the strength and bone of the Norman breed.

Taxation in Austria is far from being oppressive; although the revenue of the state, if the value of money is considered, is very considerable. The total revenue at this time is 129,746,000 florins, equivalent to 325,000,000 francs, or £12,900,000 sterling. The expenditure, exclusive of the war department, is 87,000,000 florins, or £8,700,000; but the army is understood to cost 60,000,000 florins, making the total expenditure nearly 20,000,000 florins (£2,000,000) above the income.* The exchequer has always been a matter of great difficulty with the Austrian government, as it is with all powers maintaining a costly military establishment, without the aid of any extensive commerce to enlarge its credit or increase its receipts. In 1808 the revenues were only £9,000,000; and they were in such a state of confusion at the close of the war, that, but for the subsidies of England, which, from the difference in the value of money in the two countries, told with twofold efficacy, its armies never could have been brought into the field of European independence.

Foreign commerce has been little cultivated in Austria till of late years, owing to its inland situation, and the restrictions, long almost amounting to a prohibition, which the jealousy of Russia and Turkey imposed on the navigation of the Danube. Yet is there no country which, from its vast internal resources, and the possession of so noble a natural estuary for exportation, is calculated

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17.
Taxation and
finances of
the empire.

18.
Foreign and
internal com-
merce.

* In 1834 the Income and Expenditure of the empire were as follows:

	Florins.	£
Interest of Public Debts,	40,000,000	or 4,000,000
Finance Department,	14,619,220	.. 1,462,000
Chancery and Diplomacy,	1,801,168	.. 180,168
Police,	1,643,504	.. 164,350
Civil Cost of the Army,	2,586,306	.. 258,000
Public Audit,	2,703,723	.. 270,372
Justice,	4,708,734	.. 470,874
The Courts,	1,461,139	.. 146,113
Public Works in Germany,	8,774,066	.. 877,406
.. Lombardy,	2,987,935	.. 298,793
.. Venice,	2,580,169	.. 258,000
Lesser Charges,	351,626	.. 35,000
War,	60,000,000	.. 6,000,000
	144,217,590	or 14,421,076

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to furnish materials for a greater foreign traffic; or with which a more extensive and lucrative trade is destined one day to be carried on between the owners of the rude produce of the soil and the manufacturing industry of other states. The silks, oils, and dairy produce of Lombardy and Venice; the fleeces of Hungary and Bohemia; the mineral riches of Austria and Hungary; the inexhaustible agricultural wealth of the whole empire, must ere long find a vent in an immense foreign commerce. The exports in 1834, according to the official value, were 111,092,941 florins, or £11,109,000, and the imports 107,781,409 florins, or £10,778,000; but these numbers are taken from the official entries, which are much below the real value.* If the wise and judicious measures now

The Receipts of the Imperial Treasury, in 1834, were as follows:

	Florins.	£
Land tax,	38,987,954	or 3,898,700
House tax,	3,859,178	“ 385,900
Income tax on Trades,	2,498,234	“ 249,800
Personal tax,	1,307,451	“ 130,700
Legacy tax,	879,160	“ 87,900
Total direct,	47,531,977	£4,753,000
Indirect:—		
Excise,	17,841,347	or 1,784,000
Stamps,	3,232,048	“ 323,000
Customs,	12,037,692	“ 1,203,000
Law tax,	1,882,700	“ 188,000
Lottery,	3,363,682	“ 336,000
Post Office,	1,417,362	“ 141,000
Post horses,	376,952	“ 37,000
Monopolies, viz:—		
Salt,	19,404,807	“ 1,940,000
Tobacco,	8,784,376	“ 878,000
Gunpowder,	9,329	“ 900
Domains,	3,460,656	“ 346,000
Mines,	1,952,410	“ 195,000
Hungarian Revenue,	5,330,000	“ 533,000
	126,223,598	£12,623,000

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 325, 327, 328. TCHORBORSKI'S *Finances d'Autriche*, ii. 374, 410.

* The proportions of the several parts of the empire were, in 1834:

	Imports, Florins.	
German Provinces,	61,981,390	or £6,198,139
Italian Provinces,	34,288,855	.. 3,428,885
Hungary and Transylvania,	11,511,164	.. 1,151,164
	107,781,409	or £10,768,188
	Exports.	
German Provinces,	68,533,685	or £6,853,368
Italian Provinces,	34,960,722	.. 3,496,072
Hungary and Transylvania,	7,598,534	.. 759,653
	111,092,941	or £11,109,093

—TURNBULL'S *Austria*, ii. 361.

in the course of adoption by the Austrian government, to facilitate their foreign exports by the great arteries of the Po and the Danube, and the noble harbour of Trieste, are fully carried into execution, there can be no doubt that their commerce is destined at no distant period to exhibit an amount double or triple what is at present presented. And nothing can be more certain than that Austria is a country with which, perhaps beyond any other, it is for the interest of Great Britain to cultivate commercial relations, and with which treaties on the footing of *real* reciprocity might be concluded; for her productions are those which Britain wants, and can never emulate, and the manufactures of Britain are what Austria wants, and can never rival.¹

One remarkable feature which strikes the most superficial traveller in every part of Austria Proper, the Tyrol, and Styria, is the extraordinary and general wellbeing of the peasantry. Without many of the luxuries which habit and a long command of the commerce of the world have rendered necessities to the English labourer; clothed in comparatively coarse garments, often without either tea or coffee, the Austrian peasant enjoys a much greater and more permanent share of the necessities and comforts of life than the great bulk of the working classes, at least in the manufacturing districts, of Great Britain. Contentment and happiness reign in all their dwellings. Their furniture and clothing, their carts and horses, their stables and offices, their well-fed flocks and teams, their trim hedges and ditches, indicate the influence of long-established wellbeing. In the beautiful valleys of Upper Austria, the eye of the traveller is gladdened, as in Switzerland and England, by that sure mark of general prosperity, the extension of separate dwellings and well-defined properties over the whole surface of the country. Small green enclosures, neat fences, hedgerows of lofty timber, clean and cheerful white cottages, with their little gardens and trellices of roses, are to be seen on all sides peeping out of the dark band of the circumjacent forest. Though universally educated, they have no pretensions to an intellectual character, and are far inferior to the peasants of Saxony or Scotland in general information;² but, on the other hand, they have escaped the vices

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¹ Lichtenstein, Stat. 194. Raymond and Roth, i. 124. Turnbull's Austria, ii. 360, 361.

19. General prosperity of the Austrian people.

² Personal observation. Turnbull's Austria, ii. 66, 69.

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20.

Their habits
and char-
acter.

which elsewhere have followed the unrestrained tasting of the tree of knowledge.

Passionately fond of enjoyment, easy in their circumstances, joyous and good-humoured, not disquieted about the future, having no desires beyond their condition, they lead in general a prosperous and happy life, which many nations might envy, who, by straining after ideal and unattainable objects, lose, like the dog in the fable, the real blessings which heaven has placed within their reach. Their pleasures, of which they are so fond, are chiefly of the physical kind. They do not feel the ardent desire for elevation which in free communities elevates a few to greatness, and consigns many to disappointment; and they must be changed indeed before a Burns, a Watt, or a Telford arises among them. Yet are these physical enjoyments in a great degree divested of the revolting excesses so common in northern latitudes; they drink amply of their own beer or provincial wine,* but intoxication is rare, quarrelling almost unknown amongst them: rural games, dancing, and social festivity constitute their great delight; and the kindliness of their disposition renders these rustic assemblages a scene of equal enjoyment to the spectator as to the persons engaged in them. The vast number of cattle in the monarchy—being fully double, in proportion to the population, of those which exist in France—demonstrates in a decisive manner the general wellbeing of the rural population; for a wretched people can never keep animals of comfort.† Nor are more spiritual and ennobling feelings wanting among them: hardly any people in Europe are more generally and passionately fond of music; the graves of the dead are the object of universal and touching attachment;‡ and in no part of the world is patriotic spirit more strongly felt,¹ or have more strenuous and persevering

¹ Personal observation. Macdonald's Austria. Edin. Encyclopædia, iii. 147, 149. Turnbull's Austria, ii. 66, 70.

* The wine raised in Upper and Lower Austria is worth 10,000,000 florins, or £1,000,000 yearly. About a sixth of the whole surface of Lower Austria is devoted to the cultivation of the vine.—RAYMOND and ROTH, *Statistique de toute la Monarchie Autrichienne*, i. 234.

† The horned cattle in the Austrian empire are 13,400,000 to a population of 35,000,000: in France they are 6,000,000 among 32,000,000; or just one-half.—See HUMBOLDT, *Amerique Meridionale*, vi. 96, 97; and LICHTENSTEIN, *Statistique d'Autriche*, 160, 161.

‡ These observations apply to Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Tyrol, and Carniola. In Bohemia, Hungary, and Gallicia, feudal institutions prevail; the power of the nobles is more considerable, and the condition of the people much less prosperous.

efforts been made in the hour of danger in behalf of their country.

The secret of this remarkable wellbeing of the peasantry of Austria, is to be found in the tenure by which land is held, joined to the just and equitable principles on which government has long been administered. Though the holding of landed property is exceedingly various, yet generally the Austrian cultivator is not a tenant in the English sense of the word—that is, a farmer holding at will, or in virtue of a lease; he is a *feuar* in the sense of Scotch law—that is, he has his land for ever on paying the fixed duties to the feudal superior. The lord of the manor retains several considerable privileges, particularly those of hunting, fishing, and holding certain manorial courts, and he receives also certain fines on succession or transmission; but the real right of property remains with the *coloni* as long as they discharge their feudal duties, which are generally commuted on favourable terms into payments in money. Where lands are held by tenants proper, who also are very numerous, the leases are generally for six, eight, or twelve years; and the rules of law in relation to these tenants, or their subtenants, are extremely just towards the cultivator. Though the whole goods brought on the farm are liable to the over-lord or principal tenant, the person of the subtenant is only liable to his immediate superior, and the goods can only be attached by execution after judgment obtained, not by previous sequestration or mesne process, as in the British islands.¹

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21.

Causes of this remarkable wellbeing of the Austrian peasantry,

¹ Personal knowledge.

Humane and ample provision is made for the relief of the destitute; in nothing have the benevolence and justice of the German character been more strikingly evinced than in this particular. No part of Europe, perhaps, abounds so much in charitable endowments as the southern and richer provinces of the Austrian empire; and since the reduction of the monasteries under Joseph II., between 1782 and 1786, rendered unavoidable a system of poor-laws, as was the case in Great Britain from a similar cause in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, the attention of government has been strongly and beneficially directed to that object. In every rural community or parish, and in every district of the towns, an institution for the poor,

22.

Provision for the poor in Austria.

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or "*Armen Institut*," is established under the direction of the clergyman of the parish, and an officer termed the "*Armen Vater*," or "Father of the Poor." The funds for the distributions made by these functionaries, which are very liberal, are derived from duties on articles of import in burghs, and voluntary contributions in kind or money; and the latter source, as in other agricultural communities, is generally sufficient without any direct assessment on property. Let not philosophy despise, in these humble details, the "short and simple annals of the poor;" in them, more than in the spread of popular power and passions, is the true secret of general prosperity and national attachment to be found. If we desire a proof, contrast the uniform and steadfast loyalty, amidst every disaster, of the Austrian people, with the turbulent passions and furious hostility of the Irish democracy.¹

¹ Turnbull,
ii. 48, 61.
Personal ob-
servation.

23.

Austrian sys-
tem of educa-
tion.

Education, as is now generally known, is not merely generally, but almost universally, diffused in the German provinces of Austria. Her government has organised a system, in this important particular, different from that which obtains in any other country. Aiming at the gradual and peaceful amelioration of the internal condition of the people, the equalisation of rights in the eye of the law, and the general wellbeing, combined with the tranquillity of the inhabitants, the Austrian statesmen have viewed education as a mighty engine to mould the public mind, and on the due regulation of which the national safety is dependent. In conformity with this view, two fundamental principles have been adopted, which are at the root of their whole system of instruction. The first is, that all education, in whatever rank or grade, whether public or private, from that of the prince in the university to that of the peasant at the parish school, is to be placed under the guidance of the state, and liable to the direction and control of its functionaries; the second, that all education should be blended with, and mainly founded on, religion. Under this condition, however, the most ample latitude is permitted in regard to the religious creed which is taught. It is only provided that every child shall be registered as belonging to *some* religious persuasion, and that, in his education, the principles of *that religion* are to form a material part of his instruction:

but it is immaterial what that religion is ; it may be the faith of the Jew or the Protestant, the Greek or the Romanist. The charge of supervision is committed to the clergy of the different persuasions ; but they are rigidly compelled to teach those doctrines only which have been put forth by their ruling consistories, and sanctioned by the supreme authority of the state. Thus the difficulty so sorely felt in England, and other free countries, as to what creed is to be taught at schools, is entirely avoided ; and, like the Roman Pantheon, the Austrian institutions for education admit within their ample portals all known modifications of religious belief. Education is sedulously recommended by government and its subordinate officers, and a complete system maintained at the public expense, or extensive funds set apart for that purpose, from the humble grammar-school, through the various lyceums and gymnasiums, to the eight universities which form the highest branch of the establishment.* But it is not compulsory as in Prussia, and hence, though the number of scholars in every part of the country is great and rapidly increasing, yet it does not, as it does in some of the provinces of Prussia, embrace all the children capable of receiving tuition.† On the whole, the system of education in Austria is extensive and judicious, and founded on liberal principles ; but it is easy to be wise and liberal in the administration of a despotic state. How long would such a system coexist with a free press, democratic legislation, and popular institutions ? It is there and there only that the real tendency, for good and for evil, of the fruit of the tree of knowledge is to be perceived.¹

¹ Turnbull,
ii. 124, 145.

* These universities are those of Vienna, Prague, Pavia, Lemberg, Gratz, Olmutz, Innsbruck, and Pesth.

† In the whole empire, exclusive of Hungary, Transylvania, and the military frontiers, there are—

Capable of going to school—Males, . . .	1,307,777
Females, . . .	1,221,394
	<hr/> 2,529,171
Actually at school—Males, . . .	874,840
Females, . . .	661,264
	<hr/> 1,536,104

That is, about two-thirds of the children capable of being at school are actually at it.—TURNBULL, ii. 143.—In Transylvania the proportion is still greater: there are 52,698 children at school, out of 64,227 capable of going to it—a proportion greater than in any equal part of the British empire.

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24.

Religious in-
stitutions of
the empire.

The religion of Austria is the Roman Catholic, and the great majority of the people are of that persuasion: * but persons of every variety of religious creed are alike eligible to all offices, in the army, law, or civil service; and practically there is no distinction made between them, either in government appointments or the Imperial alliances. The Archduke Charles and Joseph have both married out of the pale of the Romish church: the former having espoused a Lutheran princess; the latter, first a lady of the Greek church, then one of the Lutheran persuasion. Nine-tenths of the ample estates belonging, in former days, to the Romish church, were confiscated by the Emperor Joseph between 1784 and 1789; and the monastic orders now embrace only nine thousand members instead of eighty thousand, who formerly were maintained by their possessions. But there was this vital distinction between the proceedings of this philosophic reformer and those of our Henry VIII.: he did not bestow the confiscated lands on rapacious courtiers or reforming barons, but, with a few trifling exceptions, they were all accumulated into a religious fund (*religions kasse*) in the different provinces, from which provision was thereafter to be made for the spiritual wants and education of the people. So ample was the resource thus acquired, that no difficulty has since been experienced in providing funds for the religious and secular instruction of the rapidly increasing population. The same emperor introduced the equally important change of causing, in defiance of all the remonstrances of the Pope, the prayers and litanies in the churches to be performed in the German tongue, though mass is still celebrated in Latin. Alarmed at so portentous an innovation, the

* In the Austrian empire, there are, exclusive of the military class

Roman Catholics,	24,431,440
Greek Church, United,	3,375,840
Greek, not United,	2,722,083
Lutherans,	1,189,817
Calvinists,	2,150,721
Unitarians,	45,399
Jews,	613,283

34,528,583

—*Census of 1834; and TURNBULL, ii. 11; and MALTE BRUN, v. 727, 738.*

holy father hastened in person to Vienna, to protest against it. He was received with every possible demonstration of respect; but the new system continued, and all classes now enjoy the inexpressible comfort of joining in the tribute of prayer and praise in a language which they can understand. Gentleness and toleration pervade every department of the Austrian church. Though the spiritual authority of the Supreme Pontiff is respectfully admitted, the least attempt at interference with temporal power is steadily resisted; the patronage of livings, as in England, is vested in the crown, the bishops, clerical and lay incorporations, and private individuals; and in no part of Europe is the authority of the crown more perseveringly exerted to correct clerical abuses, or extend spiritual instruction, by ordinances altogether independent of the court of Rome.¹

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¹ Turnbull,
il. 73, 100.
Malte Brun,
v. 727, 738.

The Austrian system of government, which has succeeded in so surprising a manner in stilling the jealousies and lulling to sleep the rivalries of so many different nations, is founded on the same principles as the British government in India, and in both countries it has been brought about by the same necessity. It was the weakness of the central power, when compared with the strength of the subject provinces, which compelled the governments of both, in despair at effecting the subjugation of such extensive possessions by force, or their amalgamation by settlement, to govern them all by an attention to their interests, and a respect for their feelings. The extraordinary spectacle of the Hindoo, the Mussulman, the Parsee, and the followers of Bhud, all uniting in willing civil and military obedience to the sway of the Christian stranger, has its exact counterpart in the Imperial dominions, where the Austrian Catholics, the Bohemian Lutherans, the Polish Jews, and the Hungarian or Transylvanian Greeks, rival each other in devotion and attachment to the Imperial government. One cause alone can explain in either instance such a prodigy, and that is—attention to remote interests on the part of the central authority. Unhappily, such is the selfishness of human nature, that such attention is hardly ever to be looked for except in the weak, with whom it is a matter of necessity. Had Hungary been

25.
General principle of the
Austrian
government.

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the ruling power and the seat of government, the Bohe-
mians, the Tyrolese, the Austrians, might have been
subdued by force, but they would never have united in
willing and cheerful obedience to its sway. The rule of
the dominant Hungarians in Hungary, in Bohemia, and
Austria, would not have been that of the English in
India, but of the English in the West Indies, or, till
recent times, in Ireland.

26.
Vast natural
capabilities
of Austria.

Under the influence of this paternal system of govern-
ment, industry and cultivation have made very consider-
able progress in the Imperial dominions; but nothing
to that of which they are susceptible, and which, to all
appearance, they will one day attain. Fully a fourth
part of the whole superficial extent of the state is still
waste, a large portion of which is susceptible of cultiva-
tion; and even that which is under the plough, does not,
if Lombardy be excepted, yield on an average a fourth
of what the soil could produce.* Supposing that two
hundred million acres of the Austrian territory, out of
the two hundred and fifty-two million of which it con-
sists, are capable of profitable cultivation, this would,
at the rate of an inhabitant to every two acres, maintain
a hundred millions of inhabitants, or above three times
its present population. Great as this number is, it is
less than is to be found in some parts of Switzerland,
where large parts of the territory are sterile and rocky,
and there are nevertheless one inhabitant to every acre
and a quarter; all living in a degree of ease and affluence
almost unparalleled elsewhere in the world.¹

¹ Tchobor-
ski, i. 114,
117. Prof.
Springer's
Stat. Tables.

Austria is now not a uniform homogeneous empire,
subject to one law, descended of one race, inspired by
one national feeling; it is a *confederation of monarchies*,
united by accident or consent under one common head,
but each governed by its own constitution, laws, and

* Total superficies of the Austrian dominions—

12,167 square German miles, or 126,878,241 jochs, or 252,000,000 acres.	
Of which arable,	33,366,680 66,733,360 ..
Vineyards,	3,854,760 7,709,520 ..
Meadows, orchards, and gardens,	13,811,708 27,623,416 ..
Pastures,	11,014,707 22,029,414 ..
Forests,	33,385,015 66,770,030 ..

Total productive surface, 95,432,870 jochs, or 190,865,740 acres.

—SPRINGER'S *Stat. d'Autriche*, and TCHOBORSKI, *Sur les Finances d'Autriche*,
i. 114.

customs. The sovereign is emperor of Austria, but he is king of Hungary and Bohemia; and it is in the latter character, and in it only, that he gives his commands to these mighty dependencies. No attempt to alter the constitution, or force changes on the subjects of any of its provinces, is ever made, at least in modern times, by the government of Vienna. Satisfied if they remain peaceable, and contribute their fixed quota to the general defence of the empire, they willingly allow them to enjoy their national institutions, and sedulously attend to every circumstance, even in form, which tends to maintain their national feelings, or diffuse the illusion of real independence. The Emperor can issue orders which are obeyed both in Hungary and Bohemia, but he does so as king of these monarchies; his orders are addressed to their respective chanceries, into which none but natives are admitted, and they are always in strict conformity with their existing constitutions and laws. Improvements in local legislation or institutions are only introduced when recommended by their established parliaments or legislature, and enforced when sanctioned by their authority. The great secret of government consists in ascertaining, from correct sources, the wants of the various subjects of the empire, and anticipating their complaints by being beforehand with the requisite reforms. "Every thing for the people, nothing by them," which Napoleon described as the real secret of good government, has long been the ruling principle of the Austrian administration: their maxim is to prevent the growth of political passion by carefully conserving political and individual interests. Whether such a system is equally advantageous as the popular institutions which make such changes emanate from the direct will of the people, it is not for this place to discuss; but it may safely be affirmed that it is the only system of government adapted for a people in the circumstances of the great bulk of the subjects of Austria, or by which its various provinces could be retained in willing obedience to the central government.

Although the popular principle enters very little into the general system of the Austrian administration in any of its provinces, yet it is a mistake to suppose, as is fre-

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27.

Austria is, in fact, a confederation of monarchies.

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28.

Civil govern-
ment in the
Imperial do-
minions.

quently done in Great Britain, that the power of the crown is entirely uncontrolled, and that the government is a pure despotism. In every part of the empire there is a provincial State or "Stande," composed of the principal inhabitants. Their composition varies in different provinces; but, generally speaking, they are the notables or chief men of the district, not the representatives of any large body in the community. They consist in all cases of four classes: the clergy, the higher nobility, the ordinary landholders, and the burghers. The latter are deputies of cities, but elected by a limited class. They have no legislative power, but they have important powers of administration within their own bounds, and nearly the entire direction of the collection of the revenue, and levying of men within those limits. They make representations also, or remonstrances, on all matters of local concern; and in a government founded on the principle of preventing discontent by anticipating all the reasonable wants of their subjects, these representations are often as effectual as actual legislation, emanating from themselves, would have been. In Hungary a more thorough representative system prevails, if that system can be called representative which, framed mainly for the interests of the aristocratic body, is entirely rested on their suffrage. In Lombardy, the provincial estates are elected in a still more popular manner: the deputies being proper representatives of the whole inhabitants who pay taxes to a certain amount, and the suffrage being conducted through a double, and sometimes a triple election. But in all the provinces, the duties and powers of these assemblies are the same, and very nearly resemble those which, in ancient times, belonged to the English parliament; viz. the raising and collecting the revenue and levies of men, and representing their wants to the government. But the power of taxation and legislation belongs to the crown, to be exercised, however, by and through these local assemblies.¹

¹ Turnbull,
ii. 215, 223.
Malte Brun,
v. 396, 402.

The public debt of Austria is very considerable, and will hereafter weigh heavily, like that of England, on the energy and resources of the empire. Great pains have been taken by the Imperial authorities to conceal the magnitude of this burden, and mystify the details pub-

lished regarding it; but enough exists to show that it is a very serious burden. Part of it is of old standing, but by far the greater proportion was contracted during the disastrous wars of the French Revolution. The addition made during that long and dreadful contest was so considerable, that in 1841 it amounted to little short of 1,000,000,000 florins, (£100,000,000,) and the total interest which required to be provided for was no less than 42,817,000 florins, or £4,281,700 sterling.* This, it must be admitted, is a heavy burden upon a nation little abounding in commercial wealth, and the revenue of which has not yet reached £14,000,000 a-year. Yet it is inconsiderable, both in point of absolute and relative amount, to that of Great Britain, which, of a revenue which does not now exceed, from ordinary sources, £50,000,000 sterling, absorbs annually £28,000,000. And if the resources which ultimately may be rendered available to the two countries be taken into consideration, the balance will incline still more decisively in favour of the Austrian empire.¹ Certainly, to a country possessing a fine climate, thirty-five millions of inhabitants, and more than double the whole area of the British islands, a public

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29.
Public debt
of Austria.1 Tchobor-
ski, Finances
d'Autriche.
i. 39, 40.

* Public Debt of Austria in 1841—

	Florins.	Interest. Florins.
Paper Money,	4,343,735	
Old debt from 1792, . . .	245,815,000	2,458,150
Old debt not covered, . .	2,660,000	30,000
Debt to bankers,	42,000,000	1,850,000
Debt of Tyrol, Vorarlberg, &c., .	16,295,000	575,350
Debt of Lombardy,	74,000,000	2,980,000
New debt since 1792, . . .	444,327,596	18,641,514
Debts on Lottery,	51,273,000	
Due to the bank,	89,250,000	2,030,000
Floating debt,	30,000,000	900,000
	999,964,331	29,435,014

To the interest must be added annually—

	Florins.
For Sinking Fund,	8,170,320
Do. in Lombardy,	730,000
Do. for Lottery do. . . .	2,873,340
Annual rents applied to Sinking Fund,	1,888,150
Total Sinking Fund,	13,661,810
Repayment of old debt drawn by lot,	4,000,000
Total in discharge of debt, . . .	17,661,810
Add interest of debt,	29,465,014
Total annual charges of debt, . .	47,126,824

—TCHOBORSKI, i. 48, 49.

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debt of a hundred millions sterling cannot be considered as a very crushing burden, when Great Britain, with half these natural resources, exists and flourishes under eight hundred millions.

30.
Depreciation
of the Aus-
trian paper
during the
war, and pre-
sent sinking
fund.

The national debt of Austria was for the most part contracted during the Revolutionary war: two-thirds of its amount grew up during, or since, that terrible convulsion. Great part of it was contracted in paper money, bearing a forced circulation; the most easy method for the moment, and the most burdensome in the end, which a state can possibly adopt. The difficulty of comprehending the complicated details of Austrian finance arises, in a great degree, from this circumstance; as a considerable part of the debt is due to the holders of this paper money, which government is obliged to recognise as at par to the holders. Its depreciation was often very great during the war; but the regular and stable administration of the Imperial government has uniformly made it resume its proper value on the return of peace. And, notwithstanding the difficulty which the public exchequer has experienced in discharging the interest of their public debt since the peace, they have had the fortitude to keep up a sinking fund of 10,000,000 florins, (£1,000,000,) equal to a third of the interest of this debt; a fact which, contrasted with the ruinous abandonment of the same admirable institution during the same period by Great Britain, illustrates the vital distinction between the foresight of an aristocratic, and the recklessness of a popular government.¹

¹ Tchorborski, i. 39, 41.

31.
Her govern-
ment and
policy.

The foreign policy of Austria, like that of all other countries which are governed by a landed aristocracy, is steady, consistent, and ambitious. It never loses sight of its objects: yields when it cannot resist, but prepares in silence the means of future elevation. In no other monarchy of equal extent is the personal cost of the court so inconsiderable; a great expenditure is not required either to uphold the influence of the crown, or to overshadow the lustre of the nobility. The disposal of all the situations in the army, and those in the civil administration, which are at least as numerous, renders the influence of government irresistible, and enables the archdukes and Imperial family, without injury to their authority, to live rather with the simplicity of private citizens than the extravagance of

princes of the blood in other countries. In no part of Europe is the practical administration of government more gentle and paternal than in the Hereditary States; but in the recently acquired provinces the weight of authority is more severely felt, and many subjects of local complaint, arising from the exorbitant power of the nobles, and the feudal restrictions on the people, have long existed in the Hungarian and Bohemian dominions. The population of the empire, at the peace of Luneville in 1801, was 27,600,000; and they have given ample proof, in the glorious efforts of subsequent times, both of the courageous and patriotic spirit by which they are animated, and the heroic sacrifices of which they are capable.¹

Jealousy of Prussia was, during the years which followed the treaty of Luneville, the leading principle of the Austrian cabinet; a feeling which originated in the aggression and conquests of the Great Frederick, and had been much increased by the impolitic and ungenerous advantage which the court of Berlin took of the distresses and dangers of the Austrian monarchy, to extend, by an alliance with France, their possessions and influence in the north of Germany. Europe had too much cause to lament this unhappy division, the result of a selfish and short-sighted policy on the part of the Prussian government, which, in their rivalry of the Emperor, made them shut their eyes to the enormous danger of French ambition, till incalculable calamities had been inflicted on both monarchies, and they themselves were brought to the verge of destruction by the overthrow at Jena. Though compelled frequently to withdraw from the alliance with England, the Austrian government never ceased to look to it as the main pillar of the confederacy for the independence of Europe, and reverted to the cabinet of London on every occasion when they took up arms, in the perfect confidence that they would not apply for aid in vain. The natural inclination of the Imperial government was to lean for continental support on the Russian power; and although this tendency was considerably weakened by the part which the cabinet of St Petersburg took with Prussia in arranging the matter of German indemnities,² yet this temporary estrangement soon ceased upon the arrival of more

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¹ Bign. ii.
270, 274.

32.
Her jealousy
of Prussia,
and reliance
on England.

² Bign. ii.
275, 276.

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pressing dangers, and the two nations were to be seen contending side by side, with heroic constancy, on the field of Austerlitz.

33.
Leading persons of its cabinet at this period.

The leading persons in the administration of Vienna at this period were the Count Cobentzel, vice-chancellor of state, and Count Colloredo, a cabinet minister, and intimate friend of the Emperor. The Archduke Charles, whose great military abilities had procured for him an European reputation, was at the head of the war department; but the powers of government were really in the hands of Cobentzel and Colloredo, and an unworthy jealousy prevailed of the hero who had more than once proved the saviour of Germany. A young man, afterwards celebrated in the most important transactions of Europe, M. DE METTERNICH, had already made himself distinguished by his eminent talents in political affairs, but he had not yet risen to any of the great offices. The general policy of the Austrian cabinet at this period was reserve and caution; the empire had bled profusely from the wounds of former wars, and required years of repose to regain its strength and recruit its finances; but the principles which governed its secret resolutions were unchangeable, and it was well known to all the statesmen of Europe, that in any coalition which might be formed to restrain the ambition of France, Austria, if success appeared feasible, would bear a prominent part.¹

¹ Bign. ii.
263, 267.
Dum. xi. 23,
27.

34.
Russia, its rapid growth and steady policy.

Russia, under the benignant rule of Alexander, was daily advancing in wealth, power, and prosperity. That illustrious prince, whose disposition was naturally inclined to exalted feeling, had been bred in the exercise of benevolent affections by his tutor, Colonel La Harpe, a Swiss by birth, and a philanthropist by character, under whose instructions he had learned to appreciate the glorious career which lay before him, in the improvement, instruction, and elevation of his people. From the very commencement of his reign, his acts had breathed this benevolent spirit: the punishment of the knout, the use of torture, had been abolished; valuable rights given to several classes of citizens; improvements introduced into the civil and criminal code; slavery banished from the royal domains; and the first germ of representative institutions introduced, by permitting to the senate, the

conservators of the laws, the right of remonstrance against their introduction. But these wise and philanthropic improvements, which daily made the Czar more the object of adoration to his subjects, only rendered Russia more formidable to the powers of Western Europe. The policy of the cabinet of St Petersburg was unchanged and unchangeable : domineering ascendancy over Turkey and Persia, predominant influence in the European monarchies, formed the continued object of its ambition ; and in the contests and divisions of other powers, too many opportunities occurred of carrying its designs into execution. For above a century past, Russia has continually advanced, and never once receded ; victorious or vanquished, its opponents are ever glad to purchase a respite from its hostility by the cession of territory. Unlike the ephemeral empires of Alexander or Napoleon, its frontiers have slowly and steadily enlarged. Civilisation marches in the rear of conquest, and consolidates the acquisitions which power has made ; its population, doubling every sixty years, is daily rendering it more formidable to the adjoining states ; and its extension, to all human appearance, is not destined to be arrested till it has subjected all Central Asia to its rule, and established the Cross in undisturbed sovereignty on the dome of St Sophia and the minarets of Jerusalem.¹

At the conclusion of the reign of Peter the Great, in 1725, the population of the empire was about 20,000,000, and its revenue 13,000,000 silver rubles, or £3,200,000 sterling : in 1787, its numbers had swelled to 28,000,000, and its revenue risen to 40,000,000 rubles, or £9,000,000 : in 1804, its inhabitants were no less than 36,000,000, and its revenue about 50,000,000 silver rubles, or £12,000,000 ; a sum equivalent to at least double that sum in France, and triple its amount, at that period, in Great Britain.* The greater part of the revenue was derived from the capitation tax ; a species of impost common to all nations in a certain stage of civilisation, where slavery is general, and the wealth of each proprietor is nearly in proportion to the number of agricultural labourers on his estate. It

CHAP.
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¹ Tooke's
Russia, ii.
124, 147.
Bign. ii. 278,
280.

35.
Statistics of
the empire.
June 18,
1834.

* The revenue actually paid was 120,000,000 rubles ; but from the great emission of paper money bearing a legal currency subsequent to 1787, the value of the ruble had fallen to half of what it was in its original silver standard, and it was worth no more than half-a-crown English money.—BIGNON, ii. 282.

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amounted to five rubles for each freeman, and two for each serf, and was paid by every subject of the empire, whether free or enslaved. Customs and excise, especially on spirituous liquors—the object of universal desire in cold climates—produced a large sum: the duties on the latter articles alone brought in annually 30,000,000 paper rubles, or £3,000,000, into the public treasury. But notwithstanding this considerable revenue, and the high value of money in that comparatively infant state, the expenses of government, which necessarily embraced a considerable naval as well as military establishment, were so great that its finances were barely equal to the protection of its vast territory; and experience has demonstrated that, without large foreign subsidies, Russia is unable to bring any great force into the central parts of Europe.¹

¹ Bign. ii.
282, 285.
Malte Brun,
vi. 635.
Bremmer, i.
19.

36.
And state of
the army.

The army, raised by conscription at the rate of so many in each hundred of the male population, amounted nominally to above three hundred thousand men. But, from the vast extent of territory which they had to defend, it was a matter of great difficulty to assemble any considerable force at one point, especially at a distance from the frontiers of the empire; and in the wars of 1805 and 1807, Russia never could bring above seventy thousand men into any one field of battle. In no state of Europe is the difference so great between the amount of an army as it appears on paper, and the actual force which it can bring into the field; and a commander in general can assemble round his standard little more than half of what the gazettes announce as being at his disposal. Drawn, however, from the agricultural population, its soldiers were extremely formidable, both from the native strength and the enduring courage which they possessed. The slightest physical defect was sufficient to cause the proffered serf to be rejected; and though they embraced the military life with reluctance, and left their homes amidst loud lamentations, they soon attached themselves to their colours, and undertook with undaunted resolution any service, how perilous soever, on which they might be sent. The commissariat was wretched; the hospital service still miserably defective: but the artillery, though cumbrous, was numerous and admirably served, and the quality of the troops almost unrivalled. Accustomed to hardships

from their infancy, they bivouacked without tents on the snow in the coldest weather, and subsisted without murmuring on a fare so scanty that the English soldiers would have thought themselves starved on it. Fed, clothed, and lodged by government, the pay of the infantry only amounted to half-a-guinea, that of the Cossacks to eight-and-sixpence, a-year; but such was the patriotic ardour and national enthusiasm of the people, that even on this inconsiderable pittance they were animated with the highest spirit, and hardly ever were known to desert to the enemy. The meanest soldier was impressed with the belief that Russia was ultimately to conquer the world, and that the commands of the Czar in the prosecution of that great work must invariably be obeyed. When Benningsen retired towards Königsberg, in the campaign of 1807, and sought to elude the enemy by forced marches during the long nights of a Polish winter, the Russian murmur at retreat was so imposingly audacious, although ninety thousand men thundered in close pursuit, that the general was compelled to soothe their dissatisfaction by announcing that he was marching towards a chosen field of battle. The disorder consequent on six days of continued famine and suffering instantly ceased; and joyous acclamations rent the sky when they received the command to halt, and the lines were formed, with parade precision, amidst the icy lakes and drifted snow of Preussich Eylau.*¹

Enthusiastically beloved by his subjects, Alexander had, immediately on his accession to the throne, abolished the custom of alighting from the carriage when the royal equipages were met, which had excited so much discontent under his tyrannical predecessor; but the respect of his subjects induced them to continue the practice, and, to avoid such a mark of Oriental servitude, he was in the habit of driving about, without guards, in a private chariot. Married early in life to the beautiful Princess Elizabeth of Baden, he soon became an indifferent husband, but constantly kept up the external appearances of

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¹ Wilson's
Polish Cam-
paign, i. 31.
Bign. ii. 282,
285.

37.
Character
and manners
of the Em-
peror Alex-
ander.

* "Comrades, go not forward into the trenches; you will be lost!" cried a retiring party to an advancing detachment: "the enemy are already in possession."—"Prince Potemkin must look to that, for he gave us the order: come on, Russians!" was the reply, and the whole marched forward and perished, the victims of their heroic sense of duty.—SIR ROBERT WILSON'S *Polish War*, p. 2.

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decorum, and remained throughout an attached friend to that princess. More tender cords united him to the Countess Narishkin, a Polish lady of extraordinary fascination, gifted with all the grace and powers of conversation for which the women of rank in that country are, beyond any other in Europe, distinguished; and to her influence his marked regard for the Sarmatian nation through life is, in a great degree, to be ascribed. Immediately upon his accession to the throne, he was compelled to select his ministers from the party which placed him there; and Pahlen, Pain, and Woronzoff were his first advisers. But though attached from the outset to England, to whose influence he owed his elevation, he was sincere in his admiration for the First Consul; and, still directed by the angry feelings of 1799, entered warmly into the French project of elevating Prussia at the expense of Austria, in the division of the German indemnities. A species of prophetic sympathy united him to Frederick William, who had ascended the throne about the same age, and only shortly before himself; and this was soon ripened into a sincere attachment, from their interview at Memel in the summer of 1803, and contributed not a little to determine the subsequent course of events on the great theatre of Europe.

In proportion as the time approached when his great projects against Austria were to be carried into execution, Napoleon redoubled his ostensible efforts for the invasion of Great Britain. These preparations, which never had been more than a feint from the moment that intelligence of the stoppage of Villeneuve's fleet by Sir Robert Calder's action, and the subsequent retreat of that admiral to Cadiz, had been received, completely produced the desired effect. Austria, deceived by the accounts which were daily transmitted of the immense accumulation of forces on the coasts of the Channel, the embarkation of the Emperor's staff and heavy artillery, and the continual exercising of the troops in the difficult and complicated operation of getting on shipboard, deemed the moment come when she could safely commence hostilities, even before the arrival of the Russian auxiliaries. She broke ground, accordingly, by crossing the Inn and invading the Bavarian territories, fondly imagining that the French

38.

Austria, deceived by Napoleon's measures, crosses the Inn.

Sept. 9.

troops were still on the shores of the Channel, and that she would be able, by a rapid advance, to rouse Bavaria and the lesser powers of Germany to join her standard, and appear before the arrival of Napoleon, with the whole forces of the empire, on the banks of the Rhine. But she grievously miscalculated, in so doing, the activity and resources of the French Emperor, and soon found to her cost that she had been the dupe of his artifices, and had unwittingly played his game as effectually as if she had intentionally prostrated her resources before his ambition.¹

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1805.

¹ Dum. xiii.
1, 11. Jom.
ii. 99, 100.

The forces with which the Aulic Council engaged in this enterprise were eighty thousand men ; and the Russians were still so far removed as to render it impossible to reckon upon their co-operation in the first movements of the campaign. Precipitance in forcing on hostilities before their troops were all arrived, was the ruin of this campaign. They had, with reason, calculated upon being joined by the whole forces of Bavaria ; but, as already noticed, the paternal anxiety of the Elector rendered these hopes abortive, and threw the whole weight of that electorate into the opposite side of the scale. Public spirit in the Imperial dominions was strongly roused, and the people were prepared to make any sacrifices in defence of their country ; but they had little of the self-confidence or hope which, even more than physical power, constitutes the strength of an army. The soldiers went into the field resolute and devoted, but rather with the resignation of martyrs than the step of conquerors. Their repeated defeats had rendered them nearly desperate of success. The army was numerous, gallant, and well appointed, but hardly equal to the task of meeting unaided the united French and Bavarian forces, even if led by commanders of equal talent and experience. What, then, was to be expected from them when advancing under the guidance of Mack to meet the grand army grouped round the standards of Napoleon ?* In vain the British government transmitted to the cabinet of Vienna a detailed statement,

39.

Her troops
advance
through
Bavaria to
the Black
Forest.

* Though totally deficient in the decision, promptitude, and foresight requisite for a commander in the field, Mack was by no means without a considerable degree of talent, and still greater plausibility, in arranging on paper the plan of a campaign: and so far did this species of ability impose on Mr Pitt, that he wrote to the cabinet of Vienna, recommending that officer to the command of

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¹ Dum. xiii.
12.40.
Efforts of
Napoleon to
gain Prussia.

obtained from the Imperial staff at Boulogne, of the amount and composition of the French army, showing above a hundred and thirty thousand men, of all descriptions, ready to march; and asked, whether it was against England or Austria that this force was really intended to act? With infatuated self-confidence, their host continued to advance; soon it overran the Bavarian plains, entered the defiles of the Black Forest, and occupied with its outposts the openings from that rocky ridge into the valley of the Rhine.¹

From the moment that it was evident that hostilities were unavoidable, Napoleon was indefatigable in his endeavours to engage Prussia on his side. The instructions to Duroc, his envoy at Berlin, were, to represent to the Prussian government, "that there was not a moment to lose; that it was indispensable an alliance should forthwith be concluded between the two states; that the confederacy of Russia, Austria, and England was equally menacing to both; that, during the negotiations for a conclusion of the treaty, it was necessary that Prussia should make an open declaration against Austria, or at least a formidable demonstration on the Bohemian frontier; that the Emperor was about to make an autumnal campaign; that having dispersed the armament of Austria before the month of January, France and Prussia might turn their united forces against Russia, for which purpose the Emperor offered the aid of eighty thousand men, amply provided with every thing necessary for a campaign."* The answer of the Prussian cabinet to these propositions was in the main favourable. They admitted "that the union of France and Prussia could alone provide against the rest of the Continent such a barrier as would ensure the maintenance of general tranquillity."²

² Bign. iv.
334.

The French plenipotentiary, taking these words in a more favourable sense than they were perhaps intended,

the German army. The just and decisive opinion expressed of him by Nelson at Naples, in 1798, has already been noticed. With all his great qualities as a civil statesman, Mr Pitt had but little capacity for military combinations; and this is the judgment, in this particular impartial, pronounced upon him by Napoleon.—See NAPOLEON in MONTHOLON, ii. 432.

* Instructions to Duroc, 24th August 1805.—BIGNON, iv. 334.—These instructions, written the very day on which Napoleon received accounts of the entry of Villeneuve into Ferrol, and when he dictated to Daru the march of the grand army from Boulogne across Germany, (*ante*, chap. xxxix. § 80,) are a singular monument of his vigour and rapidity of determination.

immediately commenced the drawing out of a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the two powers; but when it was communicated to the Prussian government, their temporising policy reappeared; they were willing to unite with France in order to prevent the resumption of hostilities, but hesitated at taking any step which might involve them in the contest; and evinced, amidst all their anxiety for the acquisition of Hanover, an extreme apprehension of the consequences of a Russian war. To overcome their scruples, Napoleon did not hesitate to engage that "he would retain none of his conquests on his own account, and that the empire of France and kingdom of Italy should receive no acquisition." But the terrors of the Prussian cabinet were not to be overcome by these obviously hypocritical professions, and they persisted in their resolution to enter into no engagement which might involve them in hostilities. Matters were in this doubtful state, when the Russian minister at Berlin presented a letter from the Emperor of Russia, in which he proposed an interview with his Prussian Majesty on the frontiers of their respective dominions, and requested permission for his troops to pass through his territories on their route for Bavaria. The pride of Frederick William instantly took fire; and he replied by a decided negative against the passage of the Muscovites through any part of his dominions; but expressed his willingness to meet his august neighbour at any place which he might select. Prussia, at the same time, renewed its negotiations with France for the acquisition of Hanover as a deposit, until the conclusion of the war: a proposition to which Napoleon testified no unwillingness to accede, provided "France lost none of its rights of conquest by the deposit."¹

While these unworthy negotiations were tarnishing the reputation of the Prussian monarchy, the French troops were in full march from the shores of the Channel to the banks of the Rhine. The instructions given by Napoleon to all the chiefs of the grand army for the tracing of their route, and the regulation of their movements, were as perfect a model of the combination of a general, as the fidelity and accuracy with which they were followed were of the discipline and efficiency of his followers. The stages, the places of rest, the daily marches of every regiment,

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41.

Negotiations between the two powers. And the Russians denied a passage through the Prussian territories.

Sept. 21.

¹ Bign. iv.
338, 343, 346.

42.

March of the French troops towards Bavaria.

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were pointed out with undeviating accuracy over the immense circumference from Cherbourg to Hamburg; relays of horses provided to convey by post those who were more remote, twenty thousand carriages collected for their rapid conveyance, and the immense host caused to converge, by different routes, through France, Flanders, and the north of Germany, to Ulm, the centre where it was anticipated the decisive blows against the Austrian monarchy were to be struck.* The troops simultaneously commenced their march from the coast of the Channel in the beginning of September, and performing, with the celerity of the Roman legions, the journeys allotted to them, arrived on the Rhine from the 17th to the 23d of the same month. They were all in the highest spirits, buoyant with health, radiant with hope: the exercise and discipline to which they had been habituated during the two preceding years, in their camps on the shores of the ocean, having enabled them to overcome, with ease, fatigues which would have been deemed insurmountable at that period by any other soldiers of Europe.¹†

¹ Dum. xiii.
13, 14. Bign.
iv. 360. Jom.
ii. 103, 104.
Bour. vii. 10.

43.
Composition
and direction
of these
forces.

The army which Napoleon thus directed against the Imperialists was the most formidable, in respect of numbers, equipment, and discipline, which modern Europe had ever witnessed. Divided into eight corps under the command of the most distinguished marshals of the empire, it consisted of a hundred and eighty thousand men; and had been brought by long exercise, both in camps and in the field, to an unrivalled pitch of discipline and efficiency.‡ The plan of Napoleon was to direct the corps of Ney,

* See the orders, addressed by Napoleon to the seven marshals commanding the corps of the army, in Dumas, xiii. 302, 300. *Pièces Just.*—Many of them are dated at nine, ten, eleven, at night, at midnight: but in all is to be seen the same extraordinary union of minuteness and accuracy of detail, with grandeur and extent of general combination.

† The celerity with which the march of Marshal Ney's corps was performed is particularly remarkable.

‡ The composition of this army was as follows:—

1. Corps commanded by Bernadotte.
2. — — — by Marmont.
3. — — — by Davoust.
4. — — — by Soult.
5. — — — by Lannes.
6. — — — by Ney.
7. — — — by Augereau.
8. — — — by Murat (cavalry.)
9. Guards — — by Mortier and Bessières.
10. Bavarians — — by Wrede

—See Jom. ii. 104; Dum. xiii. 17, 18.

Soult, and Lannes, with the Imperial Guards and the cavalry under Murat, to Donawerth and Dettingen : Davoust and Marmont were to march upon Neuburg ; and Bernadotte, joined to the Bavarians, upon Ingolstadt ; while Augereau, whose corps was conveyed by post from the distant harbour of Brest, received orders to cover the right flank of the invading army, and extend itself over the broken country which stretches from the Black Forest to the Alps of the Tyrol and the Grisons. A single glance at the map will be sufficient to show that these movements were calculated to envelope altogether the Austrian army, if they remained in heedless security in their advanced position in front of Ulm. For while the bulk of the French, under Napoleon in person, descended upon their right flank by Donawerth, Bernadotte, with the corps from Hanover, got directly into their rear, and cut off the line of retreat to Vienna, while Augereau blocked up the entrance to the defiles of the Tyrol. It was of the utmost moment to the success of these great operations that the movements of the troops should, as long as possible, be concealed : and the despotic power of the French Emperor gave him every facility for the attainment of this object. A rigorous embargo was immediately laid on in all parts of the empire ; the post was every where stopped ; the troops were kept ignorant of the place of their destination ; and such were the effects of these measures, that they were far advanced on their way to the Rhine before it was known either to the cabinets of London or Vienna that they had broken up from the heights of Boulogne.¹

¹ *Jom. ii.*
105, 106.
Dum. xiii.
13, 15.

The other corps of the army, traversing their own or a friendly territory, experienced no obstacle on their march ; but that of Bernadotte, in its route across Germany, from Hanover to Bavaria, came upon the Prussian state of Anspach. Napoleon was not a man to be restrained by such an obstacle ; he had foreseen it, and given positive orders to Bernadotte to disregard the neutrality of that power. " You will traverse its territories," said he ; " avoid resting there, make abundance of protestations in favour of Prussia, testify the greatest possible regard for its interests, and meanwhile pursue your march with rapidity, alleging as an excuse the impossibility of doing otherwise, which really is the fact." These instructions

44.
Violation of
the Prussian
territory by
Bernadotte's
corps.

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Oct. 8.
1 Dum. xlii.
27, 28. Bign.
iv 345, 346.

45.
Great indignation excited
by this at
Berlin.
Oct. 14.

were punctually obeyed ; and Bernadotte, at the head of sixty thousand men, including the Bavarians and corps of Marmont placed under his orders, disregarding the remonstrances of the local authorities, traversed the Prussian territory, and assembled around Eichstadt, with his advanced guard on the Danube, between Neuburg and Ingolstadt, at the end of the first week of October. The master-stroke was delivered ; the left wing of the French in great force was interposed between the Austrians and their own dominions, while they were reposing in fancied security around the ramparts of Ulm.¹

Great was the astonishment and indignation at Berlin when the unexpected intelligence of this outrage upon their independence was received. It at once revealed the humiliating truth, long obvious to the rest of Europe, but which vanity and partiality to their own policy had hitherto concealed from the Prussian cabinet, that the alliance with France was based neither on a footing of equality, nor on any sense of mutual advantage ; that it had been contracted only for purposes of ambition by Napoleon ; that he neither respected nor feared their power, and that, after having made them the instruments of effecting the subjugation of other states, he would probably terminate by overturning their own independence. The weight of these considerations was much increased by the recollection that this outrage had been inflicted by a nation whom, for ten years, it had been the policy of Prussia to conciliate by all the means in her power ; while, on the other hand, the simple refusal to grant a passage through their territories had been sufficient to avert the march of the Russian troops, although the cabinet of Berlin had, during that time, been far from evincing the same compliance with the wishes of the Czar. These indignant feelings falling in with a secret sense of shame at the unworthy part they were about to take, in the great contest for European independence which was approaching, produced a total alteration in the views of the Prussian cabinet ; while the more generous and warlike party of the capital, at the head of which were the Queen, Prince Louis, and Baron Hardenberg, loudly gave vent to their indignation,² and openly expressed their joy at the occurrence of a circum-

² Bign. iv.
346, 347.
Dum. xlii. 28,
31. Hard.
viii. 476, 480.

stance, which had at length opened the eyes of government to the ruinous consequences of the temporising policy which they had so long pursued.

All intercourse with the French embassy was immediately prohibited; an energetic note, demanding satisfaction, was forthwith presented to the minister of that power at Berlin; and permission was given to the Russian troops to traverse in their march the Prussian territories. The projected interview between the Czar and the Prussian monarch to adjust that matter was adjourned, as the difficulty had been solved by the measure of Napoleon; the troops which had been directed towards the Russian frontiers were countermanded; and three powerful armies of observation formed,—one of sixty thousand men in Franconia, under the orders of Prince Hohenlohe; one in Lower Saxony of fifty thousand, under the Duke of Brunswick; and one in Westphalia of twenty thousand, under the command of the Prince of Hesse. This impolitic step of Napoleon is linked with many important consequences. It produced that burst of angry feeling which at length brought Prussia into the lists with France in 1806. It is thus connected with the overthrow and long oppression of that power, and may be considered as one of the many causes, at this time entering into operation, which, in their ultimate results, produced the resurrection of European freedom, and the fall of the French empire.¹

While the precipitance of Napoleon was thus producing a storm in the north of Germany, a treaty was concluded between Russia, England, and Sweden, by which the latter power engaged to furnish an auxiliary corps of twelve thousand men to act in Pomerania, in concert with a Russian force of double that amount, under the orders of Count Osterman Tolstoy. This army was to be further reinforced by the German Legion in the service of England; an addition which would raise it to nearly forty thousand men; an army, it was hoped, adequate not only to the task of reconquering the electorate of Hanover, for which it was immediately destined, but to determine at last the wavering conduct of Prussia, and give an impulse to

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46.

Hostile measures adopted by the cabinet of Berlin.

¹ Bign. iv.
346, 347.
Dum. xiii.
28, 31. Hard.
viii. 476, 480.

47.

Measures concerted between Prussia, Sweden, and England, in the north of Germany, and neutrality of Naples.

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the northern states of Germany, which might precipitate them in a united mass on the now almost defenceless frontiers of Holland and Flanders. Had Prussia boldly taken such a line, what a multitude of calamities would have been spared to itself and to Europe! More fortunate in the south than the north of Europe, Napoleon at this period concluded a convention with the court of Naples for the neutrality of that kingdom during the approaching contest. A negotiation was at the same time set on foot with the Holy See for the admission of a French garrison into Ancona: but the Pope had suffered too severely from the conquests and exactions of the Republicans to admit of such a concession; and both parties protracted the discussions with a view to gain time for the issue of military operations. These negotiations at either extremity of the line of military operations might have been attended with important effects upon the final issue of the war, if affairs had been delayed for any considerable time. But Napoleon was meanwhile preparing those redoubtable strokes in the heart of Germany, which were calculated at once to prostrate the strength of Austria, intimidate or overawe the lesser powers, and frustrate the great combination formed by the English and Russian cabinets for the deliverance of Europe.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
31, 33. Bign.
iv. 356, 357.
Bot. iv. 287.

48.
Napoleon's
proclamation
to his troops.
Sept. 27.

The Emperor arrived at Strasburg on the 27th September, and immediately addressed to his soldiers one of those heart-stirring proclamations which contributed almost as much as his military genius to the success of his arms. "Soldiers!" said he, "the campaign of the third coalition has commenced: Austria has passed the Inn, violated its engagements, attacked and chased our ally from his capital. We will not again make peace without sufficient guarantees: our generosity shall not again make us forget what we owe to ourselves. You are but the advanced guard of the great people: you may have forced marches to undergo, fatigues and privations to endure. But whatever obstacles we may encounter, we shall overcome them, and never taste of repose till we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemies." To the Bavarian troops he thus addressed himself:—"Bavarian soldiers! I come to put myself at

your head, to deliver your country from the most unjust aggression. The House of Austria wishes to destroy your independence, and incorporate you with its vast possessions. You will remain faithful to the memory of your ancestors, who, sometimes oppressed, were never subdued. I know your valour; and feel assured that after the first battle I shall be able to say with truth to your prince and my people, you are worthy to combat in the ranks of the grand army.”¹

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¹ Bign. iv.
362. Norv.
ii. 386.

The movements of the opposite armies in Germany were now rapidly bringing matters to a crisis. Mack, at the first intelligence of the approach of the French troops, had concentrated his forces at Ulm, Memmingen, and Stockach, with advanced posts in the defiles of the Black Forest, contemplating only an attack, as in former wars, in front, and expecting to be able to stem the torrent of such an invasion as effectually in a defensive position, around the ramparts of Ulm, as Kray had done the incursion of Moreau in a previous campaign. He was in total ignorance of the great manœuvre of Napoleon in turning his flank with his left wing, and interposing between his whole army and the Austrian frontier. This decisive movement, the knowledge of which had been carefully kept from the enemy, by means of a whole French corps diffused as light troops along the ridge behind which it was going forward, was now rapidly approaching its consummation. The united corps of Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, and Soult, with the Bavarians, a hundred thousand strong, had arrived at the same moment on the Danube in the rear of Mack, and without a moment's hesitation passed the river at Donauwerth, Neuburg, and Ingolstadt. Pursuing their course without interruption, they speedily arrived on the communications of the Austrian army with Vienna, and by the middle of October, Marmont and Soult were established in great strength at Augsburg, directly on the road from the Imperial headquarters to the Hereditary states; while Napoleon himself, at the head of the remainder of his army, led by Murat and Ney, was pressing upon them from the westward both on the right and left banks of the Danube.²

49.
Movements of
the French
troops to sur-
round the
Austrians.

Oct. 6 and 7.

Oct. 12.

² Dum. xiii.
35, 38. Jom.
ii. 108, 109.
Norv. ii. 388.

Struck, as by a thunderbolt, by this formidable apparition.

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50.

Mack's defensive arrangements.

tion in his rear, Mack had but one resource left, which was to have fallen back with all his forces to the Tyrol, the road to which was still open, and sought only to defend the approach to Vienna by accumulating a formidable mass in that vast fortress on the flank of the invading army. But the Austrian general had not resolution enough to adopt so daring a design, and probably the instructions of the Aulic Council fettered him to a more limited plan of operations. He confined himself, therefore, to concentrating his forces on the line of the Iller, between Ulm and Memmingen, hastily threw up intrenchments to defend the latter town, and, grouping his masses round the ramparts of the former, fronted to the eastward, to make head against the formidable enemy who had thus unexpectedly appeared in his rear. At the same time he despatched orders to General Auffenberg, who commanded twelve battalions of grenadiers and four squadrons of cuirassiers at Innspruck, to join him by forced marches, and, as soon as he arrived, despatched him to support the corps of Keinmayer, who was at the head of the vanguard near Donawerth.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
41, 43. Jom.
ii. 108, 109.

51.

Four thousand Imperialists are cut to pieces by Murat.

The brave Imperialist, while pursuing, in unsuspecting security, his march to the place of his destination, suddenly found himself enveloped at Vertingen, four leagues from Donawerth, by an immense body of French cavalry. It was the corps of Murat, eight thousand strong, which, rapidly sweeping round the Austrian infantry, menaced them on every side. In this extremity, Auffenberg formed his whole division into one great square, with the cuirassiers at the angles, and in that order boldly waited the attack of the enemy. Down came the French dragoons like a tempest, rending the air with their cries, and speedily swept away the Imperial horse stationed outside the infantry, while courageously resisting the immensely superior forces of the enemy. Still the square remained, and from its sides, fronting every way, there issued a redoubtable rolling fire, which reminded the French veterans of their own unceasing discharges at Mont Thabor and the Pyramids. The combat was long and obstinate: in vain Nansouty with the heavy dragoons charged them repeatedly on every side; the Imperialists stood firm; their sustained running fire brought down

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rank after rank of their assailants, and the issue of the combat seemed extremely doubtful, when the arrival of Oudinot with a brigade of French grenadiers changed the fortune of the day. These fresh troops, supported by cannon, opened a tremendous fire upon one angle of the square; the Austrians, worn out with fatigue, were staggered by the violence of the discharge, and Nansouty, seizing the moment of disorder, rushed in at the wavering part of the line, and in an instant an aperture was made which admitted several thousand of the enemy into the centre of the Austrian square. Collecting with heroic resolution the yet unbroken part of his troops, Auffenberg succeeded in forming a smaller square, which effected its retreat into some marshes in the neighbourhood of the Danube, which arrested the pursuit of the French horse: but three thousand prisoners, many standards, and all their artillery remained in the hands of the enemy.¹

Although the courage with which the Austrians fought on this occasion, appeared to the reflecting in every part of Europe a favourable augury for the final issue of the contest, yet to the inconsiderate multitude, who judge only from the result, the effect was very different, and the brilliant termination of the first action in the campaign was an event as animating to the French, as it was depressing to the Imperial soldiers. Napoleon, with his usual skill, availed himself of the opportunity to exhibit a spectacle which might electrify the minds of his troops. Two days after the action, he repaired in person to Zurmurhausen, where he passed in review all the corps who had been engaged in it; with his own hand distributed crosses, orders, and other recompenses to the most deserving; and pronounced a flattering eulogium on General Excelmans, when he presented the standards taken from the enemy. Another officer who, attended by only two dragoons, had so imposed on the terrors of the broken Imperialists the night after the action, as to make a hundred of them lay down their arms, received a place in the imperial guard. Never did sovereign in modern times understand so completely the art of exciting enthusiasm in the minds of his followers, by the distinction conferred on individual merit, in whatever rank of the army;² and it was as much owing to this

¹ Dum. xiii.
43, 45. Jom.
ii. 109. Bign.
iv. 364.

52.
Recom-
penses be-
stowed by
Napoleon on
the soldiers
engaged.

Oct. 9.

² Bign. iv.
365, 366.
Dum. xiii.
45, 46.

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circumstance, as to the greatness of his military genius, that the superior successes of the grand army, which he commanded in person, compared with those at a distance under the orders of his lieutenants, was owing.*

53.
The French
sweep entire-
ly round the
Austrian
position.

8th and 9th
October.

While the powerful advanced guards of the grand army, viz. the corps of Ney on the left bank of the Danube, and that of Murat on the right, were thus engaging the whole attention of the enemy, the remainder of that immense host, on the right and left, was rapidly sweeping round the flanks and rear of the Austrian troops. Soult soon joined Marmont at Augsburg; the Imperial Guards were shortly after established at the same place; Davoust, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived at Aicha, all directly in the rear of the Imperialists: while the corps of Keinmayer, almost enveloped in such immense masses, deemed itself fortunate in being able to effect its retreat, by the bridge of Neuburg, into Bavaria and the city of Munich. Thither it was immediately followed by the corps of Bernadotte, who established himself in that capital, while the troops of Marmont and Davoust were moved in the same direction, with the view of forming a powerful army of observation, which might repel any attempt on the part of the Russians, or the Austrian reserves from the Hereditary States, to disengage the army of Mack, now entirely surrounded by the French forces. But information soon arrived that the Russians were at such a distance as to be unable to take any part in the decisive operations which were approaching; and therefore Bernadotte alone was left in observation in Bavaria, and the other corps were drawn in a circle round the north and east of the Austrians at Ulm. Ney, in particular, was directed to occupy all the bridges over the Danube, and push forward his advanced guards on the right bank of the river, to give instantaneous warning of any attempt which the enemy might make to break through the net which surrounded him,¹ and regain

¹ Dum. xiii.
49, 52. Jom.
ii. 110, 111.

* Generosity as well as excellence of military conduct attracted the notice of the Emperor. At the passage of the Lech, a corporal who had been cashiered by his superior officer on account of some irregularity of discipline, beheld that officer on the point of perishing in the waves of the river. Forgetting what he had suffered at his hand, the brave man plunged in and saved him. The Emperor caused him to be brought into his presence, and after publicly eulogising his conduct, appointed him to a situation round his own person, and gave him the star of the Legion of Honour.—BIGNON, iv. 365, 366.

Bohemia by passing the rear and communications of the grand army.

Mack, instead of falling back to the Tyrol, which was the only way of retreat that now really remained to him, persisted in the idea that, by directing the mass of his forces to the northeast, he might yet regain the Bohemian frontier. He therefore moved forward all his troops, as they successively arrived from the Black Forest and the neighbourhood of the Lake of Constance, in that direction, and on the 8th October established his own headquarters at Burgau, midway between Ulm and Augsburg. Meanwhile the defence of Ulm was entrusted to General Jellachich, who laboured assiduously, night and day, not only with the garrison, but the whole inhabitants of the town and five thousand peasants from the vicinity, in strengthening the works on the heights adjoining the place. Between the 5th and 8th of October, the movement of the Austrian army was completed: it now faced towards Bavaria and the Lech, having its left resting on the Danube, over which it still held the bridges of Ulm and Gunzburg. The latter post being of great importance to the Austrians, was occupied by eight thousand of their best troops. They were there attacked by Marshal Ney, at the head of superior forces, and after a bloody conflict the bridge was carried at the point of the bayonet, and the Imperialists driven out of the town with the loss of above two thousand men. Disconcerted by this check, and despairing, from the vast accumulation of forces on the banks of the Danube and Lech, of success in any attempt to break through in that direction, Mack withdrew his headquarters to Ulm; and Ney, rapidly following his footsteps, narrowed the circle on the north and east, within which the Austrians in that city were enveloped.¹

In their advance towards Ulm, the vanguard of Ney encountered a body of Austrians, twenty thousand strong, posted in an admirable situation at Hasslach, and supported by a powerful artillery in position on the rugged heights which adjoin that hamlet. The French were so far advanced before they perceived the strength of the enemy, which was more than double their own, that retreat was impossible, while attack seemed hopeless. In these circumstances, their commander, General Dupont,

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54.

Measures of
Mack to ex-
tricate him-
self.

Oct. 9.

Oct. 10.

¹ Dum. xiii.
53, 56. Norv.
ii. 389, 390.

55.

Bloody com-
bat at Hass-
lach.

Oct. 11.

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took the most audacious, often in such situations the most prudent course. He vigorously assailed the enemy, and in the evening, the arrival of successive reinforcements in some degree restored the equality of the combat. The weight of the contest took place at the village of Jungingen, which was taken and retaken six times during the course of the day. But although they maintained a heroic struggle with inferior forces at that point, the French were unsuccessful at others; their cavalry having been overthrown by the Imperialist horse, who assailed them in rear, and their cannon and baggage swept off by their redoubtable cuirassiers, and brought in triumph to the walls of Ulm. At night Dupont retired, leaving indeed a third of his troops on the field of battle, but justly proud of having, with forces so inferior, maintained so honourable a combat, and bringing with him, as a set-off against the loss of his artillery, nearly two thousand prisoners, taken, during the terrible strife in the village, from the Imperial infantry.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
114. Dum.
xiii. 57, 62.
Bign. iv. 376.

56.
Capitulation
of four thou-
sand Austri-
ans in Mem-
mingen, and
complete in-
vestment of
Ulm.

Oct. 13.

The honour of the Austrian arms was in some degree maintained by the divided trophies of this bloody conflict; but it was shortly after severely tarnished by a less creditable transaction at Memmingen. On the 11th October, Soult was detached by Napoleon, with his whole corps, from Augsburg, against this town, and after cutting to pieces a regiment of Austrian cuirassiers, whom he encountered on his road, he completed the investment of the place on the 13th. The garrison, four thousand strong, destitute of provisions, intimidated by the great display of force which appeared round their walls, and discouraged by the disastrous issue of the combats which had hitherto taken place, capitulated on the first summons; and then began that ruinous system of laying down their arms in large bodies which, during this campaign, more even than their numerous disasters, tarnished the honour of the Imperial armies. Rapidly pursuing his success, Soult, on the day following, crossed the Iller, and with three of his divisions marched to Biberach, so as to bar the road to Upper Swabia, which hitherto had lain open to the enemy, while the fourth took post on the southeast before the ramparts of Ulm, where they were shortly after joined by the corps of Marmont and Lannes.

On the same day, Napoleon, with the Imperial Guard, advanced from Augsburg to Burgau, and established his headquarters there for the night ; while Ney, on the north, completed the circle of enemies drawn round the unhappy Imperialists. The fate of Mack was already sealed : a hundred thousand French were grouped round the ramparts of Ulm, where fifty thousand Austrians, in deep dejection, were accumulated together.¹

In advancing towards Ulm on the following morning, at the head of his guards, Napoleon came, at the bridge of the Lech, upon the corps of Marmont, which had been established there on the preceding day. The weather was dreadful ; the snow already fell in heavy flakes ; the cold was intense ; and the soldiers, burdened not only with their arms, but with provisions for several days in every man's knapsack, were slowly toiling over a road rendered almost impassable by the multitude of carriages which had already furrowed its surface. Insensible to the severity of the weather, Napoleon instantly halted, dismissed his own suite to a distance, formed the private soldiers into a dense circle around him, and there harangued them for half an hour, in a loud voice, on the situation and prospects of the campaign. He thanked them for the constancy with which they had encountered difficulties and endured privations the severest to which they could be exposed in war ; demonstrated to them the situation of the enemy, cut off from his own country, surrounded by superior forces, and obliged to fight, as at Marengo, in order to open the only avenue which remained for his escape. In the great battle which was approaching, he confidently promised them victory, if they continued to act with the resolution and constancy which they had hitherto evinced. This speech, the circumstances of which as much resemble the harangues of the Roman generals to their legions, as they are characteristic of the French army at that period, and the peculiar turn of mind in their chief, was listened to with profound attention. No sooner was it concluded than shouts and warlike exclamations broke out on all sides, and the joyful visages of the soldiers demonstrated that they fully appreciated the immense advantages which their own exertions and the skill of their chief had already secured for them.²

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¹ Jom. ii. 115,
116. Dum.
xiii. 67, 68.
Bign. iv. 368.

57.

Napoleon's
address to
his soldiers at
the bridge of
the Lech.

² Dum. xiii.
68, 69. Bign.
iv. 369, 370.

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58.

Mack resolves
to detach the
Archduke
Ferdinand to
Bohemia,
and himself
remain at
Ulm.
Oct. 13.

While the formidable legions of Napoleon were thus closing round the Imperial array, the most stormy debates took place at the headquarters at Ulm as to the course which should be pursued. Fully alive, as all were, to the extent and imminence of the danger, opinions were yet painfully divided as to the means of salvation which remained to the army. On the one hand, it was urged that the only chance of safety which was left, was to form the troops into one solid mass, and attempt to force a passage either towards Bohemia or the Tyrol; on the other, that the most advisable course was to detach the Archduke Ferdinand with the cavalry and light troops towards the former of these provinces, while Mack himself held Ulm, from whence he might hope either to be delivered by the Russians, or effect his retreat into the latter. A more fatal resolution than that of dividing their forces, in presence of such an enemy, could not possibly have been adopted. But the urgent necessity of providing, at all hazards, for the escape of a member of the Imperial house, overpowered every other consideration: and it was ultimately determined that Mack, with the bulk of the army, should run the hazard of remaining at Ulm, to engage the attention of the enemy, while the archduke endeavoured, at the head of the cavalry and light troops, to gain the Bohemian mountains.¹

¹ *Jom.* ii. 112.
Norv. ii. 392,
393.

59.

Description
of the Austri-
an position at
Elchingen.

At the same moment that this desperate resolution was formed by the Austrian generals, Napoleon was preparing for a general attack, on the following day, on the position which they occupied. His army formed a vast circle round Ulm, at the distance of about two leagues from the ramparts. The advanced posts of the two armies were every where in presence of each other. Early on the following morning, Napoleon himself ascended to the chateau of Adelhausen, from the elevated terrace of which he was surveying, by the advancing line of fire, the progress of his tirailleurs in driving in the outposts of the enemy, when his attention was arrested by a violent cannonade on the right. It was occasioned by Marshal Ney, who, at the head of sixteen thousand men, was commencing an attack on the bridge and abbey of ELCHINGEN. The Austrians, fifteen thousand strong, with forty pieces of cannon, under Laudon, had there established

themselves in one of the strongest positions which could be imagined. The village of the same name, composed of successive piles of stone houses intersected at right angles by streets, rises in the form of an amphitheatre from the banks of the Danube to a vast convent which crowns the summit of the ascent. All the exposed points on these heights were lined with artillery, all the windows filled with musketeers. The bridge over the Danube had been only imperfectly destroyed by the retiring Austrians on the preceding day; but the tottering arches were commanded by the cannon and infantry with which all the opposite heights were covered; and they still had a strong advanced guard on the northern bank of the river.¹

¹ Personal observation.
Dum. xiii.
72. Jom. ii.
118.

Undeterred by such formidable obstacles, Ney approached with his usual intrepidity to the attack. Dressed in full uniform, he was every where to be seen at the head of the columns, leading the soldiers to the conflict, or rallying such as were staggering under the close and murderous fire of the Austrians. Nothing could at first resist the impetuosity of the French: the Imperial outposts on the north bank of the river were attacked with such vigour that the assailants passed the bridge pell-mell with the fugitives, and, hotly pursuing them up the streets, arrived at the foot of the vast walls of the convent at the summit. There they were arrested by a severe plunging fire from the top of the battlements; while the Imperialists, who had been forced from the streets, took a strong position on their right, from whence they enfiladed the front of the abbey, and threatened to retake the town. Thither they were speedily followed by the French. The same division which had forced the passage of the bridge advanced in the van of the attacking column; and a desperate conflict ensued in front of the wood, which the Austrians held with invincible resolution. In vain the French brought up fresh columns to the fight. The regiments of the Archduke Charles and of Erlach, with heroic bravery, made good their ground, and, though reduced to a fourth of their numbers, still maintained, at the close of the day, their glorious defence. But towards evening, Laudon, though still in possession of the wood and abbey, found that his position was no longer tenable.² The French, now in full possession of

60.
Combat of
Elchingen.
Oct. 4.

² Dum. xiii.
72, 74. Jom.
ii. 118, 119.
Norv. ii. 393,
394. Ney, ii.
218.

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the bridge, had caused large bodies both of horse and foot to defile over. Already their cavalry was sweeping round the Austrian rear, and menacing their communications; and at length he retired, having sustained a loss in that desperate strife of fifteen hundred killed and wounded, and two thousand prisoners.*

61.
Retreat of the
Archduke
Ferdinand
with great
loss,
Oct. 15.

The resistance of these gallant troops, though fatal to too many of themselves, proved the salvation of the Archduke Ferdinand, and preserved the house of Hapsburg from the disgrace of having one of its princes fall a prisoner into the hands of the enemy. During the desperate strife at Elchingen, the archduke disposed the troops with which his sortie was to be effected into two divisions, with the one of which he made a feint of advancing towards Biberach, while Werneck, at the head of the other, moved upon Albeck and Herdenheim. The latter corps fell, with forces greatly superior, upon the division of Dupont, stationed on the road it was following, already severely weakened by the combat at Hasslach, and those brave troops were on the point of being overwhelmed by superior numbers, when Murat, with his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, came up to their support. The arrival of these reinforcements gave the French as great a superiority of numbers as their adversaries had previously enjoyed, and the Austrians were compelled to retire before nightfall in the direction of Herdenheim. On the day following they were again assailed in their march by Murat, who made eighteen hundred prisoners from their weary columns; but having been joined by the archduke, who had now returned from his feint towards Biberach, the remainder resolutely continued their endeavours to force their way through the enemy.¹

Oct. 16.
¹ Jom. ii.
124. Rapp,
39, 41. Dum.
xiii. 92. 95.

62.
Surrender of
Werneck
with 8000
men.

With characteristic adherence to old custom, even in circumstances where it is least advisable to follow it, the Imperialists had encumbered this light corps, whose safety depended on the celerity of its movements, with five hundred waggons, heavily laden. They were speedily charged by the French horse, and captured, with all the drivers and escort by which they were accompanied.

* It is from this glorious action that Marshal Ney's title of Duke of Elchingen was taken. He exposed his person without hesitation throughout the day, and seemed even to court death; but fate reserved him for greater and more melancholy destinies.—JOM. ii. 118.

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Despairing, after these disasters, of bringing his infantry in safety through the hourly increasing masses of his pursuers, the archduke in the night continued his retreat with the light horse, and by great exertions reached Donawerth. The vigour and celerity of the French pursuit were unexampled. Some of the divisions, in dreadful weather, and through roads almost impassable for carriages, marched twelve leagues a-day. The cavalry were continually on horseback; and, animated by the prospect of gaining so brilliant a prize, the troops of all arms made the utmost efforts in the pursuit. But the perseverance and skill of the Austrian cavalry triumphed over every obstacle; and after surmounting a thousand dangers, the archduke succeeded in crossing the Altmühl, and, by Reidenberg and Ratisbon, gaining the Bohemian frontier, where he was at length enabled to give some days' repose to his wearied followers. But it was with a few hundred horse alone that he escaped from the pursuit. The remainder of the corps, exhausted with fatigue, and despairing of safety, were surrounded at Trochtelfingen by the cavalry of Murat, and to the number of eight thousand men laid down their arms.¹

Oct. 18.
¹ Dum. xlii.
92, 97. Jom.
ii. 124, 126.
Norv. ii.
397, 398.
Rapp, 39, 44.

While these astonishing successes were rewarding the activity of Murat's corps, Napoleon in person was daily contracting the circle which confined the main body of the Imperialists around the ramparts of Ulm. This city, which has since become so celebrated from the disasters which the Austrians there experienced, is surrounded by a wall flanked with bastions and a deep ditch; but it lies in the bottom of a valley, overhung on the north by the heights of Michelsberg and La Tuileries, which on the other side of the Danube command it in every part. These heights, during the campaign of 1800, had been covered by a vast intrenched camp, constructed by the provident wisdom of the Archduke Charles, and it was by their aid that Kray was enabled to arrest the victorious army of Moreau for six weeks before its walls. Totally destroyed by the French after the evacuation of that city, these works had been hastily attempted to be reconstructed by Mack, after he saw his retreat cut off in the present campaign: but the ramparts were incom-

63.
The heights
round Ulm
are carried by
Napoleon.

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Oct. 18.
1 Dum. xiii.
80, 84. Jom.
ii. 120, 122.
Personal ob-
servation.

64.
Negotiations
for the sur-
render of
Mack.

Oct. 19.
2 Bour. vii.
25, 27. Dum.
xiii. 84, 86.
Rapp, Me-
moires, 28, 31.

plete; the redoubts, unarmed, were little better than a heap of rubbish; and the garrison had not a sufficient force at their disposal to man the extensive lines which were in preparation. The consequence was that these important heights, the real defence of Ulm, fell an easy prey to the enemy. Animated by the presence of the Emperor, who had established his headquarters at Elchingen, and in person directed the operations, the French troops cheerfully advanced amidst torrents of rain, and almost up to the knees in mud, to the attack. Ney speedily carried the Michelsberg, while Suchet made himself master of La Tuileries; and before nightfall the French bombs established on the heights were carrying terror and death into every part of the city.¹

Arrived on the heights of the Michelsberg, Napoleon beheld Ulm, crowded with troops, stretched out within half cannon-shot at his feet, while the positions occupied by his legions precluded all chance of escape to the Austrian army, now reduced by its repeated losses to little more than thirty thousand combatants. Satisfied that they could not escape him, and encouraged by the surrender of Werneck, of which he had just received accounts, he summoned Mack to capitulate, and returning himself to his headquarters at Elchingen, despatched an officer of his staff, Philippe de Ségur, to conduct the negotiation. Mack at first was persuaded, or attempted to make the French believe he was persuaded, that his situation was by no means desperate, and that he would in a short time be succoured by his allies. He accordingly expressed the greatest indignation at the mention of a capitulation; insisted that the Russians were at Dauchaw, within five days' march; and ultimately only agreed to surrender if in eight days he was not relieved. "You behold," said he, "men resolved to defend themselves to the last extremity, if you do not grant them eight days. I can maintain myself longer. There are in Ulm three thousand horses, which we shall consume before surrendering, with as much pleasure as you would do in our place."—"Three thousand horses!" replied Ségur, "Ah, Marshal, the want which you experience must already be severe indeed, when you think of so sad a resource!"²

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Mack, however, continued firm, and Ségur returned to Napoleon's headquarters to give an account of his unsuccessful mission.

Certain that the Austrians could not be relieved within the time specified by their general, Napoleon sent back Ségur, on the following day, with a written ultimatum, granting the eight days, counting from the 17th, the first day when the blockade was held to have been established, which in effect reduced the eight days to six. "Eight days, or death!" replied the Austrian general, and, at the same time, he published a proclamation, in which he denounced the punishment of death against any one who should mention the word "surrender!"* Shortly after, Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the French headquarters. His astonishment and confusion were extreme, when the bandage was removed from his eyes, and he found himself in presence of the Emperor and his brilliant staff. The Emperor began the conversation, by painting in the gloomiest colours the situation of the Austrian army. He cited the example of Jaffa, where he had been obliged to put the garrison, four thousand strong, to the sword, and declared that similar obstinacy would involve the Imperial army in the same lamentable fate. He pointed out the hopelessness of all ideas of rescue from the Russians, who had not yet reached the Bavarian frontier, and the increase which his blockading force would soon receive from the troops who had been victorious over Werneck, and captured the garrison of Memmingen.† The prince returned to Ulm with these untoward tidings; and Mack, falling suddenly from the height of confidence to the depth of despair, agreed to surrender. On the following day the capitulation was signed, by which the fortress of Ulm was to be given up,¹ and the whole army to lay down its

65.
They capitulate at first conditionally

¹ Rapp, 35, 36. Jom. ii. 124. Dum. xiii. 87, 88. Bour. vii. 35. See the capitulation in Dum. xiii. 396.

* The proclamation was in these terms:—"In the name of his Majesty I render responsible, on their honour and their duty, all the generals and superior officers who should mention the word 'surrender,' or who should think of any thing but the most obstinate defence: a defence which cannot require to be prolonged for any considerable time, as in a very few days the advanced guards of an Imperial and a Russian army will appear before Ulm to deliver us. The enemy's army is in the most deplorable situation, as well from the want of provisions as the severity of the weather: it is impossible that he can maintain the blockade beyond a few days; and as to trying an assault, it could only be done by little detachments: our ditches are deep, our bastions strong; nothing is more easy than to destroy the assailants. Should provisions fail, we have more than three thousand horses, which will maintain us for a considerable time."—DUM. xiii. 87.

† "You expect the Russians?" said Napoleon: "Do you really, then, not know that they have not yet reached Bohemia? Do you suppose I am not fully

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arms, on the 25th, if not before that time relieved by the Russian or Austrian armies.

66.

And then un-
conditionally.

These terms were sufficiently disgraceful to the Austrian arms; but Mack had not yet exhausted the cup of humiliation. Napoleon, to whom every hour was precious, and who already began to experience the inconvenience of so great an accumulation of men without magazines at a single point, perceiving the weakness of the adversary with whom he had to deal, sent for Mack to his headquarters at Elchingen, and there so completely bewildered him by a recital of the disasters which had attended the army, and the impossibility of their either being relieved by the Russians, or escaping to the defiles of the Tyrol, that the unhappy man, who had now entirely lost his senses, agreed to evacuate the place and surrender on the following day, on condition that the corps of Ney should not quit Ulm till the 25th. In this way, without any reason whatever, the whole other troops in the blockade, amounting to nearly seventy thousand men, were rendered instantly disposable for ulterior operations.¹

¹ Jom. ii. 127.
Dum. xiii.
97, 98. Rapp,
36.

67.

The army of
Mack defiles
before Napo-
leon.
Oct. 20.

In consequence of this new article in the capitulation, a spectacle took place on the following day unparalleled in modern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning, the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms. Napoleon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, took his station before the fire of a bivouac on a rocky eminence, forming part of the heights on the north of the city. For five hours the immense array defiled before him—the men in the deepest dejection, the officers in sullen despair, at the unparalleled disgrace which had befallen their arms. Klenau, Giulay, Gottesheim, Lich-

informed as to your situation? If I let you return on your parole, who will assure me that the soldiers at least will not immediately, in defiance of the capitulation, be employed against me? I have too often already been the dupe of such artifices on the part of your generals. This is not an ordinary war: after the conduct of your government, I have no measures to keep with it. It is you who have attacked me; I have no faith in your promises. Mack might engage for himself, but he could not do so for his soldiers. If the Archduke Ferdinand was here I could trust him; but I know he is not. He has crossed the Danube; but I will get hold of him yet. Do you suppose I am to be made a fool of? Here is the capitulation of Memmingen; show it to your general, I will grant him no other: the officers alone can be allowed to return into Austria: the soldiers must be prisoners of war. The longer he delays, the worse will be his ultimate fate."—Bour. vii. 31, 33.

tenstein, were there—names celebrated in the achievements of former wars, and destined to acquire still greater distinction in those more glorious ones which followed. Napoleon addressed himself to these brave men in delicate and touching terms: "Gentlemen," said he, "war has its chances. Often victorious, you must expect sometimes to be vanquished. Your master wages against me an unjust war. I say it candidly, I know not for what I am fighting; I know not what he desires of me. He has wished to remind me that I was once a soldier; I trust he will find that I have not forgot my original avocation. I will, however, give one piece of advice to my brother the Emperor of Germany,—Let him hasten to make peace; this is the moment to remember *that there are limits to all empires, however powerful*. The idea that the House of Lorraine may come to an end, should inspire him with distrust of fortune. I want nothing on the Continent: it is *ships, colonies, and commerce which I desire*; and their acquisition would be as advantageous to you as to me." Thus spoke Napoleon on the 20th October 1805: on the day following, the empire of the seas was for ever wrested from his arms by the victory of Nelson at Trafalgar, and on that day eight years he himself was flying from a greater disaster to the arms of France sustained on the field of Leipsic.¹*

Little anticipating these calamities, the Emperor enjoyed the splendid spectacle which was going forward. Under the appearance of perfect calmness, he concealed a mind intoxicated with the glory which surrounded him. The Imperial soldiers, amidst all their misfortunes, were filled with admiration at the conqueror by whom they had been

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On 20th Oct.
1813.
¹ Bign. iv.
374, 375.
Dum. xiii.
99. 100.

68.
Feelings of
the two
armies on the
occasion.

* As the procession of captives continued to defile before him, Napoleon said to the Austrian generals,—“It is truly deplorable that such honourable men as yourselves, whose names are spoken of with honour wherever you have combated, should be made the victims of an insane cabinet, intent on the most chimerical projects. It was already a sufficient crime to have attacked me in the midst of peace, without any declaration of war: but this offence is trivial to that of bringing into the heart of Europe a horde of barbarians, and allowing an Asiatic power to mix itself up with our disputes. Instead of attacking me without a cause, the Aulic Council should rather have united their forces to mine, in order to repel the Russian force. Such an alliance is monstrous; it is the alliance of the dogs and wolves against the sheep. Had France fallen in the strife, you would not have been long of perceiving the error you had committed.” At this moment, a general officer recounted aloud an insulting expression which he had heard from the common soldiers in regard to the Austrian captives. “You must have little respect for yourselves,” said Napoleon to his troops, with an air of marked displeasure, “to insult men bowed down by such a misfortune.”—SAVARY, i. 101, 102.

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overcome: as they defiled before him, the march of the columns insensibly became slower, and every eye was turned to the hero who filled the world with his renown. But when they had passed, the recollection of their situation fell at once upon them, and without waiting till they arrived at the place where their arms were to be deposited, and in defiance of the commands of their officers, they threw them violently on the ground, and from the vast and now disorderly array a confused murmur of grief and indignation arose. In the French army, on the other hand, nothing but joy and exultation were to be seen: never had the enthusiasm of the soldiers been so great, never their devotion to the Emperor so unbounded; and reviewing the movements of the campaign by which these astonishing successes had been gained, the veterans said to each other, "The little corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war—he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets."¹ *

¹ Dum. xiii.
101. Rapp,
37.

69.
Napoleon's
message to
the senate.

Ever anxious to make his greatest successes the means of exciting additional feelings of exultation in the inhabitants of his capital, Napoleon sent to the Conservative Senate of Paris the forty standards taken from the army at Ulm, accompanied by a flattering message, in which he said, "Senators, behold in this present which the sons of the grand army make to their fathers, a proof of the satisfaction which I experience at the manner in which you have seconded my efforts. And you, Frenchmen, make your brothers march; let them hasten to combat at our sides, in order that we may be able, without further effusion of blood or additional efforts, to repel far from our frontiers all the armies which the gold of England has assembled for our destruction. A month has not elapsed since I predicted to you that the Emperor and the army would do their duty; I am impatient for the moment when I may be able to say, 'The people have done theirs.'" Careful, at the same time, to secure the attachment of his allies, he sent six pieces of cannon to the Duke of Wirtem-

* During the rapid and complicated movements which led to the capture of Ulm, the Emperor was indefatigable in his exertions. For three days and nights he hardly ever undressed, and was almost incessantly on horseback; in the rudest weather he shared the fare and hardships of the meanest of his soldiers. In vain was he expected by the authorities at Augsburg, and magnificent preparations made for his reception: he slept in the villages, surrounded by his staff, in the humble cottages of the peasants.—Bren. iv. 376.

berg, and twenty-five thousand muskets to the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly after, he addressed to his soldiers one of those proclamations which so often electrified Europe, by the stupendous successes which they commemorated, and the nervous eloquence in which they were couched. On this occasion it was hardly possible to exaggerate the triumphs of the army: with a loss not exceeding eight thousand men, they had taken or destroyed nearly eighty thousand of their enemies.^{1*}

The blame of these disasters was wholly laid, by the Austrian government, on General Mack; he was subjected to a court of inquiry, and condemned to imprisonment for twenty years in consequence. Upon the conclusion of the war, Napoleon interceded for him, but in vain. Historic justice, however, requires that it should be stated, that although this unfortunate general was obviously inadequate to the difficult task imposed upon him of commanding a great army which was to combat Napoleon; and although he evidently lost his judgment, and unnecessarily agreed to a disgraceful abridgment of the period of the capitulation at the close of the negotiations, yet the whole disasters of the campaign are not to be visited on his head. The improvidence of the Imperial government, the faults of the Aulic Council, have also much to answer for. Mack's authority was not firmly established in the

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¹ Jom. ii. 130.
Dum. xiii.
103, 104.

70.
The blame of these disasters really divided between Mack and the Aulic Council.

* "Soldiers of the grand army! in fifteen days we have concluded a campaign. We have kept our promise; we have chased the troops of Austria from the Bavarian territories, and re-established our ally in the possession of his states. The army which, with so much ostentation and presumption, had advanced to our frontiers, is annihilated. But what signifies that to England? We are no longer at Boulogne, and her subsidies will be neither greater nor less. Of a hundred thousand men who composed that army, sixty thousand are prisoners; they will replace our conscripts in the labours of the fields. Two hundred pieces of cannon, their whole park of ammunition, and ninety standards, are in our power; of that whole army not fifteen thousand have escaped. Soldiers, I announced to you a great battle; but, thanks to the faulty combinations of the enemy, I have obtained these great advantages without incurring any risk; and, what is unexampled in the history of nations, this great result has not weakened us by the loss of fifteen hundred men. Soldiers, this astonishing success is owing to your boundless confidence in your Emperor—to your patience in undergoing fatigues—to your rare intrepidity! But we will not rest here. Already I see you are burning to commence a second campaign. The gold of England has brought against us the Russian army from the extremities of the universe; we will make it undergo the same fate. To that combat is, in an especial manner, attached the honour of the French infantry. It is there that is to be decided for the second time that question, already resolved in Switzerland and Holland, whether the French infantry is the first or second in Europe. There are no generals there whom it would add to my glory to vanquish. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with as little effusion of blood as possible. My soldiers are my children." Amidst his customary exaggeration there was much truth in this proclamation.—RAPP, 47, 48.

His proclamation to his soldiers.

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¹ Rapp, 36.
Jom. ii. 130.

army ; the great name of the Archduke Ferdinand overshadowed his influence ; the necessity of providing for the safety of a prince of the Imperial house overbalanced every other consideration, and compelled, against his judgment, that division of the troops to which the unexampled disasters which followed may immediately be ascribed.¹ It is reasonable to impute to this unfortunate general extreme improvidence in remaining so long at Ulm, when Napoleon's legions were closing around him, and great weakness of judgment, to give it no severer name, in afterwards capitulating without trying some great effort, with concentrated forces, to effect his escape. But there appears no reason to suppose, as the Austrian government did, that he wilfully betrayed their interests to Napoleon ; and it is to be recollected, in extenuation of his faults, that his authority, controlled by the Aulic Council, was in some degree shared with an assembly of officers, which, it is proverbially known, never adopts a bold resolution ; and that he was at the head of troops habituated to the discreditable custom of laying down their arms, on the first reverse, in large bodies.

71.
Errors of the
cabinet of
Vienna in the
general plan
of the cam-
paign.

While these stupendous events were paralysing the Imperial strength in the centre of Germany, the campaign had been opened, and was already fiercely contested on the Italian plains. The Aulic Council, from whose errors the European nations have suffered so often and so deeply, had, in the general plan of the campaign, committed three capital faults. The first was that of commencing a menacing offensive war in Germany with the weaker of their two great armies. The second, that of remaining on the defensive in Italy, in presence of inferior forces, with the greatest array which the monarchy had on foot. The third, that of retaining in useless inactivity a considerable body of men, with no enemy whatever to combat, in the Tyrol, which might on several occasions have cast the balance in the desperate struggles which took place to the north and south of its mountains. While Mack, with eighty thousand men, was pushed forward to bear the weight of the grand army, of double that strength, in the valley of the Danube, the Archduke Charles, with above ninety thousand, was retained in a state of inactivity on the Adige,² in presence of Massena, who had only fifty

² Jom. ii.
139. Dnm.
xiii. 103, 109.

thousand ; and twenty thousand more were scattered over the Tyrol, where they had no more formidable enemy in their front than the peaceful shepherds of Helvetia.

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No sooner was the cabinet of Vienna made aware, from the rapid march of Napoleon's troops across Germany, and the distance at which the Russians still were from the scene of action, of the imminent danger to which their army in Swabia was exposed, than they despatched orders to the Archduke Charles to remain on the defensive, and detach all the disposable troops at his command to the succour of Mack at Ulm. That gallant prince accordingly restrained the impetuosity of his numerous and disciplined battalions on the Adige ; retained his forces on the left bank of that stream, and detached thirty regiments across the Tyrol towards Germany. By this means he lost the initiative, often of incalculable importance, at least with able commanders and superior forces, in war ; was compelled to forego the opportunity of striking a decisive blow against the troops of Massena in his front ; to depress the spirits of his soldiers by keeping them in inactivity till the disasters in Germany had extinguished their hopes ; and all this for no good purpose, as, before his reinforcements could emerge from the gorges of the Tyrol, the die was cast, and the troops in Ulm had defiled as captives before the French Emperor.¹

72.
The Arch-
duke Charles
kept on the
defensive in
Italy.

Oct. 15.

¹ Jom. ii.
139. Dum. ii.
109. Bign. iv.
380, 381.

The forces in Italy were divided by the Adige, not only along the course of that river from the Alps to the Po, but in the city of Verona itself: the town properly so called, and the castles on the right bank, being in the hands of the French, while the suburbs on the left bank were in those of the Austrians. Strong barricades were drawn across the bridges which united the opposite sides of the river ; and the Archduke, reduced by the orders of the Aulic Council and the catastrophe in Swabia to a melancholy defensive, was strengthening with field-works the celebrated position of Caldiero, the importance of which had been so strongly felt in former campaigns, when Massena, stimulated by the orders of the Emperor, and the accounts he was daily receiving of the advance of the grand army to the north of the Alps, resolved to commence operations.² He accordingly denounced the armistice which had been agreed on till the 18th October,

73.
Position of
the French
at Verona.

² Bign. iv.
382, 383.
Dum. ii. 112.
115.

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and in the night preceding arrived alone in Verona, where preparations had for some time past been secretly making for forcing the bridges and gaining the entire command of the river at that point.

At midnight, on the night of the 18th, after removing, with as little noise as possible, their own barricades on the bridge, the French attached a petard to the strong barrier of separation, and at daybreak, while a violent cannonade at other points distracted the attention of the enemy, the explosion took place, and the obstacle was thrown down. It displayed, however, a yawning gulf behind it, where the bridge had been cut by the Imperialists: but this proved only a momentary obstacle to the French soldiers; some cast themselves into boats, and rowed across the stream; others brought planks and hastily threw them over the opening; the barricades at the opposite end were speedily forced: and, under cover of a thick fog, which signally favoured their operations, the intrenchments on the opposite side were stormed, and the combat continued, from street to street and from house to house, till night. A violent storm then separated the combatants, when, although the Austrians still held their forts in the town, the passage was secured to the French, a *tête-du-pont* established, and three battalions left intrenched on the left bank of the stream. This operation was a masterpiece of skill, secrecy, and resolution, on the part of the French general: it cost the Austrians two thousand men, and, what was of still greater importance, gave their antagonists the command of the passage with the loss of little more than half that number.¹

Conceiving himself threatened with a speedy attack in consequence of this audacious and fortunate enterprise, the Archduke lost no time in making preparations to repel it. The position of Caldiero, already strong, was rendered almost impregnable. Its line of rocky heights, extending from the foot of the Alps to the shores of the Adige, strengthened in every accessible point by redoubts, intrenchments, and palisades, seemed to defy attack; while the natural advantages of the ground, broken by cliffs, woods, and vineyards, from which even the arms of Napoleon had recoiled, appeared to oppose an invincible barrier to the further advance of the French troops.

74.
Forcing of
the bridge of
Verona.
Oct. 18.

¹ Bign. iv.
382, 383.
Dum. ii. 112,
119. Jom. ii.
140.

75.
Bloody but
indecisive
actions at
Caldiero.

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Massena remained inactive from the 18th to the 29th October, but, having then received intelligence of the astonishing successes of Napoleon in the plains of Swabia he resolved to resume the offensive. But how to assail seventy thousand men, strongly intrenched, with a force not amounting to fifty thousand, was a problem which even the genius of the conqueror of Zurich might find it difficult to solve. Nevertheless he resolved upon making the attempt. Oct. 28. The triumph at Ulm was announced to the soldiers by a loud discharge of artillery in the evening, and on the following morning, before their exultation had subsided, he Oct. 29. made his dispositions for attack. To assail such a position, guarded by an army superior to his own, in front, was a desperate enterprise; but the French general conceived that, by bringing the bulk of his forces to his own left, he might turn the Imperialists by the mountains, and compel them to lose all the labour they had employed in strengthening it. Massena himself, with two divisions, was to engage the enemy's attention by a feigned attack and loud cannonade in front of the position; while Verdier, at the head of the right wing, was to cross the Adige below Verona, and endeavour to turn the Austrian left, and Molitor, with the left, was to gain the mountains, and threaten their right. Molitor made great progress on the first day, and Massena, with the centre, advanced almost to the foot of the enemy's intrenchments; but after the most gallant efforts, they were driven back before night to their own ground in front of Verona, while Verdier, on the right, confined himself to a heavy firing along the line of the Adige.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
119, 128.
Jom. ii. 141.

On the following day, however, the French dispositions were more completely carried into effect. Their centre, issuing in great strength from Verona, carried all the villages occupied by the Imperial light troops, and arrived at the foot of the formidable redoubts of Caldiero; while Molitor gallantly advanced against the almost impregnable heights on their right, and Verdier made the utmost efforts to effect his passage on the lower part of the river. But all the endeavours of the latter were unsuccessful; and though his active efforts and threatening aspect detained a considerable portion of the Imperialists on the Lower Adige, the contest was almost

76.
Desperate
conflict in the
centre.

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confined to the centre and left wing. Confident in the strength of their extreme right, and indignant at the idea of being assailed by inferior forces in their intrenchments, the Austrians deployed in great masses from their centre and left, and gallantly engaged their antagonists in the plain. A terrible combat ensued. The heads of the Imperial columns were repeatedly swept away by the close and well-directed discharge of the French artillery : while the French, when they impetuously followed up their successes, were, in their turn, as rudely handled by the heavy fire of the Austrian redoubts. The heat of the battle took place round the village of Caldiero, which was speedily encumbered with dead. Massena and the Archduke themselves charged at the head of their respective reserves, and exposed their persons like the meanest soldiers ; but all the efforts of the French were unable to overcome the steady valour of the Germans. Several of Molitor's divisions on the French left penetrated to the foot of the redoubts, and more than one battalion actually reached their summit ; but they were there instantly cut to pieces by the point-blank discharge of the Imperial cannon, rapidly turned against them from the adjoining intrenchments. At length night closed on this scene of slaughter, but not before four thousand brave men were lost to both parties, without either being able to boast of a decided advantage ; for if the French had broken several columns of Imperial infantry, and made twelve hundred prisoners, they had suffered at least as much, and the redoubtable intrenchments were still in the hands of their antagonists.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
119, 143.
Jom. ii. 141,
142.

77.
The French
are in the
end repulsed.

On the following morning, Massena renewed the combat with greater prospect of success. On the preceding evening, Verdier had at length succeeded in throwing across two battalions, which were arrested by the Austrian columns in the marshes adjoining the river ; but at daybreak they were reinforced by a whole division, and advanced, combating all the way, on the dikes which ran up from the Adige to the Austrian position. Soon a bridge was completed, and the whole right wing crossed over, which, following up the retiring columns of the Imperialists, was at length stopped by the redoubt of Chiaveco del Christo, which in this quarter formed the

key of their position, and, if taken, would have drawn after it the loss of the battle. Sensible of its importance, Verdier made the utmost efforts to carry this intrenchment, but the gallantry of the defence was equal to that of the attack. General Nordman, who commanded the Austrians, saw all the cannoniers killed by his side, and was himself struck down; but his place was instantly taken by COUNT COLLOREDO, afterwards one of the most distinguished of the Imperial generals, who continued the stubborn defence till the Archduke, by bringing up fresh troops, succeeded in disengaging this band of heroes. Verdier was now assailed, in his turn, at once in front and both flanks; his corps was at length forced back, he himself severely wounded; and such were the losses of the French in this quarter, that it was with difficulty that they maintained themselves on the left bank of the Adige.¹*

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¹ Dum. xiii.
143, 149.
Jom. ii. 144,
145. Austrian
Official Re-
port.

But notwithstanding this success, the Archduke was already preparing a retreat. The Archduke John had arrived at his headquarters, and brought with him a complete confirmation of the intelligence regarding the disasters in Germany which had already circulated in obscure rumours through his army. It was no longer possible to think of preserving Italy; the heart of the empire was laid open, and it was necessary to fly to the protection of the menaced capital. The better to disguise his movement, he made preparations as if for resuming the offensive, and several strong corps were pushed forward into the mountains toward the French left, and some detachments already appeared in the rocky ridges between the Adige and the lake of Guarda. Alarmed at this movement, Massena stood on the defensive, and concentrated his forces in front of Verona; but while he was in hourly expectation of an attack, the Archduke had caused all his heavy cannon and baggage to be moved towards the rear, and when the French videttes approached the intrenchments² which had been so obsti-

78.
The Arch-
duke resolves
to retreat to
cover Vienna.

Nov. 2.

² Dum. xiii.
150, 156.
Jom. ii. 143.

* We have the best possible evidence, that of Napoleon himself, that these murderous actions terminated upon the whole to the advantage of the Austrians. "The Archduke Charles," says he, "had gained considerable advantages over Massena at Caldiero; in effect, the Prince of Essling was beaten." The Archduke spoke of the action with his accustomed modesty and truth in his official despatches.—See NAPOLEON in MONTH. ii. 108 and 116, and HARD. viii. 499.

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79.

Gallant con-
duct of the
Austrian
rearguard.

nately contested, they found them, stripped of artillery, guarded only by a few of the enemy's rearguard.

Massena's whole army instantly broke up and advanced in pursuit, but the Imperialists had gained a full march upon them. The whole artillery and baggage had already defiled by one road in admirable order; dense columns of infantry, interspersed between them, covered their movements, and a strong rearguard, under General Frimont, presented a menacing front to the pursuers. The excessive fatigue of the troops, however, rendered some repose necessary; and for this purpose, as well as to gain time for his immense array of carriages to defile in his rear, the Archduke resolved to hold firm in the neighbourhood of Vicenza, which is surrounded by an old wall flanked with towers, and by its position on the Bachiglione, the stream of which was rendered impassable by floods, commanded the only line either for the retreat of the Germans or the pursuit of the French. There he continued, accordingly, with a powerful rearguard, in battle array the whole of the 3d November, and on the following night, leaving Vogelsang with four battalions in the town, he continued his retreat in the most leisurely manner. That intrepid rearguard, with heroic firmness, continued to make good the post, despite equally the menaces and assaults of Massena, till daybreak on the 4th, and then withdrew in perfect safety to the left bank of the river, having afforded, by their admirable steadiness, time for the park of artillery to gain a march on the other troops, and for the two wings under Rosenberg and Davidowich to unite themselves to the centre of the army. It was no ordinary skill on the part of the general, and steadiness on that of the soldiers, which could, in the presence of a victorious enemy, commanded by such an officer as Massena, secure the safe retreat of seventy thousand men by a single defile and bridge, immediately after a bloody battle of three days' duration, who had been a few hours before scattered over a line of fifteen leagues in breadth.¹

Nov. 3.

¹ Dum. xiii.

153 161.

Jom. ii. 143.

From Vicenza the Archduke retired, by forced marches, through the rich and watered plains of the Brenta and Piave, towards the mountains of Friuli, separating himself altogether from Venice, into which he threw a strong

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80.

Archduke
continues his
retreat to
Laybach in
Carinthia.
Nov. 12.

garrison of eighteen battalions. When he arrived on the Tagliamento he halted for a day, and sustained a severe combat with the French advanced guard, in order to gain time to receive the information which was to decide him whether to march by Tarvis and Villach to unite his forces with those of the Archduke John in the neighbourhood of Salzburg, or proceed by the direct route through Laybach toward Vienna. The disastrous intelligence, however, which he there received of the total wreck of General Mack's army, rendered it necessary to continue his retreat as rapidly as possible by the latter of these routes to Vienna. Skilfully availing himself of every obstacle which the swollen waters of that stream as well as the Piave and the Isonzo could afford, he conducted his march with such ability, that though it lay through narrow defiles and over mountains charged with the snows of winter, no serious loss was sustained, nor the spirits of the soldiers weakened, before they descended, in unbroken strength, into the valley of the Drave and the streams which make their way to the great basin of the Danube.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
143, 144.
Dum. xlii.
165, 171.

Meanwhile Napoleon, whose genius never appeared more strongly than in the vigour with which, by separate columns, he followed up a beaten army, was pursuing with indefatigable activity the broken columns of the Austrian troops. On the 24th of October he arrived at Munich, where he was received with every imaginable demonstration of joy, and a general illumination attested the universal transports. Augsburg was made the grand depot of the army, while the leading corps, under Bernadotte, Davoust, Murat, and Marmont, pressed on in ceaseless march towards the Hereditary States. Speedily the Iser was passed: the French eagles were borne in exultation through the forest of Hohenlinden, and nothing arrested their march till they reached the rocky banks of the Inn, and appeared before the fortress of Brannau. At the same time Marshal Ney, who had remained at Ulm, in terms of the capitulation, till the 25th October, received orders to move with his whole corps upon the Tyrol, in order to clear the vast natural fortress which that district composes of the enemy's forces;² while Augereau's corps, which, having broken

81.
Advance of
Napoleon's
army through
Bavaria.
Oct. 24.

² Dum. xiii
241, 248.
Savary, i.
103. 2d Part.
Jom. ii. 144.

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1805.

82.
Defensive
measures of
the Aus-
trians.

up from Brest, had latest come to the scene of action, and had recently crossed the Rhine at Huningen, was pushed forward by forced marches to menace the western frontier of that romantic province.

While disasters were thus accumulating on all sides upon the Austrian monarchy, the cabinet of Vienna did their utmost to repair the fatal blow which had so nearly prostrated the whole strength of the state. How to arrest the terrible enemy who was pouring in irresistible force and with such rapidity down the valley of the Danube, was the great difficulty. Courier after courier was despatched to the Archduke Charles to hasten the march of his army to the scene of danger; the Archduke John was directed to evacuate the Tyrol, and endeavour to unite his forces to those of his brother to cover the capital; the levies in Hungary and Lower Austria were pressed forward with all possible rapidity; and the Emperor himself, after issuing an animating proclamation to the inhabitants of Vienna,* set out in person to hold a conference with the Russian general, Kutusoff, who was advancing with the utmost rapidity, concerning the best means of arresting the march of the enemy. But when he arrived at the headquarters of the latter at Wells, the extent of the danger became apparent. The remnant of the Austrian army, under Meerfeld and Keinmayer, which had joined him, hardly amounted to twenty thousand men; his own troops hitherto come up were not thirty thousand; and how was it possible, with such inconsiderable forces, to withstand Napoleon at the head of a hundred and fifty

* "The Emperor of France has compelled me to take up arms. To his ardent desire of military achievements, his passion to be recorded in history under the title of a conqueror, the limits of France, already so much enlarged and defined by sacred treaties, still appear too narrow. He wishes to concentrate in his own hands all the interests upon which depends the balance of Europe. Far from attacking the throne of the Emperor of France, and keeping steadily in view the preservation of peace, which we so publicly and sincerely stated to be our only wish, we declared, in the presence of all Europe, 'That we would in no event interfere in the internal concerns of France, nor make any alteration in the new constitution which Germany received after the peace of Luneville.' Peace and independence were the only objects which we wished to attain; no ambitious views, no intention such as that since ascribed to me, of subjugating Bavaria, had any share in our counsels. But the sovereign of France, totally regardless of the general tranquillity, listened not to these overtures. Wholly absorbed in himself, and occupied only with the display of his own greatness and omnipotence, he collected all his force, compelled Holland and the Elector of Baden to join him, whilst his secret ally, the Elector Palatine, false to his sacred promise, voluntarily delivered himself up to him; violated in the most insulting manner the neutrality of the King of Prussia at the very moment that he had

thousand combatants? It was therefore resolved to abandon the line of the Inn and retire towards Vienna, after breaking down all the bridges over the numerous streams which fell into the Danube, and lay across the line of march, so as to impede the enemy's advance, and effect a junction with the Russian reserves which were approaching under Benningsen and the Grand-duke Constantine, or the gallant army which was hastening to the scene of danger under the Archduke Charles.¹

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1805.

¹ Dum. xiii.
248, 250.
Jom. ii. 144.

But while every thing seemed thus to smile upon Napoleon in the south of Germany, a storm was arising in the north which menaced him with destruction. The cabinet of Berlin had taken umbrage to an extent which could hardly have been anticipated, and which was greatly beyond the amount of the injury inflicted, at the violation of the territory of Anspach. It was not the mere march of a French corps through a detached portion of their dominions which occasioned this feeling of irritation; it was the secret consciousness that the insult was deserved, which had envenomed the wound. For ten years Prussia had flattered herself that by keeping aloof she would avoid the storm; that she would succeed in turning the desperate strife between France and Austria to her own benefit, by enlarging her territory and augmenting her consideration in the north of Germany; and hitherto success had, in a surprising manner, attended her steps. At once all her prospects vanished, and it became apparent, even to her own ministers, that this vacillating policy was ultimately to be as dangerous as it had already been discreditable. So far from having increased the

83.
Increasing
irritation of
Prussia.

given the most solemn promises to respect it: and by these violent proceedings he succeeded in surrounding and cutting off a part of the troops which I had ordered to take a position on the Danube and the Iller. I am tranquil and at ease in the midst of twenty-five millions of my subjects, equally dear to my heart and house. With fortitude the Austrian monarchy arose from every storm which menaced it during the preceding centuries. Its intrinsic vigour is still undecayed. There still exists in the breasts of those good and loyal men, for whose prosperity and tranquillity I combat, that ancient patriotic spirit which is ready to make every sacrifice, and to dare every thing to save what must be saved,—their throne and their independence, the national honour and the national prosperity. From the spirit of patriotism on the part of my subjects, I expect, with a proud and tranquil confidence, every thing that is great and good; but above all things unanimity, and a quick, firm, and courageous co-operation in every measure that shall be ordered, to keep the rapid strides of the enemy off from our frontier until those numerous and powerful auxiliaries can act, which my exalted ally, the Emperor of Russia, and other powers, have destined to combat for the liberties of Europe, and the security of thrones and of nations.”—*Ann. Reg.* 1805, 713.

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respect with which she was regarded, it was now plain that she had entirely lost it; and a power which, under the guidance of the Great Frederick, had stepped forth as the arbiter of the north of Germany, was now treated with the indifference and neglect which is the bitterest ingredient in the cup of the vanquished. The veil suddenly dropped from the eyes of her ministers: they now distinctly perceived that, instead of security, they had reaped only danger from former submissions; and that, as a reward for so long a period of forbearance, they could look only, like Ulysses, for the melancholy satisfaction of being last devoured. Under the influence of these feelings, the resolution of the cabinet was violently shaken. The King openly inclined to hostile measures, but the indignation of the nation knew no bounds. Prince Louis, whose rash and inconsiderate, though vehemence and generous character, could ill brook the long inactivity of the Prussian arms, publicly and on all occasions gave vent to his desire for war; the popularity of the Queen rose almost to idolatry; the consideration of Haugwitz, the author of the temporising system, rapidly sank, and all eyes were turned to Baron Hardenberg, whose resolute counsels to adopt a more manly policy had been long known, as the only minister fit, at such a crisis, to be intrusted with the direction of affairs.¹

¹ Hard. viii.
479, 481.
Dum. xlii.
250, 251.
Nap. in Las
Cas. iv. 229.

84.
Arrival of
Alexander at
Berlin, and
conclusion of
a treaty with
Russia.
Oct. 25.

Nov. 3.

Matters were in this inflammable state when the Emperor Alexander arrived at Berlin, and employed the whole weight of his great authority, and all the charms of his captivating manners, to induce the King to embrace a more manly and courageous policy. Under the influence of so many concurring causes, the French influence rapidly declined; Duroc left the capital on the 2d November, without having been able to obtain an audience for some days previously, either from the King or Emperor; and on the day following, a secret convention was signed between the two monarchs for the regulation of the affairs of Europe, and the erection of a barrier against the ambition of the French Emperor. By this convention it was stipulated, that the treaty of Luneville was to be taken as the basis of the arrangement, and all the acquisitions which France had since made were to be wrested from it: Switzerland and Holland were to be restored to their

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independence, and, without overturning the kingdom of Italy, it was to be merely agreed that its throne and that of France were never to be occupied by the same individual. Haugwitz was to be intrusted with the notification of this convention to Napoleon, with authority, in case of its acceptance, to offer a renewal of the former friendship and alliance of the Prussian nation, but in case of refusal, to declare war, with an intimation, that hostilities would be commenced on the 15th December.¹

¹ Hard. viii.
481, 482.
Martens, vii.
Dum. xiii.
253, 254.

The conclusion of this convention was followed by a scene as remarkable as it was romantic, and which was ultimately attended by consequences of the highest importance upon the destinies of Europe. When they signed it, both were fully aware of the perilous nature of the enterprise on which they were adventuring; as the Archduke Antony had arrived two days before with detailed accounts of the disastrous result of the combats around Ulm. Inspired with a full sense of the dangers of the war, the ardent and chivalrous mind of the Queen conceived the idea of uniting the two sovereigns by a bond more likely to be durable than the mere alliances of cabinets with each other. This was to bring them together at the tomb of the Great Frederick, where it was hoped the solemnity and recollections of the scene would powerfully contribute to cement their union. The Emperor, who was desirous of visiting the mausoleum of that illustrious hero, accordingly repaired to the church of the garrison of Potsdam, where his remains are deposited, and at midnight the two monarchs proceeded together by torch-light to the hallowed grave. Uncovering when he approached the spot, the Emperor kissed the pall, and taking the hand of the King of Prussia as it lay on the tomb, they swore an eternal friendship to each other, and bound themselves, by the most solemn oaths, to maintain their engagements inviolate in the great contest for European independence in which they were engaged. A few hours after, Alexander departed for Galicia, to assume in person the command of the army of reserve, which was advancing through that province to the support of Kutusoff. Such was the origin of that great alliance, which, though often interrupted by misfortune,² and deeply checkered by disaster, was yet destined to be brought to

85.
Nocturnal
visit to the
tomb of the
Great Frederick.

Nov. 4.

² Hard. viii.
482. Dum.
xiii. 254, 255.

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1805.

86.

Prussia sub-
sequently re-
lapses into
her tempo-
rising system.

Nov. 14.

so triumphant an issue, and ultimately wrought such wonders for the deliverance of Europe.

It would have been well for the common cause, if, when Prussia had thus taken her part, her cabinet had possessed resolution enough to have interfered at once and decidedly in the war: the disaster of Austerlitz, the catastrophe of Jena, would thereby, in all probability, have been prevented. But after the departure of the Emperor, the old habit of temporising returned, and the precious moments, big with the fate of the world, were permitted to elapse without any operations being attempted. Haugwitz did not set out from Potsdam till the 14th November; the Prussian armies made no forward movement towards the Danube, and Napoleon was permitted to continue without interruption his advance to Vienna; while eighty thousand disciplined veterans remained inactive in Silesia on his left flank—a force amply sufficient to have thrown him back with disgrace and disaster to the Rhine. Even the arrival of Lord Harrowby at Berlin, a few days after the departure of Haugwitz, with full powers and the offer of ample subsidies from Mr Pitt, could not prevail on the government to accelerate the commencement of active operations. Apparently the cabinet of Berlin were desirous of seeing what turn affairs were likely to take before they openly commenced hostilities: forgetting that the irrevocable step had already been taken; that Duroc, upon leaving their capital, had proceeded straight to the Emperor's headquarters on the Danube; that the convention which had been concluded could not be kept a secret; that Napoleon, in consequence, was made their determined foe, and that every hour now lost was adding to his means of selecting his own time for their future destruction.¹

¹ Dum. xiii.
255, 256.
Hard. vii.
488, 489.
Savary, i.
104.

87.

Opinions on
the subject in
a council of
war at Pots-
dam.

There were not wanting, however, numbers who openly counselled a bolder policy, and prophesied all the disasters which would ensue from continuing longer their adherence to the procrastinating system. In a council of war, held at Potsdam soon after intelligence of the disasters at Ulm was received, the Duke of Brunswick ordered Colonel Massenbach, a young pupil of the celebrated Tempelhoff, to deliver his opinion on the present state of affairs. "The armies are

in presence of each other," said he; "a decisive battle must soon be fought. If Napoleon is beaten, his retreat through the Tyrol is secured by Marshal Ney's recent occupation of that province, and he will be beyond the reach of the Prussian forces. It is indispensable, therefore, that the Prussian army in Silesia should instantly march to the support of the allies, and that a strong body should threaten Napoleon's communications with the Rhine, in order to compel him to divide his forces. If both these measures are not adopted, and the Russians are beat, all is lost." General Ruchel, however, an older officer, ridiculed the apprehensions of such a catastrophe; and the Duke of Brunswick, with his wonted irresolution, broke up the council, without having come to any determination.¹

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¹ Hard. viii.
489.

But though Prussia was thus inactive, Napoleon was not without very serious cause for anxiety in the north of Germany. A combined force of British, Russians, and Swedes, thirty thousand strong, had recently disembarked in Hanover; and the Prussian troops who occupied that electorate had offered no resistance: a sure proof of a secret understanding between the cabinet of Berlin and that of London, in virtue of which it was to be restored to its rightful owners. The danger of an enemy in that quarter was very great, for the whole French army of occupation had been withdrawn, with the exception of the garrison of Hameln; and not only were its inhabitants warlike, and ardently attached to the British government, but there was every reason to apprehend that the flame, once lighted, might spread to Holland, where the partisans of the House of Orange had received an immense accession of strength from the calamities in which their country had been involved from the French alliance. Hardly any regular troops remained to make head against these dangers; but Napoleon contrived to paralyse the disaffected, by pompous announcements in the *Moniteur* of the formation of a powerful army of the north, of which his brother Louis, in the first instance, was to take the command, but which might soon expect to be graced by the presence of the Emperor himself.²

88.
Landing of
the allies in
Hanover.

² Jom. ii.
145. Dum,
xiii. 249.

On his right flank, Marshal Ney was more successful in achieving the conquest of the Tyrol, and relieving him

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89.
Operations in
the Tyrol.

from all anxiety in regard to that important bulwark of the Austrian monarchy. This romantic region, so interesting from its natural beauties, the noble character of its inhabitants, and the memorable contest of which it was afterwards the theatre, will form the subject of a separate description hereafter, when the campaign of 1809 is considered.* The imperious necessity to which the Austrian government was subjected, of withdrawing their forces from the Tyrol for the protection of the capital, prevented it from becoming the theatre of any considerable struggle at this time. Resolved to clear these mountain fastnesses of the Imperial troops, Napoleon ordered Ney to advance from Ulm over the mountains which form the northern barrier of the valley of the Inn right upon Innspruck; while a powerful Bavarian division, which had already occupied Salzburg, advanced by the great road from that town by Reichenhall to the same capital, and menaced Kuffstein, the principal stronghold on the eastern frontier of the province. Both invasions were successful. General Deroy, commanding the Bavarian troops, wound in silence along the margin of the beautiful lakes which lie at the foot of the rocky barrier which separates the province of Salzburg from that of the Tyrol, and suddenly pushing up the steep ascent, amidst a shower of balls from the overhanging cliffs and woods, which were filled with Tyrolese marksmen, carried the intrenchments and forts at their summit with matchless valour, and drove back the Imperialists, with the loss of five hundred prisoners, to the ramparts of Kuffstein. The whole eastern defences of Tyrol were laid open by this bold irruption: the Imperial regulars retired over the mountains towards Leoben, while the Tyrolese levies were shut up under the cannon of Kuffstein, which was soon blockaded.¹

¹ Bign. iv.
390. Jom. ii.
167. Dum.
xiii. 280, 285.

90.
Desperate
conflict in
storming the
heights.

Contemporaneous with this attack on the eastern frontier of the province, Augereau moved forward from the neighbourhood of the lake of Constance, so as to threaten Feldkirch and its western extremity; while at the same time Marshal Ney advanced, at the head of ten thousand men, against the barrier of Scharnitz, the ancient *Porta Claudia*, a celebrated mountain intrenchment which com-

* See *infra*, Chap. LVIII.

mands the direct mountain road from Bavaria to Innspruck, and was known to be almost impregnable on the only side from which it could to all appearance be assailed. An attack in front, though supported by all the fire and impetuosity of the bravest of the French troops, was repulsed with very heavy loss. Success seemed utterly hopeless. But the genius of Marshal Ney at length overcame every obstacle. Dividing his corps into three divisions, he succeeded, with one commanded by Loison, in making himself master of the fort of Leitasch, in the rear of the intrenchments: from whence his victorious troops pressed on in two columns to scale the precipices which overhung them on the southern side, to the summit of which the peasants, as a place of undoubted security, had removed their wives and children. The combat was long and doubtful: securely posted in the cliffs and thickets above, the Tyrolese marksmen kept up a deadly fire on the French troops, who, breathless and panting, were clambering up by the aid of the brushwood which nestled in the crevices, and of their bayonets thrust into the fissures of the rock. Fruitless, however, was all the valour of the defenders: in vain rocks and trunks of trees, thundering down the steep, swept off whole companies at once; as fast as they were destroyed others equally daring succeeded them, and pressed with ceaseless vigour up the entangled precipice. The summit was at length carried, and the French eagles, displayed from the edge of the perpendicular cliff in their rear, was the signal for the renewal of the attack on the intrenchments by the division stationed in their front. They were no longer tenable: a shower of balls from the heights behind, against which the Tyrolese had no defence, rendered it impossible either to man the works or stand to the guns. A panic seized the garrison; they fled in confusion, and the victorious assailants, besides that of a mountain barrier hitherto deemed impregnable, had to boast of the capture of fifteen hundred prisoners.*¹

¹ Bign. iv.
390, 391.
Jom. ii. 167,
168. Dum.
xiii. 280, 288.

* An interesting incident occurred at Innspruck. The 76th French regiment had, in the campaign of 1799, lost two of its standards. When walking in the arsenal of that town, one of its officers beheld them among the other warlike trophies of the Tyrolese. Instantly the intelligence spread that their lost ensigns were recovered, and the veterans, hastening in, kissed the tattered remnants, and wept for joy at again beholding the former companions of their glory.—BIGNON, iv. 391.

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1805.

91.
Surrender of
Jellachich.

Nov. 15.

¹ Dum. xiii.
280, 290.
Jom. ii. 168,
170.

92.
Bold enter-
prise and
final failure
of the Prince
de Rohan.

Nov. 24.

Nov. 18.

The immediate trophy of this victory was the capture of Innspruck, with sixteen thousand stand of arms. The whole northern barrier of the Inn was abandoned ; General Jellachich, who commanded in the western part of the Tyrol, retired to the intrenched camp of Feldkirch, while the Archduke John withdrew all his forces from the valley of the Inn and took post upon the Brenner, in the hope of rallying to his standard the corps in the eastern and western districts of the province before he commenced his final retreat into the Hereditary States. It was too late, however. Surrounded and cut off from all hope of succour, Jellachich, with five thousand men, was obliged to capitulate at Feldkirch, upon condition of not serving for a year against France, and leaving all his artillery to grace the triumph of the victors. The Archduke John, upon hearing of this catastrophe, abandoned the crest of the Brenner during the night, and retired by Klagenfurth to Cilly, where he effected a junction with his brother and the gallant army of Italy. But the Prince de Rohan was not equally fortunate. That gallant officer, who was stationed with six thousand men near Nauders and Finstermunz, on the western frontier of the province, found himself by these disasters cut off from any support, and isolated among the enemy's columns in the midst of the mountains of the Tyrol. Disdaining to capitulate, he formed the bold resolution of cutting his way through all the corps by which he was surrounded, and joining the garrison left in Venice.¹

Surprising success at first attended his efforts. Descending the course of the Adige, he surprised and defeated Loison's division at Bolzano, and thus opened a way for himself by Trent and the defiles of the Brenta to the Italian plains. Already the mountains were cleared ; Bassano was passed ; and the wearied troops were joyfully wending their way across the level fields to the shores of the Lagunæ, when they were met by St Cyr, who commanded the forces stationed to observe that town, and completely defeated at Castel Franco. Dispirited by such a succession of disasters, and seeing no remaining means of escape, this gallant band, still five thousand strong, was obliged to lay down its arms. At the same time the fortress of Kuffstein capitulated, on condition of the garrison being allowed to march back to the Heredi-

tary States, which was readily agreed to. Thus, in little more than three weeks, not only were the Imperialists entirely driven from the Tyrol, long considered as the impregnable bulwark of the Austrian monarchy, garrisoned by twenty-five thousand regular troops, and at least an equal amount of well-trained militia, but more than half of the soldiers were made prisoners, and all the strongholds had passed into the hands of the enemy. Finding the reduction complete, Ney, before the end of November, marched with his whole forces to Salzburg to co-operate with Massena, who was approaching the same quarter, against the Archduke Charles; while Augereau withdrew to Ulm, to observe the motions of Prussia, and the occupation of the Tyrol was committed to the Bavarian troops.¹

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¹ Dum. xiii.
280, 293.
Jom. ii. 168,
170.

It was not inability to defend its passes which led to this rapid abandonment of that important province. Notwithstanding the disasters at Scharnitz and Feldkirch, the Archduke John could still have maintained his ground among its rugged defiles, aided by the numerous warlike inhabitants, whose attachment to the House of Austria had long been conspicuous. It was the pressing danger of the heart of the empire, and the paramount necessity of providing a covering force for the capital, which rendered it absolutely imperative to withdraw the regular forces. Napoleon's progress down the valley of the Danube was every day more alarming. The formidable barrier of the Inn was abandoned almost as soon as it was taken up: forty-five thousand men could not pretend to defend so long a line against a hundred and fifty thousand. The intrenchments of Muhldorf, the ramparts of Brannau, armed as they were with artillery, were precipitately evacuated, and the Inn crossed by innumerable battalions at all points. The advantages of the latter fortress appeared so considerable, that the French Emperor gave immediate orders for its conversion into the grand depot of the army. Meanwhile Murat, at the head of the cavalry and the advanced guard, continued to press the retiring columns of the enemy: a skirmish in front of Mersbach, a more stubborn resistance near Lambach, at the passage of the Traun, while they evinced the obstinate valour of the new enemy with whom they had now to contend,²

93.
Napoleon
advances into
Upper Aus-
tria.

Oct. 31.

Nov. 3.
Nov. 4.
Nov. 6.
² Sav. ii. 102,
103. Dum.
xiii. 264, 277.
Jom. ii. 133,
134.

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hardly retarded the march of the invaders an hour: the determined opposition of the Austrians near the foot of the mountains, at the bridge of Steyer over the Ens, only delayed Marshal Davoust with the right wing of the army a day; and at length the French headquarters were established at Lintz, the capital of Upper Austria.

94.

His measures
at Lintz to
augment his
forces.

The Emperor profited by the two days' delay at Lintz, which the destruction of the bridge at that place, and the necessity of giving some repose to the troops, occasioned, to give a new organisation to his army, with a view to the surrounding and destroying of Kutusoff's corps. Four divisions of the army, amounting in all to twenty thousand men, were passed over to the left bank of the Danube, and placed under the command of Marshal Mortier, who received instructions to advance cautiously, with numerous videttes out in every direction, and always somewhat behind the corps of Lannes, which moved in advance of them on the right of the river. A flotilla was prepared to follow the army with provisions and stores down the sinuous course of the Danube; and such directions were given to the numerous corps on its right bank, as were best calculated to ensure the separation of the Russians from the Archduke Charles, and the ultimate destruction of both. Nor was it only in warlike preparations that the Emperor was engaged during his sojourn at Lintz. Duroc joined him there from Berlin, with accounts of the accession of Prussia to the confederacy of Russia and England; upon which he instantly directed the formation of an army of the north, under the command of his brother Louis, composed of six divisions; a force, as already mentioned, which, although existing on paper only, was likely to overawe the discontented powers in the north of Germany. At the same time a Spanish auxiliary corps, twelve thousand strong, under a leader destined to renown in future times, the Marquis LA ROMANA, which was already on its march through France, was ordered to hasten its advance, and follow toward that direction.¹

Nov. 8.

¹ Dum. xiii.
294, 298.
Join. ii. 145.
Sav. ii. 103.

At Lintz the Emperor received also the Elector of Bavaria, who hastened to that city to render him the homage due to the deliverer of his dominions; and on the same day Count Giulay arrived with proposals for an armistice with a view to a general peace. The ruined con-

dition of the army which had escaped from the disaster of Ulm, the general consternation which prevailed, the distance at which the principal Russian forces still were placed, and the imminent danger that the capital, with its magnificent arsenals, would immediately fall into the hands of the invaders, had prevailed in the Austrian cabinet over their long-continued jealousy of France. Napoleon received the envoy courteously ; but, after observing that it was not to a conqueror at the head of two hundred thousand men that propositions should be addressed from a beaten army unable to defend a single position, sent him back with a letter to the Emperor containing the conditions on which he was willing to treat. These were, that the Russians should forthwith evacuate the Austrian territory, and retire into Poland, that the levies in Hungary should be instantly disbanded, and the Tyrol and Venice ceded to the French dominions. If these terms were not agreed to, he declared he would continue, without an hour's intermission, his march towards Vienna.¹

These rigorous terms were sufficient to convince the allies that they had no chance of salvation but in a vigorous prosecution of the contest. The most pressing entreaties, therefore, were despatched to the Russian headquarters to hasten the advance of their reserves, while a strong rearguard took post at Amstetten, to give time for the main body and artillery to complete their march without confusion through the narrow defile of the Danube. A bloody conflict ensued there between that heroic rearguard and the French advanced column, under Oudinot, and the cavalry of Murat ; in which, although the allies were ultimately forced to retreat from the increasing multitude of the enemy,* they long stood their ground with the utmost resolution, and gained time for the army in their rear to arrive at the important rocky ridge behind St Polten, the last defensible position in front of Vienna, and which covered the junction of the lateral road running from Italy through Leoben with the great route down the

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95.

Austrian proposals of peace, which come to nothing.

¹ Sav. ii. 104.
Dum. xiii.
298, 300.
Jom. ii. 146.

96.

Kutusoff withdraws to the left bank of the Danube.

* A remarkable instance of courage occurred here on the part of a French can-
nonier. The Russian cuirassiers, by a gallant charge along the high-road, had
seized a battery of horse artillery which was firing grape at them within half
musket-shot, and sabred most of the gunners. One of them, however, though
wounded, contrived to crawl to his piece, and, putting the match to the touch-
hole, discharged it right among the enemy's horsemen with such decisive effect,
that the whole squadron turned and fled.—DUMAS, xiii. 303, 304,

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valley of the Danube to the capital. To wrest this important position from the enemy, the right wing of the army, sixty thousand strong, under Davoust, Marmont, and Bernadotte, was directed through the mountains on the right, to turn their left flank; Murat, Lannes, and Oudinot, with the French left, of above fifty thousand combatants, manœuvred on their right; while the Emperor in person, at the head of the corps of Soult and the imperial guard, was destined to strike the decisive blows in the centre. But the allies, until the arrival either of the Russian main body, or of the Archduke Charles, were in no condition to withstand such formidable forces; either of the enemy's wings greatly outnumbered their whole army. Kutusoff, therefore, decided with reason that it had become indispensable to abandon the capital; and that by withdrawing his forces to the left bank of the river, he would both relieve them from a pursuit which could not fail in the end to be attended with disaster, and draw nearer to the reinforcements advancing under Buxhowden, which might enable them to renew the conflict on a footing of equality.¹

Skilfully concealing, therefore, his intention from the enemy, he rapidly moved his whole army across the Danube at Mautern, over the only bridge which traverses that river between Linz and Vienna, and having burned its eight-and-twenty arches of wood behind him, succeeded for some days at least in throwing an impassable barrier between his wearied troops and their indefatigable pursuers. Arrived at St Polten, the French found it occupied only by light Austrian troops, who retired as they advanced: no force capable of arresting them any longer remained on the road to Vienna; and their light infantry, eagerly pushing forward, on the following day reached Burkendorf, within four leagues of the capital. About the same time Davoust, while toiling with infinite difficulty among the rocky and wooded Alpine ridges which form the romantic southern valley of the Danube, came unexpectedly on the rearguard of Meerfelt, which, unsuspecting of evil, was pursuing its course in a southerly direction, by a cross road, to avoid the pursuit of Marmont.² Suddenly assailed, it was pierced through the centre, and thrown into such confusion, that the fugitives escaped only by dispersing in the neighbouring

¹ Dum. xiii.
307, 308.
Jom. ii. 148,
149.

^{97.}
Continued
advance of
the French
towards
Vienna.
Nov. 9.

Nov. 10.

Nov. 8.
² Dum. xiii.
307, 309.
Jom. ii. 148,
149.

woods and mountains, leaving three thousand prisoners and sixteen pieces of cannon in the hands of the enemy.*

But while these great advantages were attending the standards of Napoleon on the right bank of the Danube, an unwonted disaster, nearly attended with fatal consequences, befell his forces on the left. Murat, at the head of the advanced guard of the grand army, had pressed on with his wonted ardour to the neighbourhood of Vienna, in so precipitate a manner as drew forth a severe reproof from the French Emperor; who was well aware that, divided as his troops were by so great a stream, the most imminent danger attended those on the left bank from any unguarded movement, now that the Russians had wholly passed over to that side. The catastrophe which he apprehended was not long of arriving. Mortier, following the orders which he had received, which were to keep nearly abreast of, though a little behind the columns on the right bank, was intent only upon inflicting loss upon the Russian troops which he knew had passed the river, and conceived to be flying across his line of march from the Danube towards Moravia. As he was eagerly emerging from the defiles of Diernstein, between the Danube and the rocky hills which there approach the river, beneath the towers of the castle where Richard Cœur-de-Lion was once immured, he came upon the Russian rearguard under Milaradovitch, posted in front of Stein, on heights commanding the only road by which he could advance, and supported by a powerful artillery. The French general instantly commenced the attack at break of day, though little more than the division of Gazan had emerged from the formidable defile in his rear. The combat soon became extremely warm: fresh troops arrived on both sides: the grenadiers fought man to

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98.

Destruction
of part of
Mortier's
corps by
Kutusoff.

Nov. 11.

* When travelling on the road to Vienna, in the uniform of a colonel of chasseurs, which he commonly wore, Napoleon met a carriage containing a priest and an Austrian lady in great distress. He stopped, and inquired into the cause of her lamentations. "Sir," said she, "I am on my way to demand protection from the Emperor, who is well acquainted with my family, and has received from it many obligations. My house has been pillaged, and my gardener killed, by his soldiers."—"Your name?" replied he.—"De Bunny, daughter of M. de Marbœuff, formerly governor of Corsica."—"I am charmed," rejoined Napoleon, "to have the means of serving you. I am the Emperor." The astonishment of the fair suppliant may easily be conceived. She was sent to headquarters, attended by a detachment of chasseurs of the guard, treated with the greatest distinction, and sent back highly gratified by the reception she had met with.—RAPP, 54, 55.

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¹ Sav. ii. 105.
Dum. xiv.
13. Jom. ii.
150, 151.

99.
Desperate
actions at
Diernstein.

man with undaunted resolution, and it was still doubtful which party would prevail in the murderous strife, when towards noon intelligence arrived that the division of Doctoroff was approaching. This force, ably conducted by the Austrian general Smith, who was perfectly acquainted with the country, had, by a circuitous march through the hills, reached Mortier's rear, and already occupied Diernstein and the sole line of his communications. Thus, while the French marshal had the bulk of Kutu-soff's force on his hands in front, his retreat was cut off, and with a single division of his corps he found himself enveloped by the whole Russian army.¹

Mortier instantly perceived that nothing but an immediate attack on Doctoroff's division, so as to clear the road in his rear, and permit the remainder of his corps to advance to his assistance, could save him from destruction. He had an hour before gone back in person to the division of Dupont, which was the next that was coming up, in order to hasten its march; and it was with great difficulty that, pursuing a devious path through the overhanging slopes, he succeeded in regaining the division. Gazan, now hard pressed both in front and rear. Forming his troops in close column, he advanced against Doctoroff, with the determination to force his way through at the point of the bayonet, or perish in the attempt. In silence, but with undaunted resolution, they advanced to the mouth of the terrible defile they had passed in the morning, little anticipating such a disaster; but they found the bottom of the ravine filled with dense masses of the enemy, while the river on one side, and the walls of rock on the other, precluded all hope of turning them on either side. Compelled to combat both in front and rear, they made but little progress. Incessant discharges mowed down their ranks, and destruction seemed inevitable, when the sound of a distant cannonade from the further extremity of the pass revived the hope that succour was approaching. It proved to be the division of Dupont, which, fully aware of the imminent danger of their general, was advancing with all imaginable haste to his succour, and was already engaged with the rear of Doctoroff's division, which gallantly faced about to repel them.²

² Dum. xiv.
14, 15. Jom.
i. 151, 152.
Sav. ii. 105.

This extraordinary conflict continued till nightfall with unparalleled resolution on both sides. The combatants, in the dark or by the light of the moon, continued the strife; the whole defile resounded with the incessant roar of fire-arms; while the ancient Gothic towers which once held in chains the hero of the crusades, were illuminated by the frequent discharges of artillery which flashed through the gloom at their feet. Gradually, however, Gazan's division was broken; upwards of two-thirds of their number had fallen; three eagles were taken; and Mortier himself, whose lofty stature made him conspicuous, being repeatedly intermingled with the Russian grenadiers, owed his safety to the vigour and dexterity with which he wielded his sabre. His officers, desirous of preventing so brilliant a prize from falling into the hands of the enemy, besought him to get on board a bark on the river, and make his way to the other side, but the brave marshal refused to leave his comrades.* This heroic constancy at length received its reward. The distant fire was heard to be sensibly approaching; it was Dupont, who, forcing his way with dauntless courage through the defile, was gradually compelling Doctoroff to give ground before him, while the latter now in his turn found himself between two fires. The brave Smith, at the head of the Russian column, was killed by a discharge of grape-shot, at the moment when he was making a decisive charge on the remains of Gazan's division. The French, who had exhausted all their ammunition, were roused by the cheers of their deliverers, which were now distinctly heard, to try a last effort with the bayonet. Assailed both in front and rear, Doctoroff's division was driven up a lateral valley, which afforded them the means of escape; and, amidst the cries of "France! France! you have saved us," the exhausted grenadiers of Gazan threw themselves into the arms of their comrades.¹

This untoward affair gave singular vexation to Napoleon. It was not the mere loss of three thousand men,

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100.

The French
are at length
successful.

¹ Bign. iv.
402, 403.
Dum. xiv. 2.
15. Jom. ii.
151, 152.
Sav. ii. 105.

* "No," said he, "reserve that resource for the wounded. One who has the honour to command such brave soldiers should esteem himself too happy to share their lot and perish with them. We have still two guns and some boxes of grape-shot; we are almost at Dierstein; let us close our ranks and make a last effort."—DUMAS, xiv. 14.

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101.
Mortier re-
crosses the
Danube.
Nov. 11.

which in so mighty a host was of little consequence—that of the allies had amounted to two-thirds of that number—and it could easily be repaired. It was the blot on his arms, the derangement of the plans of the campaign, which was the source of his annoyance. Mortier, on the day after the battle esteemed himself fortunate in being able, by the aid of the French flotilla on the Danube, to make his way across the river with his whole corps, leaving the left bank entirely in the hands of the enemy. The object of his movements was frustrated. All hopes of surrounding and destroying Kutusoff before the arrival of the second Russian army were at an end. What was still more mortifying to his military feelings, both the courage and capacity of the enemy had been demonstrated. His troops had not only been defeated but out-generaled; and the Muscovites, in their first serious engagement of the campaign, had gained greater trophies than the Austrians could boast of since the battle of Marengo. He paused, therefore, a day at St Polten; and, abandoning all thoughts of harassing any further the retreat of Kutusoff, turned all his attention to the capture of Vienna and the acquisition of the bridge there, which, besides its other immense advantages, would render totally impossible the junction of the Archduke Charles with the Russian forces.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
153. Dum.
xiv. 17, 18.
Sav. ii. 105.

102.
Napoleon ad-
vances rapid-
ly on Vienna.

Orders, therefore, were immediately given to Lannes and Murat to advance with all possible expedition on Vienna, and by every means in their power endeavour to gain possession of the bridges over the Danube, whether an armistice was agreed on or not.* Meanwhile the Emperor Francis retired from the capital, after confiding the charge of it at this eventful crisis to Count Wurbna, the grand-chamberlain, who executed with fidelity the difficult duty committed to his charge. The citizens were overwhelmed with consternation when

* “As soon as ten o’clock on the 12th has arrived, you may enter Vienna. Endeavour to surprise the bridge of the Danube, and if it is broken down, make it your study to find the readiest means of passing the river; that is the great affair. Should M. Giulay, before ten o’clock, present himself with proposals for a negotiation, you may suspend your march on Vienna; but, notwithstanding, use all your efforts to secure the passage of the river.”—*Orders to Murat, 12th November 1805, in DUMAS, xiv. 20.*

they found themselves deserted by the government, and assembled in tumultuous crowds to demand arms to defend their hearths and ramparts. But it was too late. The means of resistance no longer remained; and Vienna, which never yet had yielded to an enemy, was compelled to send a deputation to Napoleon's headquarters to treat of a capitulation. An active negotiation was kept up as to the terms on which an armistice could be granted; but the French Emperor would abate nothing of his rigorous demands, that the Hungarian insurrection should instantly be disbanded, and the Tyrol, with the duchy of Venice, be immediately ceded to France.¹

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¹ Jom. ii.
153, 154.
Dum. xiv. 17,
25. Sav. ii.
105.

Built in the superb basin bounded on the south by the Alps of Styria, on the east by the Carpathian mountains, on the west by the range of the Bisamberg and the hills of Bohemia and Upper Austria, Vienna, the subject of this anxious negotiation, yields to no capital of Europe, Constantinople and Naples excepted, in the beauty and salubrity of its situation. Anciently the frontier station of the Roman empire upon the Sarmatian wilds, its situation on the outskirts of civilisation has in every age rendered it a military post of the highest importance. The Hungarians alone had forced its gates in the thirteenth century; but the inhabitants hardly regarded as a conquest the success achieved by those who were now their own subjects. Its heroic resistance to an innumerable army of Turks in 1688, gave time for Sobieski to approach with the flower of the Polish chivalry; and the subsequent defeat of three hundred thousand Mussulmans beneath its walls delivered Eastern, as the victory of Tours had saved Western Europe, from a barbarian yoke. The old city is surrounded by a wall, flanked by strong bastions; but it contains only a hundred thousand souls, hardly a third of the present inhabitants of the capital. The remainder dwell in the immense suburbs which surround it on every side, separated from the ancient rampart only by a broad glaxis, conducive alike to the health and beauty of the metropolis. They are girded around by intrenchments; but such as are not defensible against a more skilful enemy than the Turks, from whose incursions they were intended to protect the inhabitants. Vienna cannot vie with Paris, Rome, or

103.
Description
of that city.

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London, in the splendour or riches of its architectural decorations, though it is not without objects of deep historic interest. The church of St Stephens, surmounted by one of the highest steeples in Europe, from the summit of which the Polish lances were first discovered gleaming in the setting sun on the ridges of the Bisamberg, surmounts in lone magnificence every other edifice in the capital, and commands a noble view of the whole mountain-bound valley in which it stands. The Emperor's palace in Vienna is not worthy of the residence of so great a monarch; but the neighbouring one of Schœnbrunn and that of the Archduke Charles are splendid structures, and the Imperial library presents a room three hundred feet in length, of surpassing grandeur. But in a military point of view the capture of this city was an object of the very highest importance, commanding as it did the only bridge below Lintz over the Danube, and containing the great arsenal of the Austrian monarchy, stored with two thousand cannon, and above a hundred thousand stand of arms.¹

¹ Personal observation.
Jom. ii. 155,
156. Dum.
xiv. 23, 25.

104.
Seizure of
the bridge of
Vienna.

The Emperor Francis had withdrawn from Vienna to Presburg, where he urged on the organising of the Hungarian insurrection, and thence he repaired to the fortified town of Brunn in Moravia, in order to concert measures with Alexander, who was hourly expected there from Berlin, for the further prosecution of the war. Meanwhile, the French forces in great strength approached the capital; and Napoleon renewed his orders to Lannes and Murat, to endeavour, by all possible means, to gain possession of the bridge which led across the river to the northern provinces of the empire. The interchange of couriers, which was frequent between the outposts of the two armies, on account of the negotiation which was going forward, gave an enemy, little scrupulous as to the means he employed, too fair an opportunity for accomplishing this object. Meerfelt, in retiring from Vienna, had intrusted the important post of the bridge over the Danube to Prince Auersberg, who, with a strong rearguard, was stationed at that, the sole avenue to the northern part of the Imperial dominions. At daybreak on the 13th November, General Sebastiani entered Vienna at the head of a brigade of dragoons, closely fol-

lowed by Murat and Lannes, with a powerful body of grenadiers. Without halting an instant, they passed through the town, crossed the suburb of Leopold on its opposite side, and marched straight to the great wooden bridge of Thabor, the head of which, on the right bank, was still held by an advanced guard of the Austrians. Every thing was ready for the destruction of the arches; the matches were set, the combustibles laid, the train ready; a powerful battery was stationed at the opposite extremity: Auersberg had but to give the word, and in a few minutes the bridge would be wrapt in flames, and all communication with the left bank cut off.¹

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¹ Bour. vii.
49. Rapp, 56,
58. Sav. ii.
105.

105.
Discreditable
stratagem by
which it was
seized.

The better to conceal their designs, Lannes and Murat advanced on foot at the head of their troops. Every thing bore a friendly appearance: the soldiers in column had their arms slung over their shoulders; they were surrounded by a host of stragglers as in time of profound peace: so frequent had been the interchange of couriers between the respective headquarters, that for three days there had been a kind of armistice between the two armies. The unsuspecting simplicity of the Germans was deceived by these appearances. Murat advanced with Lannes, with his hands behind his back, as if strolling out for a morning saunter: they called out to the Imperial officers not to fire, as the armistice was concluded; and the Austrians, trusting to their good faith, joined them, and began to converse about the approaching peace. As the conversation grew warmer, the French generals, followed by the grenadiers, insensibly advanced upon the bridge: for some time the Austrian officer did not take the alarm, but at length, seeing that it was more than half passed, and that the French troops were quickening their pace, he lost patience, and ordered the artillery to fire. The moment was terrible: the gunners stood to their pieces, the matches were raised; in an instant the bridge would have been swept with grapeshot, when Lannes walked straight up to him, saying with a loud voice,—“What are you about? do you not see?”—At this instant the grenadiers rushed forward: the Austrian officer was seized, and continued assurances held out that

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the armistice was signed : while the column advanced with a rapid step along the bridge, covering by its mass a train of sappers and miners, who followed immediately behind, and threw all the combustibles placed along its length into the river. The artillerymen on the opposite side, seeing their own officers intermingled with the French, fell into the snare, and forbore to fire ; the critical moment passed ; the French grenadiers crossed the bridge, and suddenly assailing the battery on the other side, seized the guns before the cannoniers could recover from their consternation. Instantly the grenadiers of Oudinot and Suchet succeeded them ; and the French found themselves masters of both banks of the Danube, by a stratagem conducted with a skill and intrepidity which would have been worthy of the highest admiration, were it not tarnished by a breach of faith, which neither ability nor success can either palliate or excuse.¹

¹ Bour. vii.
49, 50. Rapp,
56, 60. Sav.
ii. 105, 106.
Dum. xiv. 27,
31. Jom. ii.
157, 159.

106.
Napoleon
passes
through
Vienna, and
establishes
headquar-
ters at
Schœnbrunn.

This surprise of the bridge of Vienna gave the highest satisfaction to Napoleon, and it was in truth one of the most important events of the campaign. He was now enabled from the central position of the capital, with his army *à cheval* on the river, to direct an overwhelming force against either the Russians or the Archduke Charles, as he pleased : the junction of these two powerful converging armies, or even their engaging together in common operations, was thenceforth impossible. Impatient to profit by such extraordinary good fortune, the Emperor, at daybreak the following morning, crossed the bridge and established his headquarters at Schœnbrunn, from which the young Archduchess, Marie Louise, his future empress, had just before fled. The important effects of the capture of the bridge soon appeared. The Archduke Charles, whose columns were rapidly approaching the capital, was obliged to incline to the right, with a view, by a long circuit towards Hungary, to endeavour to regain his communications with the allied army. On the north of the river, convoys of all sorts rapidly arrived at Vienna ; the hospital train was established there ;² the immense stores found in the arsenal enabled the French to countermand all their warlike apparatus which had been

² Sav. ii. 107,
108. Dum.
xiv. 31, 33.
Bour. vii. 50,
51.

ordered up from Metz and Strasburg; while one half of the army, passed over to the north bank, threw back Kutusoff's advanced posts towards Moravia, and the other half, spread out from Kuffstein in Tyrol towards the frontiers of Hungary, interposed between the Danube and the hitherto unconquered battalions of the Archduke Charles.

On the other hand the surprise of this important bridge contributed not a little to aggravate the danger and embarrass the situation of Kutusoff. All the advantages which he had derived from his masterly movement across the Danube were now lost. The river no longer protected his rear from disaster; and alone, in presence of a force four times greater than his own, he had to continue a painful retreat to the second Russian army. He instantly fell back, and Brunn was assigned as the point of junction with the Austrian forces who had evacuated the capital. Napoleon, without a moment's delay, continued the pursuit in different columns, with a view to prevent the union. So strongly were the Austrians impressed with the idea that an armistice had been concluded, that General Nostitz, on the 15th November, when reached by the French dragoons, allowed them to pass without opposition through his squadrons, which gave them the means of falling unexpectedly on the heavy convoy which was struggling through the desperate roads in his rear. The rearguard of the Imperialists was soon overtaken, encumbered as it was with great loads of artillery and stores, which had been drawn from the arsenal of Vienna: one hundred and ninety pieces of cannon, and equipments to an immense extent, fell almost without a combat into the hands of the enemy. Leaving this easy prey to be secured by the corps which followed, Murat pushed forward, at the head of the whole cavalry and a corps of infantry about fifty thousand strong, to endeavour to reach Znaim before the enemy, which, if done, would have prevented the junction of the Russian and Austrian forces. Meanwhile, Mortier and Bernadotte, who had both crossed the Danube, and were following fast on the traces of the Russian general, thundered without intermission in his rear. His destruction seemed inevitable.¹

107.
Subsequent
movements
of the armies.

¹ Jom. ii.
159, 160.
Dum. xiv. 33
36, 45. Sav.
ii. 108.

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108.

Finesse of
Kutusoff in
parrying the
attempts of
the French
to circumvent
him.

Burning with anxiety to anticipate the enemy in his arrival at Znaim, and encouraged by the success of his stratagem with Auersberg, Murat resolved to try a similar device with Kutusoff, and for this purpose despatched a flag of truce, announcing the conclusion of an armistice, in the hope of thereby stopping the march of the Russian columns; but he soon found that he had a very different antagonist to deal with in such an attempt from the unsuspecting Austrians. Sprung from another race, and endowed with very different mental qualities, the Russians are as well skilled as the Germans are deficient in the arts of dissimulation; and they have repeatedly shown themselves superior in address to all the diplomatists of Europe. Kutusoff, whose acuteness was of the highest order, and who was inferior to none of his countrymen in the finesse of negotiation, instantly saw in this attempt the means of extricating the greater part of his army from its embarrassment. He received the French envoy in the most friendly manner, and pretended not only to enter cordially into the negotiation, but in his anxiety to put an immediate end to hostilities, sent the Emperor's aide-de-camp, Winzingerode, to propose the terms, which were, that the Russians should retire into Poland, the French withdraw from Moravia; while, in the mean time, both armies should remain in the situation which they at present occupied.* Murat fell into the snare: Bagrathion indeed, who was in presence of the French videttes with eight thousand men, remained stationary; but meanwhile, the remainder of the army defiled rapidly in his rear, and gained the important post of Znaim, which opened up their communications with the retiring Austrians and their own reserves which were approaching.¹ The Emperor Napoleon was highly

¹ Jom. ii.
160, 161.
Dum. xiv.
44, 51. Bign.
iv. 432, 434.

* "In agreeing to this proposal for an armistice," says Kutusoff, in his official account of the transaction, "I had in my view nothing but to gain time, and thereby obtain the means of removing to a greater distance from the enemy, and saving my army. The Adjutant-general, Winzingerode, sent me a duplicate of the proposed convention for my ratification; without affixing my signature, I delayed my answer for twenty hours, waiting for that of the French Emperor, and meanwhile caused the main body of the army to continue its retreat, which thereby gained two marches on the enemy. In so doing I was well aware that I was exposing the corps of Prince Bagrathion to almost certain ruin; but I esteemed myself fortunate in being able to save the army by the destruction of that corps."—DUMAS, xiv. 48.

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indignant when he heard that an armistice had been concluded, and despatched immediate orders for an attack; but before his answer could be received twenty hours had been gained, Znaim was passed, and the main body of the Russians were in full march to join their allies, leaving only Bagrathion and his division in presence of the enemy.

At noon on the 16th despatches arrived from Napoleon disavowing the armistice, and directing an immediate attack on the enemy. Kutusoff had directed Bagrathion to keep his ground to the last extremity, in order to gain time for the retreat of the army. Nothing more was requisite to induce that heroic general, with his brave followers, to sacrifice themselves to the last man on behalf of their country. He was soon assailed at once in front and both flanks, by Lannes, Oudinot, and Murat, to whose aid Soult, with his numerous and well-appointed corps, arrived soon after the action commenced. The village of Grund was the key of the Russian position, and incredible efforts were made on both sides to gain or retain possession of that important point. For long the Muscovites made good their ground: in vain column after column advanced bravely to the attack: the resistance they experienced was as obstinate as the attack was impetuous; and after several hours' murderous fighting, this band of heroes remained unbroken in the midst of their numerous enemies. Towards nightfall, however, the immense and constantly increasing masses of the enemy prevailed; the thinned ranks could no longer be preserved by a constant filing towards the centre; the French grenadiers broke into the village, and almost all the wounded Russians fell into their hands. Still the survivors maintained the desperate struggle: man to man, company to company, they fought in the houses, in the streets, in the gardens, with unconquerable resolution. The constant discharges of fire-arms and artillery spread a broad light in the midst of the gloom of a November night; and midnight found them still engaged in mortal combat. In the strife three thousand Russians fell or were made prisoners; but Bagrathion effected his retreat with the remainder, hardly five thousand, unbroken from amidst forty thousand enemies:¹ a glorious

109.
Heroic action of Bagrathion, who at length makes good his retreat.

¹ Dum. xiv. 50, 55. Sav. ii. 108, 109. Jom. ii. 160, 161. Bign. ix. 434, 435.

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achievement, which gave an earnest of the future celebrity of a hero whose career was closed with immortal renown on the field of Borodino.

110.

Junction of
the Russian
armies, and
critical position of Napoleon.

Nothing could now prevent the junction of the allied forces, and it took place on the 19th at Wischau, in Moravia, without further molestation. This great event produced an immediate change in the measures of Napoleon. It was no longer a dispirited band of forty thousand men, which was retiring before forces quadruple their own, but a vast army, seventy-five thousand strong, animated by the presence of the Russian Emperor in person, which was prepared to resist his efforts. The situation of Napoleon was in consequence daily becoming more critical. The necessity of guarding so many points, and keeping up a communication from Vienna to the Rhine, had greatly reduced his army: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand tried veterans, was rapidly approaching from the south: the Hungarian insurrection was organising in the east: seventy-five thousand Russians and Austrians were in his front: while Prussia, no longer concealing her intentions, was preparing to descend from Silesia with eighty thousand men on his communications with the Rhine.

111.

Able measures of Napoleon to avert this danger.

The measures of Napoleon to ward off so many concurring dangers were conceived with his wonted ability. Calculating that at least ten days must elapse before the Russian armies, after the fatiguing marches which they had undergone, could be ready for active operations, he resolved to make the most of that precious interval to impose upon the different enemies by whom he was surrounded. Knowing well that the great secret of war is to expand forces, when a variety of enemies are to be restrained and a moral impression produced, and concentrate them when a decisive blow is to be struck, he resolved to take advantage of this breathing-time to disseminate his troops in every direction. Heavy contributions were imposed upon the conquered territories of Austria: Marmont was pushed forward on the road to Styria to observe the Archduke Charles: Davoust received orders to advance upon Presburg to overawe the Hungarians: Bernadotte, with his corps and the Bavarians, were moved towards Iglau and the frontiers of Bohemia

to observe the motions of the Archduke Ferdinand, who, with ten thousand men whom he had collected in Bohemia, after the disaster of Ulm, and the levies of that province, was assuming a menacing attitude on the upper Danube; while Mortier with his corps, which had suffered so much in the preceding combats, formed the garrison of Vienna. The troops of Soult and Lannes, with the imperial guard and the cavalry under Murat, advanced on the road to Brunn to make head against the now united Russian armies.¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
55, 58. Jom.
ii. 162, 163.
Bign. iv. 435.

Meanwhile the French armies maintained the most exemplary discipline at Vienna, and the inhabitants, somewhat recovered from their consternation, were enabled to gaze without alarm on the warriors whose deeds had proved so fatal to the fortunes of their country. Commerce revived, the barriers were opened, provisions flowed in from all quarters, and, excepting from the French sentinels at the gates and uniforms in the streets, it could hardly have been discovered that an enemy was in possession of the capital. General Clarke was appointed governor of the city, and a provisional government organised throughout all the conquered provinces, whose first care was to preserve discipline among the soldiers, and the next to enforce the collection of the enormous contributions which the conqueror had imposed on the inhabitants. The greatest courtesy was evinced towards the academies and scientific institutions, and even considerable payments made from the military chest for the support of these useful establishments—admirable measures, demonstrating the ascendant of discipline and European courtesy over the savage passions of war, and which would have been deserving of unqualified admiration if they had not been accompanied by withering exactions, levied under the authority of Napoleon himself, and the coercion of private plunder had not been all turned to the account of the great Imperial robber.* At the same time, in the bulletins which he published, the whole calamities of the war were, as usual, ascribed to

112.
Conduct of
the French at
Vienna.

* The contribution levied on Vienna and the conquered part of Upper and Lower Austria was 100,000,000 francs, or £4,000,000 sterling, a sum fully equivalent to £8,000,000 in this country. The public stores, the legitimate objects of conquest at Vienna, were immense; 2000 pieces of artillery, of which

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¹ Bign. iv.
412, 417.
Jom. ii. 157.
Dum. xiv. 37,
40.

the English and the corrupting influence of their gold ; while, with a rudeness unworthy of so great a man, and especially unbecoming in the moment of triumph, he insulted his fallen enemies in his official publications, and did not even spare the Emperor of Austria in the point where chivalrous feelings would have been most anxious to have forborne, the character and influence of the Empress herself.¹

113.
Forces on the
two sides.

Meanwhile the allied armies had effected their junction in the neighbourhood of Wischau ; one hundred and four battalions, including twenty Austrian, and one hundred and fifty-nine squadrons, of which fifty were of the same nation, presented a total of seventy-five thousand effective men. A division of the imperial guard, under the Grand-duke Constantine, brother of the Emperor of Russia, and a corps under Benningsen, which were hourly expected, would raise it to nearly ninety thousand. The forces which the French Emperor had at his immediate disposal to resist this great array were much less considerable, and hardly amounted at that moment to seventy thousand combatants ; but such was the exhaustion of the Russian troops, after incessant marching and fighting for two months, that it was resolved to put them into cantonments for ten days round Olmutz, before resuming active operations. The troops were animated by the best spirit, and enthusiastically devoted to their sovereign, whose presence amongst them never fails to rouse to the highest pitch the loyal feelings of the Russian soldiers. But in equipment and skill in the art of war it had already become evident that they were decidedly inferior to their redoubtable adversaries, and that nothing but the indomitable firmness of northern valour had hitherto enabled them to maintain their ground in the combats which had taken place between them.²

² Dum. xiv.
61, 63. Jom.
ii. 165, 166.
Bign. iv. 435.

The hostile chiefs gradually drew near to each other. Napoleon advanced his headquarters to Brunn, a fortified place, containing considerable magazines recently abandoned by the allies, and which afforded him the immense advantage of a secure depot for his stores, sick and

500 were ready for siege use : 100,000 muskets ; 600,000 quintals of powder ; 600,000 balls ; and 160,000 bombs. 15,000 muskets were sent as a present to the Bavarians, besides the colours taken from them in 1740, when their government made common cause with France.—See BIGNON, iv. 412.

wounded, in the vicinity of the theatre of action. A few days after, when out on horseback reconnoitring the ground in the neighbourhood with his staff, he was much struck with the importance, both as a field of battle and a strategetical point, of the position of AUSTERLITZ. The two chief roads of that part of Moravia, that from Nikolsburg to Olmutz, and from Brunn towards Hungary by Holitsch, cross at that town, which renders it a military position of the highest value. "Gentlemen," said he to the generals and officers, "observe well the ground here: within a few days it will be your field of battle." The importance attached by both parties to the possession of this intersection of the roads led to a severe combat of cavalry between the advanced guard of the French, in presence of Napoleon himself, and the rearguard of the enemy, in which neither party could boast of decisive success, although the increasing force of the French compelled the allies at nightfall to retire. Advices at the same time arrived that the advanced guard of Massena had entered into communication with Marmont's corps, which formed the southern extremity of the grand army, so that Napoleon could now calculate for the decisive shock upon the united strength of the armies of Italy and Germany.¹

But notwithstanding all this, the French Emperor was fully aware of the dangers of his situation. If Massena and the Italian army had entered into communication with his extreme right, the united forces of the Archduke Charles and John, nearly ninety thousand strong, were rapidly approaching to the assistance of the allies; and it had already become evident that Mortier would be unable to retain Vienna for any length of time from their arms. The danger of losing his line of communication in rear was the more alarming that the forces in his front were rapidly increasing; and the arrival of the Grand-duke Constantine at the enemies' headquarters had already raised their efficient force to eighty thousand men, assembled in a strong position under the cannon of Olmutz. Prussia, he was well aware, was arming for the fight; and he might shortly expect to have his communications on the Upper Danube menaced by sixty thousand of the soldiers of the Great Frederick.² Every thing depended upon striking a

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114.

Napoleon reconnoitres the field of Austerlitz.
Nov. 20.
Nov. 25.

¹ Personal observation.
Bign. iv. 436.
Dum. xiv.
104, 105, 118.

115.
Dangers of his situation.

² Dum. iv.
120, 121.
Bign. iv. 438,
439. Jom. ii.
171, 172.

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decisive blow before these formidable enemies accumulated around him ; and he was not without hopes that the inexperience or undue confidence of his opponents would give him the means of accomplishing this object, and terminating the war by a stroke which would at once extricate him from all his difficulties.

116.
Simulate negotiations on both sides to gain time.
Nov. 25.

The more to inspire the allies with the false confidence which might lead to such a result, Napoleon despatched Savary with a letter to the Emperor Alexander to offer his congratulations to that monarch on his having joined the allied army, and propose terms of accommodation.* About the same time Counts Giulay and Stadion arrived at the headquarters of the French Emperor. After two days spent in fruitless negotiations, Napoleon demanded a personal interview with the Emperor Alexander. Instead of coming in person, the Czar sent his aide-de-camp, Prince Dolgorucki, whom Napoleon met at the advanced posts. "Why are we fighting?" said Napoleon, when the aide-de-camp was admitted into his presence. "Let the Em-

Nov. 25.

* "Sire," said Napoleon, "I send my aide-de-camp, General Savary, to your Majesty, to offer you my compliments on your arrival at the headquarters of your army. I have charged him to express the esteem which I entertain for your Majesty, and the anxious desire which I feel to cultivate your friendship. I indulge the hope that your Majesty will receive him with that condescension for which you are so eminently distinguished, and that you will regard me as one of the men who are most desirous to be agreeable to you. I pray God to keep your Imperial Majesty in his holy keeping." The Emperor Alexander replied from Olmutz, on the 27th, in these terms:—"I have received, sir, with the gratitude of which it was deserving, the letter which General Savary brought, and hasten to return my best acknowledgments: I have no other desire but to see the peace of Europe established on safe and honourable conditions. I desire, at the same time, to seize every occasion of being personally agreeable to you: receive the assurance of it, as well as of my high consideration."

"When I arrived at the Russian headquarters," says Savary, "I found the officers and staff declaiming against the ambition of the French government, and full of confidence in the success of their arms. The Emperor received me in the most gracious manner, and made a sign for his attendants to retire. I could not avoid a feeling of timidity and awe when I found myself alone with that monarch. Nature had done much for him: it would be difficult to find a model so perfect and gracious; he was then twenty-six years of age. He spoke French in its native purity, without the slightest tinge of foreign accent, and made use on all occasions of our most classical expressions. As there was not the least affectation in his manner, it was easy to see that this was the result of a finished education. The Emperor said, when I put the letter into his hand, 'I am grateful for this step on your master's side; it is with regret that I have taken up arms against him, and I seize with pleasure the first opportunity of testifying that feeling towards him. It is long since he has been the object of my admiration; I have no wish to be his enemy, any more than that of France. He should recollect that, in the time of the late Emperor Paul, though then only Grand-duke, when France was overwhelmed by disasters, and met with nothing but obloquy from the other cabinets, I contributed much, by directing the Russian cabinet to take the lead, to induce the other powers of Europe to recognise the new order of things in your country. If now I entertain different sentiments, it is because France has adopted different principles, which have given the European powers just cause of disquietude for their independence. I have been called on by them to concur with them

peror Alexander, if he complains of my irruptions, make corresponding invasions on his own side, and all discussion will cease betwixt us." The Russian represented that such a conduct would be repugnant to the principles of his cabinet; that the Emperor had only taken up arms to succour Austria, and obtain for the Continent a solid peace, without either personal interest in the matter or animosity against France; that he desired to see it powerful and happy, as well as all the other European states; that his empire was already so vast, that its extension was no object of ambition; and that his sole desire was the prosperity of his subjects.

Napoleon replied, that the allies wished to deprive him of his crown, and reinstate the Bourbons. This Dolgorucki contested; and he denied also that they desired to restore his Italian possessions to the King of Sardinia; but admitted that they insisted on the independence of Holland, and an indemnity for the loss of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia. "Let the Emperor of Russia imi-

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117.
Conversation
between Na-
poleon and
Alexander's
aide-de-
camp.

in establishing an order of things which may tranquillise all parties; and it is to accomplish that purpose that I have come hither. You have been admirably served by fortune, it must be admitted; but I will never desert an ally in distress, or separate my cause from that of the Emperor of Germany. He is in a critical situation, but one not beyond the reach of remedy. I command brave soldiers, and if your master drives me to it, I will command them to do their duty. You are already a great and powerful nation, and by your uniformity of language, feelings, and laws, as well as physical situation, must always be formidable to your neighbours. What need have you of continual aggrandisement? Since the peace of Luneville, you have acquired first Genoa, and then Italy, which you have subjected to a government which places it entirely at your disposal."

"Genoa has been acquired by us," answered Savary, "in spite of ourselves. Its political power was annihilated, its harbour blockaded by the English, its commerce destroyed, its means of defence against the Barbary powers at an end. Necessity, therefore, not less than inclination, compelled them to throw themselves into the arms of a foreign power. France was subjected to the whole charges of its defence before the formal act of annexation took place. As to Italy, it is altogether our conquest. We have watered its fields with our blood; twice it has regained its political existence by our efforts. If it began with republican institutions, it was in order to be in harmony with its protecting power. The changes which have since taken place in its government were intended to make it still follow the phases of our constitution. It has the same laws, usages, and internal regulations as France. It must lean on some foreign power, and has only France and Austria to choose between. We have fought for ten years to wrest it bit by bit from that power: could we permit its inhabitants to choose an alliance which would at once deprive us of the whole fruit of our labours? If Austria has not abandoned all thoughts of Italy, we are still ready to combat her for it; if she has, it is of very little moment what its form of government is. The Emperor, in sending me to your Majesty, was far from supposing that the war took its origin in these questions; if so, I not only see no possibility of peace, but anticipate a universal hostility." It was easy to see that an accommodation was impossible between powers actuated by such opposite sentiments. Savary returned, after three days spent in parleying, without having accomplished the professed object of his mission; but effectually gained its real design in making the French Emperor acquainted with the self-confidence and vehemence which prevailed at the allied headquarters.—SAVARY, ii. 112, 128.

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tate my conduct," said Napoleon, "and we shall soon come to terms of accommodation."—"He will never desert his allies," replied Dolgorucki.—"Then we must fight," rejoined Napoleon: "I wash my hands of the consequences;" and with that abruptly broke off the conference. But though it had only lasted half an hour, much had been done in that time to blind the allies as to the real state of affairs. The Emperor met him at the advanced posts, as if solicitous to conceal what was passing in the interior of the army. Preparations for a retreat were ostentatiously put forward; field-works were hastily thrown up in front of the ground occupied by the army; and Dolgorucki withdrew with the firm conviction, which he did not fail to communicate to his sovereign, that the French Emperor had lost all his former confidence, and that his great object now was to extricate himself from the perilous situation in which he was placed.¹*

¹ Sav. ii. 115.
128. Bign. iv.
437, 442.

118.
Haugwitz
arrives from
Berlin.

On the same day, Count Haugwitz arrived at the French headquarters with the ultimatum of Prussia, as agreed on in the treaty of November 3d. Since that time the measures of the cabinet of Berlin had been decidedly hostile. A combined force of Russians and Swedes had occupied the electorate of Hanover; a strong body of English troops had landed at Stade; and a proclamation from the King of England announced that the electorate was now placed under the protection of Prussia, and all the former authorities reinstated in their functions as before the French invasion. The Swedes were in full march towards the Elbe, and the Prussians towards Franconia; while a powerful force of the same nation was collecting in Silesia to bring immediate succour to the allied army. Even the garrison of Berlin had received orders to march to support the military movements which were in preparation. The eloquent declamations of the celebrated historian Muller had wrought up the public mind to a perfect frenzy; warlike enthusiasm filled every breast; and the most exaggerated reports of the disasters of the French were received with insatiable avidity. Napoleon was well aware of all this, and of the object of Haugwitz's mission. He

* When Dolgorucki had retired, Napoleon said to the officers around him, "The allies should wait till they are on the heights of Montmartre before they make such proposals;" a remarkable expression, which subsequent events rendered prophetic.—Bour. vii. 67.

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therefore resolved to temporise, and if possible dissipate the clouds which were collecting by a decisive stroke, before they burst upon his head. Accordingly he refused to enter into discussion with the Prussian minister, and recommended him, after a short interview, to open conferences at Vienna with Talleyrand, instead of remaining amidst the tumult of his bivouacs; and the wily diplomatist, not sorry of an opportunity of waiting the issue of events before finally committing his country in a contest which he had so long laboured to prevent, readily acted on his suggestion.¹

¹ Hard. viii.
497, 498.
Bign. iv. 437,
438. Jom. ii.
171.

When forces so vast were preparing to aid them, both in the north and south, it was the obvious policy of the allies to remain on the defensive, and rest secure in their strong position under the cannon of Olmutz, until the Archduke Charles had brought up his veteran battalions, and Prussia had descended in force into Silesia and Franconia. But although the expedience of doing so was fully appreciated at headquarters, it was resolved, in a council of war held on the 27th, to advance forthwith against the enemy. The Russian troops, miserably provided at that period with commissaries, and totally destitute of magazines in that part of the country, which it had never been expected would form the theatre of war, were suffering extremely from want of provisions; while the French, having the rich provinces of Lower Austria and Hungary in their rear, were amply provided with supplies of all sorts. The allied generals, too, were aware of the inferiority in number of the French troops assembled round Brunn, and were ignorant of the admirable disposition of the other corps in *échelon* in their rear, by which the two armies could in a few days be restored to an equality. Influenced by these sentiments, a forward movement was resolved on, with a view to pass the right flank of the French army, cut them off from their communication with Vienna and the reserve under Massena, and at the same time establish their own connexion with the powerful succour approaching under the Archduke Charles. The movement commenced on the 27th at daybreak, when the whole army advanced in five columns, moving parallel to each other, against the enemy.² The French were not in sufficient force at the advanced posts to resist so formidable an

119.
The allies advance to
Wischau.

Nov. 27.
² Dum. xiv.
150, 152.
Hard. viii.
505, 506.
Jom. ii. 172.

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assault; a detachment was made prisoners, and after a sharp combat the little village of Rausnitz was abandoned by Murat to Bagrathion. Encouraged by this success of its advanced guard, the Russian main body followed joyfully and rapidly in its footsteps. Headquarters were moved on to Wischau, and the outposts were pushed forward to within two leagues of Austerlitz.

120.
Preparatory
movements
on both sides.

This sudden irruption led to an immediate concentration of the French army. Murat, Lannes, and Soult received orders instantly to raise their cantonments and fall back behind Brunn, keeping only detachments in front of that place. Bernadotte was directed to leave the Bavarians alone at Iglau, and advance by forced marches to the field of action; Davoust to come up with all imaginable haste to Nikolsburg, on the right of the French position; Mortier to abandon Vienna to a division of Marmont's army, and hasten with his whole corps to the environs of Brunn; and Marmont to draw near to the capital with all his forces. In this way Napoleon's army, which, before the concentration commenced, was little more than fifty thousand strong, would be raised in a few days to ninety thousand. But before these distant succours could arrive, great successes might be obtained, and the Emperor was in no small disquietude how to arrest the enemy before his forces were reassembled. Fortunately for him, their subsequent movements were as slow and vacillating as their former had been decided and audacious. On the 29th they marched forward only two leagues, directing their chief force towards the French left: but on the day following they retraced their footsteps, and, advancing with the left in front, bivouacked at Hoqueditz, and their light troops were seen from the French outposts marching across their position towards the right of the army.¹

Nov. 29.
Nov. 30.
1 Nov. ii.
407, 408.
Jom. ii. 174,
175. Dum,
xiv. 133, 134.
Bign. iv. 439,
440.

121.
Napoleon's
measures to
draw the
enemy on.

Napoleon spent the whole of both days on horseback, at the advanced posts, watching their movements. After surveying the heights of Pratzen, the highest ground in the neighbourhood, and obviously of the first importance if the battle was fought in its environs, he said to his generals, "If I wished to prevent the enemy from passing, it is here that I should station myself; but that would only lead to an ordinary battle, and I desire decisive

success. If, on the other hand, I draw back my right towards Brunn, and the Russians pass these heights, they are irretrievably ruined." In pursuance of this design the heights were abandoned; the right was drawn back as if it was fearful of encountering the enemy. Austerlitz was evacuated, and the French army concentrated round Brunn, ready to take advantage of the first imprudent step which might be made by their adversaries. At length, on the morning of the 1st December, the intentions of the enemy were clearly manifest. Napoleon beheld, as he himself says, "with inexpressible delight," their whole columns, dark and massy, moving across his position, at so short a distance as rendered it apparent that a general action was at hand. Carefully avoiding the slightest interruption to their movement, he merely watched, with intense anxiety, their march; and when it had become evident, from the direction they were following, and the number of troops who had already passed, that the resolution to turn the right flank of the French army had been decidedly taken, he said, with the prophetic anticipation of military genius, "To-morrow, before nightfall, that army is my own." In truth, the allies, under the direction of Weyrother, whose repeated defeats at Rivoli and Hohenlinden, where he had been chief of the staff, had not yet taught him the quality of the antagonists with whom he had to deal, were venturing upon one of the most hazardous operations in war—a flank-march in column in front of a concentrated enemy, and that, too, when that enemy was Napoleon at the head of eighty thousand men.¹

Meanwhile the allies, in great strength, animated by the presence of their respective sovereigns, and in the highest spirits, were marching in five massy columns within two cannon-shots of the French outposts. Their design was to turn the right flank of the enemy, so as, in case of disaster, to cut him off from Vienna, and throw him back on the mountains of Bohemia; and with that view they proposed to commence the action by a vigorous attack on that wing, which it was hoped would be speedily defeated and thrown back in confusion on the centre. Their first column, under Doctoroff, had advanced beyond the right flank of the French as far as Aujezd; the second, commanded by Langeron, occupied

¹ Hard. viii.
506, 507.
Dum. xiv.
133, 135.
Norv. ii. 408.
Jom. ii. 175,
176. Sav. ii.
130.

122.
Allied order
of battle.

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the important heights of Pratzen, directly before the French right wing; the third, under Prybyszwecki, crowned the eminences immediately behind that elevated point; the fourth and fifth, under Milaradovitch and Lichtenstein, followed in order, showing their flank to the enemy, and stretching along the whole front of his position; while the reserve, under the Grand-duke Constantine, occupied the heights in front of Austerlitz. In all, their forces embraced a hundred and fourteen battalions and a hundred and seventy-two squadrons, amounting to fully eighty thousand men, of whom fifteen thousand were cavalry in the finest condition.¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
134, 135.
Nap. ii. 176.

123.
Description
of the field of
battle.

The French army, in concentrated masses, occupied a position in advance of the fortress of Brunn, midway between that town and Austerlitz. The Emperor's tent was placed on an elevated slope on the right of the great road leading across his line from Brunn to Austerlitz, at the distance of two leagues and a half from the former place, a little in front of Bellowitz, between the two streams which, descending towards the south, unite their waters at Punlowitz.* From this elevated point the whole extent of the line was visible, though many parts of it were obscured by rising grounds, copsewoods, and villages, which, intersected by numerous small fish-ponds, formed a sort of intrenched camp, within which the French army was placed. Their right rested on the lake Moenitz, formed by the confluence, in that undulated country, of the two rivulets above mentioned; their left on the Bosenitzberg—an elevated hill, the first of the wooded chain which separates the basin of the Schwarza from that of the Marche, and which was intrenched and crowned with artillery. The front of the whole position was covered by broad marshes, which on either side bordered the streams, intersected at right angles by the great road from Brunn to Olmutz, and by various country roads from village to village, which, from the morasses and little lakes by which they were bordered, appeared easily susceptible of defence.² Right in front of the position, on the opposite side of the rivulet, lay the line of

² Personal
observation.
Dum. xiv.
136, 143.
Jom. ii. 175,
176.

* These names will convey no ideas to readers in this country; but they will be of value to the traveller who explores, in that distant region, the theatre of this memorable conflict.

waving heights, gradually rising to the elevated point of the Pratzen, which were already covered with the enemy's troops, who, congregated in formidable masses on that imposing ridge, sought to conceal the general movement of the troops in their rear, to turn the right flank of Napoleon.

By great exertions, the French Emperor had succeeded in assembling an immense force for the decisive battle which was approaching. The left wing, under Lannes, was stationed at the foot of the hills, having a powerful advanced guard of cavalry in front of the fortified position of the Bosenitzberg. Next to these was placed the corps of Bernadotte, who by forced marches had arrived in line from Iglau on the Bohemian frontier. To their right, on the right of the high-road, were stationed the grenadiers of Oudinot, with the cavalry under Murat; and the imperial guard, under Bessières, in a second line behind them. The centre was composed of the corps of Marshal Soult, which was uncommonly strong, and occupied the villages opposite the heights of Pratzen, which had been abandoned to the enemy. The right wing, under Davoust, who by incredible efforts had come up from Hungary, was thrown back in a semicircle, with its reserves at the abbey of Raygern in the rear, and its front line stretching to the lake Moenitz. Before the night of the 1st December, above ninety thousand men were here assembled within the space of two leagues; all veterans inured to war, and burning with impatience to signalise themselves in the decisive battle which was to take place on the morrow.¹

Napoleon spent the whole of that day on horseback, riding along the ranks, visiting the outposts, addressing the soldiers, and studying the ground. When a standard of the Italian army appeared, he spoke to the men in those words of brief but nervous eloquence by which he knew so well how to win their hearts; many of the veterans he even distinguished by name, and reminded of the dangers and glories they had shared together. "Soldiers!" said he, "we must finish this war by a decisive blow;" and loud cries of "Vive l'Empereur!" proved that he had not miscalculated the ardour of his followers. He continued riding through the bivouacs,

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124.
Disposition
of the French
troops.

¹ Dum. xiv.
142, 147.
Sav. ii. 131,
134. Jom. ii.
177.

125.
Nocturnal
illumination
of the French
lines.

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animating the men, till long after nightfall, and then retired to his tent, where he dictated one of those magical proclamations which so often, on the eve of great events, contributed to the astonishing victories which he won.* Suddenly, as he rode along, surrounded by his generals, fires were seen kindling on all sides; a brilliant illumination arose in all the bivouacs; the heavens were filled with the ruddy glow; and loud shouts in every direction announced some extraordinary transport among the soldiers. It was the enthusiasm of the common men, which, wrought up to the highest pitch by the interest of the moment and the presence of their beloved Emperor, celebrated thus, by the voluntary conflagration of the wood of their huts, and straw of their bivouacs, the first anniversary of his coronation.¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
146, 149.
Sav. ii. 132,
133. Jom.
ii. 176, 177.

126.
Movements
on both sides
in the morn-
ing.

The night was cold but clear, though a thick fog, as is not unusual in that country, covered all the lower grounds, and hardly permitted the sentinels to discern each other at ten yards' distance. At four in the morning, the Emperor mounted on horseback. All was still among the immense multitude who were concentrated in the French lines; buried in sleep, the soldiers forgot alike their triumphs and the dangers they were about to undergo. Gradually, however, a confused murmur arose from the Russian host; the lights multiplied towards Aujezd and the south-eastern parts of the horizon; and all the reports from the outposts announced that the advance from right to left had already commenced along their whole line. In effect, the orders had been despatched at midnight; all their columns were in full march, within two hours after, to turn the

* "Soldiers! The Russian army has presented itself before you to revenge the disaster of the Austrians at Ulm. They are the same men whom you conquered at Hollabrunn, and on whose flying traces you have followed. The positions which we occupy are formidable, and while they are marching to turn my right, they must present their flank to your blows. Soldiers! I will myself direct all your battalions. I will keep myself at a distance from the fire, if, with your accustomed valour, you carry disorder and confusion into the enemy's ranks; but should victory appear for a moment uncertain, you shall see your Emperor expose himself to the first strokes; for victory must not be doubtful on this occasion, especially when the reputation of the French infantry is at stake, which is so dear an interest to the honour of the whole nation." This is perhaps the first instance recorded in history where a general openly announced to his soldiers the manœuvre by which he expected they would prove victorious; while the promise that he was not, except in the last extremity, to put himself at their head, affords the clearest indication of the mutual confidence which long service together had established between them.—See DUMAS, xiv. 148, 149.

French right. At three o'clock, a detachment of Austrian horse presented themselves before Tilnitz, the outermost village in their possession on that side, and shortly after an attack with infantry and artillery was made on that important post. No sooner did Napoleon hear the sound of the distant cannonade in that direction, than he ordered Soult to bring his columns up to the very entrance of the defiles formed by the villages and woods in the low grounds on either side of the rivulet, in order that, the instant the enemy appeared sufficiently engaged in their perilous cross-march, his numerous battalions might be at once thrown on their flank. The soldiers accordingly advanced: every heart throbbing with anxiety, every eye turned to the east, where still, in that wintry season, no glimmering of light appeared.¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
160. Jom.
ii. 179. Sav.
ii. 133.

Gradually the stars, which throughout the night had shone clear and bright in the firmament, began to disappear; the ruddy glow of the east announced the approach of day; and the tops of the hills, illuminated by the level rays, appeared clear and sharp above the ocean of fog that rolled in the valleys. At last the sun rose in unclouded brilliancy—that “Sun of Austerlitz” which he so often afterwards apostrophised as illuminating the most splendid periods of his life. As the mist sank and the upper eminences in the lower grounds became visible, the magnitude of the fault which the enemy had committed became apparent: the heights of Pratzen, the key to their position, which the evening before had been crowned with artillery and glittering with armed men, were now deserted. It was evident that the left wing, advancing towards Tilnitz, had descended to the low grounds, and that the allies, intent on outflanking their opponents, had entirely abandoned the thought of retaining their position. The marshals who surrounded Napoleon saw the advantage, and eagerly besought him to give the signal for action; but he restrained their ardour, and turning to Soult, said, “How long would it take you from hence to reach the heights of Pratzen?”—“Less than twenty minutes,” replied the marshal; “for my troops are in the bottom of the valley, covered with mist and the smoke of their bivouacs; the enemy cannot see them.”—“In that case,” said Napoleon, “let us wait twenty minutes; when the

127.
Napoleon at
length orders
the attack.

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¹ Dum. xiv.
160, 161.
Jom. ii. 179,
180. Sav.
ii. 133, 134.
Bign. iv. 444.

enemy is making a false movement we must take good care not to interrupt him." Burning with impatience, the marshals stood around awaiting the signal; but before that time was fully elapsed, a violent fire was heard on the right towards Tilnitz, and an aide-de-camp, arriving in haste, announced that the enemy had commenced the attack in great force in that quarter. "Now, then, is the moment," said Napoleon; and the marshals set off at the gallop in all directions for their respective corps. At the same time the Emperor mounted his horse, and riding through the foremost ranks, "Soldiers!" said he, "the enemy has imprudently exposed himself to your blows; we shall finish the war with a clap of thunder."¹

128.
Battle of
Austerlitz.

The French army occupied an interior position, from whence their columns started like rays from a centre, while the allies were toiling in a wide semicircle round their outer extremity. Marshal Soult, in the centre, first got into action; but long before he could pass the hollow ground which separated the two armies, the Russian left wing, under Buxhowden, had gained considerable successes. So violent was their onset, so great their superiority of force at the first encounter, that the French were driven from the village of Tilnitz, and Buxhowden was advancing through the defile which leads from thence to Sokelnitz, beyond the extreme right of their position. Alarmed at the progress of the enemy on the right, Napoleon ordered Davoust, who, with his reserve, was concealed behind the abbey of Raygern, to advance to check them; but before he could come up, Sokelnitz also was carried, amid loud shouts, and the French right wing appeared completely turned. But it was in such moments that the cool judgment and invincible tenacity of Marshal Davoust appeared most conspicuous. Arranging his forces in battle array beyond the village of Sokelnitz, he received the Russians, when issuing from it disordered by success, with such resolution, that they were not only arrested in their advance, but driven out of that village with the loss of six pieces of cannon. Buxhowden, however, returned in greater force; the French were again expelled, blood flowed in torrents, and both parties maintained the conflict with invincible resolution.²

² Jom. ii.
183. Dum.
xiv. 160,
165. Norv.
ii. 410.

Affairs were in this state on the right, when Soult, with

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129.

The French
cut through
the Russian
centre.

his powerful corps, was suddenly thrown on the Russian centre. The fourth Russian column, under Kollowrath, was just beginning to ascend the slopes of Pratzen, which had been entirely evacuated by the third corps, immediately preceding it, when its outposts perceived the immense dark mass of French infantry emerging out of the mist in the low grounds on their right. Kutusoff instantly saw his danger; the enemy's centre, in order of battle, was ready to assail the combined army while in open columns of march. But if a fault in generalship had been committed, nothing that resolution could do to repair it was wanting. The Emperor Alexander was with the centre column, and his was not a character to sink tamely before misfortune. By his directions, Kutusoff gave immediate orders for the corps which had descended from the heights of Pratzen to reoccupy that important position. The infantry of Milaradovitch, rapidly wheeling into order of battle from open column, was formed in two lines, and every disposition made in the utmost haste to receive the enemy. Before they could be completed, however, the first line of Soult had ascended the heights: its attack was so impetuous that the Russian front line was broken and driven back upon the second with the loss of several pieces of cannon; the heights of Pratzen, after a desperate conflict of two hours' duration, were carried, and six battalions, which occupied a hill forming the highest part of the ridge, cut to pieces. The danger was extreme; the allied army, surprised in its line of march, was pierced through the centre, and the left wing in advance entirely separated from the remainder of the army.¹

¹ Dum. xiv.
170, 172.
Jom. ii. 185,
186. Bign.
iv. 445.

While this important success was gained in the centre, the French left, under Bernadotte and Lannes, was also warmly engaged with the enemy. They, too, surprised the combined forces in their line of march; and Napoleon sent repeated orders to these generals to attack the enemy promptly and vigorously, in order to prevent them from sending forward any succours to the centre, where the decisive blow was to be struck. The French marshals advanced to the attack in the order prescribed for the whole army, with the front line in order of battle, the second in column, with the artillery between them, and

130.
Progress of
the action on
the French
left.

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Murat in reserve with the cavalry behind the second line: a disposition every where attended with the happiest effects. The Russian right wing, while moving along without any conception that the enemy was at hand, were thunderstruck at finding themselves suddenly assailed by French columns emerging in battle array out of the mist; and so complete was the surprise, that the reserve under the Grand-duke Constantine was one of the first divisions to find itself engaged. Their dispositions, nevertheless, were speedily made: the artillery was rapidly brought forward to the front, and under cover of its fire, the marching columns, with all imaginable haste, wheeled into line. Gradually, however, the French infantry gained ground; and, taking advantage of their success, the cavalry under Kellerman were assailing even the Russian imperial guard, when Prince Lichtenstein, at the head of the splendid Austrian cuirassiers, charged them with such vigour that they were instantly broken, and the allied horse, following up their success, broke through the first French line, swept through the openings between the second, and interposed in the interval between the corps of Bernadotte and Lannes. Here, however, they were in their turn charged by Murat at the head of a large body of Napoleon's cavalry, and driven back through both French lines, who threw in a flanking fire on their disordered squadrons with such effect that nearly half their numbers were stretched on the plain.^{1*}

This murderous strife on the left was attended with no decisive success to either party; but it had the desired effect of preventing any succours being sent from that

¹ Dum. xiv.
176, 181.
Jom. ii. 186.
Bign. iv.
445, 446.

* The combat of Lannes and Bernadotte, on the left, was remarkable for the perfect success with which the troops, arranged in the order prescribed by Napoleon, baffled all the efforts of the allies, whose numerous and magnificent cavalry had there a full opportunity of acting. The first line was uniformly drawn up in battle array; the second in squares of battalions—the artillery and light horse in front, with the heavy cavalry arranged in several lines in the rear of the whole. Thus, if a charge of horse, which was frequently the case, broke the first array, it passed, while disordered by success, through the intervals between the squares behind that first line, from whose front and flanks it sustained a heavy fire. If they escaped that, the horsemen were suddenly assailed, when blown and dispersed, by a solid mass of heavy cavalry in the rear, which never failed to hurl them back in confusion through the squares, who by this time had reloaded their pieces, and whose flanking fire completed the destruction of their gallant assailants. The British heavy brigade of horse at Waterloo suffered extremely from a similar disposition made by Napoleon, which enabled him ultimately to baffle the most intrepid charges of the finest cavalry in the world, after they had achieved important success.—See DUMAS, xiv. 183.

quarter to the centre, now severely pressed by Soult. At length Kutusoff, seriously alarmed at the progress of that sturdy assailant, recalled a large part of Lichtenstein's cavalry to make head against the enemy on the heights of Pratzen: they joined the horse of Ouvaroff, and formed a mass of thirty squadrons, which it was hoped would suffice to keep up the communication between the centre and right wing of the allies. Meanwhile the Grand-duke Constantine, perceiving the danger of Kollowrath's troops, and alarmed at the progress which Lannes and Bernadotte were making on his own side, brought forward the Russian imperial guard, and, descending from the heights, advanced midway into the low grounds to meet the enemy. They were received by the division of Vandamme; and while a furious combat was going on between these rival bodies of infantry, the French were suddenly assailed in flank by the Russian cuirassiers of the guard, two thousand strong, in the finest order, led by Constantine in person. The shock was irresistible: in an instant the French column was broken, three battalions were trampled under foot, and the 4th regiment lost its eagle.¹

Napoleon saw there was not a moment to be lost in repairing the disorder; and immediately ordered Marshal Bessières, with the cavalry of the guard, to arrest that terrible body of horse. Rapp put himself at the head of their advanced guard, and, preceded by four pieces of horse-artillery, set off at the gallop down the hill, to restore the combat. "Soldiers!" said he, "you see what has happened below there: they are sabring our comrades; let us fly to their succour." Instantly spurring their chargers, they precipitated themselves upon the enemy. The Russians had scarcely time to reform their squadrons after their glorious success, when this fierce enemy was upon them: they were broken, driven back over the dead bodies of the square they had destroyed, and lost their artillery. Rallying, however, in a few minutes with admirable discipline, they returned to the charge: both imperial guards met in full career: the shock was terrible; and the most desperate cavalry action that had taken place during the war ensued, and lasted for above five minutes. The infantry

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131.

Vehement
conflict of the
Russian and
French Im-
perial
Guards.

¹ Rapp, 61.
Dum. xiv. 61.
Sav. ii. 135.

132.

Decisive
charge of
Rapp, with
the French
cavalry of the
guard.

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on both sides advanced to support their comrades; the resolution and vigour of the combatants were equal; squadron to squadron, company to company, man to man, they fought with invincible firmness, and soon the ground was strewn with the dead and the dying. At length, however, the stern obstinacy of the Russians yielded to the enthusiastic valour of the French: the cavalry and infantry of their guard gave way, and after losing their artillery and standards, were driven back in confusion almost to the walls of Austerlitz; while, from a neighbouring eminence, the Emperors of Russia and Germany beheld the irretrievable rout of the flower of their army.^{1*}

¹ Rapp, 61.
62. Dum. xiv.
191, 195.
Jom. ii. 187,
188. Sav. ii.
135, 136.

133.
Decisive suc-
cesses of the
French.

This desperate encounter was decisive of the fate of the day. Pierced through the middle, with the bravest of their troops destroyed, the Russians no longer fought for victory, but for existence. In effect, the defeat of the centre, which was now borne back above a mile from the field of battle, exposed the left wing, between Aujezd and Sokelnitz, to the most imminent danger. Rapidly following up his success, Napoleon caused his reserves and imperial guard to wheel to the right to aid Soult in attacking the rear of that wing, while Davoust, near Sokelnitz, pressed its front. They first came up with a division of six thousand men, who were retracing their steps, too late, to support the centre. Assailed at once in front and both flanks by immense masses of infantry and cavalry flushed with victory, this body was speedily defeated, and half of its number made prisoners. Rapidly advancing from left to right, the victorious French next came upon Langeron, who shared the same fate: and the survivors from his division, flying for refuge to Buxhowden, first communicated to that general the melancholy intelligence of the disasters which had befallen the central divisions of the army. He immediately formed his troops into close column, and began to debouche from Aujezd with a view to regain, by a road between the margin of the lakes in his rear and the high grounds which adjoin them to the north, the remains of the army

* It is the moment when Rapp returned with his charger all bloody, to announce this decisive success, that Gerard has selected for his admirable and well-known picture of the battle of Austerlitz.—RAPP, 62.

at Austerlitz. But before they had proceeded half a mile, the marching column was furiously attacked in flank at different points by the victorious French, who succeeded in piercing it through the middle, and separating Buxhowden with a few battalions in advance from the remainder of the array. The unhappy body which was cut off, consisting of eight-and-twenty battalions, under Doctoroff and Langeron, was soon assailed in front, flank, and rear, by the imperial guard, Soult, and Davoust. After a brave resistance they were at length overwhelmed: seven thousand were taken or destroyed on the spot, and great numbers sought to save themselves by crossing, with their artillery and cavalry, a frozen lake or morass which adjoined their line of march. The ice was already beginning to yield under the enormous weight, when the shells from the French batteries, bursting below the surface, caused it to crack with a loud explosion: a frightful yell arose from the perishing multitude, and above two thousand brave men were swallowed up in the waves.¹

While these decisive successes were gained in the centre and right, the French left had also entirely prevailed over its opponents. Encouraged by the cries of victory which they heard to their right, and the sight of their battalions on the heights which in the morning had been crowded with the enemy, the French troops in that quarter redoubled their efforts, and Lannes, Bernadotte, and Murat exerted all their energies to complete the discomfiture of their gallant opponents. For five hours the combat continued without any decisive advantage, the sharp rattle of the musketry interrupted at intervals by thundering charges of horse; but at noon the allies sensibly gave way. The heights of Blasowitz, the plateau of Kruh, the village of Hollubitz, were successively carried; and at length the Russians, entirely dislodged from the ridge of eminences they had occupied in the morning, were assembled in one close column by Bagrathion, and commenced their retreat in the direction of Austerlitz. Suchet and Murat, at the head of their respective divisions of infantry and cavalry, succeeded in breaking part of that mass, and dislodging it from the road to Olmutz,² where almost the whole of the baggage of the

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¹ Dum. xiv.
195, 203.
Jom. ii. 189,
190. Sav. ii.
137.

134.
Victory also
declares for
the French
on their left.

² Jom. ii.
190, 191.
Dum. xiv.
182, 189.
Sav. ii. 136
Bign. iv. 445

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allies fell into the hands of the victors. By great exertions and heroic resolution Bagrathion succeeded, before nightfall, in effecting his retreat with the remainder to Austerlitz, already filled with the wounded, the fugitives, and the stragglers from every part of the army.

135.
Results of the
battle.

Thus terminated the battle of Austerlitz, the most glorious of all the victories of Napoleon; that in which his military genius shone forth with the brightest lustre; for the stroke which at once re-established his affairs and prostrated Europe was most clearly owing to the manifest superiority of his manœuvres. The loss of the allies was immense. Thirty thousand men were killed, wounded, or made prisoners;* a hundred and eighty pieces of cannon, four hundred caissons, and forty-five standards remained the trophies of the victor's triumph; and the disorganisation of the combined forces was complete. It is true these advantages had been dearly purchased; twelve thousand French had been killed or wounded in the struggle; but the allies were cut off from the road to Olmutz, and their line of retreat towards Hungary exposed them to be harassed by Davoust in flank, while Napoleon's victorious legions thundered in their rear. Such was the consternation produced by this disaster, that in a council held at midnight at the Emperor Francis's lodgings, it was resolved by a great majority that the further prolongation of hostilities was hopeless; and at four in the morning Prince Lichtenstein was despatched to the headquarters of Napoleon to propose an armistice.¹

¹ Jom. ii.
190, 163.
Dum. xiv.
207, 209.
Sav. ii. 137.
Bign. iv. 450,
451.

136.
Dangers of
Napoleon's
situation not-
withstanding
his success.

There was no difficulty in coming to an understanding. Napoleon was too well aware of the magnitude of the danger from which he had escaped, and the serious nature of the perils with which he was still environed, to hesitate about accepting any offers which might detach the Emperor of Germany from the alliance. He had gained, it is true, one of the most brilliant victories on record in the annals of war; and the Russian army was threatened with a disastrous retreat, which would in all probability double its losses: but it was the very immensity of the success which he had achieved which was

* The prisoners were 19,000 Russians and 600 Austrians; but a considerable proportion of them were wounded.

the source of his embarrassment. Was he prepared, in the depth of winter, to follow the Muscovite standards into the recesses of Poland or the Ukraine, and incur the hazard of rousing a national war by approaching the frontiers of Old Russia? Supposing he were, what were the enemies which he would leave on his flanks and rear? The Archduke Charles, at the head of eighty thousand men in the finest condition, was approaching Vienna, and had already summoned the French garrison in that capital to surrender, while his opponent Massena was still far on the other side of the Julian Alps. Hungary, with its ancient spirit, was rising *en masse* at his approach. The Archduke Ferdinand, with the aid of the Bohemian levies, had just chased the Bavarians from Iglau. The Russian reserves were approaching Olmutz; while Prussia, with one hundred thousand men, was preparing from Saxony to pour into Franconia, and entirely cut off all communication with the Rhine. How was it possible, with such forces accumulating in his rear, to advance further into the wilds of Sarmatia in pursuit of his Scythian foe? Yet how could he remain where he was, to permit them to encircle him with their arms? Or how retreat, without commencing a series of disasters which would certainly dissipate the magical influence of his success, and might lead to the total overthrow of his power?¹

Impressed with these ideas, it was with the most lively satisfaction that Napoleon heard of the arrival of the Austrian envoy at his headquarters, and foresaw the means of extricating himself from his present embarrassments, not only without further danger, but with the utmost possible éclat. As on the Carinthian mountains in 1797, and at Marengo in 1801, he found an audacious and perilous advance followed by the highest triumph and success. Profoundly skilled in dissimulation, however, he carefully concealed these sentiments in the recesses of his bosom, and to the Prince Lichtenstein spoke only of the magnitude of the sacrifices which he made in consenting to any accommodation, and the immense advantages which, by the continuance of hostilities, were with- in his grasp.² The better to increase the terror of his

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¹ Jom. ii.
191. Dum.
xiv. 208, 210.
Hard. ix. 2, 4.
Sav. ii. 138.

137.
The Austri-
ans sue for an
armistice.

² Bign. iv.
452. Jom. ii.
191, 192.
Dum. xiv.
209, 210.

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arms, he refused to suspend the march of his victorious legions, and, appointing the following day for the interview with the Emperor of Germany, gave orders in the meantime for following up the enemy with the utmost possible vigour.

Meanwhile the allied army, extremely weakened and in deep dejection, continued its retreat, not without sustaining a considerable loss from the attacks made on its rearguard. They crossed the Marche, and the Emperor of Russia established his headquarters at the chateau of Hollitch; but the Emperor Francis remained nearer the French outposts at Czeitch, in order to be ready for the conference which Napoleon had fixed for the day following. The latter moved on to the advanced posts, and received the Emperor of Germany at a windmill on the roadside near Sarutchitz, still shown to travellers, where the fire of a bivouac protected them from the inclemency of the weather. "I receive you," said Napoleon, "in the only palace which I have inhabited for the last two months."—"You have made such good use," replied Francis, "of that habitation, that it should be agreeable to you." The officers of their respective suites then retired, and the two emperors conversed for above two hours, in the course of which the terms of accommodation were verbally agreed on. Napoleon took advantage of that opportunity to display all his talent in the colouring which he gave to his own conduct, and the dark shades in which he represented that of the allies. Every thing, as usual, was laid on England. It was the incessant ambition, corrupting gold, and Machiavelian policy of those islanders which had so long divided the Continent; the blood and misery of the European powers were the means by which they elevated themselves to greatness, and, amidst universal suffering, engrossed the commerce of the world; the reproaches which they lavished on his ambition were in reality applicable to themselves; the cause of France was the cause of Austria, was the cause of Russia, was the cause of the civilised world; and the real enemy of them all was that perfidious power, which, having nothing in common with European nations but its situation, continually sowed the seeds of dissension on the Continent, and, secure from

138.

Interview of
the Emperor
Francis with
Napoleon.
Dec. 4.

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¹ See this admitted in
Dum. xiv.
214, 216.
Bign. iv. 453.

attack itself, found the principal source of its grandeur in the misfortunes of the states by which it was surrounded. The Emperor Francis was in no condition to enter the lists of controversy with the conqueror of Austerlitz; but he did not forget his own dignity in misfortune, and sullied his character by none of those sallies against his former allies, which Napoleon, with his usual disregard of truth, put into his mouth in the bulletins.¹

139.
Armistice
with Russia.

The conference lasted two hours, after which the two emperors embraced and separated with all the marks of mutual esteem. The conditions had been verbally agreed on, and it was arranged that Presburg should be the seat of the negotiations, and that an armistice should immediately take place at all points. The Emperor of Russia was no party to the conference; but the Emperor of Austria engaged his word of honour for his ally, that he would accept the conditions which were offered, namely, that hostilities should cease between the two armies, and that his troops should retire by slow marches, without further molestation, to their own country.* Savary was sent next day to the Emperor Alexander to invite him to accede to these terms, which were immediately agreed to; and, without requiring any other guarantee than his word, Napoleon immediately stopped the advance of his columns.^{2†} In truth, after the secession of Austria, the war, at least in that quarter, had no longer an object, and the Emperor of Russia justly deemed himself fortunate

² Sav. li. 140,
141. Dum.
xiv. 216, 218.
Bign. iv. 454.

* Though not a party to this conference, the Emperor Alexander derived great benefit from it, in securing the retreat of the troops under his command. Their only means of retreat over the Marche was by the bridge of Goding, which was defended by an Austrian division under General Meerfeldt. Davoust had already commenced his march against that point, and had arrived within little more than a mile of it, at the entrance of a defile where the Austrians had placed their artillery, when Alexander suspended the operations by a note written with his own hand, in which he announced the conference which was going forward between the emperors of France and Germany. Whether Davoust could have gained possession of the bridge at Goding is very doubtful, as, independent of the Austrians, twenty-six thousand Russians were at hand, who would have come up before evening, and fought with the courage of despair.—See SAVARY, ii. 144, 145.

† Savary reached the Emperor of Russia's headquarters at four in the morning of the 5th. He found that monarch already dressed; and he immediately received an audience. "I am very happy to see you again," said Alexander, "on an occasion so glorious for you; that day will take nothing from the reputation which your master has earned in so many battles. It was my first engagement, and I confess that the rapidity of his manœuvres never gave me time to succour the menaced points; every where you were at least double the number of our forces."—"Sire," replied Savary, "your Majesty has been misinformed. Our force, upon the whole, was twenty-five thousand less than yours; and even of that the whole was not very warmly engaged; but we

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in being able to extricate his army without further danger, from its perilous situation. Anxious to conciliate the good-will of so powerful an adversary, Napoleon returned several of the Russian officers who had been made prisoners, without exchange; and Alexander set out two days after, by post, for St Petersburg.

140.
Armistice of
Austerlitz.

On the 6th December an armistice was formally concluded at Austerlitz, by which it was stipulated, that until the conclusion of a general peace, the French should continue to occupy all those portions of Upper and Lower Austria, Tyrol, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Moravia, at present in their possession; that the Russians should evacuate Moravia and Hungary in fifteen days, and Galicia in a month; that all insurrectionary movements in Hungary and Bohemia should be stopped, and no armed force of any other power be permitted to enter the Austrian territories. This latter clause was leveled at the Prussian armaments, and it afforded the cabinet of Berlin a decent pretext for withdrawing from a coalition into which they had entered at so untoward a time. Napoleon issued a proclamation to his troops, in which he spoke with just pride of their great achievements, and awarded a liberal recompense to the wounded, and the widows of those who had fallen in the battle.* At the same time he paraded the Russian prisoners who could be moved from the hospitals, above sixteen thousand in number,¹ in the most ostentatious manner through the

1 Bign. iv.
460. Dum.
xiv. 214, 222.
Sav. ii. 148.

manceuvred much, and the same division combated at many different points in different directions; it was that which apparently multiplied our numbers. Therein lies the art of war; the Emperor, who has seen forty pitched battles, is never wanting in that particular. He is still ready to march against the Archduke Charles, if your Majesty does not, by accepting the armistice, dispose it otherwise."—"What guarantee does your master require?" replied Alexander, "and what security can I have that your troops will not prosecute their movements against me?"—"He asks only your word of honour, and has instructed me, the moment it is given, to suspend the march of Marshal Davoust."—"I give it with pleasure," rejoined the Emperor; "and should it ever be your fortune to come to St Petersburg, I hope I may be able to render my capital agreeable to you."—SAVARY, ii. 142, 143.

* In the bulletin he said, with his usual condensed energy—"Soldiers! I am content with you; you have decorated your eagles with immortal glory: peace cannot now be far removed. When every thing necessary to secure the happiness and prosperity of our country is obtained, I will lead you back to France. My people will again behold you with joy: and it will be enough for one of you to say, 'I was at the battle of Austerlitz,' for all your fellow-citizens to exclaim, 'There is a brave man!'" Liberal donations at the same time were made to all the wounded; the generals received 3000 francs each, and the common soldiers a napoleon each: the pensions to the widows of the generals were 6000 francs, or £240; of the colonels, 2400, or £96; of the common men, 200, or £8 sterling yearly.—See SAVARY, ii. 148; and BIGNON, iv. 560.

streets of Vienna on their road to France, and returned himself to Schœnbrunn to superintend the negotiations about to commence at the town of Presburg.*

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Faithful to the principles which he had sworn to adhere to at the tomb of the Great Frederick, Alexander no sooner found himself delivered from the grasp of his redoubtable adversary, than he sent to Berlin the Grand-duke Constantine and Prince Dolgorucki, offering to place all his forces at the disposal of the Prussian cabinet, if they would vigorously prosecute the war. But the veteran diplomatist to whom the fortunes of Prussia were now committed had very different objects in view, and he was prepared, by an act of matchless perfidy, to put the finishing stroke to that system of tergiversation and deceit by which, for ten years, the conduct of the cabinet of Berlin had been disgraced. Haugwitz, as already mentioned, had come to Vienna to declare war against Napoleon, and the 15th December was the day fixed for the commencement of hostilities; but the battle of Austerlitz totally deranged their plans, and the very day before he was admitted to a second audience of the French Emperor, the armistice had completely detached Austria from the coalition. Nothing was more natural than that so calamitous an event should make a total change in his view of the policy of the war, and the severest morality could not condemn a statesman who sought to withdraw his country from a contest which now appeared hopeless, and in which, from being an accessory, it was likely to be called, without any adequate preparation, to sustain the principal part.¹

141.
Dissimula-
tion of Prus-
sia, and ac-
commodation
with that
power.

i Bign. v. 14,
17. Hard. ix.
14, 28. Sav.
ii. 148, 149.

But not content with this, Haugwitz resolved to go a step further. On the breaking up of the confederacy into which he had just entered, he determined to secure a part of the spoil of his former allies; and, if he could not chase the French standards beyond the Rhine, at least endeavour to wrest from England those continental

142.
Matchless
effrontery and
perfidy of
Prussia.
Dec. 7.

* On his road thither, Napoleon met a large convoy of wounded Austrians on their route for the hospitals of the capital; he immediately descended from his carriage, and uncovering as the waggons passed, while his suite did the same, he said, in a loud voice, "Honour to the brave in misfortune!" So well did this great man know how to win the affections, and command the admiration, of the very soldiers who had lavished their best blood in combating his power.

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possessions which she now appeared in no condition to defend. With matchless effrontery he changed the whole object of his mission ; and when admitted into the presence of Napoleon after the victory, congratulated him upon his success, and proposed a treaty, the basis of which should be the old project of annexing *Hanover to the Prussian dominions* until the conclusion of a peace between France and England. Although Napoleon had not received full accounts of the treaty of 3d November, yet he was aware of its substance, and well acquainted with all the military movements which Prussia had been making in conjunction with the Russian reserve, thirty thousand strong, which had advanced from Warsaw to Breslau. Upon receiving Haugwitz, therefore, he broke out into vehement declamation against the perfidy of the Prussian cabinet; informed him that he was acquainted with all their machinations ; and that it now lay with him alone, after concluding peace with Austria, to turn his whole forces against them ; wrest from them Silesia, whose fortresses, unarmed and unprovisioned, were in no condition to make any defence ; excite an insurrection in Prussian Poland, and punish them in the most signal manner for their abominable perfidy. Reasons of state, however, he added, sometimes compelled sovereigns to bury in oblivion the best founded causes of animosity : on this occasion he was willing to overlook their past misconduct, and ascribe it entirely to the efforts of England ; but this could be only on one condition—that Prussia should at length abandon its doubtful policy, and enter heart and hand into the French alliance. On these terms he was still willing to incorporate Hanover with its dominions, in exchange for some of its detached southern possessions, which were to be ceded to France and Bavaria.¹

Overjoyed at the prospect thus afforded of extricating his country, not only without loss, but with a great accession of territory, from its perilous situation, Haugwitz at once accepted the stipulations : and it was agreed that Prussia should enter into an alliance with France, and receive, besides the margravate of Bareuth, the whole electorate of Hanover in full sovereignty, as

¹ Bign. v. 14,
17. Hard. ix
14, 28. Sav.
ii. 148.

143.
Treaty of alliance with Prussia, which gains Hanover.

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well as all the other continental dominions of his Britannic Majesty ; and, on the other hand, cede to Bavaria the margravate of Anspach, and the principalities of Neufchatel and Clèves to France ; and accede to all the conditions of the general peace of Presburg. A formal treaty to this effect was signed by Haugwitz on December 15, the very day when hostilities were to have commenced. And this treaty the King of Prussia, with disgraceful cupidity, ratified under only a slight modification. Thus the Prussian minister extricated himself, not only without loss, but with apparent advantage, from his perilous situation. But the ultimate effects of this treacherous conduct were in the highest degree disastrous : it excited a just indignation in the government of Great Britain,* without really propitiating that of France : and, by inducing a false security in the cabinet of Berlin, rendered the fall of that power, when it was driven into hostilities in the following year, as irretrievable as, in the estimation of a large part of Europe, it was deserved.^{1†}

Dec. 15.

¹ Hard. ix.
47, 49. Bign.
v. 17, 19.
Sav. ii. 149,
150.

* As this treaty is one of the most disgraceful passages in the history of Prussia, it is due to the many high-minded and honourable men which the cabinet of Berlin contained, and especially to that able statesman and intrepid counsellor, Baron Hardenberg, to say, that it was signed by Haugwitz of his own authority, at Vienna, without the knowledge or concurrence of the government at home : and that so far were they from contemplating the extraordinary turn to the prejudice of England which affairs had taken at Vienna, that, four days after the treaty was signed, a long official note was despatched by Hardenberg to Lord Harrowby, English ambassador at Berlin, in which it was declared that Prussia would regard the entry of French troops into Hanover as a declaration of war, and various arrangements were proposed for the further continuance of the Russian, Swedish, and English troops in the north of Germany. So overwhelmed was Hardenberg with confusion at discovering, six days afterwards, by despatches from Haugwitz, what that minister had agreed to in regard to Hanover at Vienna, that he was led into an angry debate with the French ministers, which, in April following, on the requisition of Napoleon, led to his dismissal from office. Napoleon, with his habitual disregard of truth, some months afterwards published in the *Moniteur* an article, in which he declared that Hardenberg, whom he cordially hated, had written this letter to Lord Harrowby without the authority of the cabinet : and that he had for "base bribes prostituted himself to the eternal enemies of the Continent."² This insinuation M. Bignon, albeit the chosen panegyrist of Napoleon, much to his credit, indignantly repelled : "A party man," says he, "and of an impassioned temperament, M. de Hardenberg was at the same time upright and honourable. That ever since the treaty of 3d November, Napoleon should regard him as the chief of the party hostile to France, and attack him as such, was all fair ; but he had no right to accuse of venality a man far above such a reproach."—See BIGNON, v. 240 ; and HARDENBERG, ix. 30, 42.

Dec. 19.

² See 34th Bulletin, and *Moniteur*, No. 106, for 1806.

† "You have come," said Napoleon to Haugwitz, on his first interview with him after the battle of Austerlitz, "to present your master's compliments on a victory ; but fortune has changed the address of the letter." From that moment, in Napoleon's mind, the ruin of Prussia was resolved on ; but he prudently determined in the mean time to dissemble his resentment, and in the first instance suggest to that power an acquisition of territory, which, by embroiling it irretrievably with England, would sow the seeds of ruin in what still remained of the coalition, and expose it, single and unaided, to the deadly strokes which he already meditated against its existence.—See BIGNON, v. 14.

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144.
Indignation
this treaty
excited at
Berlin.

Great was the general indignation at Berlin when the particulars of this extraordinary treaty were made known. The war party, in particular, with the Queen and Prince Louis at its head, whose patriotic feelings had been roused to the highest pitch by the anticipated accession of Prussia to the European league, were unmeasured in their vituperation at this disgraceful spoliation of Great Britain, at that very moment a friendly and allied power. The question as to the ratification of the treaty was long and anxiously debated in the cabinet: national ambition and cupidity contending with the principles of public faith and a more enlarged view of ultimate expedience. At length Hardenberg and the opposition so far prevailed, that the King, who had hitherto weakly yielded to Haugwitz, and agreed to the spoliation of his ally, was shaken, and the treaty was ratified only under the following reservations:—That Napoleon was to obtain at a general peace a formal cession of Hanover to Prussia, and that till that was done the occupation was to be provisional only: a thin device, totally inadequate to blind the world to the real nature of the transaction. “The conduct of Prussia,” said Mr Fox, then minister for foreign affairs, in his place in parliament, “was a union of every thing that was contemptible in servility with every thing that was odious in rapacity. Other nations have been reduced by the fortune of war to cede many of their provinces; but none except Prussia has been reduced to the lowest stage of degradation, that of being compelled to become the ministers of the rapacity and injustice of a master.”¹

¹ Hard. ix.
50, 59. Bign.
v. 241, 242.
Parl. Deb. vi.
891.

145.
Affairs of
Naples.

To complete the picture of the operations of this memorable year, and render intelligible some important clauses in the treaty of Presburg by which it was concluded, it is only necessary to give a summary of the operations in the south of Italy and the north of Germany, which were contemporaneous with these decisive strokes on the Danube and in the heart of Austria. The court of Naples had entered, somewhat late indeed, but cordially, into the alliance against France. Notwithstanding the treaty of 21st September, already mentioned, by which the neutrality of that power had been stipulated, a combined fleet, having on board ten thousand Russian and three

thousand English troops, cast anchor in the Bay of Naples, and soon after landed without experiencing any opposition. It was anticipated by the allies, what in effect happened, that this act would have the effect of embroiling the Neapolitan court with the French Emperor. Ferdinand, indeed, upon the arrival of this force, published a manifesto, in which he declared his resolution to abide by the treaty of neutrality, and his inability to resist the allied forces; and he publicly engaged in no measure of hostility against France: but his army was put on the war establishment, and placed under the direction of a Russian general. The Queen did every thing in her power to engage the cabinet in the war: the French ambassador, disbelieving, or affecting to disbelieve, the court's professions of neutrality, immediately left Naples in great indignation; and the government, seeing war inevitable, was taking measures for organising a force in the south of Italy, when the battle of Austerlitz came, like a flash of lightning, to deliver them up unprotected to the wrath of the victor.¹

It is probable that the common cause did not suffer materially from the absence of the pusillanimous troops of Naples from the theatre of war; but the case was very different with the forces which had been assembled in the north of Germany. Anxious to strike an important blow in that quarter, but not deeming their strength sufficient to venture on the Continent till the intentions of Prussia were declared, the British government had fitted out a considerable expedition, composed of the King's German legion and a strong body of English troops, amounting altogether to eighteen thousand men, which arrived, in October, in Swedish Pomerania, under the command of General Don and Lord Cathcart. To these were soon after joined a Swedish corps of twelve thousand men, and a Russian force, under Count Ostermann Tolstoy, of ten thousand; and it was the intention of the allies that the united force, of which the King of Sweden was to receive the command, having liberated Hanover, and raised the military force of that electorate, should advance towards Holland, and, after freeing the United Provinces from their chains, threaten the north of France. Many causes conspired to produce the miscar-

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¹ Bot. iv.
198, 199.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 193.
Jom. ii. 198,
199. Bign. v.
35, 37.

146.
And of the
north of
Germany.

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riage of this well-conceived expedition. The vehemence of the King of Sweden could not brook the vacillating conduct of the cabinet of Berlin, and he threatened that power in so unbecoming a manner, that the allies, who at that moment were negotiating to effect the accession of Prussia to the confederacy, were obliged to interfere in order to accommodate matters, upon which he resigned the command and retired to Stralsund. Three weeks were consumed in negotiations to repair the breach ; and when at length he was prevailed on to resume the direction, the period of successful action had passed. It was already the middle of November, and all that this powerful force could effect was to commence the siege of Hameln, when the battle of Austerlitz changed the face of Europe. The immediate effect of that blow, followed as it soon after was by the accession of Prussia to the French league, was to dissolve this heterogeneous armament : the Russians retired to Mecklenburg, the English re-embarked their forces, and the Swedes took shelter under the cannon of Stralsund.¹

¹ *Jom. ii.*
196, 197.
Ann. Reg.
1805, 187,
188.

147.
Peace of
Presburg.
27th Dec.

The negotiations with Austria, dictated by the irresistible power of Napoleon, were not long of being brought to a close. By the peace of Presburg she was in a manner isolated from France, and to appearance rendered incapable of interfering again in the contests of Western Europe. To Bavaria she was compelled to cede the Tyrol and the Inviertel ; to the kingdom of Italy, the whole continental dominions of Venice. The whole changes to the south of the Alps, which had been the original cause of the war, were recognised. The Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg were elevated to the thrones of their respective dominions, with large accessions of territory to each : to the former, besides the Tyrol and Vorarlberg, the principality of Eichstadt, and various lesser lordships in Germany ; to the latter, the five towns of the Danube, part of the Brisgau, and several other fiefs. Baden acquired the remainder of the Brisgau, with the Ortenau and town of Constance. In exchange for so many sacrifices, Austria merely received the small electorate of Salzburg and the possessions of the Teutonic Order, which, from their dispersion in different states, were little more than a nominal acquisition. But what was of still

greater importance, the Emperor Francis was forced to engage, "to throw no obstacles in the way, either as chief of the empire, or as co-sovereign, of any acts which, in their character of sovereigns, the Kings of Wirtemberg or Baden might think proper to adopt,"—a clause which, by providing for the independent authority of their infant kingdoms, virtually dissolved the Germanic empire. The counter-stipulations were entirely illusory: Napoleon guaranteed, jointly with Austria, the independence of the Helvetic Confederacy, which he held in chains; and that of the Batavian Republic, which he already destined as a separate appanage for his brother Louis.¹

Disastrous as these conditions were to the Austrian monarchy, the secret articles contained stipulations still more humiliating. By them it was provided, that Austria was to pay a contribution of forty million francs, or £1,600,000, in addition to nearly an equal sum already levied by the French authorities in the conquered provinces, and the loss of all the military stores and magazines which had fallen into their hands, which were either sent off to France or sold for behoof of that power.* But her government judged wisely that all these losses, how serious soever, might one day be repaired, if the nucleus of the army were preserved entire; and therefore they redeemed, at a heavy ransom, in virtue of permission contained in the secret articles of the treaty, a large por-

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¹ See the Treaty in Martens, viii. 388. Jom. ii. 195. Dum. xiv. 236, and 339, 351.

148:
Secret articles of the treaty.

* The losses of Austria by this treaty were,—

	Population.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
She received	2,975,620	1,417	17,075,000
	271,000	86	2,900,000
Clear loss,	2,704,620	1,331	14,175,000
Bavaria gained	631,000	526	3,490,000
Wirtemberg gained	132,400	53	691,000
Baden gained	143,620	54	508,000
Kingdom of Italy gained	1,856,000	711	10,000,000

Besides this, the sums drawn from Austrian contributions and from the sale of the vast warlike magazines which fell into the hands of the French, amounted to 85,000,000 francs, or £3,500,000. —HARDENBERG, ix. 472; and BIGNON, v. 32.

After this accession of territory, the newly erected states stood as follows:—

	Population.	Army.	Square German Miles.	Revenue in Florins.
Bavaria,	3,250,000	60,000	1,760	21,000,000
Wirtemberg,	1,154,000	20,000	346	8,000,000
Baden,	569,000	10,000	260	6,000,000
But Austria retained,	24,900,000	230,000	10,936	110,000,000

Bavaria by this means was rendered as powerful as Prussia was at the accession of the Great Frederick.—HARDENBERG, ix. 472, 474, *App.* and 23, 24; and *Stat. des Etats Autrichiens, par le Baron LICHTENSTEIN.*

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¹ Hard. ix.
17, 19, 25.
Dum. xiv.
426, 428.

149.
Objects of
Napoleon in
this treaty.

tion of stores and artillery which had become the booty of the victor, and in secret resolved to exert all their efforts to repair in silence the military strength of the monarchy. It is this system, firmly resolved on and steadily executed, which has enabled them to rise superior to all their reverses, which has brought them triumphant through a war of twenty years' duration, and obliterated the effect of a series of defeats which would have prostrated the strength of any other people—a memorable example of the vast effect of perseverance in human affairs, and the manner in which it can not only compensate, in nations equally as individuals, the want of more brilliant acquirements, but obtain the final mastery over the greatest efforts of transitory passion.¹

It is evident, from the statistical details given in the preceding note, that Napoleon had no intention, by the peace of Presburg, of totally overthrowing the Austrian monarchy. He wished only to throw its strength to the eastward, and prevent it from coming in contact with, or feeling jealousy at, his acquisitions in Italy or Germany. He proposed to interpose a barrier of subordinate kingdoms, dependent on France, between his empire and the Hereditary States;—the kingdom of Italy to the south of the Alps, those of Bavaria and Wirtemberg to the north of these mountains. Talleyrand, improving upon this idea, went so far as to propose the cession to Austria of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, as the means of giving them the command of the Danube, inducing them to extend themselves to the eastward, and throwing a perpetual bone of contention between the cabinets of Vienna and St Petersburg; but Napoleon deemed this too hazardous for immediate execution, as precluding all hope of accommodation with Russia, with which he was extremely desirous of concluding a treaty; with a view to turning his undivided force against England.²

² Bign. v. 87.

150.
Dethrone-
ment of the
King of
Naples.

This treaty was immediately followed by a measure hitherto unprecedented in European history—the pronouncing a sentence of dethronement against an independent sovereign, for no other cause than his having contemplated hostilities against the French Emperor. On the 26th December a menacing proclamation proceeded from Presburg, in the 37th bulletin, which evi-

dently bore marks of Napoleon's composition, against the House of Naples. The conqueror announced, that Marshal St Cyr would advance by rapid strides to Naples, "to punish the treason of a criminal queen, and precipitate her from the throne. We have pardoned that infatuated king, who thrice has done every thing to ruin himself. Shall we pardon him a fourth time? Shall we a fourth time trust a court without faith, without honour, without reason?—No! *The dynasty of Naples has ceased to reign*—its existence is incompatible with the repose of Europe and the honour of my crown." St Cyr immediately received orders to march, in order to carry this decree into execution. Such was the first of those sentences of dethronement which Napoleon afterwards pronounced against many of the European monarchs, which substituted his own family for the ancient possessors in so many of the adjoining thrones, and ultimately, by a just retribution, overturned his own.¹

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¹ Bign. v. 34.
Hard. ix. 20.

This extraordinary severity towards a monarch who was only meditating hostilities against the French Emperor, and had certainly done less injury to his dominions than any European dynasty, was one of the most unjustifiable acts of that relentless conqueror, and at the same time descriptive of that mixture of boldness and prudence by which his ambitious enterprises were always regulated. Let the case be put as the French themselves stated it. The ambassador of Naples at Paris, acting under the authority of his cabinet, with the dagger at their throat, and under the threat of immediate invasion, had agreed, on the 21st September, to a treaty of neutrality, which was ratified by the court, under the like menaces, on the 8th October. The arrival of the Russian and English squadron in the Bay of Naples, six weeks afterwards, liberated them from their apprehensions, and the cabinet was preparing to violate the former treaty, and join in the coalition against France. Such a departure from national faith was dishonourable: it was a fair ground for hostility, and might have justified exactions of considerable magnitude; but was it a sufficient reason for dethronement? That is the point; and if it is, what European dynasty has not, fifty times over, justly provoked this severity? How often, on this principle, has

151.
Reflections
on this step.

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Napoleon himself deserved that penalty for having violated solemn treaties, when it suited his own convenience, almost before the ink with which they were signed was dry? And what excuse is to be made for the revolutionary government of France, which so often sent its armies into the adjoining states, to proclaim war to the palace and peace to the cottage, and every where rouse, by its emissaries and proclamations, the democratic authorities to break through all former national engagements, upon the principle that treaties made by despots can never bind the emancipated sons of freedom? But this has in every age been the system of the revolutionary party. None so loud as they are in the condemnation of the principles, when acted on by others, on which their own entire previous conduct had been founded.

152.
Secret views
of Napoleon
in this step.

In fact, however, this unprecedented act of dethroning an independent sovereign, merely because he was making preparations for hostilities contrary to a subsisting treaty, was instigated by a different motive. Already Napoleon had formed the secret design of encircling France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of subsidiary crowns, and of placing on all the neighbouring thrones the members of his own family. He began with Naples, because its inhabitants were the most unwarlike, and therefore the least likely to offer any resistance to the change; and because an unerring instinct led him to regard as enemies every member of the Bourbon family, wherever situated. Subsequent instances of the same rapacious policy will occur in the cases of Holland, Spain, and Prussia. And without a constant reference to this grand object, it is impossible to explain the extraordinary rigour which he uniformly manifested towards the inconsiderable states in his vicinity, and the comparative lenity evinced to the great military monarchies whose hostilities had always been as implacable as they were formidable.

The remaining career of Napoleon during this memorable year was a continued triumphal procession. On the 29th December he announced the conclusion of peace to his soldiers,* and at the same time complimented the

* "Peace has just been signed with the Emperor of Austria. You have in the last autumn made two campaigns—you have seen your Emperor share your dangers and your fatigues—I wish also that you should see him surrounded with the grandeur and splendour which belong to the sovereign of the first

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153.

Napoleon's
return to
Vienna,
Munich, the
Rhine, and
Paris.

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burgher guard of Vienna on their exemplary conduct during the occupation of their capital by his troops, and as a mark of his esteem, restored to them the city arsenal, containing, besides its arms, a number of standards taken in the wars with the Turks. He could well afford to be generous; the public arsenal had yielded to him two thousand pieces of cannon, which were already far advanced on their road to France. He arrived at Munich on the 31st December; and on the day following appeared the proclamation in which he announced to the enraptured inhabitants the elevation of the Elector to the royal dignity. There also he was met by the Empress Josephine: a succession of fêtes of unprecedented splendour succeeded, in the course of which Eugene Beauharnais, as the deserved reward of valour, probity, and glory, received the hand of the Princess Augusta, daughter of the King of Bavaria. At the same time the grandson of the Elector of Baden was married to Stephanie Beauharnais, adopted daughter of the French Emperor. On this occasion Napoleon, in default of his own lawful issue, called Eugene Beauharnais to the succession of the throne of Italy. The formation of a common system of conglomeration was at the same time announced to the senate in these terms: "We reserve to ourselves the power to make known by ulterior dispositions the bonds which we propose to establish, *after our own demise*, between all the states in alliance with the French empire which, as depending on a common interest, absolutely require a common tie." Finally, a hundred days after the army had crossed the Rhine at Strasburg, the Emperor recrossed that river at the same place, and proceeded by rapid journeys, under triumphal arches, amidst applauding multitudes, to Paris, where he arrived on the 25th January. A hundred days! unparalleled in the past history of Europe for the magnitude and splendour of the events which they embraced; during which had occurred the capitulation of Ulm, the triumph of Austerlitz, the shock of Trafalgar:¹ but destined to be

¹ Bign. v.
39, 53.
Dum. xiv.
237, 239.

people in the universe. You shall all be there—we will celebrate the memory of those who have died in these two campaigns on the field of honour—the world shall ever see us ready to follow their example, or to do even more than we have hitherto accomplished, if necessary, to vindicate our national honour, to resist the efforts of those who give way to the seductions of the eternal enemies of the Continent." Almost before the cannon of Austerlitz had ceased to sound, Napoleon was contemplating a Prussian war.—BIGNON, v. 41.

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154.
Reflections
on the cam-
paign.

eclipsed by another hundred days, in future times, fraught with still more momentous occurrences, the recollection of which will endure till time itself shall be no more.*

The campaign of Austerlitz is the most remarkable, in a military point of view, which the history of the war afforded. In no other year were events of such magnitude crowded together, nor had achievements so vast rewarded the combinations of genius. When we recollect that in the beginning of August the French army was still cantoned on the heights of Boulogne, and that by the first week of December Vienna was taken, and the strength of Austria and Russia finally prostrated in the heart of Moravia, we are lost in astonishment at the magnitude of the successes gained, and the celerity with which ruin was brought on the coalesced powers. The march across France and Germany, the enveloping of Mack, the advance to Vienna, the thunderbolt of Austerlitz, were all concluded in four months! In the first division of the war, Austria struggled for six years in doubtful hostility against the Republic: in the second, she brought it to the brink of ruin, and yielded only, after a desperate strife of four years, to the ardent genius of Napoleon, and the scientific combinations of Moreau: but in the third she was utterly prostrated, though supported by all the might of Russia, under Alexander in person, in two months after her troops first came into collision with those of France! The extent of these triumphs, great as it is, is less surprising than its celerity; and we are naturally led to ask where, in these disastrous days, were the heroes who so long arrested the arms of Napoleon under the walls of Mantua, and drove the troops of the Directory, at the point of the bayonet, from the banks of the Adige to the shores of the Var? Blunders undoubtedly were committed; misfortunes occurred; but they were not peculiar to this season or this campaign; and in the long records of Imperial fatuity, parallels are not wanting to the advance to Ulm or the flank march of Austerlitz. What was it, then, which made those false steps for the first time in European history irretrievable,

* The public authorities had prepared a magnificent reception for Napoleon; but he disappointed them by entering Paris in the night, unattended by any escort. He had previously sent the forty-five standards taken at Austerlitz to the senate, who deposited them with extraordinary pomp in the halls of the Luxembourg.—JOMINI, ii. 209.

and rendered errors in tactics the cause, not of the loss of towns or the retreat of armies, but the overthrow of empires, and the dissolution of confederacies ?

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This astonishing result was doubtless, in some degree, owing to the French Emperor having now for the first time chosen as the theatre of war the valley of the Danube, the natural avenue to the Hereditary States, the line where neither fortresses nor mountains impeded his march, but a great navigable river constantly furnished the means of transport and supplies to his army. In former wars, the contest lay in corners of the empire ; in the plains of Flanders, among the fortresses of Italy, or the ridges of the Alps ; and a disaster, however great, led only to the loss of the immediate theatre of combat. But in the present, all these minor objects were relinquished, and the main strength of the invader was concentrated in the direct road from Paris to Vienna. By a singular infatuation, with which the Archduke Charles is no ways chargeable, as he had clearly pointed out the danger, the Aulic Council had left this wide avenue totally defenceless ; and while they sent the bulk of their forces, under their best commanders, to the Italian plains, on which side the empire was already protected by the fortified line of the Adige and the ridges of the Alps, they intrusted the defence of the shores of the Danube, though threatened by Napoleon in person, to an inferior army, under the guidance of an inexperienced leader. The ruinous effects of this error were perceived, not only in the magnitude of the disasters which were incurred, but in the irretrievable consequences with which they were attended. Like a skilful player at chess, Napoleon struck at the heart of his adversaries' power while they were accumulating forces round his extremities : and when he held Vienna in his grasp, and struck them to the earth at Austerlitz, the army of the Archduke Charles, equal in numbers to his own, was uselessly employed in traversing the defiles of the Rhætian Alps.

155.
Importance
of the valley
of the Danube
as the theatre
of contest
between
France and
Austria.

This extraordinary success, however, was not gained without proportionate risk ; and it was evident, even to the most superficial observer, that the imprudence of the allies in giving battle at Austerlitz had extricated Napoleon from the most perilous situation in which he had stood

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156.
Dangers of
Napoleon's
position be-
fore the
battle.

since the commencement of his career. At Marengo, Italy only was at stake, and his retreat, in case of disaster, was opened by the St Gothard and the St Bernard: at Campo Formio, the principal army of France was still unengaged, and Moreau with a vast force was preparing to advance to his support through southern Germany. But before the battle of Austerlitz his last reserves had arrived: the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand men, was menacing one flank, while Prussia, with an equal force, was preparing to descend upon another, and the Emperor of Russia was in his front with a host hourly increasing and already nearly equal to his own. Delay in such circumstances was ruin: advance with such arrays in his rear was impossible: retreat was the first step to perdition. Vast as the forces of France were at the commencement of the campaign, they were fairly overmatched by the banded strength of Europe: great as the talents of Napoleon were, his daring stroke at the vitals of his enemies had brought him into a situation from whence extrication, save by their imprudence, was impossible. They had nothing to do but retreat towards Poland or Hungary, and the invader must, to all human appearance, have been enveloped and destroyed. To hazard a battle when such chances were accumulating against him, after the experience they had had of the prowess of his troops, appears such an act of imprudence, that one is almost tempted to believe that Providence, as part of its great design for the government of human affairs, had struck the allied chiefs with judicial blindness, in order that the mighty drama might end in a deeper tragedy—a still more righteous and moral retribution.

157.
Vast growth
of the mili-
tary power of
France since
the peace.

But though this rapid advance to the heart of the empire was one of the immediate causes of the extraordinary conquests of the French Emperor, yet it was by no means the principal: and though perhaps his triumphs might not have been so rapid, the result would probably have been the same under a more cautious system, although he had chosen any other theatre for the contest. It was the astonishing increase in the military power of France during the five years which had elapsed since the termination of hostilities, which was the principal cause of the rapid overthrow of the Austrian power. Napoleon poured down

the valley of the Danube with a hundred and eighty thousand men, while Massena held the Archduke Charles in check in Italy with twice the numbers which fought the battle of Marengo. Forces so vast had never before been brought into action at any period of the war: nor was this display merely an ephemeral effort: it was from an armed body of six hundred thousand men * that France maintained the contest, and she was capable of keeping them on foot for an indefinite period. It was at once evident upon the commencement of hostilities, that her military power had increased more during five years of peace than nine of previous warfare: and that Austria, nearly a match single-handed for her ancient rival when she laid down her arms, was totally unequal to the contest when she resumed them.

This great change is one of the most remarkable transitions of the war, and more descriptive than any other which occurred, of that profound and unceasing system of military aggrandisement which formed the leading feature in the foreign policy of Napoleon. When he sheathed his victorious sword at the peace of Luneville, moderation and equity breathed in all his proclamations, and he professed the most anxious desire to cultivate only the arts of peace. But in the midst of these professions, and while the Continent was in a state of profound tranquillity, he was silently but incessantly augmenting his warlike resources, increasing his levies, disciplining his forces, new-modelling his army, incorporating all lesser states with his dominions; and the fruit of these perpetual pacific advances appeared in the most decisive manner on the resumption of hostilities, when he was enabled at once to beat down powers which had previously waged a long and doubtful war with the Republic. It was on this principle that his conduct was invariably founded;

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158.

Similar growth during peace characterised all the reign of Napoleon.

* Strength of the French army in August 1805.

Troops of the line,	341,000 men.
Light infantry,	100,130
Light horse,	60,554
Heavy horse, or of the line,	16,944
Artillery,	46,489
Engineers,	900
Gendarmerie,	15,691
Imperial guard,	8,500

Besides the Coast-guard, 100,000 strong, 590,208

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every suspension of warfare was employed only in the preparation of additional military forces, or in the annexation of some minor state to his dominions; and he never appeared so terrible as when he first came to a rupture with the powers with whom he had contracted the closest alliances, and been longest on terms of the greatest apparent cordiality. Five years of continental peace followed the treaty of Luneville; but a hundred and eighty thousand men sprang up, as if by enchantment, to follow the standards of Napoleon on its termination. Ten years of neutrality or alliance with the cabinet of Berlin ensued after the treaty of Bâle: but at one blow he struck the Prussian monarchy to the earth, when at last she took up arms. For twelve years Spain laid her treasures and resources at his feet; but he rewarded that fidelity by the dethronement of her sovereign and the seizure of her dominions. He professed eternal friendship to Alexander at Tilsit; but during the five years of alliance which followed, he was preparing the five hundred thousand warriors whom he afterwards led to the Kremlin.

159:
Justification
which this
affords of the
British policy
during the
war.

It is the perception of this undeviating policy, and of the enormous additions which every interval of peace made to his warlike strength, which forms the true and unanswerable vindication of the conduct of the British cabinet throughout the struggle. That he had from the very first marked out England for destruction, he has told us himself, and proved by every part of his conduct. To what advantage he could turn the shortest breathing-time in warfare, even on that element where his power was weakest, is demonstrated by the vast increase which was shown to have taken place in the French marine on the breaking out of hostilities—an increase which, compared with its situation at the peace of Amiens, is a more signal instance of warlike resurrection than even the victories of Ulm and Austerlitz. Had any one predicted in 1800 that, before five years had elapsed, Napoleon was to have the means of assembling seventy sail of the line in the Channel, and actually to combat Nelson with a force superior to the greatest fleet England could fit out, he would have been deemed much less worthy of credit, than if he had foretold that at the same period Austria was to be prostrated in a single campaign.

Peace was impossible with an enemy actuated by such a principle, and capable of turning to such account every intermission of war: and the result has abundantly proved the justice of these views. For while the military strength of France arose more terrible after every pacification on the Continent of Europe, her naval power, thus wonderfully recruited during the peace of Amiens, never recovered the unbroken warfare which followed the disaster of Trafalgar.

Doubtless the abilities displayed by Napoleon during this campaign were of the very highest order. The secrecy and rapidity of the march of so vast a body of troops across France; the semicircular sweep by which they interposed between Mack and the Hereditary States, and compelled the surrender of that unhappy chief with half his army: the precision with which nearly two hundred thousand men, converging from the shores of the Channel, the coasts of Brest, the marshes of Holland, and the banks of the Elbe, were made to arrive each at the hour appointed around the ramparts of Ulm; the swift advance on Vienna; the subsequent fanlike dispersion of the army to overawe the Hereditary States; their sudden concentration for the decisive fight at Austerlitz; the skill displayed in that contest itself, and the admirable account to which he turned the fatal cross march of the allied sovereigns, are so many proofs of military ability never exceeded even in the annals of his previous triumphs. At the same time, it is not to be imagined that the difference in the magnitude of the results which were obtained is to be considered as the measure of the talent displayed in this as compared with other campaigns. It was the immensity of the force now at the disposal of the French Emperor, and the incomparable discipline and organisation which it had obtained while encamped on the shores of the Channel, which was the principal cause of the difference. It is no longer a general supplying by consummate talents, as at Arcola and Rivoli, for deficiency of numbers, that we see maintaining a long, doubtful, and desperate strife; we behold a mighty conqueror, whose power was irresistible, sweeping over the earth with the fierce tempest of Scythian war. In the results of this campaign were evinced more than the military talents of

160.
Great abilities displayed by Napoleon in the arrangements for this campaign.

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the general; the previous preparations of the emperor, the deeply matured combinations of the statesman, produced their natural results. He did not now take the field with a force which left any thing to chance; he appeared with such a host as almost made him the master of fate; and the fruit of five years' pacific preparation appeared in the reduction of the contest to a desperate strife of a few months' duration.

161.
Errors of the
Allies.

Great, however, as were the abilities, and unbounded the resources of the French Emperor in this memorable campaign, it was not to them alone that he was indebted for its unparalleled triumphs. The errors of the Austrians, the infatuation of the allied cabinets, had their full share in the general result. Untaught by the disasters of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the Aulic Council rushed inconsiderately into the field; and, leaving the Archduke Charles with eighty thousand in Italy, to combat an inconsiderable enemy, they exposed Mack, with an inferior force, to the shock of Napoleon at the head of a hundred and eighty thousand men, in the valley of the Danube. When that ill-fated commander found himself cut off from his line of communication with Vienna by the interposition of Bernadotte in his rear, instead of instantly taking a decisive part, and falling with his whole forces upon the enemy behind him, or retiring by the only road which was yet open to the mountains of the Tyrol, he remained for ten days paralysed at Ulm, sending out detachments, first in one direction, then in another, all of which met with superior forces and were defeated; thereby both breaking down the spirit of his own troops, and giving the invader time to envelop with his immense masses their fortified position. In vain had the foresight of the Archduke Charles, at the close of the preceding war, surrounded the heights of Ulm with a vast intrenched camp, capable of bidding defiance to, and stopping the advance of, the greatest invading force: the improvidence of the Aulic Council, by providing no magazines within its walls, had rendered these preparations of no avail; and Mack found himself, after a week's blockade, reduced to the necessity of feeding on horse-flesh, and ultimately capitulating, with thirty thousand of the best troops of the monarchy.

When the rapid advance of Napoleon towards Vienna

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162.

And of the
Aulic Council
at Vienna.

threatened to separate the Russian forces from the retreating columns of the Archduke Charles, and every thing depended on the destruction of the bridge of the capital, the credulous simplicity of the officer in command at that important station delivered it unscathed into Napoleon's hands, and gave him the means of interposing safely between their converging armies, and striking tremendous blows from his central position, first on the one bank and then on the other. When the Allies were reduced to their last throw on the plains of Moravia; when every thing counselled a cautious policy, and forces capable of annihilating the invaders were accumulating on all sides; when the Archduke Charles, with eighty thousand undiscouraged veterans, was within sight of the steeples of Vienna, and Prussia, with a hundred thousand men, was preparing to descend upon the Danube; when, by simply retreating and drawing the enemy on, with such formidable armies in his rear, the allies must inevitably have led him to destruction or driven him to a disastrous retreat, their ill-judged confidence impelled them prematurely into action, and their rash flank march, in presence of such a general and such an army, enabled him to gain a decisive victory when on the verge of destruction.*

But most of all is Prussia answerable for the disasters of this campaign. She was clearly warned of her danger: Mr Pitt had prefigured it to her in colours brighter than the light. The violation of the territory of Anspach had demonstrated in what manner she was regarded by the conqueror; that he contemned her menaces, despised her

163.

Ruinous effects of the indecision of Prussia.

* In a memoir presented to the British government by the cabinet of Vienna, after the peace of Presburg, the disasters of the campaign were ascribed,—1. To the failure on the part of the allied powers to realise, in the north of Germany, those promised diversions which might have prevented Napoleon from accumulating his whole force in that country, and especially that in the electorate of Hanover, against the Austrian forces on the Danube. 2. To the unexpected violation of the territory of Anspach, which compelled the Austrian army either to fall back upon the Inn, or see itself cut off from its base of operations. 3. To the fault of General Mack, who, instead of adopting the former alternative, and retiring to form a junction with Kutusoff in the Hereditary States, remained immovable on the Iller till he was surrounded by superior forces. 4. To the delay experienced in the march of the second Russian army, for the purpose of watching the preparations of Prussia, which, until her intentions were fixed by the Emperor Alexander in person, detained it above a month in observation on the Polish frontier. 5. To the negligence of Prince Auersberg in not destroying the bridge over the Danube at Vienna, which at once gave the French the command of both banks, and exposed Kutusoff to imminent danger of being cut off and destroyed before he could effect a junction with the reserves under Buxhowden.—See HARD. viii. 511.

There can be no doubt that these causes all conspired to bring about the

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power, and reserved for her only the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. Then was the time to have taken a decisive part—then was the moment to have made amends for the vacillation of ten years, and, by a cordial union with Austria and Russia, put a final stop to the progress of the enemy. No one can doubt that, if she had done so, such would have been the result. A simple declaration of war would have arrested the decisive march of Bernadotte into the rear of Mack; allowed time for his army to have retired to the Inn; permitted the Russians to join the unbroken strength of the Austrian monarchy; and compelled Napoleon, instead of a menacing offensive with superior, to have commenced a cautious defensive with inferior forces. When the boundless calamities which such a determination would, to all human appearance, have prevented to Europe are considered, it is impossible not to be filled with the most poignant regret at the temporising policy which occasioned their continuance, or to avoid the feeling, that as to Prussia more than any other power these misfortunes had been owing, so it was a most righteous dispensation which made them fall more heavily on her than on any of the states which had bravely struggled to avert them. Well might Napoleon say with the Roman annalist—*“Nec aliud adversus validissimas gentes pro nobis utilius, quam quod in commune non consulunt. Rarus duabus tribusve civitatibus ad propulsandum commune periculum conventus: ita, dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur.”**

In fact, the forces which Mr Pitt had now arrayed for

enormous calamities of the campaign. But, without disputing their influence, and fully admitting the ruinous effects of the indecision of Mack, and the want of foresight of the Aulic Council in not having provided adequate magazines either at Ulm or in Moravia, it must yet, in common fairness, be admitted, that Prussia and England had an equal share in bringing about the common calamities. The vacillation of the former power from the first paralysed both Russia and England: the former by detaining those forces long in Poland which, earlier advanced, might have changed the fate of the campaign; the latter by preventing, from the dread of irritating so weighty a power, those important operations in the north of Germany, which would so materially have relieved the overwhelming pressure of Napoleon on the Danube. Hanover was the ill-gotten spoil which at that critical moment tied up the hands of Prussia, and brought on her the catastrophe of Jena and Tilsit.

* “Nor has any thing been more advantageous to us, in combating the most powerful nations, than that they adopt no common measures. It is rare to see an alliance between two or three states to avert a common danger: thus, as they engage singly, they are all conquered.”—TACITUS, *Agricola*, 12.

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164.

Ability displayed by Mr Pitt in the formation of this confederacy.

this last and decisive struggle against France were of the most formidable description ; and the success with which he had triumphed over all the jealousies of the European powers is the brightest page in his diplomatic career. After repeated failures, the great work was at length accomplished : the continental sovereigns were united in a cordial league to stop the progress of the conqueror, and armies fully adequate to the task were assembled at their command. Disaster had at last taught them wisdom ; the presence of a common danger had at that moment at least extinguished their jealousies. For the first time since the commencement of the war, Austria and Prussia stood forth, backed by Russia, for the fight, and five hundred thousand veterans, led by their sovereigns in person, were prepared to roll back to the Rhine the tide of Gallic invasion. The principles of the coalition were as just as its forces were immense ; and the powers who had suffered so much from French ambition, were bound by a secret compact neither to attempt any conquest on its original territory, nor interfere in the internal frame of its government.* Restitution of what it had reft from others, security against its aggressions in future, alone were to be insisted on.

To say that this great and equitable confederacy was unsuccessful—that its fortunes were shaken at Ulm, thrown down at Austerlitz—is no impeachment whatever, either of the justice of its principles or the wisdom of its general combinations. Mr Pitt necessarily intrusted the execution of its details to the allied sovereigns or their generals ; and it was by them that the fatal errors were committed. No foresight on his part could have prevented the inconsiderate advance to Ulm, or the ruinous cross march at Austerlitz—no efforts that he could make, and he spared none, were able to bring Prussia at the critical moment into the field. The vulgar, in all ages, are governed merely by the result, and award praise or censure according as victory is won or lost ; but it is the noblest province and first duty of history to separate the accidental from the intrinsic, in estimating the merits of human conduct. Judging by this standard, it will give

165.

Its failure is no impeachment of the justice of his principles.

* See note, 11th January 1805, Mr Pitt to Russian ambassador.—Appendix A, Chap. xxxix.

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the highest praise in diplomatic ability to Mr Pitt for the formation of this confederacy, and the extinction of the jealousies on all sides which had so long hindered its construction; and disregard, in the estimate of that merit, its calamitous result, as much as, in weighing the military greatness of Napoleon, it will overlook the disastrous issue of his later campaigns, and award to him a higher place for his immortal conflict with superior forces in the plains of Champagne, than when triumphing on the heights of Austerlitz, or striking down the Prussian monarchy on the field of Jena.

166.
Error of Mr
Pitt's in this
matter.

¹ Hard. viii.
512.

But though great in diplomacy and finance, Mr Pitt was little skilled in military combinations. A more vigorous warlike policy at that period, such as Mr Burke had, from the first, strenuously recommended, might have averted the whole disasters of the war. England also must take her share of the common responsibility, not only in having, in conjunction with Russia, suggested the unhappy appointment of Mack to the command,¹ but also, by abstaining from all continental hostilities till the campaign was decided, having permitted that accumulation of force by which he was overwhelmed. Great Britain, secure in her sea-girt citadel, had then five hundred thousand men in arms. Had she despatched eighty thousand of this vast force early in the campaign to a decisive point: had her troops marched to the shores of Kent when the legions of Napoleon broke up from the heights of Boulogne for the Rhine, and boldly attacked the enemy in Flanders, the march of the troops which cut off the retreat of Mack would have been prevented; and Prussia would probably have been determined, by such a demonstration, to have thrown her weight into the scale in time to prevent the subjugation of Europe.

167.
His last illness and
death.

The dissolution of the great confederacy, which he had so long laboured to construct, and from which he confidently expected such important results, was fatal, however, to the master-spirit which had formed it. The constitution of Mr Pitt, long weakened by the fatigues and the excitement incident to his situation, sank at length under anguish occasioned by the dissolution of the confederacy. In vain he tried the waters of Bath; in vain he retired for a while from the fatigues of office: his con-

stitution was worn out by the labours, the anxiety, and the excitement which have proved fatal to so many parliamentary leaders, and, while yet hardly advanced beyond middle life, he already felt the weakness of age. Upon a frame thus enfeebled, the disappointment and anguish arising from the prostration of the last hopes of European freedom by the defeat of Austerlitz, fell with overpowering force. From the time the disastrous news was received he hourly declined, and political distress accelerated an event already approaching from natural causes. A devouring fever seized his blood—delirium quenched the fire of genius. In the intervals of rest, however, his thoughts were still riveted upon the fortunes of his country. After a melancholy survey of the map of Europe, he turned away, saying, "Henceforth we may close that map for half a century!" so little could the greatest intellect anticipate that general resurrection of the principles of freedom which even then was beginning, and which his own efforts had so largely contributed to produce. At the close of a lingering illness, which he bore with the wonted fortitude of his character, he expired at his house in London, on the 23d January 1806, exclaiming with his last breath, "Alas! my country!" not less the victim of devotion to patriotic duty than if he had been pierced through the heart on the field of battle.¹

Thus perished, at the age of forty-seven, while still in the zenith of his intellectual powers, William Pitt. He was born on the 28th May 1759, and early distinguished himself by his ardent zeal and uncommon proficiency in the classical languages and mathematical studies, as well as by the quickness of his wit and repartee in society. The name of his father, the great Earl of Chatham, soon procured for him a favourable introduction to parliament; and at the age of twenty-two he made his first entrance into public life as member for the borough of Appleby, in January 1781. From the very first his powers of speaking were so remarkable, that he took his place as if it had been set apart for him as a leader of the old Whig party, to which his father had belonged. On the rupture of George the Third with the coalition ministry in 1784,² the sovereign turned to him as the only man in the country capable of contending with the formidable

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¹ Gifford's Pitt, iii. 347. 360. Ann. Reg. 1806, 13, 14.

168. His early life, education, and first entrance into public life.

² Tomline's Life of Pitt. i. 1, 39. *Ante*, chap. ix. §§ 34-37.

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majority which Mr Fox and Lord North then directed in parliament; and the ultimate success which his talent and intrepidity won for him in that contest gave him the undisputed command of government, which continued almost without interruption till the time of his death, two-and-twenty years after.

169.
Character of
Mr Pitt, and
his mighty
achievements.

Considered with reference to the general principles by which his conduct was regulated, and the constancy with which he maintained them through adverse fortune, the history of Europe has not so great a statesman to exhibit. Called into action at the most critical and eventful period in the annals, not merely of his country, but of modern times, he firmly and nobly fulfilled his destiny: placed in the vanguard of the conflict between ancient freedom and modern democracy, he maintained his ground from first to last, under circumstances the most adverse, with unconquerable resolution. If the coalitions which he formed were repeatedly dissolved; if the projects which he cherished were frequently unfortunate, the genius which had planned, the firmness which had executed them, were never subdued; and from every disaster he arose only greater and more powerful, till exhausted nature sank under the struggle. If the calamities which befell Europe during his administration were great, the advantages which accrued to his own country were unbounded; and before he was called from the helm, he had not merely seen its independence secured by the battle of Trafalgar, but its power and influence raised to the very highest pitch, by an unprecedented series of maritime successes. Victories unexampled in the annals of naval glory attended every period of his career. In the midst of a desperate strife in Europe, he extended the colonial empire of England into every quarter of the globe; and when the continental nations thought all the energies of his country were concentrated on the struggle with Napoleon, he found means to stretch his mighty arms into another hemisphere, strike down the throne of Tippoo Saib in the heart of Hindostan, and extend the British dominion over the wide expanse of the Indian Peninsula. Under his administration, the revenue, trade, and manufactures of England were doubled, its colonies and political strength quadrupled;

and he raised an island in the Atlantic, once only a remote province of the Roman empire, to such a pitch of grandeur as to be enabled to bid defiance to the world in arms.

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But these external successes, great as they were, were but a part of the lasting benefits of Mr Pitt's government. It was the interior which was the scene of his real greatness; there the durable monuments of his intellect are to be seen. Inheriting from his father, the great Lord Chatham, a sincere love of freedom; early imbued with liberal principles; the strenuous supporter of a relaxation of the fetters of trade, financial improvement, Catholic emancipation, and such a practical and equitable system of parliamentary reform as promised to correct the inequalities complained of, without injustice to individuals or danger to the state, he was at the same time as fully alive to the extreme risk of legislating precipitately on such vital subjects, or permitting democratic ambition, under the name of a desire of improvement, to agitate the public mind at a hazardous time by attempts to remodel the institution of society. In the first instance, therefore, he was rather favourable to the French Revolution, and, unlike Mr Burke, yielded a cold and reluctant assent to those who proclaimed its dangers. He resolutely adhered to his pacific policy as long as it was possible for him to do so; and it was truly said at the time, by those who knew him best, that "he was dragged into the contest with as much reluctance as a man of conscientious principles into a duel."¹

170.
Principles of
his domestic
administra-
tion.

¹ Wilber-
force's Life,
ii. 172, 417.

But when once forced into the conflict, he espoused it with all the ardour of his character. No sooner, therefore, did the French Revolution become ungovernable, and it had become evident that a general social convulsion was designed, than he threw the weight of his influence into the opposite scale. Though an advocate for a strict neutrality, till the murder of the king had thrown down the gauntlet to every established government, he then espoused it with the whole ardour and perseverance of his character, and became the soul of all the confederacies which, during the remainder of his life, were framed to oppose a barrier to the diffusion of its principles and the ravages of its armies. The steady

171.
How he was
first drawn
into the war.

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friend of freedom, he was on that very account the resolute opponent of democracy—the deadly, because the unsuspected enemy by whose triumphs, in every age, its principles have been subverted, and its blessings destroyed. When the greatest intellects in Europe were reeling under the shock, when the ardent and philanthropic were every where rejoicing in the prospects of boundless felicity which the regeneration of society was supposed to be opening, when Mr Fox was pronouncing the revolutionary constitution of France “the most stupendous monument of political wisdom and integrity ever yet raised on the basis of public virtue in any age or country,” his superior sagacity, though only after that of Burke, beheld amid the deceitful blaze the small black cloud which was to cover the world with darkness.

172.
He became
the great
champion
against the
French Rev-
olution.

Watching with incessant vigilance the changeful forms of the Jacobin spirit, ever unravelling its sophistry, detecting its perfidy, unveiling its oppression, he thenceforth directed the gigantic energies of his mind towards the construction of a barrier which might restrain its excesses: and if he could not prevent it from bathing France in blood, and ravaging Europe with war, he at least effectually opposed its entrance into the British dominions. With admirable foresight he there established a system of finance adequate to the emergency, and which proved the mainspring of the continued, and at length successful resistance which was opposed to revolutionary ambition: * with indomitable perseverance he rose superior to every disaster, and incessantly laboured to frame, out of the discordant and selfish cabinets of Europe, a cordial league for their common defence. Next to Burke, he alone of all the statesmen of his age, from a comparatively early period appreciated the full extent of the danger, both to the independence of nations and the liberty of mankind, which was threatened by the spread of democratic principles: and continually inculcated the necessity of relinquishing every minor object, to unite in guarding against the advances of this new and tremendous enemy. And the event has abundantly proved the justice of these principles; for

* See Chap. XLI. “On the British Finances.”

while liberty perished in a few months in France, amidst the fervour of revolutionary ambition, it steadily grew and flourished in the British empire; and the forty years which immediately followed the commencement of his resistance to democratic ambition, have proved not only the most glorious, but the freest of its existence.

Chateaubriand has said, "That while all other contemporary reputations, even that of Napoleon, are on the decline, the fame of Mr Pitt alone is continually increasing, and seems to derive fresh lustre from every vicissitude of fortune." It is not merely the greatness and the constancy of the British statesman which has drawn forth this magnificent eulogium; it is the demonstration which subsequent events have afforded of the justice of his principles, which is the real cause of the steady growth and enduring stability of his fame. Without the despotism of Napoleon, the freedom of the Restoration, the revolt of the Barricades, and the military government of Louis Philippe, his reputation would have been incomplete in foreign transactions; without the great organic change of 1832, and the subsequent experience of democratic influence in Great Britain, his worth would never have been appreciated in domestic government. Every hour, abroad and at home, is now illustrating the truth of his principles. He was formerly admired by a party in England as the champion of aristocratic rights; he is now looked back to by the nation as the last steady asserter of general freedom. His doctrines were formerly prevalent chiefly among the great and affluent: they are now embraced by the generous, the thoughtful, the unprejudiced of every rank; by all who regard passing events with the eye of historic inquiry, or are attached to liberty as the birthright of the human race, not the means of elevating a party to absolute power. To his speeches we now turn as to a voice issuing from the tomb, fraught with prophetic warnings of future disaster. It is contrast which gives brightness to the colours of history; it is experience which brings conviction to the cold lessons of political wisdom. Many and eloquent have been the eulogiums pronounced on Mr Pitt's memory; but all panegyrics are lifeless compared to that furnished by Earl Grey's administration.

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1805.

174.

Erroneous
views of for-
eign writers
on his de-
signs.

Foreign writers of almost every description have fallen into a signal mistake in estimating the policy of this great statesman. They all represent him as governed by an ardent ambition to elevate his own country—the mortal enemy, on that account, of the French nation—and as influenced through life by a Machiavelian desire to promote the confusion and misery of the Continent, in order that England might thereby engross the commerce of the world. There never was a more erroneous opinion. For the first ten years of his political life, Mr Pitt was not only noways hostile to France, but its steadfast friend. So far from being actuated by a commercial jealousy of that country, he had embraced the generous maxim of Mr Smith's philosophy, that the prosperity of every state is mainly dependent on the prosperity of those which surround it.* Had he been influenced by the malevolent designs which they suppose, he would not have adhered to a strict neutrality when France was pierced to the heart in 1792; but, before the revolutionary levies were completed, have raised the standard to avenge the interference of its government in the American war. He was to the

* In the debate on the Treaty of Commerce with France, on February 12, 1787, Mr Fox said, "France is the *natural enemy of Great Britain*; and she now wishes, by entering into a commercial treaty with us, to tie up our hands and prevent us from engaging in alliances with other powers. All the most glorious periods of our history have been when in hostility, all the most disgraceful when in alliance with that power. It is the disgrace of the Tories that they have interfered to stop these glorious successes. This country should never, on any account, enter into too close an alliance with France; the true situation is the bulwark of the oppressed whom that ambitious power has attacked."

"The honourable gentleman has said," observed Mr Pitt, "that France is the natural enemy of England: I repudiate the sentiment. I see no reason whatever why two great and powerful nations should always be in a state of hostility merely because they are neighbours; on the contrary, I think their prosperity is mutually dependent on each other, and as a British subject, not less than a citizen of the world, I entertain the sincerest wish for the prosperity and happiness of that great country. To suppose that one nation is unalterably the enemy of another nation is weak and childish; having no foundation in the experience of nations, it is a libel on the constitution of human societies, and supposes the existence of diabolical malice in the original frame of man."¹ Nor were these sentiments merely uttered in the heat of debate; they were carried into effect in every great and important legislative measure; and this statesman, whom the continental writers represent as the eternal inveterate enemy of France, concluded a commercial treaty between that country and Great Britain, which in liberality far surpasses any thing ever proposed by the warmest modern advocates of free trade. It stipulated "a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each party in all the kingdoms of Europe." The wines of France were to obtain admission on the same terms as those of Portugal; their brandy on paying a duty of seven shillings a gallon; their oil on the same terms as that of the most favoured nation; their hardware, cutlery, and iron work on a duty *ad valorem* of ten per cent! So wide is the common opinion as to the principles of this great statesman from the truth!—See the Treaty in *Parl. Hist.* xxvi. 234-240.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 392, 402.

last degree unwilling to engage in the war with France : he engaged in it with a reluctance, which all the horrors of the Revolution were hardly able to dispel. Ample evidence of this has now been obtained from the best informed memoirs of the period which have been recently published, particularly those of Lord Malmesbury and Mr Wilberforce. It was not against France, but *Republican* France, that his hostility was directed ; it was not French warfare, but French propagandism which he dreaded ; and his efforts would have been equally persevering to resist Russia or Austria by the aid of the Gallic legions, if these insidious principles had emanated from their states. And even as it was, it was not till a very late period that he was reluctantly compelled to forego his pacific policy ; and if he is blamable at all, it is for having adhered to it too long.

If, from the contemplation of the general principles of Mr Pitt's government, we turn to the consideration of the particular measures which he often embraced, we shall find much more room for difference of opinion and frequent cause for historic censure. Unequalled in the ability with which he overcame the jealousies, and awakened the activity of cabinets, he was by no means equally felicitous in the warlike measures which he recommended for their adoption. Napoleon has observed, that he had no turn for military combinations,¹ and a retrospect of the campaigns which he had a share in directing, must, with every impartial mind, confirm the justice of the opinion. By not engaging England as a principal in the contest, and trusting for land operations almost entirely to the continental armies put in motion by British subsidies, he prolonged the war for an indefinite period, and ultimately brought upon the country losses and expenses much greater than would have resulted from a more vigorous policy in the commencement. By directing the national strength chiefly to colonial acquisitions, he succeeded, indeed, ultimately, in wresting from the enemy all their maritime possessions, and raising the commercial prosperity of the country to the very highest pitch ; but this was done at the cost of a war of twelve years' duration, and an addition of above three hundred millions to the national debt : whereas, by the vigorous application of a comparatively inconsiderable English force to the heart of the enemy's

175.

His errors.

¹ Las Cas.
iii. 274.

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1805.

power at the outset, or when their resources were failing before the arrival of Napoleon at the helm, he would, in all human probability, have gained the same object at a comparatively trifling sacrifice, and at the same time liberated the Continent from Gallic oppression. In warlike combinations he was too much inclined to follow out the Austrian system of simultaneous operations over an extensive circle; and to waste those forces on the reduction of sugar islands, or useless descents with small bodies on the coasts of France, which, if concentrated upon the decisive point, would have accelerated by twenty years the triumphs of Toulouse and Waterloo. In justice to the British statesman, however, it must be observed, that at that period eighty years of repose, and the disastrous results of the American war, had weakened the military spirit of the nation, and dimmed the recollections of its ancient renown; and that no one deemed it capable of those vast and persevering efforts on land, which at length brought the contest to a glorious termination.

“It is needless,” say the Republicans, “to raise statues to Mr Pitt’s memory: he has raised up an indestructible monument to himself in the national debt. His name will never be forgotten as long as taxes are paid by the British people.” If, however, it is apparent that the war, both with the Republic and Napoleon, was unavoidable, and, from the principles on which it was conducted, incapable of adjustment, those burdens, generally speaking, are to be regarded as the salvage paid for the safety of the empire, and are no more chargeable on his memory than the losses sustained during a gale are on the skilful pilot who has weathered the storm. The real point for consideration is, whether these vast expenses were not unnecessarily swelled by the adoption of an over-cautious, and therefore protracted system of warfare, and whether much of the debt might not have been avoided by contracting it in a different, and, ultimately, less burdensome form. And probably the warmest of his partisans will find it difficult to defend the frequent practice which he adopted, of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, giving a bond for a hundred pounds to the public creditor for every sixty advanced—a system which, although favourable to public credit at the moment, from the low rate at which it enabled

176.
Opinion of
the democra-
tic party in
England of
him.

him to contract the largest loans, led to an enormous addition to the national burdens in after times; prevented the return of peace from making the due diminution in the interest of the debt; and saddled the nation with the ultimate payment of above a third more than it ever received.

Mr Pitt's eloquence and talents for debate were of the very highest order, his command of financial details unbounded, and his power of bringing a vast variety of detached facts or transactions to bear on one general argument—the noblest effort of oratory—unequalled in modern times. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and continued through life, in all his leisure moments, the study of the exquisite remains of ancient genius. But he did this with the wise design of transferring to his own tongue the brevity and force of their expressions, not in the hopeless desire of rivalling their beauties in their own language. So successful was he in this, that many of his speeches, delivered extempore during the heat of debate, will bear a comparison with all but the finished specimens of written Greek or Roman eloquence. Kindly and affectionate in domestic life, he yet felt in all their force the passions of youth, and was far from being inaccessible to the ascendant of female charms.* But these feelings were all kept in subordination to greater objects, and accordingly in private life his conduct was irreproachable. Concentrated on national objects, he had none of the usual passions or weaknesses of the great; his manners were reserved and austere; his companions, in general, men inferior in years and capacity to himself; he had many admirers—few friends. His figure was tall and thin, his features sharp, his forehead open and thoughtful—

177.
His private
character.
Funeral
honours paid
to him.

—————“Deep in his brow engraven,
Deliberation sat and sovereign care.”†

Superior to the vulgar desire for wealth, he was careless, though addicted to no expenses, of his private fortune;

* He was a great admirer of female dress, and so accomplished a connoisseur in it that the celebrated Lady Hester Stanhope, his cousin, who lived in his house for many years, and presided over his establishment, used to take his advice in the arrangement of her curls and drapery when she was going to a ball. In early life he was such an admirer of a captivating Devonshire beauty, that he had the gallantry to drink her health out of her satin slipper.—*Memoirs of Lady Hester Stanhope*, vol. i. p. 81, 82.

† MILTON'S *Paradise Lost*.

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¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 42, 62, 71,
138.

and the man who had so long held the treasury of Europe and the Indies, was indebted to the gratitude of the nation for a vote of forty thousand pounds, to pay the debts which he owed at the time of his death. In this vote Mr Fox cheerfully and honourably concurred; but he resisted the motion for a monument at the public expense to his memory, upon the ground, that however splendid his abilities, or praiseworthy his integrity had been, the principles of his conduct were not such as to entitle him to the character of an "excellent statesman."¹* The monument which the House of Commons, by a great majority, voted, was placed above his grave in Westminster Abbey, already illustrated by the ashes of so many of the great and good in English history; but the historian who surveys the situation of the British empire at the close of the contest which he so nobly maintained, and recollects that the liberty of mankind was dependent on its success, will award him a wider mausoleum, and inscribe on his grave the well-known words, "Si monumentum quæris, circumspice!"

* "When I see a minister," said Mr Fox, "who has been in office above twenty years, with the full command of places and public money, without any peculiar extravagance or waste, except what might be expected from the multiplicity of duties to which his attention was directed, exerting his influence neither to enrich himself nor those with whom he is connected, it is impossible not to conclude that he has acted with a high degree of integrity and moderation. In the course of his long administration, the only office which he took to himself was the Wardenship of the Cinque Ports. But I cannot concur in a motion for funeral honours upon Mr Pitt as an 'excellent statesman.' Public honours are matters of the highest importance, and we must not in such cases yield our consent if it is opposed by a sense of public duty."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 61, 62.

CHAPTER XLI.

THE BRITISH FINANCES, AND MR PITT'S SYSTEM OF
FINANCIAL POLICY.

It would be to little purpose that the mighty drama of the French revolutionary wars was recorded in history, if the mainspring of all the European efforts, the BRITISH FINANCES, were not fully explained. It was in their boundless extent that freedom found a never-failing stay; in their elastic power that independence obtained a permanent support. When surrounded by the wreck of other nations, when surviving alone the fall of so many confederacies, it was in their inexhaustible resources that England found the means of resolutely maintaining the contest, and waiting calmly, in her citadel amidst the waves, the return of a right spirit in the surrounding nations. Vain would have been the prowess of her seamen, vain the valour of her soldiers, if her national finances had given way under the strain. Even the conquerors of Trafalgar and Alexandria must have succumbed in the contest they so heroically maintained, if they had not found in the resources of government the means of permanently continuing it. Vain would have been the reaction produced by suffering against the French Revolution, vain the charnel-house of Spain and the snows of Russia, if England had not been in a situation to take advantage of the crisis. If she had been unable to aliment the war in the Peninsula when its native powers were prostrated in the dust, the sword of Wellington would have been drawn in vain; and the energies of awakened Europe must have been lost in fruitless efforts if the wealth of Britain had not at last arrayed

CHAP.
XLI.

1805.

1.
Importance
of the subject.

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XLI.

1805.

2.

Astonishing
financial ef-
forts of Eng-
land during
the war.

them in dense and disciplined battalions on the banks of the Rhine.

How, then, did it happen, that this inconsiderable island, so small a part of the Roman empire, was enabled to expend wealth greater than ever had been amassed by the ancient mistress of the world; to maintain a contest of unexampled magnitude for twenty years; to uphold a fleet which conquered the united navies of Europe, and an army which carried victory into every corner of the globe; to acquire a colonial empire that encircled the earth, and subdue the vast continent of Hindostan, at the very time that it struggled in Spain with the land forces of Napoleon, and equipped all the armies of the north for the liberation of Germany? The solution of the phenomenon, unexampled in the history of the world, is without doubt to be in part found in the persevering industry of the British people, and the extent of the commerce which they maintained in every quarter of the globe; but the resources thus afforded would have been inadequate to so vast an expenditure, and must have been exhausted early in the struggle, if they had not been organised and sustained by an admirable system of finance, which seemed to rise superior to every difficulty with which it had to contend. It is there that the true secret of the prodigy is to be found; it is there that the noblest monument to Mr Pitt's wisdom has been erected.

3.

Historical de-
tails. Public
income before
the Common-
wealth.
Large in-
crease conse-
quent on the
Great Rebel-
lion.

¹ Hume, v.
412, vi. 112.

² Ibid. vii.
341.

The national income of England at an early period was very inconsiderable, and totally incommensurate to the important station which she occupied in the scale of nations. In the time of Elizabeth it amounted only to £400,000 a-year; and in that of James I. to £450,000, and even including all the subsidies received from parliament during his reign, £480,000 a-year—sums certainly not equivalent to more than £800,000, or £1,000,000 of our money.¹ That enjoyed by Charles I. amounted on an average to £895,000 annually; a sum perhaps equal to £1,500,000 in these times.² It was the Long Parliament which first gave the example of a prodigious levy of money from the people in England; affording thus a striking instance of the eternal truth, that no government is so despotic as that of the popular leaders, when relieved from all con-

trol on the part of the other powers in the state. The sums raised in England during the Commonwealth—that is, from 3d November 1640, to 5th November 1659—amounted to the enormous and, if not proved by authentic documents, incredible sum of £83,000,000,—being at the rate of nearly £5,000,000 a-year; or more than five times that which had been so much the subject of complaint in the times of the unhappy monarch who had preceded it.* The permanent revenue of Cromwell from the three kingdoms was raised to £1,868,000: or considerably more than double that enjoyed by Charles I.† The total public income at the death of Charles II. was £1,800,000, under James II. £2,000,000; sums incredibly small, when it is recollected that the price of wheat was not then materially different from what it is at the present moment.‡

¹ Pebrer,
139, 143.

* “It is seldom,” says Hume, “that the people gain any thing by revolutions in government; because the new settlement, jealous and insecure, must commonly be supported with more expense and severity than the old: but on no occasion was the truth of this maxim more sensibly felt than in England after the overthrow of the royal authority. Complaints against the oppression of ship-money and the tyranny of the Star Chamber had roused the people to arms, and, having gained a complete victory over the Crown, they found themselves loaded with a multiplicity of taxes formerly unknown, while scarce an appearance of law and liberty remained in any part of the administration.”²

² Hume, vii.
115.

‡ The following are some of the items in this enormous aggregate of £83,000,000 raised from the nation during the Commonwealth,—a striking proof of the despotic character of the executive during that period:—

Land-tax,	£32,000,000
Excise,	8,000,000
Tonnage and poundage,	7,600,000
Sale of Church lands,	10,035,000
Sequestration of bishops, deans, and inferior clergy, for four years,	3,528,000
Sequestration of private estates in England,	4,564,000
Fee-farm rents for five years,	2,963,000
Composition with delinquents in Ireland,	1,000,000
Sales of estates in Ireland,	3,567,000
Other lesser,	10,074,000
Total,	£83,331,000

—PEBRER, 139, 140.

† Of this sum, there was drawn from England,	£1,517,274
from Scotland,	143,652
from Ireland,	207,790

Total, £1,868,716

—PEBRER, 140.

‡ The quarter of wheat, from 1636 to 1701, was on an average 51s, 11½d.

From 1700 to 1765, 40s. 6d.

From 1764 to 1794, 44s. 7d.

In 1835 the average of the quarter in Great Britain was 39s. 8d., and the average of the five years preceding 1836 was only 48s. The price was much higher during the next five years, but that was the result of uncommonly rainy seasons coming in succession during that whole period.—SMITH'S *Wealth of Nations*, i. 358; and *Corn Average*, 1835.

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XLI.

1688—1700.

4.
Permanent
addition to
them on the
accession of
William III.

These inconsiderable taxes, however, were destined to be exchanged for others of a very different character, upon the accession of the House of Brunswick to the throne. The intimate connexion of the princes of that family with continental politics, and the long wars in which in consequence the nation was involved, soon led to a more burdensome system of taxation, and the raising of sums annually from the people which in former times would have been deemed incredible. So great was the increase of the public burdens during the reign of William, that the national income, in the thirteen years that he sat on the throne, was nearly doubled: being raised from £2,000,000 a-year to £3,895,000. But the addition made to the public revenue was the least important part of the changes effected during this important period. It was then that the NATIONAL DEBT began; and government was taught the dangerous secret of providing for the necessities, and maintaining the influence of present times, by borrowing money and laying its payment on posterity.¹

1 Pebrer, 59,
60.5.
Reasons
which led to
the introduc-
tion of the
national debt.

Various motives combined to induce the government, immediately after the Revolution, to adopt the system of borrowing on the credit of the state. Notwithstanding the temporary unanimity with which the Revolution had been brought about, various heart-burnings and divisions soon succeeded that event, and the exiled dynasty still numbered a large and resolute body, especially in the rural districts, among their adherents. Extensive patronage and no small share of corruption were necessary to secure the influence of government over a nation thus divided: foreign wars were rightly deemed requisite to maintain the ascendant of the Protestant principles to which the king owed his accession to the throne; and the continental connexions of the house of Orange imperiously required the intervention of Great Britain in those desperate struggles by which the very existence of the commonwealth of Holland was endangered. The same cause which led to nearly the duplication of the public burdens of France by Louis Philippe,* after the revolution of 1830, produced a similar increase

* The following is a statement of the budgets of France before and after the Revolution of July. It is a curious and instructive object of contemplation to

in the taxes of Great Britain after the change of dynasty in 1688, and originated the dangerous system of borrowing on the security of the assessment of future years. It was justly thought, that the present influence of government could in this way be increased to an extent altogether impracticable if the expenditure of each year were to be limited to the supplies raised within itself; and that, by the distribution of the debt among a great number of public creditors, an extensive and influential body might be formed, attached by the strong tie of individual interest to the fortunes of the ruling dynasty; because they were aware that their claims would be disregarded by the legitimate monarchs if restored to the throne. The expedient, therefore, was fallen upon of contracting a debt transferable by a simple power or attorney, in the smallest shares, from hand to hand; and capable of being used almost like the highest and most valuable species of bank-notes, in the transactions of the nation. To the steady prosecution of this system, and the formation of a secure deposit by its means for the savings of the nation, much of the subsequent prosperity and grandeur of England is to be ascribed. But, like all other human things, it has its evils as well as its advantages: and in the perilous facility of borrowing, which the magnitude of the national resources and the fidelity with which the public engagements were fulfilled produced, is to be found the remote but certain cause of financial embarrassments, now to all appearance irremediable.

It is unnecessary to follow the successive steps by which both the public revenue and the national debt of Great Britain were increased after this period. Suffice it to say,

observe a similar convulsion leading, in countries so widely different in their character, customs, and institutions, as France and England were at the accessions of the dynasties of Orange and Orleans to their respective thrones, to a result so precisely similar:

Corresponding
increase of the
expenditure of
France on the
accession of
Louis Philippe.

1824,	.	.	951,000,000,	or about £38,000,000
1825,	.	.	946,000,000,	.. 37,800,000
1826,	.	.	942,000,000,	.. 37,600,000
1827,	.	.	986,000,000,	.. 39,400,000
1828,	.	.	939,000,000,	.. 37,500,000
1829,	.	.	975,000,000,	.. 39,000,000
1830, Revol. in July,	.	.	981,000,000,	.. 39,200,000
1831, Louis Philippe,	.	.	1,511,000,000,	.. 60,400,000
1832, Ditto,	.	.	1,100,000,000,	.. 44,400,000
1833,	.	.	1,120,000,000,	.. 44,800,000

—See *Stat. de France*, published by government.

CHAP.
XLI.

1784.

6.

Progressive
growth of the
public debt
during the
succeeding
century.

that both were largely augmented during the glorious war of the Succession; that the long and pacific administration which followed, effected no sensible reduction in their amount; that the checkered contest of 1739, and the more triumphant campaigns of the Seven Years' war, contributed equally to their increase: and that the disasters of the American struggle were attended by so great an augmentation of the national burdens, that at its termination in 1783, in the opinion both of Mr Hume and Adam Smith,* they must inevitably prove

* The following table exhibits, in a clear and condensed form, the increase of the public revenue, and progressive growth of the debt, from the Revolution in 1784 to the present times.

	Debt.	Interest.	Public Revenue.
National Debt at the Revolution,	£664,263	£39,865	£2,001,885
Increase during the reign of William,	15,730,439	1,271,087	
Debt at the accession of Queen Anne,	16,394,702	1,310,952	3,895,205
Increase during the reign of Queen Anne,	37,750,661	2,040,416	
Debt at the accession of George I.,	54,145,363	3,351,368	5,691,803
Decrease during the reign of George I.,	2,053,128	133,807	
Debt at the accession of George II.,	52,092,235	3,217,561	6,762,463
Decrease during the peace,	5,137,612	253,526	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1739,	46,954,623	2,964,035	6,874,000
Increase during the war,	31,338,689	1,096,979	
Debt at the end of the war, 1748,	78,293,312	4,061,014	6,923,000
Decrease during the peace,	3,721,472	664,277	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1756,	74,571,840	3,396,737	7,127,164
Increase during the war,	72,111,004	2,444,104	
Debt at the end of the war in 1763,	146,682,844	5,840,841	8,523,440
Decrease during the peace,	10,739,793	364,000	
Debt at the opening of the American war, 1776,	135,943,051	5,476,841	10,265,405
Increase during the war,	102,541,819	3,843,084	
Debt at the peace of 1783,	238,484,870	9,319,925	11,962,000
Decrease during the peace,	4,751,261	143,569	
Debt at the opening of the war, 1793,	233,733,609	9,176,356	16,658,814
Increase during the war,	295,105,668	10,252,152	
Debt at the peace of Amiens, 1st February 1801,	528,839,277	19,428,508	34,113,146
Increase during the second war,	335,983,164	12,796,796	
Debt at the peace of Paris, 1st February 1816,	864,822,441	32,225,304	72,210,512
Decrease since the peace,	82,155,207	3,883,841	
Debt on the 5th January 1832,	£782,667,234	£28,341,463	£50,990,000

—MOREAU and PEBRER'S *Tables*, 70, 89, 153, 245; and PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

fatal in the end to the independence of the nation. At the close of the last contest the public revenue was £12,000,000, and the debt £240,000,000, the interest of which absorbed so large a proportion as £9,319,000 of the annual income of the state; the loans contracted during its disastrous continuance having been no less than one hundred millions.¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1784.

¹ Febrer, 245.

It was at this period that Mr Pitt came into office, on the resignation of Mr Fox and the coalition ministry. His ardent and sagacious mind was immediately turned to the consideration of the finances, and the means of extricating the nation from the embarrassments, to ordinary observers inextricable, in which it had been involved by the improvident expenditure of preceding years. It was evident, from a retrospect of history, that no sensible impression had been made on the debt by any efforts of preceding times; that though a sinking fund had long existed in name, yet its operations had been very inconsiderable; and that all the economy of the long periods of peace which had intervened since the Revolution, had done little more than discharge a tenth of the burdens contracted in the preceding years of hostility. The interest of the debt absorbed now more than two-thirds of the public revenue. It was impossible to conceal that such a state of things was in the highest degree alarming; not only as affording no reasonable prospect that the existing engagements could ever be liquidated, but as threatening at no distant period to render it impossible for the nation to make those efforts which its honour or independence might require. Little foresight was required to show, that, in the course of events, wars and changes must arise, which would render it indispensable for the government to assume a menacing attitude, and possibly engage in a long course of hostilities. But how could any administration venture to assume the one, or the people bear the other, if an immense load of debt hung about their necks, absorbing alike by its interest their present revenues, and paralysing by its magnitude the credit by which their resources might be increased on any unforeseen emergency?

7.
Alarming
financial as-
pect of the
country on
Mr Pitt's
accession to
power in
1784.

These dangers took strong possession of the mind of Mr Pitt; but instead of sinking in despair under the difficulties of the subject, he applied the energies of his under-

CHAP.
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1784.

8.
Principle on
which he pro-
posed to
remedy the
existing evils.

standing with the utmost vigour to overcome them. Nor was it long before he perceived by what means this great object could with ease and certainty be effected. The public attention at this period had been strongly directed to the prodigious powers of accumulation of money at compound interest; and Dr Price had demonstrated, with mathematical certainty, that any sum, however small, increasing at that ratio, would in a given time extinguish any debt, however great.* Mr Pitt, with the instinctive sagacity of genius, laid hold of this simple law to establish a machine by which the vast debt of England might, without difficulty, be discharged. All former sinking funds had failed in producing great effects, because they were directed to the *annual* discharge of a certain portion of debt; not the formation, by compound interest, of a fund destined to its future and progressive liquidation: they advanced, therefore, by addition, not multiplication—in an arithmetical, not a geometrical ratio. Mr Pitt saw the evil, and not merely applied a remedy, but more than a remedy: he not only seized the battery, but turned it against the enemy. The wonderful powers of compound interest, the vast lever of geometrical progression, so long and sorely felt by debtors, were now to be applied to creditors; and, inverting the process hitherto experienced among mankind, the swift growth of the gangrene was to be turned from the corruption of the sound to the eradication of the diseased part of the system. Another addition, like the discovery of gravitation, the press, and the steam-engine, to the many illustrations which history affords of the lasting truth, that the greatest changes both in the social and material world are governed by the same laws as the smallest; and that it is by the felicitous application of familiar principles to new and important objects, that the greatest and most salutary discoveries in human affairs are effected.

Mr Pitt's mind was strongly impressed with the incalculable importance of this subject, one before which all wars or subjects of present interest, excepting only the preservation of the constitution, sank into insignificance.

* A penny laid out at compound interest at the birth of our Saviour, would, in the year 1775, have amounted to a solid mass of gold eighteen hundred times the whole weight of the globe.

From the time of his accession to office in 1784, his attention had been constantly riveted upon it, and he repeatedly expressed, in the most energetic language, his sense of its overwhelming magnitude. "Upon the deliberation of this day," said he, in bringing forward his resolutions on the subject on 29th March 1786, "the people of England place all their hopes of a full return of prosperity, and a revival of that public security which will give vigour and confidence to those commercial exertions upon which the flourishing state of the country depends. Yet not only the public and this House, but other nations are intent upon it; for upon its deliberations, by the success or failure of what is now proposed, our rank will be decided among the powers of Europe. To behold this country, when just emerging from a most unfortunate war, which had added such an accumulation to sums before immense, that it was the belief of surrounding nations, and of many among ourselves, that we must sink under it—to behold this nation, instead of despairing at its alarming condition, looking boldly its situation in the face, and establishing upon a spirited and permanent plan the means of relieving itself from all its encumbrances, must give such an idea of our resources as will astonish the nations around us, and enable us to regain that pre-eminence to which on many accounts we are so justly entitled. The propriety and even necessity of adopting a plan for this purpose is now universally allowed, and it is also admitted that immediate steps ought to be taken on the subject. It is well known how strongly my feelings have been engaged, not only by the duties of my situation, but the consideration of my own personal reputation, which is deeply committed in the question, to exert every nerve, to arm every vigilance, to concentrate my efforts towards that great object, by which alone we can have a prospect of transmitting to posterity that which we ourselves have felt the want of, an efficient sinking fund for the national debt. To accomplish this is the first wish of my heart;¹ and it would be my proudest hope to have my name inscribed on a pillar to be erected in honour

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XLI.

1786.

9.

His strong expressions on the importance of the subject in parliament.

¹ Parl. Hist. xxvi. 1295, 1313, 1109.

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1786.

of the man who did his country the essential service of reducing the national debt."

10.
And his simultaneous adoption of measures for national defence.

It is worthy of especial notice, however, that though thus deeply impressed with the paramount importance of raising up an effective sinking fund for the reduction of the public debt, Mr Pitt was equally resolute not to attempt it by any measure by which the public security might be impaired; and, on the contrary, at the very same time strongly advocated and carried a bill for the fortification of Portsmouth and Plymouth, which required several hundred thousand pounds. "He would not be seduced," he said, "by the plausible and popular name of economy—he would not call it only plausible and popular, he would rather say the sacred name of economy—to forego the reality; and for the sake of adding a few hundred thousand pounds at the outset to the sinking fund, perhaps render for ever abortive the sinking fund itself. Every saving, consistently with national safety, he would pledge himself to make; but he would never consent to starve the public service, and to withhold those supplies, without which the nation must be endangered."¹ Every measure of this great man was directed to great and *lasting* national objects. He was content to impose present burdens, to forego present advantages, and incur present unpopularity, for the sake of ultimate public advantage; the only principle which ever yet led to greatness and honour, either in nations or individuals, as the opposite system, gilded by present popularity or enjoyment, is the certain forerunner of ultimate ruin.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1109.

11.
Establishment of the sinking fund, and Mr Pitt's speech on introducing it.

In pursuance of these designs, Mr Pitt proposed that a million yearly—composed partly of savings effected in various branches of the public service, to the amount of £900,000, and partly of new taxes, to the amount of £100,000—should be granted to his Majesty, to be vested in commissioners chosen from the highest functionaries in the realm; that the payments to them should be made quarterly; and that the whole sums thus drawn should be by them invested in the purchase of stock, to stand in the name of the commissioners, the dividends on which were to be periodically applied to the further purchase

of stock, to stand and have its dividends invested in the same manner. In this way, by setting apart a million annually, and religiously applying its interest to the purchase of stock, the success of the plan would be secured; because the future accumulations would spring, not from any additional burdens imposed on the people, but from the dividends on the stock thus bought up from individuals, and vested in the public trustees. The powers of compound interest were thus brought round from the side of the creditor to that of the debtor—from the fundholders to the nation; and the national debt was eaten in upon by an accumulating fund, which, increasing in a geometrical progression, would, to a certainty, at no distant period, effect its total extinction.* “If this million,” said Mr Pitt, “to be so applied, is to be laid out, with its growing interest, it will amount to a very great sum in a period that is not very long in the life of an individual, and but an hour in the existence of a great nation; and this will diminish the debt of this country so much, as to prevent the exigencies of war from raising it to the enormous height it has hitherto done. In the period of twenty-eight years, the sum of a million, annually improved, would amount to four millions per annum. But care must be taken that this sum be not broken in upon. This has hitherto been the bane of this country; for if the original sinking fund had been

* The following table will exemplify the growth of capital when its interest, at the rate of five per cent, is steadily applied to the increase of the principal. Suppose that £20,000,000 is borrowed; and that, instead of providing by taxes for the interest merely of this large sum, provision is made for £1,200,000 yearly, leaving the surplus of £200,000 to be annually applied to the purchase of a certain portion of the stock, by commissioners, for the reduction of the principal, the dividends on the stock so purchased being annually and progressively employed in the same manner. The progressive growth in ten years will stand as follows:—

First year's surplus,	.	.	.	£200,000
Second,	.	.	.	210,000
Third,	.	.	.	220,500
Fourth,	.	.	.	231,250
Fifth,	.	.	.	242,562
Sixth,	.	.	.	253,078
Seventh,	.	.	.	265,654
Eighth,	.	.	.	278,286
Ninth,	.	.	.	292,114
Tenth,	.	.	.	306,661
				£2,500,105

The wonderful rate at which this fund increases must be obvious to every observer, and it is worthy of especial notice, that this rapid advance is gained without imposing one farthing additional upon the country, by the mere force of an annual fund, steadily applied year after year, with all its fruits, to the reduction of the principal debt.

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1786.

properly preserved, it can easily be proved, that our debts at this moment would not have been very burdensome ; but this, hitherto, has been found impracticable, because the minister has uniformly, when it suited his convenience, gotten hold of this sum, which ought to have been regarded as most sacred. To prevent this, I propose that this sum be vested in certain dignified commissioners, to be by them applied quarterly to buy up stock ; by which means no considerable sum will ever be open to spoliation, and the fund will go on without interruption. Long, and very long, has the country struggled under its heavy load, without any prospect of being relieved ; but it may now look forward to the object upon which the existence of the country depends. A minister could never have the confidence to come down to the House, and propose the repeal of so beneficial a law—of one so directly tending to relieve the people from their burdens. The essence of the plan consists in the fund being invariably applied in diminution of the debt ; *it must for ever be kept sacred, and especially so in time of war.* To suffer the fund at any time, or on any pretence, to be diverted from its proper object, would be to ruin, defeat, and overturn the whole plan.”¹*

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1309,
1322.

12.
Mr Fox gives
this plan his
cordial sup-
port.

Nor was Mr Fox behind his great rival in the same statesmanlike and heroic sentiments ; but he pointed out with too prophetic a spirit the dangers to which the reserved fund might be exposed, amidst the necessities or weaknesses of future administrations. “No man,” said he, “in existence was, or ever had been, a greater friend to

* The speech delivered by Mr Pitt on this occasion, which went over the whole details of our financial system, is one of the most luminous of his whole parliamentary career. An intimate friend of his has recorded, “That having passed the morning of this most important day in providing and examining the calculations and resolutions for the evening, he said he would take a walk to arrange in his mind what was to be said in the House in the evening. His walk did not last above a quarter of an hour, and when he came back he said he believed he was prepared. He then dressed, and desired his dinner to be sent up ; but hearing that his sister, and another lady residing with her in the family, were going to dine with him at the same early hour, he desired that they might dine together. Having passed nearly an hour with those ladies, and several friends who called on their way to the House, talking with his usual liveliness and gaiety, as if he had nothing on his mind, he then went immediately to the House of Commons, and made that elaborate and far-extended speech, as Mr Fox called it, without one omission or error.—See No. V. WILLIAM PITT ; *Blackwood's Magazine*, xxxvi. 852 ; a series of papers on the character of this illustrious man, by Dr Croly, one of the ablest writers of the age, containing by far the best account of his policy and character extant in any language.

the principle of a sinking fund than I have been, from the very first moment of my political life. I agree perfectly with the right honourable gentleman, in his ideas of the necessity of establishing an effective sinking fund, for the purpose of applying it to the diminution of the national debt, however widely I may differ from him as to the subordinate parts of the plan. Formerly, the payment of the national debt was effected by a subscription of individuals, to whom the faith of parliament had been pledged to pay off certain specified portions at stated periods. Under that system, when the nation, or when parliament, stood bound to individuals, the pledge was held as sacred as to pay the interest of the national debt at present; whereas, under the new system, when no individual interests were concerned, nothing would prevent a future minister, in any future war, from coming down to the House and proposing the repeal of the sinking fund, or enabling government to apply the whole money or stock in the hands of the commissioners to the public service. What would prevent the House from agreeing to the proposition? or was it at all likely that, under the exigency of the moment, they would not immediately agree to it, when so much money could so easily be got at, and when they could so readily save themselves from the odious and unpleasant task of imposing new taxes on themselves and their constituents?"¹ Memorable words from both these great men! when it is recollected how exactly the one predicted the wonderful effects which experience has now proved his system was calculated to have produced, in reducing, in a period of time smaller than the most ardent imagination could have supposed, a debt double the amount of that which he estimated as so great an evil; and with how much accuracy the other pointed out the vulnerable point in the composition of his scheme, and predicted the cause, springing from the necessities or weakness of future administrations, which would ultimately prove its ruin!

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxvi. 1318.

The bill passed both Houses without a dissentient voice; and on the 26th May, the King gave it the royal assent in person, to mark his strong sense of the public importance of the measure.

May 26.

The sinking fund thus provided was amply sufficient to have discharged all the existing debt within a moderate

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XLI.

1792.

13.

It is passed
by the legis-
lature, and
made appli-
cable to all
future loans.

March 30,
1792.

period ; and so well aware was its author of its vast productive powers, that he observed, that when it rose to four millions, it should be submitted to Parliament whether it should thenceforth be suffered to increase at compound interest. But the events which followed, soon not only rendered illusory all danger of the debt being too rapidly reduced, but made an addition to the system unavoidable to meet the new and overwhelming obligations contracted during the war. Some expedient, therefore, was necessary to provide for the liquidation of these vast additional debts ; and it was in the means taken to do so that the extensive foresight and unshaken constancy of Mr Pitt is to be discerned. He laid it down as a principle, which was never on any pretence whatever to be departed from, that when any additional loan was contracted for, provision should be made for its gradual liquidation. "We ought," said Mr Pitt, "not to confine our views to the sinking fund, compared with the debt now existing. If our system stops there, the country will remain exposed to the possibility of being again involved in those embarrassments which we have in our own time so severely experienced, and which apparently brought us to the verge of bankruptcy and ruin. To guard against such dangers hereafter, we should enact that, whenever any loan shall take place in future, unless it be raised on annuities, which will terminate in a moderate number of years, there should of course be issued out of the consolidated fund,* to the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, *an additional sum sufficient to discharge the capital of such loan in the same period as the sinking fund, after reaching its largest amount will discharge what will then remain of the present debt.* To do this, one hundredth part of the capital borrowed would be sufficient to be raised from the country on such emergencies ; for instance, supposing it were necessary to raise by loan ten millions, £100,000 should be raised in addition to the existing funds appropriated to the redemption of the debt, in order to relieve the country within a given time of this additional burden. In addition to this, I propose

* The consolidated fund was a certain portion of the ordinary taxes, which were amassed together and devoted to certain fixed objects of national expenditure. The surplus of this fund, as it was called, or the excess of those branches of revenue above the charges fixed on them, was annually appropriated during war among the ways and means to the current war expenditure.

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XLI.

1792—1802.

that £200,000 a-year additional should, from this time forward, be regularly granted out of the ordinary revenue of the country to the sinking fund." Mr Fox stated, "that he had ever maintained the necessity of establishing a fund for reducing the national debt, and that as strongly when on the Ministerial as the Opposition benches. He had not the power to promote it as effectually as Mr Pitt, but he wished it as warmly."¹ In conformity with the united opinion of these great men, it was enacted by the statute passed on the occasion, "that whenever in future any sums should be raised by loans on perpetual redeemable annuities, a sum equal to one per cent on the stock created by such loan should be issued out of the produce of the consolidated fund quarterly, to be placed to the account of the commissioners."² Every additional loan was thus compelled to draw after itself, as a necessary consequence, a fresh burden, by the annual payment of which the extinction of the principal might to a certainty be expected in little more than forty years.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxix. 1050,
1053.² 32 Geo.
III. c. 69.14.
Modification
introduced
upon the sys-
tem in 1802.

April 14.

Under this system the whole loans were contracted, and the sinking fund was managed, till 1802 ; and as immense sums were borrowed during that period, the growth of the sinking fund was far more rapid than had been originally contemplated. In that year an alteration of some importance was made, not indeed by Mr Pitt, but by Mr Addington, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, with his consent and approbation. "The capital of the debt," said he, "is now £488,000,000 ; its interest, including the charges of the sinking fund, £23,000,000 : it is impossible to contemplate either the one or the other without the utmost anxiety. What I now propose is, that the limitation which was formerly provided against the accumulation of the original sinking fund should be removed ; and that both that original fund and the subsequent one, created by the act of 1792, should be allowed to accumulate till they have discharged the whole debt." This proposition was unanimously agreed to : it being enacted, "that this fund should accumulate till the whole existing redeemable annuities should be paid off." By this act, the original sinking fund of £1,000,000, with the £200,000 subsequently granted, and the one per cent on all the subsequent loans, were combined into one consolidated fund, to

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1802.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxv. 890,
892.

be applied continually, at compound interest, till the whole debt then existing was paid off, which it was calculated would be in forty-five years.¹ Under these three acts of 1786, 1792, and 1802, the sinking fund continued to be administered with exemplary fidelity, not only during Mr Pitt's life, but after his death, till 1813, when a total change in the system took place, which eventually led to its ruin, and has, to all appearance, rendered the financial state of the country almost desperate. To obtain a clear view of the practical effects of Mr Pitt's system, it is necessary to anticipate somewhat the march of events, and give a summary of the operation of the sinking fund which he established down to the period when it was abandoned by his more embarrassed and less provident successors.

15.
Immense re-
sults of the
sinking fund.

From the accounts laid before parliament, it appears that the sinking fund of a million which Mr Pitt established in 1786, had increased, by accumulation at compound interest, and the great additions drawn from the one per cent on the vast loans from 1792 to 1812, to the enormous sum of *fifteen millions and a half yearly* in 1813, while the debts which it had discharged during that period amounted to no less than £238,231,000 sterling. This great increase had taken place in twenty-seven years; whereas Mr Pitt had calculated correctly that his original million would be only four millions in twenty-eight years; the well-known period of the quadruplication of the sum at compound interest of five per cent. The subsequent £200,000 a-year granted, undoubtedly accelerated in a certain degree the rate of its advance; but the true cause of the extraordinary and unexpected rapidity of its increase is to be found in the prodigious accumulation which the one per cent on subsequent loans produced. This distinctly appears from the table compiled below, showing the sums paid off by the sinking fund in every year from 1786 to 1813—the loans contracted during that period—the stock redeemed by the commissioners, and the proportion of each loan paid to them for behoof of the public debt. It thence appears how rapidly and suddenly the sinking fund rose, with the immense sums borrowed at different periods during the war; and when it is recollected that the loans contracted from 1792 to 1815 were £585,000,000, it will not appear surprising, that even the small sum of one per cent

on each, regularly issued to the national debt commissioners, should have led to this extraordinary and unlooked for accumulation.*

It is this subsequent addition of one per cent on all loans contracted since the institution of the sinking fund, which has been at once the cause of its extraordinary increase and subsequent ruin. While the nation in general were entirely satisfied with Mr Pitt's financial statements, and, delighted with the rapid growth of the sinking fund, never examined whether the funds for its prodigious extension were provided by the fictitious supply of loans, or the solid growth of the revenue above the expenditure, a few more sagacious observers began to inquire into the solidity of the whole system, and, mistaking its past operation, which had been almost entirely *during war*, for its *permanent* character, which was to appear chiefly on the return of

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XLI.

1802.

16.
Obloquy to
which it be-
came ex-
posed.

* Table showing the sums paid to the Commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt in every year from 1786 to 1816; the stock redeemed by them in each year; the loans contracted, and proportion of those loans paid to those Commissioners in every year for that period; with the public revenue of the state for the same time.—MOREAU'S *Tables*; PRÉRIER'S *Tables*, 153, 154, 246; *Parl. Pap.* 1822, &c. 145; PORTER'S *Parl. Tables*, i. 1; COLQUHOUN, 292, 294; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, ii. 296.

Table showing
the progressive
growth of the
sinking fund.

Years.	Sinking Fund.	Stock Redeemed by Sinking Fund.	Loans Contracted.	Proportion of Loan Paid to Sinking Fund.	Expenditure, including Interest of Debt, Funded and Unfunded, and Sinking Fund.	Total Charge of Debt, including Sinking Fund.	Revenue.
	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1792	1,458,504	1,507,100			16,179,347	9,437,862	16,382,435
1793	1,534,970	1,962,650	4,500,000		17,434,767	9,890,904	17,674,395
1794	1,630,615	2,174,405	12,907,451	1,630,615	22,754,366	10,715,941	17,440,809
1795	1,672,000	2,804,945	42,090,646	1,872,200	29,305,477	11,081,159	17,374,890
1796	2,143,596	3,083,455	42,736,196	2,143,596	39,751,091	12,345,987	18,243,876
1797	2,639,724	4,390,670	14,620,000	2,639,724	40,791,533	13,683,129	18,668,925
1798	3,369,218	6,716,153	18,000,000	3,361,752	50,793,857	16,405,402	20,518,780
1799	4,294,325	7,858,109	12,500,000	3,984,252	51,241,798	20,108,885	23,607,945
1800	4,649,871	7,221,338	18,600,000	4,288,208	59,296,081	21,572,567	29,604,008
1801	4,767,692	7,315,002	34,410,000	4,620,479	61,617,988	21,661,029	28,685,829
1802	5,310,511	8,091,454	23,000,000	5,117,723	73,072,468	23,808,895	28,221,183
1803	5,922,979	7,733,421	10,000,000	5,685,542	62,373,480	25,436,894	38,401,738
1804	6,287,940	10,527,243	10,000,000	6,018,179	54,912,890	25,066,212	49,335,975
1805	6,851,200	11,395,692	21,526,699	6,521,394	67,619,475	26,669,646	49,652,471
1806	7,615,167	12,234,064	18,000,000	7,181,482	76,055,793	28,963,702	51,698,124
1807	8,323,329	12,807,070	12,500,000	7,829,588	75,154,548	30,336,859	58,002,291
1808	9,479,165	14,171,407	12,000,000	8,908,673	78,349,689	32,052,537	61,524,113
1809	10,188,607	13,965,824	19,532,000	9,555,853	76,566,013	32,781,892	63,042,746
1810	10,904,451	14,332,771	16,311,000	10,170,104	76,865,548	33,986,223	66,029,349
1811	11,660,601	15,669,194	24,000,000	10,813,016	83,735,223	35,248,933	64,427,371
1812	12,502,860	18,147,245	27,871,323	11,643,881	88,757,324	36,388,790	63,327,432
1813	13,483,160	21,108,442	58,763,100	12,439,631	105,943,727	38,443,147	63,211,422
1814	15,379,262	24,120,867	18,500,000	14,181,006	106,832,260	41,755,235	70,926,215
1815	14,120,963	19,149,684	45,135,559	12,748,231	92,280,180	42,902,430	72,131,214
1816	13,452,696	20,280,098	3,000,000	11,902,051	65,169,771	43,902,999	62,264,546

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XLI.
1802.

peace, loudly proclaimed that the whole was founded on an entire delusion: that a great proportion of the sums which it paid off had been raised by loans; that at all events, a much larger sum than the amount of the debt annually redeemed, had been actually borrowed since the commencement of the war; that it was impossible that a nation, any more than an individual, could discharge its debts by mere financial operations, and that the only way of really getting quit of encumbrances was by bringing the expenditure permanently under the income.¹

¹ Hamilton on the Sinking Fund, and others.

17.
General diffusion of this delusion.

These doctrines soon spread among a considerable part of the thinking portion of the nation; but they made little general impression till the return of peace had diverted into other channels the attention of the people, formerly concentrated on the career of Napoleon; and democratic ambition, taking advantage of national distress, had begun to denounce all that had formerly been done by the patriots who had triumphed over its principles. Then they speedily became universal. Attacks on the sinking fund were eagerly diffused and generally credited—the delusion of Mr Pitt's system—the juggle so long practised on the nation, were in every mouth; the meanest political quacks, the most despicable popular demagogues, ventured to discharge their javelins at the giants of former days; and a system on which the greatest and best of men in the last age had been united, in commendation of which Fox had vied with Pitt, and Sheridan with Burke, was universally denounced as the most complete and ruinous deception that ever had been palmed off by official fraud on the credulity of mankind.

18.
Which is the more dangerous as it involves much abstract truth mixed with error.

Had these doctrines been confined to the declamation of the hustings, or the abuse of newspapers, they would have furnished the subject only of curious speculation on the way in which principles, just to a certain extent, and truths, undeniable as they were originally stated, became perverted, when they were employed beyond what their authors intended, as an engine for the purposes of faction or ambition. But unhappily the evil soon assumed a much more serious complexion. The prevailing ideas spread to the legislature, and the statesmen who succeeded to the government, imbued partly with the declamation of the

period, influenced partly by the desire of gaining a temporary popularity by the reduction of the public burdens,*

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* The following table exhibits the progression and decline of the Sinking Fund from the time of its being first instituted in 1786, till it was broken upon by Mr Vansittart in 1813, and till its virtual extinction in 1838.

1802.
Ultimate extinction of the sinking fund. Table showing its progressive growth, decline, and final extinction.

Years.	Stock Redeemed.	Money applied to Reduction of Debt.	Total Amount of Funded Debt.
	£	£	£
1786	662,000	500,000	239,693,900
1787	1,503,000	1,000,000	239,200,719
1788	1,506,000	1,000,000	237,697,665
1789	1,558,000	1,155,000	236,191,315
1790	1,587,500	1,230,000	234,632,465
1791	1,507,100	1,371,000	233,044,965
1792	1,962,650	1,458,504	231,537,865
1793	2,174,405	1,634,972	229,614,446
1794	2,804,945	1,872,957	234,034,718
1795	3,083,455	2,143,697	247,877,237
1796	4,390,670	2,639,956	301,861,306
1797	6,790,023	3,393,214	355,323,774
1798	8,102,875	4,093,164	381,525,836
1799	9,550,094	4,528,568	414,936,334
1800	10,713,168	4,908,379	423,367,547
1801	10,491,325	5,528,315	447,147,164
1802	9,436,389	6,114,033	497,043,489
1803	13,181,667	6,494,694	522,231,786
1804	12,860,629	7,436,929	528,260,642
1805	13,759,607	9,402,658	545,803,318
1806	15,341,799	10,625,419	573,520,932
1807	16,064,962	10,185,579	593,694,287
1808	16,181,689	10,584,672	601,733,073
1809	16,656,643	11,359,579	604,237,474
1810	17,884,234	12,095,691	614,789,091
1811	20,733,354	13,075,977	624,301,936
1812	21,322,168	14,078,577	635,583,448
1813	24,245,039	16,064,057	661,409,958
1814	27,552,230	14,830,957	740,023,535
1815	22,599,653	14,241,397	752,857,236
1816	24,001,083	13,945,117	816,311,940
1817	23,117,541	14,514,457	796,200,192
1818	19,460,982	15,339,483	776,742,403
1819	19,648,469	16,305,590	791,867,314
1820	31,191,702	17,499,773	794,980,480
1821	24,518,885	17,219,957	801,565,310
1822	23,605,931	18,889,319	795,312,767
1823	17,966,680	7,482,325	796,530,144
1824	4,828,530	10,652,059	791,701,612
1825	10,583,732	6,093,475	781,123,222
1826	3,313,834	5,621,231	778,128,265
1827	2,886,528	5,704,706	783,801,739
1828	7,281,414	4,667,965	777,476,890
1829	6,035,414	4,569,485	772,322,540
1830	6,425,465	4,545,465	771,251,932
1831	3,304,729	1,663,693	757,486,997
1832	9,079	5,696	754,100,549
1833	1,321,749	1,023,704	751,658,883
1834	2,461,927	1,776,378	743,675,299
1835	1,846,791	1,270,050	758,549,860
1836	2,169,700	1,590,727	761,422,570
1837	1,968,219	1,300,609	763,630,552
1838	nil.	nil.	762,771,224

without any regard to the interests of future times, went on borrowing or abstracting from the sinking fund till it was totally extinguished. During the great convulsion of 1832, the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt issued an official intimation that their purchases for the public service had altogether ceased. The principle acted upon since 1823, when it was first announced in parliament, has been, to apply to the reduction of debt no more than the annual surplus of the national income above its expenditure; and as that surplus, under the jealousy of expenditure incident to a democratic system, can never be expected to be considerable, Mr Pitt's sinking fund may now, to all practical purposes, be considered as destroyed.

In the preceding observations, the march of events has been anticipated by nearly thirty years, and changes alluded to which will form an important subject of analysis in the subsequent volumes of this, or some other history. But it is only by attending to the abandonment of Mr Pitt's system, and the effects by which that change has been, and must be attended, that the incalculable importance of his financial measures can be appreciated, or the wisdom discerned which, so far as human wisdom could, had guarded against the evils which must, to all appearance, in their ultimate consequences, dissolve the British empire.

It is perfectly true, as Mr Hamilton and the opponents of the sinking fund have argued, that neither national nor individual fortunes can be mended by mere financial operations—by borrowing with one hand, while you pay off with another; and unquestionably Mr Pitt never imagined that if the nation was paying off ten millions a-year, and borrowing twenty, it was making any progress in the discharge of its debt. In this view, it is of no moment to inquire what proportion of the debt annually contracted was applied to the sinking fund; because, as long as larger

19.
Comparison
of the argu-
ments for and
against the
sinking fund.

Tables; PORTER'S Progress of the Nation, ii. 260; and for 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, pp. 3, 4, each year.

N.B.—This table exhibits the progress of the Sinking Fund and Stock redeemed in Great Britain and Ireland, which explains its difference from the preceding table, applicable to Great Britain alone.

Since 1838 to 1843, no money has been applied to the reduction of the national debt; on the contrary, fresh debt to the amount of £10,000,000 has been contracted, being at the average of £1,650,000 a-year. About as much has been paid off since 1842: but wholly by the operation of the war income tax.—*PONTER'S Parl. Tables, vii. 4, and viii. 4.*

sums than that fund was able to discharge were yearly borrowed by the nation, it is evident that the operation of the system was attended with no *present* benefit to the state; nay, that the cost of its machinery was, for the time at least, an addition to its burdens. But, all that notwithstanding, Mr Pitt's plan for the redemption of the debt was founded not only on consummate wisdom, but on a thorough knowledge of human nature. He never looked to the sinking fund as the means of paying off the debt while loans to a larger amount than it redeemed were contracted every year; he regarded it as a fund which would speedily and certainly effect the reduction of the debt *in time of peace*.*

20.
Value of the
system in
time of peace.

It was then that its real effect was to be seen: it was then that the debt contracted during war was to be really discharged. And the admirable nature of the institution consisted in this, that it provided a system, with all the machinery requisite for its complete and effective operation, which, although overshadowed and subdued by the vast contraction of debt during war, came instantly into powerful operation the moment its expenditure was terminated. This was a point of vital importance; indeed, without it, as experience has since proved, all attempts to reduce the debt would have proved utterly nugatory. Mr Pitt was perfectly aware of the natural impatience of taxation felt by mankind in general, and the especial desire

He clearly saw
the objections
since urged
against the
system.

* Mr Pitt's speech on the budget in 1798, affords decisive evidence that he laboured under no delusion on the subject of the operation of the sinking fund during war; but always looked forward to its effects when loans had ceased in consequence of the return of peace, as exemplifying its true character, and alone effecting a real reduction of the debt. "By means of the sinking fund," said he, "we had advanced far in the reduction of the debt previous to the loans necessarily made in the present war, and every year was attended with such accelerated salutary effects as outran the most sanguine calculation. But having done so, we have yet far to go, as things are circumstanced. If the reduction of the debt be confined to the operations of that fund, and the expenses of the war continue to impede our plans of economy,—we shall have to go far *before the operation of that fund, even during peace, can be expected to counteract the effects of the war*. Yet there are means by which I am confident it would be possible, in not many years, to restore our resources, and put the country in a state equal to all exigencies. Not only do I conceive that the principle is wise and the attempt practicable to procure large supplies out of the direct taxes from the year, but I conceive that it is equally wise and not less practicable to make provision for the amount of the debt incurred and funded in the same year: and if the necessity of carrying on the war shall entail upon us the necessity of contracting another debt, this principle, if duly carried into practice, with the assistance of the sinking fund to co-operate, will enable us not to owe more than we did at its commencement. *I cannot indeed take it upon me to say that the war will not stop the progress of liquidation*; but if the means I have pointed out are adopted and resolutely adhered to, it will leave us at least stationary."—*Parl. Hist.* xxxiii. 1053, 1054.

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always experienced, when the excitement of war ceases, that its expenditure should draw to a termination. He foresaw, therefore, that it would be impossible to get the popular representatives at the conclusion of a war to lay on *new* taxes, and provide for a sinking fund to pay off the debt which had been contracted during its continuance. The only way, therefore, to secure that inestimable object, was to have the whole machinery constructed and in full activity during war, so that it might be at once brought forward in full and efficient operation, upon the conclusion of hostilities, without any legislative act or fresh imposition whatever, by the mere termination of the contraction of loans.

21.
Distinctive
merit of Mr
Pitt's system
for the sink-
ing fund.

From what has now been stated, it will readily be discerned, in what the grand merit of Mr Pitt's financial system consisted. It was the imposition, by law, of sufficient *indirect* taxes to meet not only the interest of every new loan, but a hundredth part more to provide a sinking fund for the extinction of its capital, which was its grand distinction. It brought the nation successfully through the crisis of the war, and would have proved the ultimate salvation of the empire, if it had been adhered to with the steadiness which he so earnestly impressed upon the nation, and if no subsequent monetary change had rendered impossible the continuance of the indirect taxes necessary to uphold the system. There was neither juggle nor deception in this. It was a very plain and practical operation, viz :—the providing a surplus of taxation to eat in at compound interest on the capital of the debt. This principle of providing such a surplus is the well-known and indispensable preliminary to every system for the reduction of burdens, whether in public or private. It was in the building upon that foundation the superstructure of a regular invariable system, and bestowing on it the wonderful powers of compound interest, that Mr Pitt's great merit consisted. It was the subsequent repeal of the indirect taxes laid on to provide this surplus fund during peace, when there was no necessity whatever for such a measure, and no motive for it but the thirst for temporary applause in successive administrations, which was the real evil that ruined this noble fabric, and has rendered the debt a hopeless burden

on the nation. And if any doubt could exist on this subject, it would be removed by recollecting the example of France prior to the Revolution, when the system went on for half a century before that crisis, of borrowing large sums annually, and making no provision whatever for payment even of their annual interest, in consequence of which the finances got involved in such a state of hopeless embarrassment as, by rendering the convocation of the States-General unavoidable in a moment of extraordinary excitement, overturned the monarchy.¹

The result has completely proved the wisdom of these views. Crippled and mangled as the sinking fund has been by the enormous encroachments made upon it by the administrations of later times, it has yet done much during the peace to pay off the debt: amply sufficient to demonstrate the solidity of the principles on which it was founded. In sixteen years, which elapsed from 1816 to 1832, even after these copious reductions, it has discharged more than eighty-two millions of the debt, besides the addition of seven millions made by the bonus of five per cent granted to the holders of the five per cents, who were reduced to four: that is, it has paid off in that time nearly ninety millions.* It is not a juggle which, in a time so short in the lifetime of a nation, and during the greater part of which Great Britain was labouring under severe distress in almost all the branches of its industry, was able, even on a reduced scale, to effect a reduction so considerable.

Nor has the experience of the last twenty years been less decisive as to the absolute necessity of making the provision for the liquidation of the debt part of a permanent system, to which the national faith is absolutely and unequivocally bound, and which depends for no part of its efficiency upon the votes or financial measures of

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¹ See *ante*,
Chap. iii.
§§ 118-125.

22.
Proof of these
principles af-
forded by the
result during
the last
twenty years.

23.
It is clearly
the only way
of effecting a
reduction of
the debt.

* Funded debt on January 5, 1816,	.	.	.	£816,311,940
Unfunded ditto,	.	.	.	48,510,501
		Total,	.	£864,822,441
Total debt on 5th January 1833,—				
viz. Funded,	.	.	£754,100,549	
Unfunded,	.	.	27,752,650	
				781,853,199

Paid off in sixteen years, £82,969,242
—*Annual Finance Statement*, 1833; and FEBRER, 246; and PORTER'S *Parliamentary Tables*, ii. 6.

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the year. Since this ruinous modification of Mr Pitt's unbending self-poised system was introduced; since the fatal precedent was established of allowing the minister to determine, by annual votes, how much of the sinking fund was to be applied to the current services of the year, and how much reserved for its original and proper destination, the encroachment on the fund has gone on continually increasing, till at length it has to all practical purposes swallowed it entirely up. The sinking fund, when thus broken upon, has proved the subject of continual subsequent violation, till the shadow even of respect for it is gone. If such has been the fate of this noble and truly patriotic establishment, even when no increased burden was required to keep it in activity, and the temptation which proved fatal to its existence was merely the desire to effect a reduction of taxes long borne by the nation, it is easy to see how utterly hopeless would have been any attempt to make considerable additions to the annual burdens upon the conclusion of hostilities, with a view to effect a diminution of its public debt; and how completely dependent, therefore, the sinking fund was for its very existence, upon Mr Pitt's system of having all its machinery put in motion at the time the loans were contracted during war, and its vast powers brought into full view, *without any application to the legislature*, by the mere cessation of borrowing on the return of peace.*

Durable and
far-seeing sys-
tem which he
had established.

* In Mr Pitt's Financial Resolutions, in the year 1799, which embrace a vast variety of important financial details, there is the clearest indication of the lasting and permanent system to which he looked forward with perfect justice for the entire liquidation of the public debt. One of these resolutions was,—“That supposing the price of 3 per cent stock to be on an average, after the year 1800, £90 in time of peace, and £75 in time of war, and the proportion of peace and war to be the same as for the last hundred years, the average price of peace and war will be about £85; that the whole debt created in each year of the present war will be redeemed in about forty years from such year respectively, and the whole of the capital debt existing previous to 1793, will be redeemed in about forty-seven years from the present time; that from 1808 to 1833 (at which time the capital debt created in the first year of the present war would be redeemed, and the taxes applicable to the charges thereof would become disposable,) taxes would be set free in each year of peace to the amount of £133,000, and of war to that of £168,000; that the amount of the sum annually applicable to the reduction of the debt would in the course of the same period gradually rise from £5,000,000 to £10,400,000; and that, on the suppositions before stated, taxes equal to the amount of the charges created during each year of the present war will be successively set free, from 1833 to 1840, to the amount in the whole of £10,500,000, and about 1846, further taxes to the amount of £4,200,000, being the sum applicable from 1808 to the reduction of the debt existing previous to 1793; making in all, when the whole debt is extinguished in 1846, a reduction of £19,000,000 yearly.” Such was the far-seeing and durable system of this great statesman; and

Not a shadow of a doubt can now remain that Mr Pitt's and Mr Addington's anticipations were well founded, and that if their system had been adhered to since the peace, the whole national debt would have been discharged by the year 1845. The payment of eighty millions, under the mutilated system, since 1815, affords a sample of what might have been expected had its efficiency not been impaired. Even supposing that, for the extraordinary efforts of 1813, 1814, and 1815, it had been necessary to borrow from the commissioners the whole sinking fund during each of these years, still, if the nation and its government had possessed sufficient resolution to have resumed the system with the termination of hostilities, and steadily adhered to it since that time, the debt discharged by the year 1836 would, at five per cent, have been above five hundred millions, and the sinking fund would now (1835) have been paying off above forty millions a-year. Or, if the national engagements would only have permitted the sinking fund to have been kept up at ten millions yearly from the produce of taxes, and if the accumulation were to be calculated at four per cent, which, on an average, is probably not far from the truth, the fund applicable to the reduction of debt would now have been above twenty millions annually, and the debt already discharged would have exceeded three hundred and thirty millions! A more rapid reduction of funded property would not probably have been consistent, either with a proper regard to the employment of capital, or the due creation of safe channels of investment, to receive so vast an annual discharge from the public treasury.*

experience has now proved, that, if his principles had been adhered to, and the taxes applicable to the charges of the debt had not been imprudently repealed, these anticipations would have been more than realised, notwithstanding the vast increase of the debt since that time.¹

* Table I., showing what the Sinking Fund, accumulating at five per cent, if maintained at £15,000,000 a-year, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836:—

1816	. . .	£15,000,000	Brought forward,	. . .	£212,660,625
1817	. . .	15,750,000	1827	. . .	25,530,240
1818	. . .	16,537,500	1828	. . .	26,839,360
1819	. . .	17,363,870	1829	. . .	28,181,423
1820	. . .	18,231,973	1830	. . .	29,580,464
1821	. . .	19,143,566	1831	. . .	31,079,590
1822	. . .	20,100,774	1832	. . .	33,153,577
1823	. . .	21,005,038	1833	. . .	34,816,000
1824	. . .	22,055,284	1834	. . .	35,524,625
1825	. . .	23,157,048	1835	. . .	37,238,312
1826	. . .	24,315,572	1836	. . .	39,099,214
Carry forward,	. . .	£212,660,625	Total in 20 years,	. . .	£533,708,430

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24.

Had it been adhered to the whole debt would have been discharged in 1845.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 1155.

Tables showing the progressive growth of a sinking fund of fifteen or ten millions, from 1816 to 1836.

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25.

Causes which
have led to
the decay of
this system.

Every thing, therefore, conspires to demonstrate that Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the national debt was not only founded on just principles and profound foresight, but on an accurate knowledge of human nature, a correct appreciation of the principles by which such a salutary scheme was likely to be defeated, and the means by which alone its permanent efficiency could be secured. And no doubt can now remain in any impartial mind, that, if that system had been resolutely adhered to, the whole debt contracted during the wars of the French Revolution might have been discharged in little more than the time which was occupied in its contraction. What is it, then, which has occasioned the subsequent ruin of a system constructed with so much wisdom, and so long adhered to under the severest trials with unshaken fidelity? The answer is to be found in the temporary views and yielding policy of succeeding statesmen: in the substitution of ideas of present expedience for those of permanent advantage; in the fatal contraction of the currency in 1819, which rendered the continuance of the indirect taxes which formed the basis of the sinking fund difficult, and in the end impossible; in the advent of times when government looked from year to year, not from century to century; in the mistaking the present applause of the unreflecting many for that sober approbation of the thoughtful few, which it should

Table II., showing what the Sinking Fund, if maintained from the taxes at £10,000,000 sterling, and if accumulating at four per cent only, would have paid off from 1816 to 1836:—

1816	. . .	£10,000,000	Brought forward,	. . .	£138,243,700
1817	. . .	10,400,000	1827	. . .	16,032,580
1818	. . .	10,816,000	1828	. . .	16,673,880
1819	. . .	11,264,000	1829	. . .	17,340,832
1820	. . .	11,715,560	1830	. . .	18,034,464
1821	. . .	12,671,544	1831	. . .	18,754,840
1822	. . .	13,178,404	1832	. . .	19,505,032
1823	. . .	13,705,540	1833	. . .	20,285,232
1824	. . .	14,253,760	1834	. . .	21,096,640
1825	. . .	14,822,948	1835	. . .	21,930,504
1826	. . .	15,415,944	1836	. . .	23,107,724
Carry forward,	. . .	£138,243,700	Total in 20 years,	. . .	£331,005,423

Supposing the stock, in the first case, purchased on an average at 90 by the commissioners, the £533,708,430 sterling money would have redeemed a tenth more of the stock, or £587,000,000. Supposing it bought, in the second case, at an average of 85, which would probably have been about the mark, the £342,000,000 sterling money would have purchased nearly a seventh more of stock, or £385,357,000, being just about a half of the debt existing at this moment, (1835.)

ever be the chief object of an enlightened statesman to obtain.

When a Greek orator was applauded by the multitude for his speech, the philosopher chid him; "for," said he, "if you had spoken wisely these men would have given no signs of approbation." The observation is not founded on any peculiar fickleness or levity in the Athenian people, but on the permanent principles of human nature, and that general prevalence of the desire for temporary ease over considerations of permanent advantage, which it is the great object of the moralist to combat, and to the influence of which the greatest disasters of private life are owing. And, without relieving subsequent statesmen of their full share of responsibility for an evil which will now in the end probably consign the British empire to destruction, it may safely be affirmed that the British people, and every individual amongst them, must bear their full share of the burden. A general delusion seized the public mind. The populace loudly clamoured for a reduction of taxation, without any regard to the consequences, not merely on future times, but their own present advantage. The learned fiercely assailed the sinking fund, and, with hardly a single exception, branded the work of Pitt and Fox as a vile imposture, incapable of standing the examination of reason or experience. The Opposition vehemently demanded the remission of taxes; the government weakly granted the request. Year after year passed away under this miserable delusion; tax after tax was repealed amidst the applause of the whole nation; * the general concurrence in the work of destruction for a

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1806—1832.

26.

It was the
desire for
present popu-
larity in the
government.

* Taxes repealed since the peace of 1814 to 1834.—

	Net produce.	Gross produce.	
1814. War duties on goods, &c.	£932,000	£948,861	Table showing the amount of direct and in- direct taxes repealed from 1816 to 1834.
1815. Ditto,	222,000	222,749	
1816. Property tax and war malt,	17,547,000	17,886,666	
1817. Sweet wines,	37,000	37,813	
1818. Vinegar, &c.	9,500	9,524	
1819. Plate glass, &c.	269,000	273,573	
1820. Beer in Scotland,	4,000	4,000	
1821. Wool,	471,000	490,113	
1822. Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000	2,164,037	
1823. Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000	4,286,389	
1824. Thrown silk and salt,	1,801,000	1,805,467	
1825. Wine, salt, &c.	3,676,000	3,771,019	
1826. Rum and British spirits,	1,967,000	1,973,915	
1827. Stamps,	84,000	84,038	
Carry forward,	£33,343,500	£33,958,163	

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time almost obliterated the deep lines of party distinction, and, amidst mutual compliments from the opposition to the ministerial benches, the broad foundations of British greatness were loosened; the provident system of former times was abandoned; revenue to the amount of forty millions a-year surrendered without any equivalent; and the nation, when it awakened from its trance, found itself saddled for ever with eight-and-twenty millions as the interest of debt, without any means of redemption, and a democratic constitution which rendered the construction of any such in time to come utterly hopeless.

27.
Great error
in not repeal-
ing at once all
the direct
taxes on the
peace.

The people were entitled to demand an instant relaxation from taxation upon the termination of hostilities; the pressure of the war taxes would have been insupportable when the excitement and expenditure of war were over. The income tax could no longer be endured; the assessed taxes and all the direct imposts should at once have been repealed; no man, excepting the dealers in articles liable to indirect taxation, should have paid any thing to government. This was a part, and a most important part, of Mr Pitt's system. He was aware of the extreme and well-founded discontent which the payment of direct taxes to government occasions; he knew that nothing but the excitement and understood necessities of war can render them bearable. His system was, therefore, to provide for the extra expenses of war entirely by loans or direct taxes, and to devote the indirect taxes to the interest of the public debt and the permanent charges of government—those lasting burdens which could not be reduced without injury to the national credit or security on the termination of hostilities. In this way a triple

	Brought forward,	Net produce.	Gross produce.
		£33,343,500	£33,958,163
1828. Rice, &c.	.	51,000	52,227
1829. Silk, &c.	.	126,000	126,406
1830. Beer, hides, and sugar,	.	4,070,000	4,264,425
1831. Printed cotton and coals,	.	1,588,000	3,189,312
1832. Candles, almonds, raisins, &c.	.	747,000	754,996
1833. Soap, tiles, &c.	.	1,000,000	1,100,000
1834. House duty,	.	1,200,000	1,400,000
		£42,125,500	£44,845,529
Laid on in the same time,	.	5,813,000	
Net taxation reduced,	.	£36,312,500	

Of which £18,690,000 was direct, and £17,490,000 indirect.
—See *Parl. Paper*, 14th June 1833, and *Budget* 1834, *Parl. Deb.*

object was gained. The nation during the continuance of war was made to feel its pressure by the payment of heavy annual duties, while upon its conclusion the people experienced an instant relief in the cessation of those direct payments to government, which are always felt as most burdensome; and at the same time the permanent charges of the state were provided for in those indirect duties, which, although by far the most productive, are seldom complained of from their being mixed up with the price of commodities, and so not perceived by those who ultimately bear their weight. Mr Pitt's system of taxation, in short, combined the important objects of heavy taxation during war, instant relief on peace, and a permanent provision for the lasting expenses of the state, in the way least burdensome to the people. The influence of these admirable principles is to be seen in the custom so long adhered to, and only departed from amidst the improvidence of later times, of separating, in the annual accounts of the nation, the war charges from the permanent expenses, and providing for the former by loans and temporary taxes, for the most part in the direct form, while the latter were met by lasting imposts, which were not to be diminished till the burdens to which they were applicable were discharged.

Following out these principles, the income tax, the assessed taxes, the war malt tax, and in general all the war taxes, should have been repealed on the conclusion of hostilities, or as soon as the floating debt contracted during their continuance was liquidated: but, on the other hand, the indirect taxes should have been regarded as a sacred fund set apart for the permanent expenses of the nation, the interest of the debt, and the sinking fund, and none of them repealed till, from the growth of a surplus, after meeting those necessary charges, it had become apparent that such relief could be afforded without trenching on the financial resources of the state. That the growth of population, and the constant efforts of general industry, would progressively have enabled government, without injuring these objects, to afford such relief, at least by the repeal of the most burdensome of the indirect taxes, as the salt tax, the soap and candle tax, and part of the malt tax, is evident, from the consideration that the taxes given up since

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1816—1832.

28.

Imprudent
remission of
indirect taxes
since 1816.

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1826—1832.

the peace amount to £42,000,000, while £5,000,000 only have been imposed during the same period,* and consequently after the repeal of the income tax, assessed taxes, and these oppressive indirect taxes, an ample fund for the maintenance of the sinking fund, even at the elevated rate of fifteen millions a-year, would have remained. Thus Mr Pitt's system involved within itself the important and invaluable qualities of providing amply for the necessities of the moment, affording instant relief on the termination of hostilities, and yet reserving an adequate fund for the liquidation of all the national engagements in as short a time as they were contracted.

29.
Little good
has been
derived from
this repeal of
indirect taxes.

If, indeed, the nation had been positively unable to bear the burden of the sinking fund of fifteen millions drawn from the indirect taxes, it might have been justly argued that the evil consequences of its abandonment, however much to be deplored, were unavoidable; and therefore that the present hopeless situation of the debt may be the subject of regret, but cannot be reproached as a fault to any administration whatever. But unfortunately this was by no means the case. To all appearance, the nation has derived no material benefit from a great part of the taxes thus improvidently abandoned, but has, on the contrary, suffered in all its present interests, as well as future prospects, from the change. In proof of this, it is only necessary to recollect, that during the war the nation not only existed, but throve under burdens infinitely greater than have been imposed since its termination, and that, too, although the exports and imports at that period were little more than *half* of what they have since become. During the four last years of the war, the sum annually raised by taxes was from sixty-five to seventy-five mil-

	* Total taxes repealed since the peace,	£42,115,000
	Might have been repealed, viz.—	
Ample funds which existed for its main- tenance, even after providing largely for the public relief.	Property tax and war malt,	£17,547,000
	War duties on goods,	1,154,000
	Annual malt and hides,	2,139,000
	Salt and assessed taxes,	4,185,000
	Candles,	600,000
	Soap tax,	800,000
	House tax,	1,200,000
		£27,625,000
	Leaving to support the sinking fund,	14,490,000
		£42,115,000
	Besides £5,813,000 of fresh taxes imposed during the same period.	

lions, while twenty years after it was from forty-five to fifty ; although, during the first period, the exports ranged from forty-five to sixty millions, and the imports from twenty-five to thirty ; while, during the latter, the exports had risen to seventy-five millions, and the imports to forty-five ; and in the last year the former had swelled to the enormous amount of one hundred and five millions, and the latter to sixty.*

Without doubt, the prosperity of the later years of the war was in a great degree fictitious : most certainly it depended to a certain extent on the feverish excitement of an extravagant issue of paper, and was also much to be ascribed to a large portion of the capital of the nation being at that period annually borrowed and spent in an unproductive form, to its great present benefit and certain ultimate embarrassment. It is equally clear, that if this had gone on for some years longer, irreparable ruin must have been the result. But there is a medium in all things. As much as the public expenditure before 1816 exceeded what a healthful state of the body politic could bear, so much has the expenditure since that time fallen short of it. Violent transitions are as injurious in political as in private life. To pass at once from a state of vast and unprecedented expenditure to one of rigid and jealous economy, is in the highest degree injurious to a nation ; it is like reducing a patient suddenly from an inflammatory diet to the fare of an anchorite. It may sometimes be unavoidable, but unquestionably the change would be much less perilous if gradually effected.

It was unquestionably right, at the conclusion of the war, to have made as large a reduction as was consistent

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30.

Immense
burdens under
which the
nation prospered
during
the war.

	Raised by taxes.	Official value. Exports.	Official value. Imports.
		Great Britain and Ireland.	Great Britain and Ireland.
* 1813,	£63,211,000	£38,226,283	£25,163,411
1814,	70,926,000	Records destroyed by fire.	
1815,	72,210,000	52,573,034	33,755,264
1816,	62,264,000	58,624,600	32,987,396
1830,	£55,824,802	£69,691,302	£46,245,241
1831,	54,810,190	71,429,004	49,713,889
1832,	50,190,315	76,071,572	44,586,241
1836,	£48,591,180	£97,621,549	£57,230,963
1837,	47,030,000	85,781,669	54,737,301
1838,	47,978,753	105,170,549	61,268,320

—PEBRER'S *Tables*, 159, 341 ; PORTER'S *Tables*, I. 48, and II. 49 ; Finance Accounts, 27th March 1839 ; PORTER'S *Progress of the Nation*, II. 296.

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1816—1832.

31.
Argument on
this subject.

with the public security in the army and navy, and to stop at once the perilous system of borrowing money. Such a reduction at once permitted the repeal of the whole direct war taxes. But having done this, the question is, Was it expedient to go a step farther, and make such reductions in the indirect taxes, of which no serious complaint was made, as amounted to a practical repeal of the sinking fund? That was the ruinous measure. The maintenance of that fund at twelve or fifteen millions a-year, raised from taxes, with its growing increase, would to all appearance have been a happy medium, which, without adding to, but, on the contrary, in the long run diminishing, the national burdens, would at the same time have prevented that violent transition from a state of expenditure to one of retrenchment, under the effects of which, for twenty years after the peace, all branches of industry, with only a few intervals, continued to labour. No one branch of the government expenditure would have gone farther to uphold, during this trying time, the industry and credit of the country, and diffuse an active demand for labour through all classes, than that which was devoted to the sinking fund. Such a fund, beginning at twelve or fifteen millions a-year derived from taxes, and progressively rising to twenty, thirty, and forty millions, annually, applied to the redemption of stock, must have had a prodigious effect, both in upholding credit and spreading commercial enterprise through the country. It would have produced an effect precisely opposite to that which the annual absorption of the same sum in loans, during the war, occasioned.

32.
Great immediate as well as ultimate advantages which would have attended keeping up the sinking fund.

The public funds, under the influence of the prodigious and growing purchases of the commissioners, must have been maintained at a very high level; it is probably not going too far to say, that, since 1820, they would have been constantly kept at from ninety to one hundred. The effect of such a state of things in vivifying and sustaining commercial enterprise, and counteracting the depression consequent upon the great diminution of the government expenditure in other departments, must have been immense. The money given for the stock purchased by the commissioners would have been let loose upon the country; their operations must have continually poured out upon

the nation a stream of wealth, constantly increasing in amount, which, in the search for profitable investment, could not have avoided giving a most important stimulus to every branch of national industry. The sinking fund would have operated like a great forcing-pump, which drew a large portion of the capital of the country annually out of its unproductive investment in the public funds, and directed it to the various beneficial channels of private employment. Doubtless the funds necessary for the accomplishment of this great work could only have been drawn from the nation, as the proceeds of the stock purchased by the commissioners, just as the produce of the taxes is all extracted from the national industry; but experience has abundantly proved that such a forcible direction of a considerable part of the national income to such a productive investment, is often more conducive to immediate prosperity, as well as ultimate advantage, than if, from an undue regard to popular clamour, it is allowed to remain at the disposal of individuals. It is like compelling a spendthrift and embarrassed landowner, not only to provide annually for the interest of his debts, but to pay off a stated portion of the principal, which, when assigned to his creditors, is immediately devoted to the fertilising of his fields and the draining of his morasses.

Nor is this all. The high price of the funds consequent upon the vast and increasing purchases of the commissioners, would have gone far not only to keep up that prosperous state of credit which is essential to the well-being of a commercial country, but have induced numbers of private individuals to sell out, in order to realise the great addition to their capitals which the rise of the public securities had occasioned. To assert that this forced application yearly of a considerable portion of the national capital to the redemption of the debt, would have altogether counteracted the decline in the demand for labour consequent on the transition from a state of war to one of peace, would be going farther than either reason or experience will justify. But this much may confidently be asserted, that the general prosperity consequent on this state of things could not have failed to have rendered the taxation requisite to produce it comparatively an endurable burden—that the nation would, to all appearance, have been much more pros-

33.
Beneficial result which would have arisen from keeping up the price of the funds.

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1816—1832.

perous than it has been under the opposite system, and, at the same time, would have obtained the incalculable advantage of having paid off, during these prosperous years, above two-thirds of the national debt. This prosperity, doubtless, would have been partly owing to a forced direction of capital ; but, whatever danger there may be in such a state of things while debt is annually contracted, there is comparatively little when it is continued only for its discharge—and when an artificial system has contributed to the formation of a burden, it is well that it should not be entirely removed till that burden is reduced to a reasonable amount.

34.
Public errors
which led to
its abandon-
ment, and
their distress-
ing effects.

Every one, when this vast reduction of indirect taxes was going on, to the entire destruction of the sinking fund and Mr Pitt's provident system of financial policy, looked only, even with reference to present advantage, to one side of the account. They forgot that if the demands of government on the industry of the nation were rapidly reduced, its demands on government must instantly undergo a similar diminution ; that if the exchequer ceased to collect seventy millions a-year, it must cease also to expend it. Every reduction of taxation, even in those branches where it was not complained of, was held forth as an alleviation of the burdens of the nation, and a reasonable ground for popularity to its rulers ; whereas, in truth, the relief even at the moment was more nominal than real. Though a diminution of those burdens was effected, it took place frequently in quarters where they were imperceptible, and drew after it an instantaneous and most sensible reduction in the demand for labour and the employment of the industrious classes, at a time when such demand could ill be spared, from the same effect having simultaneously ensued from other causes. Great part of the distress which has been felt by all classes since the peace, was the result of the general diminution of expenditure, which the too rapid reduction of so many indirect taxes and consequent abandonment of the sinking fund necessarily occasioned ; and which the maintenance of its machinery, till it had fulfilled its destined purpose, would to a very great degree have alleviated. It augments our regret, therefore, at the abandonment of Mr Pitt's financial system, that the change had not even the excuse of present necessity or obvious

expedience for its recommendation ; but was the result of undue subservience to particular interests, or desire for popularity on the part of our rulers, unattended even by the temporary advantages for the sake of which its incalculable ultimate benefits were relinquished.

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XLI.

1816—1832.

Lord Castlereagh made a most manly endeavour, in 1816, to induce the people to submit for a few years to that elevated rate of taxation by which alone permanent relief from the national embarrassments could be expected ; but he committed a signal error in the tax which he selected for the struggle, and deviated as much from Mr Pitt's principles in the effort to maintain that heavy impost, as subsequent administrations did in their abandonment of others of a lighter character. The income tax, being a direct war impost of the most oppressive and invidious description, was always intended by that great statesman to come to a close with the termination of hostilities ; and its weight was so excessive, that it was impossible and unreasonable to expect the people to submit any longer to its continuance. Nothing could be more impolitic, therefore, than to commit government to a contest with the nation on so untenable a ground. It was the subsequent repeal of indirect taxes to the amount of above thirty millions a-year, when they were not complained of, and when the fall in the price of the taxed articles, from the change in the value of money, had rendered their weight imperceptible, which was the fatal deviation from Mr Pitt's principles.

35.
Lord Castle-
reagh's error
regarding the
income tax.

The administrations by whom this prodigious repeal was effected are not exclusively responsible for the result. It is not unlikely, that, from the growing preponderance of the popular branch of the constitution, it had become impossible to carry on the government without the annual exhibition of some such fallacious benefit, to gain the applause of the multitude ; and it is more than probable that, from the excessive influence which in later years it acquired, the maintenance of any fixed provident system of finance had become impossible. But they are to blame, and history cannot acquit them of the fault, for not having constantly and strenuously combated this natural, though ruinous, popular weakness ; and if they could not prevail on the House of Commons to adhere to Mr Pitt's

36.
The nation
was mainly
responsible
for this
change of
system.

CHAP.
XLI.

1816—1832.

financial system, they should at least have laid on them the responsibility of all the consequences of its abandonment. And as the repeal of indirect taxes during peace was the fatal error, so the return to an income tax during the burdens of the Chinese, and the disasters of the Affghanistaun wars, in 1842, was a wise and manly measure, as much in accordance with the spirit of Mr Pitt's financial policy as the previous calamitous reductions of indirect taxes had been against it.

It was impossible to explain Mr Pitt's system for the reduction of the debt, without anticipating the course of events, and unfolding the ruinous results which have followed the departure from its principles. The paramount importance of the subject must plead the author's apology for the anachronism; and it remains now to advert, with a different measure of encomium, to the funding system on which that statesman so largely acted, and the general principles on which his taxation was founded.

37.
Advantages
of the fund-
ing system.

It is evident that, in some cases, the funding system, or the plan of providing for extraordinary public expenses by loans, the interest of which is alone laid as a burden on future years, is not only just, but attended with very great public advantage. When a war is destined apparently to be of short endurance, and a great lasting advantage may be expected from its results, it is often impossible, and if possible would be unjust, to lay its expenses exclusively upon the years of its continuance. In ordinary contests, indeed, it is frequently practicable, and when so it is always advisable, to make the expenses of the year fall entirely upon its income, so that at the conclusion of hostilities, no lasting burden may descend upon posterity. But in other cases this cannot be done. When, in consequence of the fierce attack of a desperate and reckless enemy, it has become necessary to make extraordinary efforts, it is often altogether out of the question to raise supplies in the year adequate to its expenditure; nor is it reasonable in such cases to lay upon those who, for the sake of their children as well as themselves, have engaged in the struggle, the whole charges of a contest of which the more lasting benefits are probably to accrue to those who are to succeed them. In such cases, necessity

in nations, not less than individuals, calls for the equalisation of the burden over all those who are to obtain the benefit; and the obvious mode of effecting this is by the funding system, which, providing at once by loan the supplies necessary for carrying on the contest, lays its interest as a lasting charge on those for whose behoof the debt had been contracted. Nor is it possible to deny, amidst all the evils which the abuse of this system has occasioned, its astonishing effect in suddenly augmenting the resources of a nation; or to resist the conclusion deducible from the fact, that it was to its vigorous and happy application at the close of the war, that the extraordinary successes by which it was distinguished are in a great degree to be ascribed.*

But this system, like every thing good in human affairs, has its limits; and if extraordinary benefits may sometimes arise from its adoption, extraordinary evils may still more frequently originate in its abuse. Many individuals have been elevated, by means of loans contributed at a fortunate moment, to wealth and greatness; but many more have been involved, by the fatal command of money which it confers for a short period, in irretrievable embarrassments. Unless suggested by necessity and conducted with prudence—unless administered with frugality and followed by parsimony, borrowing is to nations, not less than individuals, the general road to ruin. It is the ease of contracting compared with the difficulty of discharging; the natural disposition to get a present command of money, and leave the task of paying it off to posterity, which is the temptation that, to communities not less than single men, so often proves irresistible. Opulent nations, whose credit is high, become involved in debt from the same cause which has overwhelmed almost all the great estates in Europe with mortgages. The existence of the means of relieving pre-

38.
Its dangers.

* Loans contracted by the British government in the latter years of the war,—

1812,	£24,000,000	1814,	£58,763,000
1813,	27,871,000	1815,	18,500,000

Of these great loans upwards of £12,000,000 was, in 1813, 1814, and 1815, applied annually to the subsidising of foreign powers; in consequence of which, the whole armies of Europe came to be arrayed in British pay on the banks of the Rhine; while, at the same time, the Duke of Wellington, at the head of 80,000 men, was maintained on the southern frontier of France.—*MOREAU'S Tables; FEBRER, 246.*

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XLI.

1816—1832.

sent difficulties, by merely contracting debt, is more than the firmness either of the heads of families or the rulers of empires can resist. And there is this extraordinary and peculiar danger in the lavish contraction of debt by government, that, by the great present expenditure with which it is attended, a very great impulse is communicated at the time to every branch of industry, and thus immediate prosperity is generated out of the source of ultimate ruin.

39.
Mr Pitt's
views on this
subject.

Mr Pitt was fully aware both of the immediate advantages and ultimate dangers of the funding system. His measures, accordingly, varied with the aspect which the war assumed, and the chances of bringing it to an immediate issue which present appearances seemed to afford. During its earlier years, when the continental campaigns were going on, and a rapid termination of the strife was constantly expected, as was the case with the Spanish Revolution in 1823, or the Polish in 1831, large loans were annually contracted, and the greater part of the war supplies of the year were raised by that means; provision being made for the permanent raising of the interest, and of the sinking fund for the extinction of these loans, in the indirect taxes which were simultaneously laid on, and to the maintenance of which the national faith was pledged, till the whole debt thus contracted, principal and interest, was discharged.* It is no impeachment of the wisdom of this system, so far as finance goes, that the expectations of a speedy termination of the contest were constantly disappointed, and that debt to the amount of a hundred and sixteen million pounds was contracted before the continental peace of Campo Formio in 1797, without any other result than a constant addition to the power of France. The question is not, whether the resources obtained from these loans were beneficially expended, but whether the debts were contracted yearly under a belief, founded on rational

* 1793,	Loan contracted,	£4,500,000
1794,	12,907,451
1795,	42,090,646
1796,	42,736,196
1797,	14,620,000

£116,854,293

grounds, that by a vigorous prosecution of the contest, it might speedily be brought to a successful issue? That this view, so far as mere finance considerations are concerned, was well founded, is obvious from the narrow escapes which the French Republic repeatedly made during that period, and the many occasions on which the jealousies of the allies, or the niggardly exertion of its military resources by Great Britain, threw away the means of triumph when within their grasp.

The financial measures of the British minister, therefore, during this period, were justifiable and prudent: the real error consisted in the misapplication or undue husbanding of the land forces of the country, for which it is not so easy to find an apology. But after the peace of Campo Formio, in 1797, this system of lavish annual borrowing, in expectation of an immediate and decisive result, necessarily required a modification. Great Britain was then left alone in the struggle. Her continental allies had all disappeared from the field of battle; and the utmost that she could now expect was, to continue a defensive warfare till time or a different series of events had again brought their vast armies to her side. To have continued the system of borrowing for the war expenses of the year, in such a state of the contest, would have been to go on with measures which were likely to lead to perdition. The war having now assumed a defensive and lasting complexion, the moment had arrived when it became necessary to bring the taxes within the year nearer to a level with the expenditure. This change, and the reasons for it, are thus detailed in Mr Pitt's speech on the budget for the year 1798:—

“Nineteen millions is the sum which is required for extraordinary expenses in the present year. According to the received system of financial operations, the natural and ordinary mode of providing for this would be by a loan. I admit that the funding system, which has so long been the established mode of supplying the public wants, is not yet exhausted, though I cannot but regret the extent to which it has been carried. If we look, however, at the general diffusion of wealth, and the great accumulation of capital; above all, if we consider the hopes which the enemy has of wearing us out by the em-

CHAP.
XLI.
1797.

40.
Modification
which they
received after
the first con-
tinental peace
in 1797.

41.
Mr Pitt's
speech on the
change then
introduced.

CHAP.

XLI.

1798.

barrassments of the funding system, we must admit that the true mode of preparing ourselves to maintain the contest with effect and ultimate success, is to reduce the advantages which the funding system is calculated to afford within due limits, and to prevent the depreciation of our national securities. We ought to consider how far the efforts we shall exert to preserve the blessings we enjoy, will enable us to transmit the inheritance to posterity unencumbered with those burdens which would cripple their vigour, and prevent them from asserting that rank in the scale of nations which their ancestors so long and gloriously maintained. It is in this point of view that the subject ought to be considered. Whatever objections might have been fairly urged against the funding system in its origin, no man can suppose that, after the form and shape which it has given to our financial affairs, after the heavy burdens which it has left behind it, we can now recur to the notion of making the supplies raised within the year, on such a scale of war expense as we are now placed in, equal the expenditure. If such a plan, how desirable soever, is evidently impracticable, some medium, however, may be found to draw as much advantage from the funding system as it is fit, consistently with a due regard to posterity, to afford, and at the same time to obviate the evils with which its excess would be attended. We may still devise some expedient by which we may contribute to the defence of our own cause, and to the supply of our own exigencies; by which we may reduce within equitable limits the accommodation of the funding system, and lay the foundation of that quick redemption which will prevent the dangerous consequences of an overgrown accumulation of our public debt.

“To guard against the undue accumulation of the public debt, and to contribute that share to the struggle in which we are engaged which our abilities will enable us, without inconvenience to those who are called upon to contribute, to afford, appears essentially necessary. I propose, with this view, to reduce the loan for this year (1798) to twelve millions, and to raise seven millions by additional taxation within the year. I am aware that this sum does far exceed any thing which has been raised

42.

He proposes
to augment
the supplies
raised within
the year.

at any former period at one time ; but I trust that whatever temporary sacrifices it may be necessary to make, the House will see that they will best provide for the ultimate success of the struggle, by showing that they are determined to be guided by no personal considerations ; and that, while they defend the present blessings they enjoy, they are not regardless of posterity. If the sacrifices required be considered in this view—if they be taken in reference to the objects for which we contend, and the evils we are labouring to avert, great as they may be compared with former exertions, they will appear light in the balance. The objects to be attained in the selection of the tax to meet this great increase are threefold. One great point is, that the plan should be diffused as extensively as possible, without the necessity of such an investigation of property as the customs, the manners, and the pursuits of the people would render odious. The next is, that it should exclude those who are least able to contribute or furnish means of relief. The third, that it should admit of those abatements which, in particular instances, it might be prudent to make in the proportion of those who might be liable under its general principles. No scheme, indeed, can be practically carried into execution in any financial arrangement, much more in one embraced in such difficult circumstances as the present, with such perfect dispositions as to guard against hardship in every individual instance ; but these appear to me to be the principles which should be kept in view in the discussion of the proper method to be adopted for meeting the large deficiency, which, from the contraction of the loan, it will become necessary to make good by taxation within the present year.”¹

In pursuance of these admirable principles, Mr Pitt proposed to treble the assessed taxes, which fell chiefly on the rich, such as servants, horses, carriages ; and that the house and window tax, which in a great measure are borne by the middle ranks, should only be doubled ; both under various restrictions, to restrain their severity in affecting the humbler class of citizens. This was agreed to by the committee of the House of Commons ; and thus the first step was made in the new system of contracting the loan within narrower limits, and making the

CHAP.
XLI.

1798.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii. 1042,
1045.

43.
Trebling of
the assessed
taxes.

CHAP.
XLI.

1798.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii. 1076.

supplies raised within the year more nearly approach to its expenditure. But the produce of the tax fell greatly short of the expectations of government, as they had calculated on its reaching seven millions, whereas it never exceeded four millions and a half; a deficiency which demonstrated that the limits of indirect taxation on these objects had been passed, and rendered a recurrence to borrowing necessary in that very year. The trebled assessed taxes thus imposed, however, were, according to Mr Pitt's plan, to be continued only for a limited time; and kept up only as a war burden.¹

44.
In Mr Pitt's
view these
heavy bur-
dens were to
be temporary
only.

"I propose," said he, "that the increased assessment now voted shall be continued till the principal and interest of the loan contracted this year shall be discharged: so that after the seven millions shall have been raised within this year, the same sums continued next year, with the additional aid of the sinking fund, will pay off all that principal and intermediate interest. If you feel yourselves equal to this exertion, its effects will not be confined to the benefits I have stated in the way of general policy; it will go to the exoneration of the nation from increased burdens. Unless you feel that you have a right to expect that, by less exertion, you will be equally secure, and indulge in the hope that, by stopping short of this effort, you will produce a successful termination of the war, you must put aside all apprehensions of the present pressure, and, by vigorous exertion, endeavour to secure your future stability; the happy effects of which will soon be seen and acknowledged. I am aware it will be said that it would have been fortunate if the system of funding had never been introduced, and that it is much to be lamented that it is not terminated; but if we are arrived at a moment which requires a change of system, it is some encouragement for us to look forward to benefits which, on all former occasions, have been unknown, because the means of obtaining them were neglected. Raise the present sum by taxation in two years, and you and your posterity are completely exonerated from it; but if, on the other hand, you fund its amount, it will entail an annual tribute for its interest which, in forty years, will amount to no less than forty millions. These are the principles, this is the conduct, this is the language, fit for men legislating for a country

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XLI.

1799.

that, from its situation, character, and institutions, bears the fairest chance of any in Europe for perpetuity. You should look to distant benefits, and not work in the narrow circumscribed sphere of shortsighted selfish politicians. You should put to yourselves this question, the only one now to be considered, 'Shall we sacrifice, or shall we save to our posterity, a sum of between forty and fifty millions sterling?' And above all, you should consider the effect which such a firm and dignified conduct would have on the progress and termination of the present contest, which may, without exaggeration, involve every thing dear to yourselves, and decide the fate of your posterity."¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiii. 1054,
1055.

45.
Great change
of system
thus intro-
duced.

Here was a great change of system, and a remarkable approximation to a more statesmanlike and manly mode of raising the supplies required for the existing contest. Instead of providing taxes adequate to the interest merely of the sums borrowed, direct burdens were now to be imposed, which in two or three years would discharge the whole principal sums themselves. An admirable plan, and the nearest approximation which was probably then practicable to the only safe system of finance, that of making the supplies raised within the year equal or nearly equal to the expenditure. It was soon, however, departed from amidst the necessities or profusion of future years; and from the heavy burdens which it imposes at the moment, and its withdrawing as much capital from the private employment of labour as it adds to the public, it was necessarily attended both with greatly more present suffering, and far less counteracting prosperity, than the more encouraging and delusive system of providing for all emergencies by lavish borrowing, which had previously, and for so long a period, been adopted.

46.
First intro-
duction of
the income
tax.

The new system, thus commenced, was continued with more or less resolution during all the remainder of Mr Pitt's administration. But, in spite of the clear perception which all statesmen had now attained of the ultimate dangers of the funding system, it was found to be impossible to continue the new plan to the full extent originally contemplated by its author. In the next year, the war again broke out under circumstances the most favourable to the European powers, and sound policy forbade a nig-gardly system of finance, when, by a great combined effort,

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XII.

1799.

Feb. 1799.

it appeared possible to obtain, during the absence of Napoleon on the sands of Egypt, all the objects of the war in a single campaign. Impressed with these considerations, Mr Pitt proposed the income tax in 1799; a great step in financial improvement, and, if considered as a *war* impost, and regulated according to a just scale, the most productive, and for such circumstances the most expedient, that could be adopted. The grounds on which this great addition to the national burdens was proposed, were thus stated by Mr Pitt:—

47.
Mr Pitt's
speech intro-
ducing this
impost, and
his plan.

“The principles of finance which the House adopted last year, were, first, to reduce the total amount to be at present raised by loan; and next, to provide for the deficiency by a temporary tax, which should extinguish the loan within a limited time. The modifications, however, which it became necessary to introduce into the increase of the assessed taxes last year, considerably reduced its amount; and it is now necessary to look for some more general and productive impost, which may enable us to continue the same system of restraining the annual loan within reasonable limits. With this view, it is my intention that the presumption on which the assessed taxes is founded shall be laid aside, and that a general tax shall be imposed on all the leading branches of income. No scale, indeed, can be adopted which shall not be attended with occasional hardship, or withdraw from the fraudulent the means of evasion: but I trust that all who value the national safety will co-operate in the desirable purpose of obtaining, by an efficient and comprehensive tax upon real ability, every advantage which flourishing and invigorated resources can confer upon national efforts.” In pursuance of these principles, he proposed that no income under £60 a-year should pay any thing: that, from that up to £200 a-year, it should be on a graduated scale; and that for £200 a-year and upwards, it should be ten per cent. No one was to be called on to make disclosure to the commissioners; but if he declined, he was to be liable to be assessed at the sum which they should fix: if he gave in a statement of his receipts, he was, if required, to confirm it on oath. Funded property was to be assessed as well as other sources of income, and the profits of tenants were to be estimated at three-fourths of the rack rent of their lands. The total tax-

able income of Great Britain he estimated at £102,000,000 a-year; and calculated the produce of the tax at ten millions sterling. In consideration of this great supply, he proposed to reduce the trebled assessed taxes to their former level, and to restrict the loan to £9,500,000, for which the income tax was to be mortgaged, after the mortgage imposed for the loan of the former year had been discharged.¹

CHAP.
XLI.
1799.

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 5, 6,
18, 22.

In opposition to this bill, it was argued by Sir William Pulteney and a considerable body of respectable members, "That the general and wise policy of the country, from the Revolution downwards, had been to lay taxes on consumption, and consumption only; and to this there was no exception but the land-tax, which was of inconsiderable amount; for even the window-tax was a burden on a luxury which might be diminished at pleasure. Now, however, the dangerous precedent is introduced of levying a heavy impost, not on expenditure or consumption, but on income: that is, of imposing a burden which, by no possibility, can be avoided. If this principle be once introduced, it is impossible to say where the evil may stop; for what is to hinder the government to increase the tax to a fifth, a third, or even a half: that is, to introduce the confiscations which have always distinguished arbitrary governments, and have been in an especial manner the disgrace of the French Revolution? The great danger of this tax, therefore, is, that it not only sanctions a most odious and dangerous inquisition into every man's affairs, but it is so calculated as to weigh with excessive severity on the middle orders of society, while it would bear but slightly in comparison upon the highest, and totally exempt the lowest. It would destroy the middle class, and do it soon; it would totally prevent the accumulation of small capitals, the great source of general prosperity; and then we should have only two classes in the community—and a miserable community it would be—of noblemen and peasants. The principle that every man should contribute according to his means, is doubtless just: but is this a contribution according to means? Quite the contrary—it is a tax which falls with undue severity upon some classes, and improper lightness on others. A person possessing permanent and independent income may spend

48.
Objections
urged against
it.

CHAP.
XLI.

1799.

what portion of it he chooses, without injury to his heirs : but income resulting from personal industry, or from profession, stands in a very different situation ; for it is necessary that a part of the income of these descriptions should be laid by as a provision for old age or helpless families. Expenditure, therefore, is the only sure criterion of taxation, because it alone is accommodated to the circumstances or necessities of each individual taxed : and if a few misers, under such a system, may avoid contributing their proper share, they are only postponing the day of payment to their heirs, who, in all probability, will be the more extravagant ; and far better that such insulated individuals should escape, than the far-spread injustice be inflicted which would result from the adoption of the proposed alteration.”¹

¹ Parl. Hist.
xxxiv. 134,
147.

49.

It is adopted
by parlia-
ment.

The income tax, notwithstanding these objections, was adopted by the House of Commons in the year 1799 ; the loan of that year being, for Great Britain and Ireland, £18,500,000, besides £3,000,000 of exchequer bills. But in comparing the amount of the loans which would have been necessary, if this system of increasing the supplies raised within the year had not been adopted, with that actually contracted under the new system, it was satisfactorily shown by Mr Pitt that no less than £120,000,000 would ultimately be saved to the nation by the more manly policy, when the interest which was avoided was taken into account—a striking proof of the extraordinary difference to the ultimate resources of a country, which arises from raising the supplies within the year, and providing them in great part by the funding system. The system of Mr Pitt, however, in regard to these direct taxes, was, in one important particular, a deviation from his general financial policy ; and the embarrassing consequences of this deviation speedily became conspicuous. At the first imposition of the treble assessment it was intended as an extraordinary resource, which there was no likelihood would be required beyond one or two years ; and, in consequence, it was mortgaged for a considerable proportion of the loans contracted in the years when it was in operation ; and the same principle was continued when it was commuted for the income tax. But when this system continued for several years in succession, it

came to violate the principle that these direct taxes, being a burdensome impost, should be continued only while the war lasted; for in the years from 1798 to 1801 the amount thus fixed as a preferable burden on the direct war taxes was no less than fifty-six millions.

The magnitude of this mortgage obliged Mr Pitt, in 1801, to return to his old mode of contracting loans, by providing, in the increase of indirect taxes, for their interest and the sinking fund required for their redemption; and, in 1802, when Mr Addington came to arrange the finances for a peace establishment, he got quit altogether of this embarrassing load on the direct taxes, which would have required them, contrary to all principle, to be continued for nine years after the war had ceased, and boldly funded at once the whole of this £56,000,000 as well as £40,000,000 of unfunded debt which existed at the end of the war; and for the whole of this immense sum of £96,000,000 he contrived to find sufficient taxes, even when adhering to Mr Pitt's system of making provision in the funding of loans, not only for its annual interest, but the sinking fund destined for its redemption. There can be no doubt that this was a very great improvement, and that it restored this branch of our finances to their true principle, which is, that the whole sums required for the interest and redemption of the debt should be raised by indirect taxes, and direct burdens reserved only for the extraordinary efforts made during the continuance of the war—to make the supplies raised within the year as nearly as possible equal its expenditure.¹

The changes which have now been mentioned embraced all the leading principles of Mr Pitt's financial system. In subsequent years the same policy was adopted which had been introduced with so much success in later times, of augmenting as much as possible the supplies raised within the year, and diminishing as much as might be the loan which it was still necessary annually to contract. And of the success with which this system was attended, and the rapid growth of the machinery erected for the extinction of the debt, the best evidence is preserved in the honest testimony of his Whig successor in the important office of chancellor of the exchequer:—"In the year

CHAP.
XLI.

1799—1806.

50.
Change subsequently induced on the system.

¹ Parl. Deb. viii. 573, 574.

51.
Advantages of the new system.

CHAP.
XII.

1799—1806.

1803," said Lord Henry Petty, afterwards Lord Lansdowne, "the proportion of the sinking fund to the unredeemed debt was as one to eighty-two; the former being £5,835,000, and the latter £480,572,000. But in the year ending 1st February 1806, the sinking fund amounted to £7,566,000; and the unredeemed debt was then £517,280,000, making the proportion one in sixty-eight. After this it is unnecessary for me to enter into any eulogium on the sinking fund, or to detain the House with any panegyric on its past effects or future prospects. Its advantages are now fully felt in the price of stock and contracting of loans; and independent of all considerations of good faith, which would induce the House to cling to it as their sheet-anchor for the future, they were pledged to support it, having had positive experience of its utility. And of the vast importance of raising a great part of the supplies within the year, no better proof can be desired than is furnished by the fact, that, during the first ten years of the war, the increase of the debt was £253,000,000, being at the rate, on an average, of twenty-five millions a-year: whereas during the three years of the present war, from 1803 downwards, the total sum borrowed has been £36,000,000, being at the rate of twelve millions a-year only."¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 70.
Parl. Deb. vi.
567, 570.

52.

Mr Pitt's permanent taxes were all in the indirect form. Their advantages.

With the exception, however, of the war taxes thus imposed for a special purpose, and which were pledged to be temporary burdens, enduring only for the year in which they were raised, or at most for a year or two after it, all the other taxes imposed by Mr Pitt were in the indirect form. And in particular, the interest of the loans annually contracted, when laid as a permanent burden on the nation, and the amounts requisite for the immediate redemption of the principals of which the war taxes were not mortgaged, as was done in 1799, were all provided for in this mitigated form. The wisdom of this arrangement cannot be better stated than in the words of Mr Hume:—"The best taxes are such as are levied upon consumption, especially those of luxury, because such taxes are least felt by the people. They seem in some measure voluntary, since a man may choose how far he will use the commodity which is taxed. They are paid gradually and insensibly; they naturally produce sobriety and frugality, if judiciously im-

posed; and being confounded with the natural price of the commodity, they are scarcely perceived by the consumers. Their only disadvantage is, that they are expensive in the levying. Taxes, again, upon possessions are levied without expense, but have every other disadvantage. Most statesmen are obliged to have recourse, however, to them, in order to supply the deficiencies of the others. Historians inform us that one of the chief causes of the destruction of the Roman state was the alterations which Constantine introduced into the finances, by substituting *a universal direct tax in lieu of almost all the tithes, customs, and excise which formerly composed the revenues of the empire*. The people in all the provinces were so grinded by this imposition that they were glad to take refuge under the conquering arms of the barbarians, whose dominion, as they had fewer necessities and less art, was found to be preferable to the refined tyranny of the Romans.¹ It is to be regarded, therefore, as a capital excellence in Mr Pitt's financial measures, that he not only provided in permanent imposts, for the interest of the whole public debt and the sinking fund necessary for its redemption, but made that provision exclusively in taxes in the indirect form, the burden of which is imperceptible, and is never the subject of any general complaint; whereas the direct taxes, which are always felt as so oppressive, were reserved, as a last resource, for the unavoidable exigencies of war, and specially restricted to those years only during which the excitement and necessities of the actual contest were experienced.

In addition to these forcible reasons for ever, except in cases of obvious necessity, and when its resources are exhausted, preferring indirect to direct taxation, there is another of perhaps still greater importance which has never yet met with the attention it deserves. It has often been observed with surprise by travellers, that though the sums which are extracted from the people in a direct form by the Turkish Pashas or the Indian Rajahs have frequently the effect of totally ruining industry, yet they are inconsiderable when compared to the immense revenue derived from the customs and excise in the European states, without any sensible impediment to its exertions. The reason, though not apparent at first sight,

CHAP.
XLI.

1805—1810.

¹ Hume's
Essays, i.
365, 366.

53.
Arguments
for indirect
taxation.

CHAP.
XLI.

1806—1810.

when stated appears entirely satisfactory. It consists in a difference to the resources of the state similar to that experienced in agriculture upon the meadows beneath, between drawing off water from the fountain-head and drawing it off at a vast distance below after it has fertilised numerous plains in its course. If you abstract money in a direct form from the cultivator or the artisan, the revenue taken goes at once from the producer to the public treasury ; but if you withdraw it from the person who ultimately sells the manufactured article to the consumer, it has, *before it is withdrawn*, put the industry of a dozen different classes of persons in motion. The sum received by the government may be the same in both cases : but how immense the difference between the effect upon general industry when it is seized upon by the tax-collector early in its course, and only withdrawn after it has given all the encouragement to different branches of employment it is capable of effecting ! Fifty different individuals are often put to their shifts to meet the burden of an indirect tax, and, by their united effort and increased economy in production, discharge it without difficulty ; a direct one falls in undivided severity on one alone, and if he attempts to throw it upon another, he is immediately met by a diminished sale for his produce. So important is this distinction, that it may safely be affirmed that no nation ever yet was ruined by indirect taxation ; nor can it be so, for before it becomes oppressive it must cease to be productive. Many, however, have been exterminated by much smaller sums levied in the direct form ; that method of raising the supplies being attended with this most dangerous quality, that it is often most productive when it is trenching most deeply on the sources of future existence.

Nor is there any foundation for the obvious reply to this argument, based on the observation, that if the productions of industry are taxed in the person of the consumer, he must diminish the quantity which he can purchase, and thus industry will be as effectually paralysed as if the impost were laid directly upon the producer. Plausible as this argument undoubtedly is, the common sense and experience of mankind have every where rejected its authority. No complaint was made

54.
Reply to the
objections
against them.

during the war of fifty-five millions levied annually, by means of indirect taxes, on the people of Great Britain ; but so burdensome was the income tax, producing only fourteen millions a-year, felt to be, that all the efforts of government could not keep it on for one year after its termination. When the voice of the people was directly admitted, through the portals opened by the Reform Bill, upon the legislature, it was not the forty-two millions levied annually in the indirect form, but the four millions and a half extracted directly by the assessed taxes, which were made the subject of such loud complaint, that a great reduction in those burdens became indispensable. The people, however unfit to judge of most matters in legislation, may be referred to as good authority in the estimation of the burdens which are felt as most oppressive by them at the moment.

Nor is it difficult to perceive the reason of this universal opinion among all practical men, how adverse soever it may be to the theoretical opinions of philosophers. Indirect taxes, if judiciously laid on, and not carried to such an excess as to render them unproductive, often do not in reality fall on any one individual with overwhelming severity ; they are defrayed by the economy, skill, or improved machinery of all the many persons who are employed in the manufacture of the taxed article. The burden is so divided as to be imperceptible. Portioned out among fifteen or twenty different hands, the share falling on each is easily compensated. A slight increase in the economy of the manufacturer, a trifling improvement in the machinery for production of the article taxed, in the many hands engaged in its preparation, more than extinguishes the burden. The proof of this is decisive : the manufactures of England not only existed, but prospered immensely, under the combined pressure of the heavy indirect taxation and the enormous rise of prices occasioned by the suspension of cash payments during the war : many of them, though the value of money had fallen to a half during that period, were sold at half the price at its termination which they brought at its commencement. Of all the parts of Mr Pitt's financial system, none was more worthy of admiration than that which provided for all the *permanent* expenses of the nation by

CHAP.
XLI.

1806—1810.

55.
Reasons of
the superior
lightness of
indirect taxa-
tion.

CHAP.
XII.

1806—1810.

the indirect taxes ; of all the errors committed by his successors, none has been more prejudicial than the obstinate retention of direct, and the lavish relinquishment of indirect taxes.

56.
Cases in
which indi-
rect taxes, by
being exces-
sive, become
direct bur-
dens on pro-
duction.

It results from these principles, that when an indirect tax is very heavy, and laid on a raw material, or one subjected to but a slight manufacturing process, it is frequently impossible for the producer either to compensate the tax by increased skill or economy of the article, or to lay it upon the consumer. In such cases the tax ceases to be an indirect impost on consumption ; it becomes a direct burden on production, and if unduly heavy, may terminate in the total ruin of the class on whom it was imposed. A signal instance of this occurred in regard to the heavy import duties on sugar. The burden formerly of thirty shillings, then of twenty-seven shillings, and now of twenty-four shillings the hundredweight on West India sugar, was little felt during the war, when that article sold for forty or forty-five pounds the hogshead (from £6 to £6, 10s. the cwt. ;) but when, on the return of peace, prices fell to twelve or fifteen pounds the hogshead (from 50s. to 60s. the cwt.) including duty, it became intolerably severe. It then became nearly a hundred per cent on the rude material ; the same as if a duty of fifty shillings a-quarter had been laid on wheat raised in England for the home consumption. Nor had either the planter or the refiner the means of eluding this tax to any considerable degree, by either raising the price of the article to the consumer, or diminishing by economy or machinery the cost of its production. The cost of raising rude agricultural produce can hardly ever be diminished to any considerable extent by the application of machinery ; and the stoppage of the slave trade necessarily, in the first instance at least, increased the cost of production, while the only way in which it seemed possible to render the burden tolerable was by augmenting the quantity raised, which necessarily depressed to an undue extent the price which it bore in the market. Being unable to diminish the cost of production from these causes, all the efforts of the planters to make head against their difficulties, and defray the interest of their mortgages, by raising more

extensive crops of sugar, only tended to lower prices, and throw the taxes as an exclusive burden on themselves. The proof of this is decisive: the price of sugar in America is generally higher than in England, if the duty be deducted, sometimes by fully a third. In 1831, the price per hundredweight was, in Great Britain, twenty-three shillings and eightpence, excluding duty; while in America it was thirty-six shillings per hundredweight in the same year. Taking into view the greater expense of freight to Britain than America from these islands, there can be no doubt that almost the whole tax has been paid in many years by the producers, amounting though it now does to a hundred per cent. Nothing more is requisite to explain the almost total ruin which had fallen on these splendid colonies, even before the last fatal measure of emancipating the slaves was carried into effect.¹

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XLI.

1806—1810.

¹ Commons' Rep. on West Indies, 1832, p. 7.

In all fiscal measures on this subject, there is one principle to be constantly kept in view, to the neglect or oversight of which, more than any thing else, the ruin of the West Indies is to be ascribed. This is, that while many branches of manufacturing industry possess the means, by improvements in machinery or the division of labour, of compensating very heavy fiscal burdens, *the raisers of rude produce can hardly ever do the same*; so that, unless they can succeed in laying the tax upon the consumer, which is very often altogether beyond their power, they are forced to pay it entirely themselves, and it becomes a ruinous direct burden on industry. No doubt can exist on this head, when it is recollected not merely how slight is the improvement which agriculture has ever received from the aid of machinery, but that, while in the most highly civilised states, such as England, the cost of raising manufactures is always, notwithstanding heavy taxes and a plentiful currency, less than in ruder states, that of producing agricultural produce is always much greater. Great Britain can undersell the world in manufactures, but her farmers would be ruined without a corn-law; a fact strikingly illustrative of this vital distinction, and pointing to a very different rate of indirect taxation when

57.
Important difference between indirect taxes on rural and manufactured produce.

CHAP.
XLI.

1806—1810.

58.

General character of Mr Pitt's financial measures. Their grandeur and foresight.

applied to rude produce and manufactured articles, which has never yet met with adequate attention.

Such were the general features of Mr Pitt's financial policy. Decried by the spirit of party during his own lifetime, and that of the generation which immediately followed; stigmatised by the age which found itself oppressed by the weight of the burdens he had imposed, and which had forgotten the evils he had averted; obliterated almost, amidst the temporary expedients and conceding weakness of the governments by whom he was succeeded, it is yet calculated to stand the test of ages, and appears now in imperishable lustre from the bitter and experienced, though now irrevocable, consequences of its abandonment. Grandeur of conception, durability of design, far-seeing sagacity, were its great characteristics. It was truly conceived in a heroic spirit. Burdening, perhaps oppressing, the present generation, it was calculated for the relief of future ages; inflicting on its authors a load of present odium, it was fitted to secure the blessings of posterity when they were mouldering in their graves. Founded on that sacrifice of the present to the future which is at once the greatest violence to ordinary inclinations, the invariable mark of elevated understandings, and the necessary antecedent of great achievements, it required for its successful development, patience, self-denial, and magnanimity in subsequent statesmen equal to his own. It fell, because such virtues could not be found in the age by which he was succeeded. In contemplating his profound plans for the ultimate and speedy liberation of England, even from the enormous burdens entailed on its finances by the Revolutionary war, we feel that we are conversing with one who lived for distant ages, and who voluntarily underwent, not the fatigues which are forgotten in the glory of the conqueror, but the obloquy consequent on the firmness of the statesman, in the prosecution of what he felt to be for the ultimate good of the nation. In comparing his durable designs with the temporary expedients of the statesmen who preceded and followed him, we experience the same painful transition as in passing from the contemplation of the stately

monuments of ancient Egypt, wrought in granite, and constructed for eternal duration, to that of the gaudy but ephemeral palaces of the Arabs who dwell amidst their ruins, and whose brilliancy cannot conceal the perishable nature of the materials of which they are composed.

While doing justice, however, to the great qualities of this illustrious financier, it is indispensable that we should not draw a veil over his faults; and the application of his own principles to the measures which he sometimes adopted will best explain the particulars in which he was led astray. I. The first great defect which history must impute to the financial measures of Mr Pitt, is having carried too far, and continued too long, the funding system, and not earlier adopted that more manly policy of raising as large a portion as possible of the supplies within the year, the benefits of which he himself afterwards so fully explained. During the years 1793 and 1794, indeed, when formidable armies menaced France on every side, and the iron barrier of the Netherlands was broken through to an extent never achieved by Marlborough or Eugene, a speedy termination of the war might reasonably be expected, and it was just, therefore, to lay the vast expenses of those years in a great degree on the shoulders of posterity. But after that crisis was past; after Flanders and Holland had yielded to the victorious arms of Piehegru; after Spain had retired from the struggle, and the Republic, instead of contending for its existence on the Rhine, was pursuing, under Napoleon, the career of conquest in Italy, it had become evident that a protracted contest was to be expected, and measures of finance suitable to such a state of things should have been adopted. The resolute system of raising a considerable portion of the supplies within the year should have been embraced, at latest, in 1796, and the enormous loans of that and the two following years reduced to one-half. Those loans amounted to seventy-five millions; if forty millions had been raised in the time by taxation, in addition to the imposts actually paid, the difference in the sum since paid by the nation down to this time, on account of the loans of those years, would have been above £120,000,000! So prodigious is the difference as regards the ultimate accumulation of burdens, between the ener-

CHAP.
XLI.

1790—1806.

59.

Their errors.
Undue extent of the
funding system.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790—1806.

getic and intrepid system of raising a large portion of the supplies within the year, and the more acceptable but delusive policy of providing at the moment only for the interest, and leaving to posterity the charge of providing for the liquidation of the principal.

60.
Niggardly
use of the
military
forces of Eng-
land.

II. But if the insidious advantages of the funding were to be preferred to the ultimate benefits of the taxing system, it was indispensable that the warlike resources of the state should have been put forth on a scale, and in a way, calculated to reap sudden advantages commensurate to the immense burdens thus imposed on posterity ; that the contest, if gigantic and expensive, was at least to be short and decisive. That the military power of England was capable, if properly directed and called forth, of making such an effort, is now established by experience. The more the histories of the campaigns from 1793 to 1800 are studied, the more clearly will it appear that the armies of France and the coalition were very equally poised ; that the scale sometimes preponderated to one side and sometimes to the other, but without any decisive advantage to either party. After three years of protracted strife, the Republican armies, in the close of 1795, were still combating for existence on the Rhine, and gladly accepted a temporary respite from the victorious arms of Clairfait : after three additional years of desperate warfare, they were struggling for the frontiers of the Var and the Jura with the terrible energy of Suwarroff and the scientific ability of the Archduke Charles. No doubt can remain, therefore, that the forces on the opposite sides of that great contest were, at these periods at least, extremely nearly matched. With what effect, then, might the arms of England have been thrown in upon the scene of warfare ; and how would the balance, so long quivering in equilibrium, have been subverted by the addition of fifty thousand British soldiers on the theatre of Blenheim or Ramilies !

61.
This was his
great defect.

Herein, therefore, lay the capital error of Mr Pitt's financial system, considered with reference to the warlike operations it was intended to promote. While the former was calculated for a temporary effort only, and based on the principle of great results being obtained in a short time by an extravagant system of expenditure, the latter was arranged on the plan of the most niggardly exertion

of the national strength, and the husbanding of its resources for future efforts, totally inconsistent with the lavish present dissipation of its funds. No one would have regretted the great loans from 1793 to 1799, amounting though they did to a hundred and fifty millions sterling, if proportionate efforts in the field had at the same time been made; and if it was evident that nothing had been omitted which could have conduced to the earlier termination of the war. But our feelings are very different when we recollect that during these six years, big with the fate of England and the world, only two hundred and eight thousand men were raised for the regular army, and that a nation reposing securely in a sea-girt and inaccessible citadel, never had above twenty thousand soldiers in the field, out of a disposable force of above a hundred thousand, and that only in the two first years of the war. Mr Pitt's plans for military operations were all based on the action of continental armies, while the troops of his own country were chiefly employed in distant colonial expeditions; picking up pawns in this manner at the extremity of the board, when by concentrated moves he might have given checkmate to his adversary at the commencement of the game. His military successes, in consequence, amounted to nothing, while his financial measures were daily increasing the debt in a geometrical progression: and thence, in a great measure, the long duration and heavy burdens of the war.

III. But the greatest of all Mr Pitt's errors, and the one which was the most inexcusable, because it was most at variance with the admirable foresight and enduring fortitude of his other financial measures, was the extent to which he carried the ruinous system of borrowing in the three per cents; in other words, inscribing the public creditor for £100 in the books of the bank of England, in consideration of only £60 advanced to the nation. That this policy had the effect of lowering the interest of the loans contracted, and thereby diminishing the burdens of the nation at the moment, may be perfectly true; but what was the advantage thus gained, compared to the enormous burden of saddling the nation with the payment of forty pounds additional to every sixty which it had received? The benefit was temporary and inconsiderable;

62.
Injudicious
system of
borrowing in
the three per
cents.

CHAP.
XLI.

1790—1806.

the evil permanent and most material. Of the seven hundred and eighty millions which now compose the national debt, about six hundred millions have been contracted in the three per cents ; and if this whole debt were to be paid off at par, the nation would have to pay in all two hundred and fifty millions more than it ever received. Supposing it to be redeemed by a sinking fund at 80, on an average, which, taking a course of years together, of peace and war, is probably not far from the mark, and which coincides with Mr Pitt's estimate in 1799, the surplus to be paid above what was received, would still be one hundred and fifty millions.

63.
Its effect in
preventing
the reduction
of interest on
peace.

Nor have the evils of this improvident system of borrowing been limited to the great addition thus unnecessarily made to the capital of the national debt. Its effect upon the burden of the interest has been equally unfortunate. Doubtless the loans were, in the first instance, contracted during the war on more favourable terms, as to interest, than could have been obtained if the money had been borrowed in the 5 per cents ; that is, if a bond for £100 had been given for each £100 only paid into the treasury. But as a set-off against this temporary and inconsiderable advantage, what is to be said to the experienced impossibility, with great part of the funds so contracted, of reducing the interest in time of peace ? It is impossible to lower the interest of the 3 per cents till interest generally falls below 3 per cent ; because if it were attempted when the rate was higher, all the stockholders would immediately demand their money, and government, being unable to borrow below the market rate, would become bankrupt. Nevertheless, it may safely be affirmed that interest, on an average, since 1815, has not exceeded, if it has reached, 4 per cent. Had the national debt all been contracted in the 5 per cents, it might all have been subjected to the operation which in 1824 proved so successful with the 5 per cents, and which, on £157,000,000 only of the debt, the amount of that stock, saved the nation at that time £1,700,000 a-year, to which is to be added the half of that sum since gained by the reduction of the same stock to $3\frac{1}{2}$; which, after taking into view the dissentients, has saved the nation, *for ever*, £2,400,000 yearly. Calculating the interest of the £600,000,000 in the 3 per cents

(£360,000,000 sterling) at £18,000,000 a-year, the proportion of this annual burden, which would have been saved by the first reduction of one per cent, would have been £3,600,000, and by the second of $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, £1,800,000 more; in all, £5,400,000 for ever. The sum already saved to the nation, on interest alone, paid since 1824, would have been above fifty millions sterling. Every twenty years in future the sum saved, with interest, would exceed a hundred and fifty millions a-year!

The temporary reduction of interest obtained by contracting the debt in this ruinous manner will bear no sort of comparison with these serious losses, with which the system was ultimately attended.* It appears, from the

* Take, for example, the following loans contracted in the 3 and 5 per cents, at different periods during the war:—

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1790—1806.

64.

Temporary
diminution of
interest was
no adequate
compensation
for these
evils.

	Amounts ac- tually paid into Treasury.	Interest.	Rate per cent.
	£	£	
1794. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,907,451	96,326	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	10,806,000	502,791	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1795. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,490,646	80,494	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	17,777,163	841,374	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1796. Loan in 5 per cents,	2,034,889	101,744	5 per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	8,500,000	493,145	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1797. Loan in 5 per cents,	17,815,918	1,006,242	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	13,000,000	825,500	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1801. Loan in 5 per cents,	2,227,012	111,380	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1806. Loan in 3 per cents,	27,519,544	1,344,487	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
1807. Loan in 5 per cents,	1,293,200	64,660	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	10,800,000	512,400	4 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, but £140 stock created for each £60 paid.
1809. Loan in 5 per cents,	7,932,100	408,878	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,600,000	538,433	4 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.
1811. Loan in 5 per cents,	4,909,350	258,315	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	11,925,243	569,500	4 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.
1814. Loan in 5 per cents,	5,549,400	277,470	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 per cents,	12,345,076	574,362	4 $\frac{3}{4}$ per cent.
1815. Loan in 5 per cents,	10,313,000	603,310	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.
Do. in 3 and 4 per cents,	27,000,000	1,517,400	5 $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

—See PEBBER'S *Tables*, 246, from MOREAU.

It clearly appears, from this remarkable table, that the difference between the interest paid on loans in the 3 and the 5 per cents, from the beginning to the end of the war, varied only from a half to an eighth per cent. And the real difference was even less than here appears; for the public creditors were frequently, in the three per cents, inscribed for much more than £100 in consideration of £60 advanced. In particular, in 1807, they received no less than £140 of stock for each £60 paid.

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curious table of loans contracted during the war, compiled by Moreau, that the difference in the interest of the loans in the 3 per cents and the 5 per cents was seldom above a half per cent, generally not more than a quarter. What is the additional burden thus undertaken during the contest, to the permanent reduction which the opposite system would have enabled government to have effected on the return of peace? Even supposing the difference of interest on the loans while the war lasted had been on an average one per cent, what was this burden, during its continuance, to the reduction of the interest *for ever* to four or three and a half per cent? This thing is so clear that it will not admit of an argument; and if the public necessities had rendered it impossible to have raised the additional interest during the year, it would have been better to have contracted an additional loan every year while the inability lasted, to defray the additional interest, than, by contracting the debt on such disadvantageous terms, to have disabled posterity for ever from taking advantage of the return of peace to effect a permanent reduction of the public debts. So strongly, indeed, has the impolicy of this mode of contracting debt now impressed itself upon the minds of our statesmen, that, by a solemn resolution in 1824, parliament pledged itself never again, under any pressure, to borrow money in any other way than in the 5 per cents: a resolution worthy of the British legislature, and which it is devoutly to be hoped no British statesman will ever forget, but which is too likely to be overlooked, like so many other praiseworthy determinations, amidst the warlike profusion or democratic pressure of subsequent times.*

* The author was early in life impressed with the disastrous effects of this borrowing in the three per cents, but it was long before he found any converts to an opinion now generally received. In the year 1813, when a student at college, he maintained the doctrines stated in the text on this subject in a company consisting of the most eminent and intelligent bankers in Scotland; and, in particular, contended, that if Mr Pitt could not have afforded to pay annually from the taxes a larger interest for his loans than he actually undertook, he should have "borrowed a *little loan* to pay the interest of the great loan, rather than have contracted debt in the three per cents." They all, however, disputed the justice of the opinion, maintaining that the money could not have been obtained on other terms; and the "*little loan*" became a standing joke against the author for many years after. Should these lines meet the eye of Mr Anderson of Moredun, one of the oldest and most valued of the author's friends, and now one of the leading partners of the highly respectable firm of Sir William Forbes and Co. of Edinburgh, he will recur, perhaps, not without interest, to this incident.

It is true, as Mr Pitt contemplated the extinction of the whole public debt before the year 1846 by the operation of the sinking fund, and had provided means which, if steadily adhered to, would unquestionably have produced that result even at an earlier period, the disastrous effects which have actually occurred from this mode of contracting so large a portion of the debt are not to be charged so strongly as an error in his financial system. In the contracting of loans, present relief was, in his estimation, the great object to be considered, because the means of certainly redeeming them within a moderate period, on the return of peace, were simultaneously provided. It was of comparatively little importance that the interest of the 3 per cents could not be reduced during peace, when the speedy liquidation of the principal itself might be anticipated; and the addition of nearly double the stock to the sum borrowed appeared of trifling moment, when the only mode of redeeming the debt which any one contemplated, was the purchase of stock by the sinking fund commissioners at the current market rates. Still, though these considerations go far to excuse, they by no means exculpate Mr Pitt as regards these measures. Admitting that the reduced rate of interest during the war might be considered as a fair set-off against the enhanced rate for the pacific period of nearly the same amount which elapsed before the debt was discharged, still what is to be said in favour of a system which redeems at 85 or 90 a debt contracted at 58 or 60? In looking forward to this method of liquidating the debt, as calculated to obviate all the evils of inscribing the public creditor for a larger amount of stock than he had advanced of money, Mr Pitt forgot the certain enhancement of the price of stock by the admirable sinking fund which he himself had established; and the more strongly and justly he elucidated the salutary tendency of its machinery to uphold the public credit, the more clearly did he demonstrate the ruinous effects of a method of borrowing which turned all that advance to the disadvantage of the nation in discharging its engagements.*

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65.

In Mr Pitt's view, the sinking fund was to remedy all these evils.

* It is a common opinion that the great expenses of Mr Pitt's administration were owing to the subsidies so imprudently and needlessly advanced to foreign powers, to induce or enable them to carry on the contest. This, however, is a mistake. The loans and subsidies to foreign powers during the whole war only amounted to £52,528,470; of which no less than £33,000,000 were advanced

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67.
Vast effects
of suspension
of cash pay-
ments in
1797.

To Mr Pitt's financial system there belongs a subject more vital in its ultimate effects than any which has been considered, and the whole results of which are even yet far from being exhausted. The SUSPENSION OF CASH PAYMENTS in 1797, already noticed in the transactions of that year, was a measure of incomparably more importance than any financial step of the past or the present century. When taken in conjunction with the almost total destruction of the productiveness of the Spanish Mines in America, in consequence of the revolution which broke out in that country in 1808, and the subsequent and unavoidable resumption of cash payments, by the bill of 1819, in Great Britain, it led the way to a series of changes in prices,

Table of the
whole expenses
of every year,
in every de-
partment, dur-
ing the war.

during the three last years. At Mr Pitt's death the sum was only £6,370,000. The subsidies granted, with the years when they were received, and the other items of the expenditure of the war, were as follows:—(MOREAU.) (PORTER.)

Years.	Subsidies to Foreign Powers.	Army.		Civil List.	Ordnance.	Navy, Total.	Total charge of Debt, Funded and Unfunded.	Total Expenditure.
		Ordinary.	Extraord.					
	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.	L.
1793	2,198,200	4,167,312	1,021,536	843,603	2,464,307	10,715,941	22,754,366	
1794	4,000	9,209,236	1,027,761	1,500,767	4,219,156	11,081,159	29,305,477	
1795	810,500	14,562,737	1,025,842	1,968,008	8,135,140	12,345,987	39,751,091	
1796	99,500	13,738,350	1,125,053	2,590,000	7,780,868	13,683,129	40,761,583	
1797	—	16,203,690	1,081,046	2,121,552	11,984,031	16,405,402	50,739,837	
1798	120,012	7,986,297	3,165,854	1,111,376	1,715,355	12,591,728	20,108,885	
1799	325,000	9,898,716	4,241,433	1,208,067	2,221,516	13,036,490	21,572,867	
1800	2,613,178	9,971,889	3,906,000	1,247,420	1,918,967	14,809,488	21,661,029	
1801	200,114	8,838,208	5,347,174	1,290,136	2,165,909	17,303,370	23,808,895	
1802	—	6,951,193	2,635,063	1,338,766	1,500,733	11,704,400	25,436,894	
1803	—	8,134,315	3,165,092	1,425,545	1,827,150	7,979,878	25,066,212	
1804	—	12,183,891	3,560,804	1,417,517	3,550,142	11,759,352	26,669,646	
1805	—	10,758,343	6,261,387	1,914,104	4,782,289	14,466,998	28,963,702	
1806	—	9,282,192	5,829,000	1,676,323	5,511,064	16,084,028	30,336,859	
1807	—	9,956,684	5,431,867	1,680,061	4,190,748	16,775,762	32,052,537	
1808	1,400,000	11,353,390	5,847,760	1,724,147	5,108,960	17,467,891	32,781,592	
1809	2,050,000	12,591,041	5,872,054	1,696,994	4,374,184	19,236,037	33,986,223	
1810	2,660,103	11,357,623	7,178,677	1,651,297	4,652,335	20,054,412	35,248,923	
1811	2,977,747	13,753,163	10,116,196	1,589,097	4,557,509	19,540,679	36,388,790	
1812	5,315,828	15,382,050	9,605,313	1,748,349	4,252,416	20,500,339	38,443,147	
1813	11,294,416	18,500,985	10,968,535	1,708,526	3,404,582	21,996,624	41,755,235	
1814	10,024,624	16,532,945	17,662,610	1,675,152	4,480,729	21,961,567	42,912,440	
1815	11,035,248	23,172,137	1,682,021	2,963,892	16,373,870	87,902,989	65,169,771	
Totals	53,128,470	384,787,438	32,936,125	71,082,262	328,236,415	619,830,178	1,539,176,633	

This most instructive table proves at a glance how little share either the foreign subsidies or civil expenditure had in the vast outlay of fifteen hundred millions during the war. The first was only a thirtieth, the latter hardly a forty-eighth of the total expenditure. The vastness of the sums absorbed by the debt is a striking feature, amounting to more than a third of the whole; but it was in a certain degree unavoidable. The cost of the navy, amounting to about a fifth, is not to be regretted; for it gave England the naval dominion of the globe. It was the prodigious expenditure for the army, amounting to a fourth of the whole, which is the real subject of regret, attended as it was with no exploits worthy of being recorded till the last eight years of the war; coinciding thus with what every other consideration indicates, that it was the niggardly use of that arm, and the ignorance which prevailed as to its efficacy, which was the real reproach to Mr Pitt's administration.

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and, of consequence, in the relative situation, power, and influence of the different classes of society, more material than any which had occurred since the discovery of the mines of Potosi and Mexico. To it the future historian will perhaps point as the principal cause of the great revolution of England in 1832, and the ultimate decline of the British empire. This important and vital subject, however, so momentous in its consequences, so interesting in its details, requires a separate chapter for its elucidation, and will more appropriately come to be considered in a future volume, when the effects of the monetary changes during the whole war are brought into view, and the commencement of another set of causes, having an opposite tendency from the rapid decay of the South American mines at its close, is at the same time made the subject of discussion.

At present, it only requires to be observed, that the effects of the suspension of cash payments, whether good or evil, are not fairly to be ascribed to Mr Pitt. They were not, like the consequences of the issue of assignats in France, the result of a barbarous and inhuman confiscation, nor, like the subsequent changes of a similar kind in this country, of theoretical or abstract opinions. They were forced on the British statesman by stern necessity. Bankruptcy—irretrievable national bankruptcy, stared him in the face, if the momentous step were any longer delayed. Once taken, the fatal measure could not be recalled; a resumption of cash payments during the continual pressure and vast expenditure of the war was out of the question. The nation has had ample experience of the shock it occasioned, and the protracted misery it produced, at a subsequent period, even in the midst of profound peace. To have attempted it during the whirl and agitation of the contest, would at once have prostrated all the resources of the kingdom.

68.
Causes which produced the suspension of cash payments in 1797.

No doubt, however, can remain that the suspension of cash payments contributed essentially to increase the available resources of Great Britain for carrying on the war. An extension of the circulating medium, especially if accompanied by a great and increasing present expenditure, never fails to have this effect. It is when the subsequent stoppage or contraction takes place, that the

69.
Its powerful operation in increasing the present resources of the state.

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perilous nature of the experiment becomes manifest. Great immediate prosperity to all around him is often produced by the prodigality of the spendthrift; but if he trenches deep, amidst this beneficent profusion, on the resources of future years, the day of accounting will inevitably come alike to himself and his dependents. In seeking for the causes of the vast and continued warlike exertions of England during the war, and of the apparently boundless financial resources which appeared to multiply, as if by magic, with every new demand upon them, just as in investigating the causes of the difficulties under which all classes have laboured since the peace, a prominent place must be assigned to the alterations in the currency, as productive of present strength as they were conducive to future weakness. No financial embarrassments of any moment were experienced while the war lasted, subsequent to 1797. In vain Napoleon waited for the failure of the funding system, and the giving way of England's financial resources. Year after year the enormous expenditure continued; loan after loan, with incredible facility, was obtained; and at the close of the war, when the revenues of France and all the continental states were fairly exhausted, the treasures of Great Britain were poured forth with a profusion unexampled during any former period of the struggle.

70.
It was the
mainspring of
the financial
strength of
the nation
during the
war.

No existing wealth, how great soever, could account for so prodigious an expenditure. Its magnitude points to an *annual creation* of funds even greater than those which were dissipated. It is in the vast impulse given to the circulation by the suspension of cash payments, and subsequent extension of paper credit of every description, that the great cause is to be found of the never-failing resources of Great Britain during so long a period. Her fleets commanded the seas; her commerce extended into every quarter of the globe; her colonies embraced the finest and richest of the tropical regions; and in the centre of this magnificent dominion was the parent state, the quickened and extended circulation of which spread life and energy through every part of the immense fabric. Great as was the increase of paper in circulation after the obligation to pay in specie was removed, it was scarcely equal to the simultaneous increase in exports, imports,

and domestic industry; and almost boundless as was the activity of British enterprise during those animating years, it must have languished from want of commensurate credit, if it had not been sustained by the vivifying influence of the extended currency.* It is evident, also, that the

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* Table showing the amount of Bank Notes in circulation from 1792 to 1815, with the commercial paper under discount at the Bank during the same period, and the Gold and Silver annually coined at the Bank, with the Exports, Imports, and Revenue for the same period.

Years.	L. s. Notes in circulation.	Under L. s.	Commercial Paper rendered at Bank.	Bullion Coined.	Total of Notes.	Official Value Imports into Great Britain.	Official Value Exports from Great Britain.	Revenue.	British Vessels' Tonnage.
1792	11,307,380	—	—	1,171,868	11,307,380	19,659,358	24,904,850	17,984,464	1,540,145
1793	11,368,910	—	—	2,747,430	11,368,910	19,659,357	20,390,179	17,707,983	—
1794	10,744,020	—	—	2,558,895	10,744,020	22,204,893	26,748,938	17,799,994	—
1795	14,017,510	—	2,946,500	463,416	14,017,510	23,736,889	27,123,338	18,456,498	—
1796	10,729,520	—	3,505,000	464,680	10,729,520	22,187,919	30,518,013	18,545,028	—
1797	9,657,760	867,585	5,350,000	2,600,297	10,139,365	21,013,056	28,917,010	18,652,046	—
1798	11,637,610	1,448,280	4,490,600	2,967,565	13,095,330	23,122,303	27,317,087	20,462,595	—
1799	11,494,150	1,465,650	5,403,900	449,892	12,953,900	24,066,700	29,556,637	23,311,018	1,905,438
1800	15,372,980	1,471,540	6,401,500	189,367	16,854,880	25,237,781	33,381,617	35,016,351	1,725,949
1801	13,576,520	2,634,760	7,363,100	450,243	16,213,280	26,405,373	37,873,324	37,111,690	2,147,629
1802	13,337,860	2,612,020	7,353,300	437,019	15,186,880	26,308,273	38,075,239	38,203,937	2,167,803
1803	13,338,970	2,968,360	10,747,000	596,445	15,319,830	25,104,541	31,071,108	45,615,182	2,298,570
1804	12,646,560	4,331,270	9,362,400	718,397	17,077,580	26,454,281	30,540,491	50,555,190	2,253,442
1805	13,011,010	4,360,160	11,365,500	54,668	17,571,170	27,344,720	32,984,401	64,071,908	2,263,714
1806	12,540,790	4,485,000	12,380,100	405,106	16,990,680	23,426,845	30,558,084	59,406,731	2,394,819
1807	14,093,680	4,099,890	13,484,600	None	18,788,690	25,660,953	25,156,629	62,147,601	2,385,408
1808	14,251,360	4,095,170	12,490,100	371,714	18,748,690	30,170,292	45,867,216	67,825,897	2,426,044
1809	15,159,180	4,301,500	15,475,700	298,946	21,019,600	37,613,204	42,656,843	65,309,100	2,474,774
1810	16,246,130	5,860,420	20,070,600	316,936	23,360,220	25,240,704	27,337,252	65,752,125	2,478,799
1811	16,246,130	7,114,090	14,355,400	312,263	23,360,220	24,922,923	37,982,377	68,302,850	—
1812	15,951,280	7,437,030	14,291,600	None	23,405,320	Records destroyed by fire.	—	—	—
1813	15,407,320	7,713,610	12,330,200	519,722	23,120,930	22,022,771	51,358,398	70,240,313	2,616,965
1814	16,455,540	8,345,540	13,295,800	None	24,801,080	27,022,771	51,358,398	72,203,143	2,681,276
1815	18,296,400	9,035,250	14,917,000	None	27,261,650	26,374,921	48,216,186	62,640,711	2,648,593
1816	18,021,220	9,001,400	11,416,400	None	27,022,620	—	—	—	—

Table showing the paper and coin issued, with the exports, imports, and revenue of every year during the war.

—*Parl. Deb.* vii. xiv. xv.; *App. Parl. Hist.* xxxv. 1563; Colquhoun, 99.—*Moreau's Tables*, and *Pepper*, 279.—*Marshall's Digest*, pp. 97, 147, 236.

Thus, in the twenty-four years from 1792 to 1816, the circulation of England, including the large and small notes and commercial paper discounted at the Bank, was more than tripled; the revenue tripled, the exports more than doubled, and the imports increased a half. The increase of commercial paper from 1792 to 1810, was *sevenfold*—indicating, perhaps, the greatest and most rapid rise in mercantile transactions in the whole history of the world.

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funding system, with all its dangers and ultimate evils, of which the nation since the peace has had such ample experience, was eminently calculated to increase this feverish action of the body politic, and produce a temporary flow of prosperity, commensurate, indeed, to the ultimate embarrassments with which it was to be attended, but still exciting a degree of transient vigour, which could never have arisen under a more cautious and economical system of management.

71.
Great temporary advantages of the funding system.

The contracting and immediately spending of loans, to the amount of thirty or forty millions a-year, in addition to a revenue of equal amount, raised by taxation, had an extraordinary effect in encouraging every branch of industry, and enabling the nation to prosper under burdens which at first sight would have appeared altogether overwhelming. Government is proverbially a good paymaster, and never so much so as during the whirl and excitement of war. The capital thus sunk in loans was indeed withdrawn from the private encouragement of industry: but it was so only in consequence of being directed into a channel where its influence in that respect was still more powerful and immediate than it ever would have been in the hands of individuals. It was in great part dissipated, indeed, in a form which did not reproduce itself, and afforded no means of providing for its charges hereafter; but still that circumstance, how prejudicial soever to the resources of the state in future times, did not diminish the temporary excitement produced by its expenditure. Under the combined influence of this vast contraction of loans and extended paper circulation, the resources of the nation were increased in a rapid and unparalleled progression: exports and imports doubled, the produce of taxes was continually rising, prices of every sort quickly rose, interest was high, profits still higher, and all who made their livelihood by productive industry, or by buying and selling, found themselves in a state of extraordinary and increasing prosperity. That these favourable appearances were to a certain extent delusive; that the flood of prosperity thus let in upon the state was occasioned by exhausting, in a great degree, the reservoirs of wealth for future emergencies; and that a long period of languor and depression was to follow

this feverish and unnatural period of excitement, is indeed certain. But still the effect at the moment was the same, and in the activity, enterprise, and opulence thus created, were to be found the most powerful resources for carrying on the contest. How beneficial soever to the finances of the state in future times it might have been, to have raised the whole supplies by taxation within the year, it was impossible that from such a prudent and parsimonious system there could have arisen the extraordinary vigour and progressive creation of wealth which resulted from the lavish expenditure of the national capital in maintaining the conflict; and but for the profuse outlay, which has been felt as so burdensome in subsequent times, the nation might have sunk beneath its enemies, and England, with all its glories, been swept for ever from the book of existence.

Had Mr Pitt's system, attended as it was, however, with this vast expenditure of capital instead of income on the current expenses, made no provision for the ultimate redemption of the debt thus contracted, it would, notwithstanding the prodigious and triumphant results with which it was attended, have been liable to very severe reprehension. But every view of his financial policy must be imperfect and erroneous, if the sinking fund, which constituted so essential a part of the system, is not taken into consideration. Its great results have now been completely demonstrated by experience: and there can be no question that, if it had been adhered to, the whole debt might have been extinguished with ease before the year 1845; that is, in nearly as short a time as it was created. Great as were the burdens of the war, therefore, he had established the means of rendering them only temporary; durable as the results of its successes have proved, the price at which they were purchased admitted, according to his plan, of a rapid liquidation. It is the subsequent abandonment of the sinking fund, in consequence of the unnecessary and imprudent remission of so large a proportion of the indirect taxes on which it depended, which is the real evil that has undone the mighty structure of former wisdom; and for a slight and questionable present advantage, rendered the debt, when undergoing a rapid and successful process of liquidation,

72.

Undue
ascendency
of popular
power led to
the undoing
of Mr Pitt's
durable system
for reduction
of the
debt.

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a lasting and hopeless burden on the state. The magnitude of this change is too great to be accounted for by the weakness or errors of individuals: the misfortune thus inflicted upon the country too irreparable to be ascribed alone to the improvidence or shortsighted policy of subsequent governments. Without exculpating the members of the administrations who did not manfully resist, and, if they could not prevent, at least denounce the growing delusion, it may safely be affirmed, that the great weight of the responsibility must be borne by the nation itself. If the people of Great Britain have now a debt of seven hundred and seventy millions, with hardly any fund for its redemption, they have to blame, not Mr Pitt, who was compelled to contract it in the course of a desperate struggle for the national independence, and left them the means of its rapid and certain liquidation, but the blind democratic spirit which first, from its excesses in a neighbouring state, made its expenditure unavoidable, and then, from its impatience of present sacrifice at home, destroyed the means of its discharge.

“All nations,” says M. Tocqueville, in his profound work on American democracy, “which have made a great and lasting impression on human affairs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic bodies: the instability and impatience of the democratic spirit render the states in which it is the ruling power incapable of durable achievements.”¹ The abandonment of a system fraught with such incalculable future advantages as the sinking fund, but requiring a present sacrifice for its maintenance, affords decisive evidence that the balance of the constitution had become overloaded in reality, before it was so in form, on the popular side, and that the period had arrived when an “ignorant impatience of taxation” was to bring about that disregard of every thing but present objects, which is the invariable characteristic of the majority of mankind. During nearly thirty years of aristocratic rule in England, that noble monument of national foresight and resolution progressively prospered: with its decline, the efficiency of the great engine of redemption was continually impaired under the increasing influence of the

73.

And it must ultimately ruin the British empire.

¹ Tocqueville, ii. 237.

unthinking multitude; and at length, upon the subversion of that aristocratic predominance by the great change of 1832, it was finally to all practical purposes destroyed. Irretrievable ultimate ruin has thus been brought upon the state; for not only is the burden now fixed upon its resources inconsistent with the permanent maintenance of the national independence, but the steady rule has been terminated, under which alone its liquidation could have been expected.

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But if the sun of British greatness is setting in the Old, it is from the same cause rising in renovated lustre in the New World. The impatience of the democratic spirit, both in the British isles and on the shores of the Atlantic—the energy it develops, the desires it creates, the burdens which it perpetuates, the convulsions which it induces, all conspire to impel the ceaseless wave of emigration to the west; and the very distresses consequent on an advanced stage of existence force the power and vigour of civilisation into the primeval recesses of the forest. In two centuries the name of England may be extinct, or survive only under the shadow of ancient renown; but a hundred and fifty millions of men in North America will be speaking its language, reading its authors, glorying in its descent. Nations, like individuals, were not destined for immortality; in their virtues equally as their vices, their grandeur as their weakness, they bear in their bosoms the seeds of mortality. But in the passions which elevate them to greatness, equally as those which hasten their decay, is to be discerned the unceasing operation of those principles at once of corruption and resurrection which are combined in humanity; and which, universal in communities as in single men, compensate the necessary decline of nations by the vital fire which has given an undecaying youth to the human race.

74.

But will still
more impel
the British
race to the
New World.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM THE PEACE OF PRESBURG TO THE RENEWAL OF THE
CONTINENTAL WAR.—JANUARY—OCTOBER, 1806.

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1806.
1.
Immense
results of the
campaign of
Austerlitz.

THE peace of Presburg seemed to have finally subjected the Continent to the empire of France. The greatest and most formidable coalition which had ever been arrayed against its fortunes was dissolved. The military strength of Austria had received to all appearance an irreparable wound; Prussia, though irritated, was overawed, and had let the favourable moment for striking a decisive blow elapse without venturing to draw the sword; and even the might of Russia, hitherto held in undefined dread by the states of southern Europe, had succumbed in the conflict, and the northern Autocrat was indebted to the generosity of the victor for the means of escaping from the theatre of his overthrow. When such results had been gained with the great military monarchies, it was of little moment what was the disposition of the lesser powers; but they, too, had been terrified into submission, or retired from a contest in which success could no longer be hoped for. Sweden, in indignant silence, had withdrawn to the shores of Gothland; Naples was overrun; Switzerland was mute; and Spain consented to yield its fleets and its treasures to the conqueror of northern Europe. England, it is true, with unconquerable resolution and unconquered arms, still continued the contest; but after the prostration of the continental armies, and the destruction of the French marine, it appeared no longer to have an intelligible object; while the death of the great statesman who had ever been the uncompromising foe of the Revolu-

tion, and the soul of all the confederacies against it, led to a well-founded expectation that a more pacific system of government might be anticipated on the part of his successors.

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The hopes entertained by Napoleon of such a temporary accommodation with England as might leave him at liberty, by fostering his naval power, to prepare the means of its final subjugation, were soon to all appearance likely to be realised. The death of Mr Pitt dissolved the administration of which he was the head. His towering genius could ill bear a partner in power or rival in renown. Equals he had none—friends few; and with the exception of Lord Melville, whom the pending accusation had compelled to retire from government, perhaps no statesman had ever possessed his unre-served confidence. There were many men of ability and resolution in his cabinet, but none of weight sufficient to take the helm when it dropped from his hands; and when he sank into the grave, the ministry, which was supported by his single arm, fell to the earth. The King, indeed, who was aware of the danger of introducing a change of policy in the middle of a desperate conflict, and still retained a keen recollection of the humiliation to which he had been subjected in consequence of the India bill introduced by the Whigs in 1784, made an attempt to continue the government in the same hands, and immediately after Mr Pitt's death commissioned Lord Hawkesbury to form a new administration on the same basis. But that experienced and cautious statesman soon perceived that the attempt, at that period at least, was impossible, and the only use he made of his short-lived power was to accept the wardenship of the Cinque Ports, which had been held by Mr Pitt, and was the most lucrative sinecure in the gift of the crown—an appointment which gave rise to keen and acrimonious discussions in both houses of parliament under the succeeding administration.¹

2.
Premiership
offered to
Lord
Hawkesbury,
and declined.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 18, 21.
Parl. Deb. iv
67, 75.

Independently of the acknowledged weakness of the ministry after Mr Pitt ceased to sustain its fortunes, the state of public opinion rendered it extremely doubtful whether any new administration could command general support which was not founded on a coalition of parties,

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3.

Public opinion on the necessity of a coalition of parties.

and a union of all the principal statesmen of the time to uphold the fortunes of the state. The defeat of Austerlitz, and the consequent exposure of Great Britain to the necessity of maintaining the war single-handed against the forces of combined Europe, had made a deep impression on the public mind. Many believed some change of system to be necessary; and the opinion was sensibly gaining ground, that, having unsuccessfully made so many attempts to overthrow the power of revolutionary France by hostility, the time had now arrived when it was not only expedient, but necessary, to try whether its forces might not be more effectually disarmed by pacific relations. Complaints against the abuses of government—some real, some imaginary—during the conduct of so long and costly a war, had multiplied to a great degree. The Opposition journals had increased in number and vehemence of declamation; and the vote against Lord Melville in the House of Commons had shaken the opinion of numbers in the integrity of government, in that point where Mr Pitt's administration had hitherto been regarded as most pure. The Tories, it was said, are exhausted by perpetual service for twenty years; the hopes of the state are to be found in the ranks of the Whigs; or, at all events, the time has now arrived when those absurd party distinctions should cease, and all true friends to their country, on whichever side of politics, must unite for the formation of a liberal and extended administration, on so broad a basis as to bring its whole capacity to bear on the fortunes of the state during the perilous times which are evidently approaching. A general wish, accordingly, was felt for the formation of a government which should unite "all the talents" of the nation, without regard to party distinction—a natural wish at all times, and frequently indulged by the British people, but which has never led to any good result in the history of England. It never can do so, except in such a crisis of national danger as would have led the Romans to appoint a dictator, and calls for the suspension of all difference in foreign or domestic policy for the warding off immediate danger, by which all are equally threatened.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 17, 25.

Yielding, at length, though unwillingly, and with

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4.

Mr Fox is
sent for.

sinister presentiments, to the inclinations of the people and the necessity of his situation, the King, on the 26th January, sent a message to Lord Grenville, so long the firm supporter of Mr Pitt's foreign administration, requesting his attendance at Buckingham House, to confer with his Majesty on the formation of a government. Lord Grenville suggested Mr Fox as the person he should consult on the subject. "I thought so, and I meant it so," replied the King; and immediately the formation of an administration was intrusted to these two illustrious men. The anxious wish expressed both by the sovereign and the nation that the government should be formed on the broadest possible basis, so as to include all the leading men of the country, led to a coalition of parties, which, although it gave great apparent stability at the outset, was little calculated in the end to ensure the permanence of the administration.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 21.

Three distinct and well-defined parties, independent of the partisans of Mr Pitt's cabinet, then divided the legislature and the nation. The ardent Whigs, who had adhered through all the horrors of the French Revolution to democratic principles, were represented by Mr Fox and Mr Erskine, and embraced all the zealous adherents of republican institutions throughout the country. Parliamentary reform, Catholic emancipation, the repeal of the test acts, the abolition of slavery, peace with France, were inscribed on their banners. Another section of the Whig party existed, who had recently been arrayed in fierce hostility against their former allies. They were composed of the old Whig families which had seceded with Mr Burke, at the commencement of the French Revolution, from the popular side, and acted with Mr Pitt till his resignation in 1800, but never coalesced with his government after his resumption of power. This party, led in parliament by Lord Grenville, Earl Spencer, and Mr Windham, embraced many powerful aristocratic families and a large portion of private worth and ability, but their hold on the affections of the populace was not so considerable as that of their stancher brethren. In hostility to France and fierce opposition to revolutionary principles, they yielded not to the warmest partisans of Mr Pitt; but in domestic questions they inclined to the

5.

State of parties in the
country, and
their principles.

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popular side, and might be expected to form a salutary check on the innovating ardour of the more democratic portion of the government. Less considerable from general support or parliamentary eloquence than either of these great parties, the adherents of Mr Addington's administration, who had remained in Opposition ever since they were displaced from power, were still of importance from their business talents and the intimate acquaintance they had with the machinery of government. Lord Sidmouth (formerly Mr Addington) was the leader of this portion of the old Tory administration, whom exclusion from office had led to coalesce, not in the most creditable manner, with their ancient antagonists, and, from the known pacific inclinations of their chief, no serious difference of opinion in the cabinet was anticipated, at least so far as foreign affairs were concerned.

6.

Composition
of the cabi-
net.

The leaders of these three parties were combined in the new cabinet; but the preponderance of Mr Fox's adherents was so great as to render the ministry, to all intents and purposes, a Whig administration, which speedily appeared in the universal removal of all Tory functionaries from every office, even the most inconsiderable, under government. Mr Fox, though entitled, from his talents and influence, to the highest appointment under the crown, contented himself with the important office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, deeming that the situation in which most embarrassment was to be expected, and where his own principles were likely soonest to lead to important results. Lord Grenville was made First Lord of the Treasury; Mr Erskine, Lord Chancellor; Lord Howick (formerly Mr Grey,) First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr Windham, Secretary at War;* Earl Spencer, Secretary of State for the Home

* The Cabinet was composed of the following members :—

Lord Erskine—Lord Chancellor.
 Earl Fitzwilliam—President of the Council.
 Viscount Sidmouth—Lord Privy Seal.
 Lord Grenville—First Lord of the Treasury.
 Lord Howick—First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Earl Moira—Master-General of the Ordnance.
 Earl Spencer—Secretary of State for Home Affairs.
 Mr Fox—Foreign Affairs.
 Mr Windham—Secretary at War.
 Lord Henry Petty—Chancellor of the Exchequer.
 Lord Ellenborough—Chief Justice, with a seat in the Cabinet.

—*Ann. Reg.*, 1806, 26.

Department. The cabinet exhibited a splendid array of ability, and was anxiously looked to by the country, with the undefined hope which naturally arises upon admitting a party whose leaders had been so long celebrated by their eloquence and genius, for the first time, after so long an exclusion, to the administration of public affairs. But, amidst the general satisfaction, there were many who observed with regret that all the members of the recent government were excluded from office, and anticipated no long tenure of power to a coalition which departed thus widely from the path of its predecessors, and voluntarily rejected the aid of all who had grown versant in public affairs. By a still greater number the admission of the Lord Chief-justice into the cabinet was justly regarded as a most dangerous innovation, fraught with obvious peril to that calm and dispassionate administration of judicial duties, which had so long been the glory of English jurisprudence.¹

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¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 26, 28.

Notwithstanding the essential and total change which the ministry had undergone, and the accession of a party to power who had so long denounced the measures of their rivals as fraught with irreparable injury to the best interests of the state, no immediate change in the policy of government took place; and Europe beheld with surprise the men who had invariably characterised the war as unjust and impolitic, preparing to carry it on with a patience and foresight in no degree inferior to that of their predecessors—a striking circumstance, characteristic alike of the justice of the reasons which Mr Pitt had assigned for its continuance, and the candour of the party who had now succeeded to power. The budget of Lord Henry Petty was but a continuation of the financial system of his great predecessor, modified by the altered situation of affairs, and the necessity which had obviously arisen of making provision for a protracted maritime struggle. The system of raising as large as possible a proportion of the taxes within the year, so happily acted upon since 1798 by the late government, was continued and extended; and, in pursuance thereof, it was proposed to carry the war taxes from fourteen to nineteen millions and a half,—an increase which was effected by raising the income tax from six and a half to ten per cent, and an

7.
First measures of the
new ministry.
The budget.

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addition of 3s. a hundredweight to the duty on sugar. The loan, notwithstanding this great addition, was still £18,000,000, to provide for the interest of which, and a sinking fund to redeem the principal, the war wine-duty was declared permanent, producing £500,000 a-year, and an additional duty laid on pig-iron, calculated to produce as much more, besides lesser duties, to the amount in all of £1,136,000.* The great addition to the income tax was loudly complained of as a grievous burden and total departure from all the professions of economy so often made by ministers; but there is reason to believe that indirect taxes could not have been relied on to produce so great an increase as was required in the public revenue; and there can be no doubt that, in adopting the manly course of making so great a demand on present income rather than increase the debt, they acted a truly patriotic and statesmanlike part.¹

¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 566, 574.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 71.

8.
Return of
Napoleon to
Paris. Fin-
ancial crisis
there.

The return of Napoleon to Paris, where he arrived on the night of the 26th January, to the great disappointment of the municipality and people, who had made the most magnificent preparations for his triumphal reception, had become necessary, from the financial crisis which had there occurred, and which threatened to in-

		Charges. Great Britain.
* The budget of this year stood as follows:—		
Navy,	.	£15,281,000
Army,	.	18,500,000
Ordnance,	.	4,718,000
Miscellaneous,	.	2,170,000
Arrears of Subsidies,	.	1,000,000
Vote of Credit,	.	2,000,000
		£43,669,000
Supplies.		
Great Britain.		
Malt and Personal Estate Duties,	.	£2,750,000
Grants from Captured Ships,	.	1,000,000
Lotteries,	.	380,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund,	.	3,500,000
War Taxes,	19,500,000	} 18,000,000
Deduct as outstanding at end of year,	1,500,000	
Loan,	.	18,000,000
		£43,630,000

exclusive of the permanent income on the one hand, and permanent charges on the other, which added largely to both sides of the account: the charges of the debt being £23,000,000, and the total sum raised by taxes and other sources of revenue, £55,796,000, while the total expenditure was £72,750,000, and income, including the loan of £18,000,000, no less than £73,796,000.—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 566, 569; *PORTER'S Parl. Tables*, i. 1.

volve the government in the most serious embarrassments. This catastrophe, partly arising from political, partly from commercial causes, had long been approaching, and the public consternation was at its height when the Emperor re-entered the Tuileries. Without undressing or going to bed, he sent for the minister of finances at midnight, and spent the whole remainder of the night in a minute and rigid examination of that functionary, and all the persons connected with his establishment. At eleven next day, the council of finance was assembled: it sat nine hours; and when it broke up, M. Mollien was appointed minister of finances, and M. de Marbois, the former minister, dismissed.¹

¹ Bign. v. 96.
Bour. vii. 111.

This panic, which at the time excited such consternation at Paris, and which, if the issue of the campaign had been doubtful, might have been attended with the most disastrous effects, arose from very simple causes. During the whole of 1805, the Bank of France, yielding to the flood of prosperity which on all sides flowed into the empire, and urged on by the constant demand for accommodation on the part of all the contractors and others engaged in the public service, rendered necessary by the expenditure of government constantly keeping in advance of the receipts of the treasury, had been progressively enlarging its discounts. Before the Emperor set out for the army, they had risen from thirty to sixty millions, double the usual amount. In the midst of the apparent prosperity produced by that excessive increase, the sagacious mind of Napoleon perceived the seeds of future evil; and amidst all the turmoil of his military preparations at Boulogne, he repeatedly wrote to the minister of finances on the subject, and warned him of the danger of the Bank of France trusting too far the delusive credit of individuals engaged in extensive transactions, or pushing to an undue length, in the form of a paper circulation, the royal privilege of coining money.* The immense discounts which

9.
Its ostensible
causes.

* His words are, in a letter to the minister of finances²—"The evil originates in the bank having transgressed the law. What has the law done? It has given the privilege of coining money in the form of paper to a particular company; but what did it intend by so doing? Assuredly that the circulation thus created should be based on solid credit. The bank appears to have adopted a most erroneous principle, which is to discount to individuals, not in proportion to their real capital, but the number of shares of its capital stock which they possess. That, however, is no real test of solvency. How many persons may be

² From Boulogne, Sept. 24, 1805.

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occasioned the peril, were almost entirely granted to the functionaries engaged in the public service, and who, being obliged to make good their payments to government by a certain day, and embarrassed by the remote period to which all payments from the public treasury were postponed, were frequently driven to this resource to supply the deficiencies arising from the backward payments of individuals, and their credit was in some sort interwoven with that of the general administration.¹

¹ Bign. v. 85,
88. Bour. vii.
92, 96.

10.
Vast specu-
lations of M.
Ouvrard.

A few rich companies also had shared in the liberality of the bank, who were engaged in most extensive speculations in all parts of the world, and so deeply implicated in the furnishing of the precious metals to that establishment, that their support on its part was almost a matter of self-preservation. The greatest of these, was that of which Ouvrard was the leading partner; and its engagements with the Bank of France were to an enormous amount. This great capitalist had for several years been engaged in vast contracts for the service of the Spanish fleet, and so extensive were his transactions, that almost all the treasures of Mexico found their way into his coffers. Gradually he had introduced himself into the principal departments of the French service; and before the middle of 1805, nearly seventy millions of francs (£2,800,000) was owing chiefly to the company of which he was a member by the public treasury of that country. The long delays thrown in the way of the liquidation of this debt by the government, occasioned an excessive multiplication of paper securities, which soon fell considerably in value in the money market: but so implicated was the treasury in these transactions, that it was compelled to go on in the same perilous course,² and thus increase the deprecia-

² Bign. v. 85,
93. Bour. vii.
92, 100.

possessed of fifty or a hundred such shares, and yet be so embarrassed that no one would lend them a single farthing? The paper of the bank is thus issued in many, perhaps a majority of cases, not on real credit, but a delusive supposition of wealth. In one word, in discounting after this manner the bank is *coining false money*. So clearly do I see the dangers of such a course, that, if necessary, I would stop the pay of my soldiers rather than persevere in it. I am distressed beyond measure at the necessities of my situation, which, by compelling me to live in camps, and engaging me in distant expeditions, withdraw my attention from what would otherwise be the chief object of my anxiety, the first wish of my heart,—a good and solid organisation of all which concerns the interest of banks, manufactures, and commerce." What admirable wisdom in these remarks, written at the camp of Boulogne, in the midst of the boundless arrangements which the march of the army to Ulm, already commenced, must have required, and of which his correspondence furnishes such ample proof!—See BIGNON, v. 85, 86.

tion, which had already become sufficiently alarming. The consequence was, that the bills of the public contractors sank so much in value that they would no longer pass current in the market; at length they fell so low as 10 instead of 100: an universal disquietude prevailed, and the demands upon the public treasury had already become very heavy, at the moment when it had little else than paper securities in its coffers.

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Matters were in this critical state when the breaking out of the German war, and departure of the army for the Rhine, occasioned an immense and immediate demand for metallic currency, which alone would pass in foreign states, both on the part of government and individuals. Napoleon, for the different branches of the public service, took fifty millions of francs (£2,000,000) from the Bank of France. Unable, after this great abstraction, to meet his other engagements, the minister of finances had recourse to Ouvrard, Vanlerbergh, and Seguire, who advanced 102,000,000 francs (£4,080,000) to the public treasury, and received in return long-dated bills for 150,000,000. To meet this advance Ouvrard hastened to Madrid, to obtain a supply of piastres from the Spanish government; and such was the ascendancy which he had acquired at that capital, that he shortly after concluded a treaty with the King of Spain, in virtue of which his company, during the whole remainder of the war, acquired "an *exclusive* right to carry on the whole trade to the Spanish colonies, and to import the *whole treasures* and merchandise brought from thence to the European shores." Never before had such a power been vested in any company: nearly the whole treasures of the world were to pass through their hands. But though this treaty gave Ouvrard the prospect of obtaining from America, before a year expired, 272,000,000 francs (£11,400,000) in hard dollars, yet this would not furnish a supply for present necessities; and the efforts of all the capitalists of Europe, which were put in requisition for the occasion, were unable to meet the crisis or avert a catastrophe. Desprez and several of the greatest capitalists in Paris failed: this immediately occasioned a terrific run upon all the other public functionaries, as well as the bank and the treasury. Paper would no longer pass; credit was at an end; and M. Vanlerbergh, one of the

11.
The immediate cause of the explosion was the absorption of gold for the German war.

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greatest of the national contractors, was prevented from failing solely by an advance to a great amount from the public funds. The consequences would have been fatal to the empire had a disaster at the same time occurred in Germany, for the government were absolutely without the means of replenishing any branch of the public service. But the battle of Austerlitz and the treaty of Presburg operated as a charm in dispelling the panic : with the cessation of continental war the demand for the precious metals immediately ceased ; and the crisis was in fact over, when the return of the Emperor to the Tuileries entirely restored the public confidence. But the danger had been so pressing, that nothing but the instantaneous termination of the war could have averted it : and by merely protracting the contest in Moravia for a few months, the allies would infallibly have brought the French government to a national bankruptcy.¹

¹ Bign. v. 89,
94. Bour. vii.
100, 111.
Sav. ii. 157,
162.

12.

Measures of
Napoleon in
consequence.

Napoleon was highly indignant at these embarrassments, and fully appreciated the magnitude of the peril from which he had been extricated by the fortunate victory of Austerlitz.* Public opinion, as usual, followed the impulse set by its leaders ; the imprudent facility of M. de Marbois, the minister of finances, became the general object of reprobation, and the greatest wits of the capital exerted their talents in decrying his administration.† The Emperor minutely scrutinised the embarrassments of the bank and the treasury : it was found that the total deficit of the public contractors to the government amounted to 141,000,000 francs, (£5,600,000,) of which Ouvrard and Vanlerbergh owed nearly two-thirds, and measures of severity were immediately ordered against all the defaulters, who were thrown into prison without distinction. The gigantic company of M. Ouvrard and his partners was in consequence reduced to bankruptcy : but in the end nearly the whole deficit was recovered for the nation. The system of providing for the public service by means of contractors was shortly after abandoned :² but, a

² Bour. vii.
111. Bign. v.
96, 97.

* "Beaten," says Savary, "in the depths of Moravia, deprived by inconceivable imprudence of all the resources on which he was entitled to calculate, he would have been wholly unable to repair his losses, and his ruin from that moment was inevitable."—SAVARY, ii. 161.

† The unbending firmness of M. de Marbois being mentioned in laudatory terms in presence of Madame de Staël, "He !" said she, "he is nothing but a willow wand painted to look like bronze"—BOUR. vii. 111.

few years after, the government was under the necessity of resuming it: and Napoleon ultimately made the most ample amends to the injured M. de Marbois, by appointing him president of the Chamber of Accounts.

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In fact, though it suited the interests of the Emperor to represent this alarming catastrophe as exclusively the result of the imprudent facility of the minister of finances, and the inordinate profusion of discounts by the Bank, yet the evil in reality lay a great deal deeper, and the crisis was, in fact, occasioned by the vicious system to which the extravagant expenditure of the Imperial government had driven the finance ministers. Although the budgets annually presented since Napoleon seized the government had exhibited the most flattering aspect, yet in reality they were in a great degree fictitious, and intended to conceal the labouring condition of the finances. The actual receipts of the treasury for the last five years had been a hundred millions below the annual expenses. In addition to this, the payments of the finance minister required to be almost all made in the course of each year; while the period of his receipts for the same time, according to the established mode of collecting the revenue, extended to eighteen months. Thence arose an indispensable necessity for a recourse to money-lenders, who instantly advanced cash to the treasury, and received in return bills payable when the tardy receipts of the revenue might be expected to be realised. In this way, while the receipts and expenditure as exhibited in the budget annually presented to the Chambers, were nearly equal, there was in reality a most alarming deficit, which was daily increasing; and it was only by largely anticipating, by the discount of bills accepted by the treasury, the revenue of succeeding terms or years, that funds could be provided for the liquidation of the daily demands upon it.¹

13.
Real cause of
the catastro-
phe.

¹ Bign. v. 87,
88, 103.

Recourse was at first had to the receivers-general of the departments to make these advances: and this system succeeded, though with some difficulty, during the comparatively economical years of 1803 and 1804. But the vast expenditure of 1805, occasioned partly by the equipment of the expedition at Boulogne, partly by the cost of the Austrian war, rendered their resources totally unavailing; and it became necessary to apply to greater capital-

14.
Means by
which the
crisis had
hitherto been
avoided.

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ists, who, in anticipation of future payments, could afford to make the great advances required by government. M. de Marbois was thus driven by necessity to M. Ouvrard and the company of the Indies, who were already the contractors for the supplies to almost all the forces, both by land and sea ; and thus became invested with the double character of creditor of the state for advances made on exchequer bills, and also for payment of the supplies furnished to the different branches of the public service. Thence the deep implication of this company with the transactions of government ; and the necessity of the Bank of France supporting, by extraordinary and lavish discounts, the credit of individuals or associations, from whom alone government derived the funds requisite for its immense engagements. The monetary embarrassments of 1805, therefore, like almost all others, were occasioned by an extravagant expenditure : but they arose not on the part of individuals, but of government ; the crisis was not commercial but political.¹

¹ Bign. v. 87,
88.

15.
The root of
the evil was
the extrava-
gant expen-
diture of
government.

Thence the singular and instructive fact, that the whole inordinate discounts, of which Napoleon so loudly complained, were made not to individuals engaged in private undertakings, but to the contractors for the public service. The root of the evil lay in the extravagant expenditure of the Emperor himself, which rendered the anticipation of future revenues indispensable, to a perilous extent, in every branch of government. Considered in this view, this financial crisis was not a mere domestic embarrassment, but an important event in the progress of the contest : it indicated the arrival of the period when France, almost destitute of capital from the confiscations of the Convention, and severely weakened in its national credit by the injustice committed during its rule, was unable from its own resources to obtain the funds requisite for carrying on the gigantic undertakings to which its ruler was driven in defence of its fortunes ; and when foreign conquest and extraneous spoliation had become indispensable, not merely to give vent to the vehement passions, but to maintain the costly government and repair the financial breaches occasioned by the Revolution. Napoleon, however much he was disposed to lay the fault, according to his usual system, on others, was in secret perfectly aware

of the perilous pass to which his financial affairs had now been brought, and, like Alexander, he trusted to his sword to cut the Gordian knot. M. Marbois had long before represented to him the danger of "having for the bankers of the state those to whom its ministers were indebted;" and Napoleon was so sensible of this, that he had long before expressed his resolution, in military fashion, to have M. Ouvrard arrested, and made to disgorge some of what he called his ill-gotten wealth, but he had never been able to emancipate himself from his influence.^{1*}

¹ Bign. v. 87, 88.

16.
Financial changes in consequence introduced in France.

The crisis of 1805, however, made decisive measures necessary. "I will have no alliance," said he "between the bank and the treasury. If such existed, a simple movement of the funds might reveal the most important state secrets. We cannot too soon sign an arrêt for the emancipation of the treasury." The difficulty was, that the treasury had to pay every twelve months an hundred and twenty millions francs (L.4,800,000) more than it received, in consequence of the backwardness of all payments to the exchequer. To liquidate part of this debt, sixty millions (L.2,400,000) were funded in the five per cents; the capital of the Bank of France was doubled; and deposit banks, under the name of "caisses de service," where the receivers-general of the revenue were invited to deposit the sums they had drawn as soon as they were received, and encouraged to do so by being offered interest for all sums so deposited prior to the time when they were bound to make them forthcoming. By this means, the necessity of having recourse to paper credit to raise funds upon anticipated revenues was in a great measure avoided, and the collection of the taxes conducted with much greater regularity than formerly.

² Bign v. 80, 189, and 195.

But these financial improvements, great as they were, did not strike at the root of the evil, which was a permanent expenditure by government greatly beyond its

* "Bourrienne," said he, in 1800, "my part is taken: I will cause M. Ouvrard to be arrested."—"General," replied the secretary, "have you any proofs against him?"—"Proofs? What are required? He is a contractor, a scoundrel. He must be made to disgorge. All of his tribe are villains. How do they make their fortunes? At the public expense. They have millions, and display an insolent extravagance when the soldiers are without shoes or bread. I will have no more of this." He was accordingly arrested and thrown into prison; but as there was no evidence whatever against him, he was speedily liberated, and soon, from his great capital, regained all his former influence with the government.—Bour. vii. 94, 95.

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17.

And imposi-
tion of the
French
armies as a
burden on
foreign states.
Nov. 18.

income. To cure this by means of loans, the well-known practice in Great Britain, was impossible in a country so ruined in its commercial relations and interests as France then was. The victories of Ulm and Austerlitz solved the difficulty. From the moment the grand army crossed the Rhine, it was fed, clothed, lodged, and paid at the expense of Germany.* On the 18th November, an edict of the Emperor directed the transmission of all funds to the army of the north to cease; and on the 18th of December a similar order was given in regard to the army of Italy. Thus the three principal armies of the empire ceased to be any longer a charge upon its finances, and the tributary or conquered states bore the burden of the greater part of that enormous military force by which they were overawed or retained in subjection. This system continued without intermission during the whole remainder of the reign of Napoleon; and the budgets annually presented to the Chambers were in consequence, as the Duke de Gaeta, their principal compiler, himself confesses, no true statement of the Imperial expenses.¹ They were delusive even in what concerned the domestic finances of France, by always exaggerating the income and diminishing the expenditure; and, as concealing the greater part of the enormous contributions levied by the army in the conquered states, totally fallacious.²

¹ Gaeta, l.
272, 434.

² Bign. v. 99,
100.

18.
French bud-
get for 1805,
and exposi-
tion by the
minister of
the interior.

The budget of France for 1805, presented to the Chambers in February 1806, accordingly exhibited a most deceptive picture of the national finances; but even as it was it showed an expenditure of 666,000,000, (L.26,600,000,) and an income of only 588,000,000, (L.23,600,000,) the balance being made out by contributions levied from foreign states.† But although Napoleon knew as well as

* From the Castle of Louisberg in Wirtemberg, Napoleon wrote, so early as 4th October 1805, to the minister of finances at Paris—"The army maintains the most exact discipline: the country hardly feels the presence of the troops. We live here on *Bons*: *I have no need of money from you.*" These *Bons* were treasury bills, which were discharged by the French government out of the contributions levied on the inhabitants, or the sums extracted from the conquered countries.—BIGNON, v. 100.

† The Receipts and Expenditure exhibited were as follows:—

RECEIPTS	
Francs.	
Direct taxes,	311,649,196
Registration and stamps	172,763,591
Customs,	52,725,918
Lottery,	13,860,000

any one the perilous nature of the crisis which the government had recently experienced, it was no part of his policy to permit his subjects to share his disquietude, and he resolved to dazzle the world by a splendid exposition of the state of the empire. The report drawn up by Champagny, minister of the interior, contained a picture of the Imperial dominions, which, from the magnitude of the victories it recounted, and the splendour of the undertakings it commemorated, might well bear a comparison with Pliny's panegyric of Trajan. It represented the navigation of the Seine and the Saone as essentially improved; Alexandria surrounded with impregnable fortifications; Genoa furnishing its sailors and naval resources to France; Italy delivered from the presence of the English; the sciences, the arts encouraged; the capital about to be adorned by the most splendid monuments; the Alps and the Apennines yielding to the force of scientific enterprise, and the noble routes of the Simplon, Mount Cenis, the Corniché, and the Mont Genevre, opening to loaded chariots a path amidst heretofore impassable snows; numberless bridges established over the Rhine, the Meuse, the Loire, the Saone, and the Rhone; ¹ Bign. v. 104, 108. harbours and wet docks in a state of rapid construction in five-and-thirty maritime cities; ¹ the works of Antwerp

	Francs.
Brought forward, . . .	559,998,705
Post-office, . . .	10,000,000
Excise, . . .	25,000,000
Salt, . . .	3,000,000
<hr/>	
Total from France, . . .	588,998,705 francs, or £23,600,000
“ from Italy, . . .	30,000,000 or 1,200,000
“ from Germany and Holland, . . .	100,000,000 or 4,000,000
<hr/>	
Total, . . .	718,998,705 francs, or £28,800,000

EXPENDITURE.

Army, . . .	271,500,000
Navy, . . .	140,000,000
Church, . . .	35,000,000
Interest of debt, . . .	69,140,000
Civil list, . . .	27,000,000
Minister of Finance, . . .	43,349,800
“ of Justice, . . .	21,200,000
“ of Interior, . . .	29,500,000
“ of Treasury, . . .	8,000,000
“ of Police, . . .	700,000
Miscellaneous, . . .	20,765,339

666,155,139 francs, or £26,600,000

—See DUC DE GAETA, 304; BIGNON, v. 102; PEUCHET, 560.

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and Cherbourg promising soon to rival the greatest naval establishments of England.

19

Exposition of
the triumphs
of France, and
silence as to
Trafalgar.

The exposition concluded with a rapid view of the advantages which France had derived from the successive coalitions which had been formed against its existence.

"The first coalition, concluded by the treaty of Campo Formio, gave the republic the frontier of the Rhine, and the states which now form the kingdom of Italy; the second invested it with Piedmont; the third united to its federal system Venice and Naples. Let England be now convinced of its impotence, and not attempt a fourth coalition, even if subsequent events should render such a measure practicable. The House of Naples has irrevocably lost its dominions; Russia owes the escape of its army solely to the capitulation which our generosity awarded: the Italian Peninsula, as a whole, forms a part of the great empire: the Emperor has guaranteed, as chief supreme, the sovereigns and constitutions which compose its several parts." In the midst of these just subjects for exultation, Napoleon had not the moral courage to admit the terrible disaster of Trafalgar. That decisive event was only alluded to in the following passage of his opening speech to the Chambers:—"The tempests have made us lose some vessels after a combat imprudently engaged in. I desire peace with England; I shall not on my side retard its conclusion by an hour. I shall always be ready to terminate our differences on the footing of the treaty of Amiens." Thus, while the Neapolitan dynasty, for merely making preparations for war, was declared to have ceased to reign, England, which had struck so decisive a blow at his maritime strength, was invited to a pacification on terms of comparative equality—a striking instance of that resolution to crush the weak, and temporise, till the proper time arrived, with the powerful, which formed so remarkable a feature of Napoleon's policy.¹

¹ Bign. v.
104, 110.
Hard. ix. 91.

20.

Erection of
the Column
in the Place
Vendôme.

The return of Napoleon to Paris was the signal for the commencement of magnificent public structures in that capital. The municipality voted a monument to the Emperor and the grand army, which, after much hesitation as to the design, it was at length resolved to make a triumphal column, composed of the cannon taken in the Austrian campaign, surmounted by a statue in bronze of

the Emperor. The design was speedily carried into effect ; five hundred Imperial guns, melted down and cast anew, assumed the mould of the principal actions of the campaign, which wound, like the basso-relievo on Trajan's pillar at Rome, to the summit of the structure, 120 feet from the ground, where the statue of Napoleon, since carried off by the Emperor Alexander as a trophy of victory to St Petersburg, was placed. Since the accession of Louis Philippe it has been replaced by an admirable bronze representation of the great conqueror in his gray riding-coat, which has become canonised in the minds of the French by the feelings of admiration, almost amounting to devotion, with which his memory is regarded. Magnificent fêtes were projected by the Emperor to signalise the return of the grand army to the capital ; but they were adjourned, first on the account of the sojourning of the troops on the Austrian frontier, next from the menacing aspect of Prussia, and finally abandoned after the gloom and bloodshed of the Polish campaign.¹

¹ Bign. v.
112, 113.

The ominous announcement, made from the depths of Moravia, that the dynasty of Naples had ceased to reign, was not long allowed to remain a dead letter. Massena was busily employed, in January, in collecting his forces in the centre of Italy, and before the end of that month fifty thousand men, under the command of Joseph Buonaparte, had crossed the Pontifical States and entered the Neapolitan territory in three columns, which marched on Gaeta, Capua, and Itri. Resistance was impossible ; the feeble Russian and English forces which had disembarked to support the Italian levies, finding the whole weight of the war likely to be directed against them, withdrew to Sicily ; the court, thunderstruck by the menacing proclamation of 27th December, speedily followed their example ; the governors of the cities first exposed to invasion hastened to appease the conqueror by submission ; a futile attempt at negotiation by means of Prince St Theodore did not suspend for an instant the march of the victorious troops. In vain the intrepid Queen Caroline, who still remained at Naples, armed the lazzaroni, and sought to infuse into the troops a portion of her own indomitable courage ; she was seconded by none ; Capua opened its gates ; Gaeta was invested ;² the

21.
Advance of
the French
against
Naples.

² Dum. xv.
95, 99. Bign.
v. 114, 116.
Hard. ix. 56,
58.

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Campagna filled with the invaders ; she, vanquished but not subdued, compelled to yield to necessity, followed her timid consort to Sicily ; and, on the 15th February, Naples beheld its future sovereign, Joseph Buonaparte, enter its walls.

22.
Successful in-
vasion of
Calabria.

But although the capital was thus occupied by the invaders, and the reigning family had taken refuge in the sea-girt shores of Sicily, the elements of resistance still existed in the Neapolitan dominions. The Prince of Hesse-Philipsthal had the command of Gaeta, and he had inspired the garrison of eight thousand men which he commanded with a share of his own heroic resolution. When summoned to capitulate, this gallant officer replied, that his honour would not permit him to lower his colours till the last extremity ; and the long resistance which he made, coupled with the natural strength of the place, which could be approached, like Gibraltar, only by a neck of land strongly fortified, inspired the Sicilian cabinet with the hope that something might yet be done for the deliverance of its continental dominions. During the first tumult of invasion, the peasantry of Calabria, in despair at the universal desertion of the kingdom, both by their government and its allies, submitted to the enemy ; and General Regnier, with a considerable corps, in the outset experienced little resistance in his occupation of the principal strongholds of the country. But the protraction of the siege of Gaeta, which occupied Massena with the principal army of the French, gave them time to recover from their consternation ; and the cruelty of the invaders, who put to death without mercy all the peasants who were found with arms in their hands, on the pretence that they were brigands, drove them to despair. A general insurrection took place in the beginning of March, and the peasants stood firm in more than one position ; but they were unable to withstand the shock of the veterans of France, and in a decisive action in the plain of Campo-Tenese their tumultuary levies, though fifteen thousand strong, were entirely dispersed. The victorious Regnier penetrated even to Reggio, and the standards of Napoleon waved on its towers, in sight of the English videttes on the shores of Sicily.¹

¹ Bot. iv.
Hard. ix. 88,
90. Dum. xv.
107, 116.

When hostilities had subsided, Joseph repaired in per-

son to the theatre of war, and sought, by deeds of charity, to alleviate its distresses, while his beneficent mind contemplated great and important public works to ameliorate that savage and neglected district. He visited the towers of Reggio, admired the magnificent harbour of Tarentum, and had already formed the design of canals and roads to open up the sequestered mountains of Calabria. In the midst of these truly princely projects he received at Savigliano, the principal town of the province, the decree by which Napoleon created him king of the Two Sicilies. By so doing, however, he was declared not to lose his contingent right of succession to the throne of France; but the two crowns were never to be united. At the same time the Venetian states were definitively annexed to the kingdom of Italy, and that capital was to give his title to the eldest son of its sovereign. The beautiful Pauline, now married to Prince Borghese, received the duchy of Guastalla, subsequently united to the same dominions; the Princess Eliza was created Princess of Lucca Piombino; Murat was made Grand-duke of Berg, with a considerable territory; and the Emperor reserved to himself twelve duchies in Italy, of which six were in the Neapolitan dominions, which were bestowed on the principal officers of his army.* Thus, while he was elevating the members of his family to the neighbouring thrones, the military hero of the Revolution already gave indications of his secret design, by reconstructing the titles of honour which it had cost so much bloodshed to destroy, to overturn its principles.¹

Events, however, soon occurred which showed the infant sovereign what an insecure tenure he had of his dominions. Hardly had he returned to Naples to receive the congratulations of his new subjects on his

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23.

Joseph
Bonaparte
created King
of the Two
Sicilies.
March 30.

April 4.

¹ Bign. v.
131. Hard.
ix. 93, 94.
Colletta, ii.
14, 15.

* "The interests of our crown," said Napoleon, "and the tranquillity of the continent of Europe, require that we should secure in a stable and definitive manner the fate of the people of Naples and Sicily, fallen into our power by the right of conquest, and forming part of the great empire—we therefore declare our well-beloved brother Joseph King of the Two Sicilies." By the same decree, Berthier was created Prince of Neufchatel, which had been ceded by Prussia; Talleyrand obtained, with the title of Prince of Benevento, the principality of the same name, which belonged to the Pontifical States; Bernadotte became Prince of Pontecorvo; Cambacérès and Le Brun, Dukes of Parma and Placentia. Substantial reservations in favour of the crown of France accompanied the creation of these inferior feudatories; a million yearly was reserved from the Neapolitan revenues to be distributed among the French soldiers.—HARD. ix. 94, 95; BIGN. v. 131.

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24.

Naples is
threatened
by Sir Sidney
Smith.
General
Stuart lands
in the Bay of
St Euphemia.

July 1.

elevation, when the island of Capri, the celebrated retreat of the Emperor Tiberius, whose romantic cliffs bound the horizon to the south of the Bay of Naples, was wrested from his power by an English detachment. Nothing but the generous forbearance of the commander of the squadron, Sir Sidney Smith, saved his capital and palace from a bombardment, amidst the festive light of an illumination. Shortly after, a still more serious disaster occurred in the southern provinces of his dominions,

attended in the end with important effects on the fortune of the war. Encouraged by the prolonged resistance of Gaeta, and the accounts which were brought from all quarters of the disaffection which prevailed in Calabria, the English commanders in Sicily resolved upon an effort by land and sea, with the double view of exciting an insurrection on the one side of the capital, and relieving the fortress which so gallantly held out on the other. In the beginning of July an expedition set sail from Palermo, consisting of somewhat less than five thousand men, which landed in the Gulf of St Euphemia: and the commander, Sir John Stuart, issued a proclamation calling on the Calabrians to repair to his standard and unite their efforts to expel the intruding sovereign. Few or none, however, of the peasantry appeared in arms; no intelligence of more distant armaments was received; and the English general was beginning to hesitate whether he should not re-embark his troops, when advices were received that Regnier, with a French force not greatly exceeding his own, was encamped at MAIDA, about ten miles distant. With equal judgment and resolution, Sir John Stuart immediately resolved to advance against his opponent; and if he could not expel the enemy from the Neapolitan territories, at least give the troops of the rival nations an opportunity, so much longed for, of measuring their strength on a footing of comparative equality. He moved forward his forces, accordingly, in quest of the enemy. On the 5th July the outposts of the two armies were within sight of each other, and both sides prepared for a decisive conflict on the following morning:¹ the French never doubting that they would speedily drive the presumptuous islanders into the sea; the English anxious, but not apprehensive, that it would

¹ Bot. iv. 210,
211. Colletta,
ii. 19. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
142. Dum.
xv. 142, 145.

be found, in the hour of trial, that they had not degenerated from their ancestors of Blenheim or Poitiers.

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25.
Regnier
resolves to
attack them.

When the English army arrived in sight, the corps of Regnier, consisting of five thousand infantry, six hundred cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery, was strongly posted on a range of wooded heights which skirted the little plain stretching from their feet toward the sea; while the British, bivouacking in that marshy and unhealthy expanse on the banks of the Amato, were in a situation of all others the most exposed to the pestilential influences of the malaria, at that sultry season in full activity. But Regnier was inspired with a supercilious contempt for his opponents, with whom he had combated in Egypt, and the defeats from whom, there received, he had entirely ascribed, in his subsequent publication, to the errors of General Menou. He was encouraged, besides, by the arrival of reinforcements in the night, which raised his forces to seven thousand five hundred men,¹ and, resolving to leave nothing to the diseases of the climate, he marched at once to the encounter. Hastily, therefore, he descended from the heights, crossed the sluggish stream, and advanced against the enemy.²

¹ Bot. iv. 2,
11.
² Ibid. iv.
211. Dum.
xv. 144. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
142.

26.
Battle of
Maida.
July 6.

Surprised, but nothing dismayed at the unexpected appearance of forces so much more considerable than they had anticipated, the British troops awaited, with undiminished resolution, the attack. Their right rested on the Amato, at the point where its lazy current fell into the sea; the thickets and underwood which enveloped its mouth were filled with light troops, who kept up a destructive fire on the assailants as they approached. Notwithstanding the heavy loss which they sustained in consequence, the French bravely advanced, and, impatient of victory, after a few volleys had been exchanged, rushed forward with the bayonet. But they little knew the enemy with which they had now to deal. No sooner did the English right, consisting of the light companies of the 26th, 27th, 35th, 58th, 61st, 81st, and 85th regiments, perceive the levelled steel of their opponents, than they too advanced with loud cheers to the charge; the 1st light infantry, a famed French regiment, as gallantly pressed forward; and the rival nations approached each other till their bayonets literally crossed. At that appalling moment

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French enthusiasm sank before British intrepidity; their battalions broke and fled; but were instantly overtaken amidst deafening shouts, and assailed with such fury, that in a few minutes seven hundred lay dead on the spot, and a thousand, including General Compère, were made prisoners. Taking advantage of this overthrow, the brigade under General Auckland, which was immediately to the left of the victorious right, also pressed forward, and drove the enemy in that quarter from the field of battle. Defeated thus in the centre and right, Regnier made an attempt with his cavalry, in which arm the British were totally deficient, to overwhelm the other flank: a rolling fire of musketry repelled them from the front of the line; but their squadrons rapidly wheeling round the immovable infantry, succeeded in turning its left, and this movement might have yet retrieved the day, when the French cavalry, in the midst of their advance, were assailed by a close and well-directed fire in flank from the 28th regiment, which had that morning landed, and came up most opportunely at the decisive moment to take a part in the action. This unexpected discharge totally disconcerted the horse, which fled in disorder from the field of battle; and the enemy, routed at all points, withdrew their shattered battalions across the Amato, weakened by the loss of half their numbers.¹*

¹ Sir J. Stuart's Despatch, *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 591, 593. *Bot.* iv. 211, 212. *Colletta*, ii. 20. *Dum.* xv. 146, 148.

27.
Great moral effect of this victory.

The battle of Maida, though hardly noticed by the French nation amidst the blaze of Ulm and Austerlitz, had a most important effect upon the progress of the war. It is often by the feelings which it excites, and the moral impression with which it is attended, more than by its immediate results, or the numbers engaged on either side, that the importance of a victory is to be estimated. In this point of view, never was success more important than that thus achieved. True, the forces engaged were inconsiderable, the scene remote, the probable immediate advantages trifling: but what mattered all that? it was a duel between France and England, and France had succumbed in the conflict. At last the rival states had come into col-

* The total loss of the British was only 44 killed and 284 wounded. The Duchess of Abrantes states the loss of the French at 5000 men.—D'ABRANTES, ix. 136; and Sir J. STUART'S *Despatch*, *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 594.

lision, on terms approaching to equality, and free from the paralysing influence of lukewarm or dubious allies. The result had been decisive: the veterans of Napoleon had fled before the British steel. Indescribable was the national exultation at this glorious result. The disasters of the early years of the war were forgotten, or ascribed to their true cause—general inexperience in the military art; confidence, the surest presage of victory, when guided by prudence, was transferred from the naval to the land service; and, reposing securely on the fights of Alexandria and Maida, all classes openly expressed their ardent desire for an early opportunity of measuring the national strength on a greater scale with the conquerors of continental Europe. Publications began to issue from the press which strongly urged the adoption of a more manly system of military policy,* and the descent of the British in large bodies on the shores of Germany or Italy: the people no longer hesitated to speak of Cressy and Azincour. The British historian need entertain no fears of exaggerating the moral influence of this success, even with so inconsiderable a force. He will have occasion to portray a similar result to the enemies of his country, from the successes of the Americans with detached ships at the close of the war. Napoleon was well aware of its importance: he received the accounts of the defeat at Maida with a degree of anguish which all his matchless powers of dissimulation could not conceal.¹ “Sive tanta, sive minor, victoria fuit, ingens eo die res, ac nescio an maxima illo bello, gesta sit; non vinci enim ab Hannibale, vincentibus tunc difficilior fuit, quam postea vincere.”²†

¹ D’Abr. ix. 136.

² Liv. xxiii. 16.

But, though productive in the end of the most important consequences from the moral feelings which it inspired, the victory of Maida was not attended at the moment with any durable results. In the first instance, indeed, considerable advantages were gained. Every town

28.

Its immediate results are less considerable.

* In particular, Captain Pasley’s able and energetic treatise on the military policy of England; a work which had a powerful effect in directing the public attention to this important subject.

† “Be the victory great or small, a great affair was achieved on that day, and I know not but the most important in the war. For not to be conquered by Hannibal, was then more difficult than afterwards to conquer.”—LIVY, xxiii. 16.

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and fort along the coast of Calabria fell into the hands of the victors. The whole artillery, stores, and ammunition collected for the invasion of Sicily, were taken or destroyed. The French forces made a precipitate retreat on all sides, and the insurrection spread like wildfire through the whole southern provinces of the Neapolitan dominions. A few days after, the town of Crotona, containing a thousand men, chiefly wounded, surrendered to the insurgents. The detachments of the French were cut off on all sides, and massacred with savage cruelty by the peasantry, whose ferocity General Stuart in vain endeavoured to appease, by a proclamation earnestly imploring them not to disgrace their cause by a deviation from the usages of civilised warfare. So general were the losses, that Regnier was unable to stop his retreat till he reached the intrenched camp of Cassano, where the junction of Verdier's division enabled his shattered army, weakened by the loss of eight thousand men, at length to make head against the enemy.¹

¹ Dum. xv.
148, 155.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 595.
Bot. iv. 213.
Join. ii. 238.
Bign. v. 126.

29.
Surrender of
Gaeta.

July 18.

These disasters might have been attended with important results upon the whole campaign in the Peninsula, could Gaeta have held out till the combined English and Neapolitan forces approached its walls. But the progress of the siege, and the vigour of Massena, who commanded the attacking army, rendered this impossible. After a gallant resistance, and the display of great skill on both sides, which rendered this siege one of the most memorable of the whole war, a practicable breach was effected in front of the citadel, while a second, of smaller dimensions, was formed on its flank. Already a column of three thousand grenadiers was prepared for the assault. Prince Hesse Philipsthal had some days before been mortally wounded by the bursting of a shell, and removed on board an English vessel to Sicily: his successor was not animated with his dauntless spirit; proposals of capitulation were made; and Massena, glad on any terms to render his force disposable for still more pressing exigencies, granted them the most honourable conditions.²* The garrison, still seven thousand strong,

² Bign. v. 127,
128. Dum.
xv. 155, 170.
Bot. iv. 214.

* The physical difficulties experienced by the assailants in this memorable siege were of the most formidable description; its details, which are fully given by General Mathieu Dumas, are highly interesting to the military reader. No

marched out with the honours of war; and on the 18th July the French flag waved on its classic and almost impregnable battlements.

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The surrender of Gaeta, by rendering disposable the whole besieging force of Massena, eighteen thousand strong, made the insurrection in Calabria hopeless, and the ulterior stay of the English army on the Neapolitan shores impossible. Sir John Stuart, therefore, slowly bent his steps towards the Straits of Messina; and at length, on the 5th September, after a residence of two months, the last detachments of the English embarked for Palermo, leaving of necessity, though on this occasion for the last time, the stain too often thrown on their arms, of exciting a people to resistance whom they subsequently abandoned to their invaders. Meanwhile the advance of Massena, though stubbornly resisted and attended with great bloodshed, was a succession of triumphs. The insurgents stood their ground bravely at the romantic defile of Lauria, so well known to travellers in Calabria, but were at length turned by the Monte Galdo and defeated with great slaughter. A guerilla warfare ensued, attended with savage cruelty on both sides. The stream of the Calore, which flowed through the theatre of the contest, descended to the sea charged with the bodies of the slain. But, after several months of carnage, the French troops regained all the ground they had occupied prior to the descent of the English; and an amnesty, judiciously published by King Joseph, at length put a period to this sanguinary and hopeless contest, in which they lost by sickness and the sword little short of fifteen thousand men.¹

30.
Retreat of the
English.
Suppression
of the insur-
rection.

Aug. 5.

Nov. 10.
1 Dum. xv.
171, 179.
Joni. ii. 239,
246. Bot. iv
214, 217.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 143,
148.

No monarchy in Europe stood more in need of reformation than that of Naples when Joseph took possession of its throne. The administration of justice, the regulation of the finances, the general police of the country,

less than 120,000 cannon-shot and 22,000 bombs were fired by the garrison upon the besiegers before they returned a single gun; but when their batteries were opened on the 10th July, the superiority of their fire became soon apparent. Gaeta, named after the nurse of Æneas,* underwent a desperate siege from the Austrians in 1707, when it surrendered only after a murderous assault by Marshal Daun. Thirty years afterwards, it was besieged and taken when defended only by an insufficient garrison.—See DUMAS, xv. 155, 170.

* "Tu quoque litoribus nostris, Æneia nutrix,
Æternam moriens famam, Caieta, dedisti."

VIRGIL, lib. vii.

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31.
Domestic re-
forms of
Joseph in
Naples.

stood equally in need of improvement. Hence the remarkable fact, so common on the Continent, so rare in England, that the most democratically inclined of the whole community were those of the higher ranks who had travelled, or received the advantages of a liberal education, while the supporters of the arbitrary government, and all the abuses following in its train, were to be found among the rabble of the cities and the peasantry of the country. A state of things which, however at variance with what is generally prevalent in a constitutional monarchy, arises naturally from the feelings brought into action in such circumstances as here occurred, and has been since abundantly verified by the experience of the southern monarchies of Europe when exposed to revolutionary convulsions. Joseph Buonaparte, who was endowed by nature with an inquisitive and beneficent spirit, found ample room for, and soon effected, the most extensive ameliorations. Without conceding in an undue degree to the democratic spirit, he boldly introduced reforms into every department. The estates held by the nobles by a military tenure were deprived of their unjust exemption from taxation; their castles, villages, and vassals subjected to the common law of the realm; the number of convents was restricted; part of their estates appropriated to the discharge of the public debt, part devoted to the establishment of schools in every province for the youth of both sexes. Academies for instruction in the military art, in naval science, in drawing, a national Institute, and various other useful institutions, were established in the capital. Roads, bridges, harbours, and canals were undertaken or projected, and a general spirit of activity diffused by the energy of the government. Great part of these improvements have survived the ephemeral dynasty with which they originated, and constitute part of the lasting benefits induced in other countries by the disastrous wars of the French Revolution.¹

¹ Colletta, ii.
1, 15. Bign.
v. 135, 139.

The conquest of Naples and ascent of the throne of the two Sicilies by the brother of Napoleon was not the only usurpation which followed the peace of Presburg. The old commonwealth of Holland was destined to receive a master from the victorious Emperor; while the republic

of Venice, incorporated by the decree of 30th March with the kingdom of Italy, furnished a noblesse to surround and support his throne. Since their conquest by the French, under the victorious arms of Pichegru, the Dutch had uniformly shared in all the revolutionary convulsions of the parent republic; and the authority latterly conferred on the grand pensionary in 1805, had almost rendered it a monarchical government. Meanwhile the misfortunes of the state were unparalleled. Its most valuable colonies had been conquered by the English, and were to all appearance indefeasibly united to that absorbing power. The Cape of Good Hope had become a half-way house to their vast dominions in Bengal; the island of Ceylon had recently been added to their possessions in the Indian Archipelago; and Surinam itself, the entrepot of the commercial riches of Holland in the Eastern seas, had fallen into their hands. Their harbours were blockaded, their commerce ruined, their flag had disappeared from the ocean; and the state, as usual at the close of revolutionary convulsions, had fallen under the despotic rule of ignoble men, whose tyranny over others was equalled only by their base adulation to the foreign rulers of the commonwealth. The people, despairing of relief, and worn out by the exactions of obscure tyrants, in the election of whom the respectable classes had taken no share, were desirous of any change which promised a more stable and creditable order of things.¹

Encouraged by these dispositions, Napoleon resolved to place his brother Louis on the throne of Holland. With this view a Dutch deputation, composed of persons entirely in his interest, was instructed to repair to Paris and demand his appointment. A treaty was soon concluded, which, on the preamble "that it had been found by experience that the annual election of a chief magistrate was the source of continual discord, and that in the existing state of Europe a hereditary government could alone guarantee the independence and furnish securities to the civil and religious liberties of the state," declared Louis King of Holland. A few days after, the new monarch was proclaimed, and issued a decree, in which he promised to maintain the liberties of his people, whose independence was guaranteed by the Emperor. But the

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32.

Miserable
state of Hol-
land since its
conquest by
France.¹ Hard. ix.
99, 100.
Bign. v. 141.

33.

Napoleon's
measures to
place his
brother Louis
on the throne
of that
country.
May 26.

June 5.

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elusory nature of that independence was made painfully evident by the characteristic speech which Napoleon made to his brother on the occasion:—"Never cease to regard yourself as a Frenchman. The dignity of con- stable of the empire shall be reserved to you and your descendants. It will recall to your recollection the duties you have to discharge *towards me*, and the importance which I attach to the guardianship of the strong places which I intrust to you, and which compose the northern frontier of my states."¹

¹ Hard. ix.
99, 100.
Bign. v. 141,
142.

34.
Creation of
military fiefs
in the king-
dom of Italy.

At the same time, the incorporation of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy afforded the Emperor an opportunity of laying the foundation of that territorial noblesse by which he hoped to add stability and lustre to his throne. Twelve military fiefs were created out of the ceded districts, which Napoleon reserved for the most distinguished of his marshals and ministers; while a fifteenth of the revenue which they yielded to the treasury at Milan was set apart to form appanages suitable to those dignities. A revenue of one million two hundred thousand francs (£48,000) was on this occasion set apart from the taxes of the kingdom of Italy, to form a fund out of which he was to recompense his soldiers, and which was soon divided among a great variety of claimants. Thus Napoleon was rendering the conquests of his arms not only the source of power to himself, but of emolument to his followers in every degree.²

² Bign. v.
139, 140.

35.
Napoleon's
secret views
in these mea-
sures.

The system upon which Napoleon now openly entered, of placing his relations and family on the thrones of the adjoining kingdoms, and surrounding France with a girdle, not of affiliated republics, but of dependent dynasties, was not, as has been sometimes imagined, a mere ebullition of personal vanity or imperial pride. It had its origin in profound principles of state policy, and a correct appreciation of the circumstances which had elevated him to the throne and continued to surround him when there. He clearly perceived that it was revolutionary passion, converted by his genius into the spirit for military conquest, which had placed him on his present pinnacle of power, and that he was regarded with a jealous eye by the old European dynasties, who both dreaded, from dear-bought experience, the fervour which had elevated him to the

throne, and were averse to the principles which had overturned the ancient family. He felt that, of necessity, however disguised under the semblance of friendship, his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him. This being the case, the only permanent bond of alliance to which he could trust was that which united him to his own family, and identified with his own the interests of inferior royalties, dependent on the preservation of his great parent diadem. "I felt my isolated position," says he, "and threw out on all sides anchors of safety into the ocean by which I was surrounded; where could I so reasonably look for support as in my own relations? could I expect as much from strangers?" Such were the views of Napoleon; and that, *situated as he was*, they were founded on reason, is perfectly obvious. That the measures to which they led him, of displacing the adjoining monarchs, and seating on their thrones the members of his own family, were calculated to excite in the highest degree the jealousy and hostility of the other continental powers, and thus had a powerful influence in producing his ultimate overthrow, is indeed equally certain. But these considerations afford no ground for impeaching the soundness of the principles by which his conduct was regulated. They show only that he was placed in circumstances which required a hazardous game to be played; and afford another to the many illustrations which the history of this eventful period exhibits of the eternal truth, that those who owe their elevation to revolutionary passion, whatever form it may have assumed, are driven on before a devouring flame, more fatal in the end to those who are impelled by, than to those who resist its fury.^{1*}

On the same day on which a king was given by the French Emperor to the United Provinces, an ambassador arrived from the Grand Signior, who came to congratulate him on his accession to the Imperial dignity. He was received with the utmost condescension; and the words used by Napoleon on the occasion are well worthy of being recorded, when taken in conjunction with his sub-

¹ Bign. v.
132, 143.
Las Cas. vii.
127.

^{36.}
Audience
given to the
Turkish am-
bassador.

* "The truth is," said Napoleon, "that I was never master of my own movements—I was never altogether my own. I was always governed by circumstances."—LAS CAS. vii. 124, 125.

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sequent conduct to that power by the treaty of Tilsit. "Every thing," said he, "that can happen, either of good or bad fortune, to the Ottomans, will be considered in the same light by France. Have the goodness, M. Ambassador, to transmit these words to Sultan Selim. Let him ever recollect that my enemies, who are also his own, may one day penetrate to his capital. He never can have any cause of apprehension from me: united to my throne, he need fear nothing from his enemies." Within a year after these words were spoken, Napoleon signed on the Niemen a treaty with Russia for the partition of the whole Turkish territories in Europe.¹

¹ Bign. v.
145.

37.
Naval operations. Sailing and division of the Brest fleet.

Dec. 13, 1805.

But while fortune seemed thus lavishing her choicest gifts on Napoleon by land, and the dynasties of Europe were melting away before his breath, disaster, with equally unvarying course, was attending all his maritime operations, and the sceptre of the ocean had irrevocably passed into the hands of his enemies. The victory of Trafalgar, with the subsequent achievement of Sir Richard Strachan, had almost entirely destroyed the great combined fleet which under Villeneuve had issued from Cadiz: but the squadrons of Rochefort and Brest, upon the co-operation of which Napoleon had so fondly calculated, still existed; and he was not yet sufficiently humbled by disaster to renounce altogether the hope of deriving some advantage from their services. He resolved to employ the remainder of his naval forces, not in regular battles with the English fleet, but in detached operations in smaller armaments, against their remote colonies or merchant vessels. Half the Brest squadron, consisting of eleven line-of-battle ships, was victualled for six months; and in the middle of December, when the Channel fleet was blown off the station by violent winds, they stood out to sea, and shortly after divided into two squadrons. The first, under Admiral Leissegues, consisting of five ships of the line and two frigates, was destined to carry out succours to St Domingo; while the second, under Villaumez, embracing six ships of the line and two frigates, received orders to make for the Cape of Good Hope, and do as much injury as possible to the English homeward-bound merchant fleets.² But a cruel destiny awaited both squadrons, which

² Dum. xv.
84, 86. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
229.

nearly annihilated the enemy's remaining naval force, and almost closed the long series of British maritime triumphs during the war.

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Admiral Leissegues arrived without any accident at St Domingo, and disembarked his troops and stores; but the damage he had experienced from the wintry storms during the passage of the Atlantic rendered some repairs necessary, which were undertaken in the open roadstead of that harbour. The imprudent security which had dictated that resolution was soon severely punished. On the 6th February Admiral Duckworth, who had been detached from the blockading squadron before Cadiz in pursuit of the enemy, hove in sight with seven ships of the line and four frigates. Four of the English ships engaged each a single adversary, while the three others united against the *Imperial*, a splendid vessel of a hundred and thirty guns, which bore the Admiral's flag, and was equal to the encounter of any two of its opponents. So unequal a contest as that with three, however, could not be of long endurance. Notwithstanding all their efforts to escape, the French squadron were overtaken and brought to close action: a desperate conflict of two hours ensued, which terminated in the whole of their line-of-battle ships being taken or destroyed; three having struck their colours, and two, including the superb *Imperial*, being driven ashore and burned. The frigates stood out to sea during the confusion of this murderous engagement, and escaped. Nothing could exceed the gallantry with which the French in all their ships stood to their guns: on board the three taken alone, the killed and wounded were no less than 760; while the total loss of the British was only 64 killed, and 294 wounded. The *Imperial*, before it ran ashore, had seen 500 of its bravest sailors mowed down by the irresistible fire of the English vessels.¹

38.
Defeat of the
firstsquadron
at St Do-
mingo.

¹ Dum. xv.
86, 89. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
229. Bign. v.
156.

Though not overtaken by so overwhelming a disaster, the cruise of Admiral Villamez, with the remainder of the Brest fleet, was in the end nearly as calamitous. Having received intelligence when he approached the Cape, of the capture of that settlement by the British, he stood over for Brazil, where he watered and revictualled at Bahia, and moved northward towards the West Indies, in hopes of falling in with the homeward-bound Jamaica

39.
Disasters of
Villamez's
squadron.

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June 4.

July 8.

July 15.

August 28.

July 30.

fleet. Thither he was tracked by Sir Alexander Cochrane, with four sail of the line, who, though not in sufficient strength to risk an engagement, followed him at a distance, and, by means of his look-out frigates, observed all his movements. On the 12th July, Sir John Borlase Warren arrived from England at Barbadoes. His squadron had been fitted out and performed the voyage with unexampled rapidity, having left Spithead only on the 4th June: Sir Richard Strachan soon after made his appearance with a second fleet in the same latitude, while a third, under Admiral Louis, put to sea in the end of August, to intercept their return. As it was now evident that the attention of the English government was fully fixed on this squadron, the last which the enemy had at sea, the most serious apprehensions began to pervade the French that they would share the fate of their comrades on the coast of St Domingo; and under the influence of these feelings the Veteran, of seventy-four guns, commanded by Jerome Buonaparte, separated from the rest of the squadron, and without any orders stood away in the night of the 30th July for France. Discouraged by this defection, and perceiving no possibility of maintaining his position, Villaumez saw no resource but to make sail for the first friendly harbour in Europe. In doing so, however, he was assailed by a furious tempest, which totally dispersed his fleet: the Foudroyant, severely disabled, with difficulty reached the Havannah, pursued by the English frigate Anson under the very guns of the Moro Castle; the Impetueux was standing in for the Chesapeake, when she was descried by Sir Richard Strachan's squadron, driven ashore and burned, her crew being made prisoners; two other seventy-fours were destroyed by the English in the same bay; the Cassard alone, which was supposed to have foundered at sea, regained Brest about the middle of October in the most deplorable condition. Jerome Buonaparte, in the Veteran, made a rich prize in returning to Europe; but, chased by some English vessels when he reached the Bay of Biscay, he was obliged to let go his booty, and after a hard run only reached the coast of France by steering his vessel ashore under the batteries of the little harbour of Concarneau, where the hulk was abandoned, but the crew and guns got into safety.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 230,
231. Bign.
v. 157, 158.
Dum. xv. 90,
94.

The squadron under Admiral Linois, which had so long wandered almost unmolested in the Indian Ocean, and done very great damage to our commerce in the East, after its inglorious repulse by the China mercantile fleet, of which an account has already been given,* made an attack on the *Centurion*, fifty guns, and a few English merchantmen, in the Bay of Vizigabatam; but though they took one of the merchantmen, and drove another on shore, they could make no impression on the line-of-battle ship, which, with undaunted resolution, bore up against triple odds, and at length succeeded in repulsing the enemy. Finding that the Cape of Good Hope had been conquered by the British, Linois at length bent his steps homeward, and had reached the European latitudes, when he fell in the night into the middle of Sir John Borlase Warren's squadron, and after a short action was taken, with the *Marengo* of eighty and the *Belle Poule* of forty guns. Next day, five large frigates, with troops on board bound for the West Indies, were met at sea by a British squadron under Sir Samuel Hood, and, after a running fight of several hours, four out of the five were captured. The only division of the enemy at sea at that period which escaped destruction was the Rochefort squadron, under Admiral Lallemand, which had the good fortune not to fall in with any of the British fleets, and at length, after a cruise of six months, regained its harbour, having made eight hundred prisoners from merchant vessels in the course of its voyage. From its singular good fortune in eluding the pursuit of all the fleets sent in search of it by the British government, Lallemand's was called by the English sailors the Invisible Squadron. He had the luck to meet and capture the *Calcutta* of fifty guns, which, unsuspecting danger, fell into the middle of his fleet of four line-of-battle ships, and surrendered after a gallant resistance; and his safe return was celebrated as a real triumph by the French, who in those disastrous days accounted an escape from the enemy at sea as equivalent to a victory.¹

These maritime transactions conduct us to an important epoch in the war—that in which the French and Spanish navies were TOTALLY DESTROYED, and the English fleet,

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40.

Capture of
Linois, and
other naval
operations.
Sept. 18,
1805.

March 13,
1806.

March 14.

Dec. 15,
1805.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 220.
Bign. v. 153,
154.

* *Ante*, Chap. xxxvii. § 27.

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41.
Reflections
on these last
naval dis-
asters of
France.

by general consent, had attained to UNIVERSAL DOMINION. There is something solemn, and apparently providential, in this extraordinary ascendancy acquired on that element by a single power. Nothing approaching to it had occurred since the fall of the Roman empire. Napoleon afterwards acquired important additions of maritime strength. The fleets of Russia, the galleys of Turkey, the important harbours of Denmark, were put at his disposal: but he never again ventured on naval enterprises; and, with the exception of an unhappy sortie of the Brest fleet, which was soon terminated by the flames of Basque roads, no sea-fight of any moment occurred to the conclusion of the war. Fearless and unresisted, the English fleets thenceforward navigated the ocean in every part of the globe, transporting troops, convoying merchantmen, blockading ports, with as much security as if they had been traversing an inland sea of the British dominions. Banded Europe did not venture to leave its harbours. All apprehensions of invasion disappeared; and England, relieved alike from danger of domestic warfare or colonial embarrassment, was enabled to direct her undivided attention to land operations, and launch forth her invincible legions in that career of glory which has immortalised the name of Wellington.

42.

Greatness of
the French
navy under
Louis XVI.

It was not thus at the commencement of the struggle, nor had it been thus in the preceding war. The mild and pacific Louis XVI. had nursed up the French marine to an unprecedented pitch of power. The French and Spanish fleets had rode triumphant in the Channel. Gibraltar had been revictualled in presence of superior forces only by the admirable skill of Admiral Howe; and more than once it had seemed for a moment doubtful whether the ancient naval greatness of England was not about to yield to the rising star of the Bourbons. When the war broke out, Louis bequeathed to the Convention a gallant fleet of eighty ships of the line, and a splendid colony in St Domingo, which equalled all the other sugar islands of the world put together. But revolutionary convulsions, however formidable in the creation of a military, can never produce a naval power. The insanity of Brissot and the society of Les Amis des Noirs cut off the right arm of the maritime strength of France

by the destruction of St Domingo; the confiscations of the Convention utterly ruined her commercial wealth; the blockade of her harbours deprived her of the only means of acquiring naval experience. One disaster followed another, till not only her own fleets were destroyed, but the navies of all Europe were so utterly paralysed that the English flag alone appeared on the ocean, and the monarch whose will was obeyed from Gibraltar to the North Cape, and from the Ural Mountains to the Atlantic Ocean, did not venture to combat the sloops which daily insulted him in his harbours.

This astonishing result led to a total change in the weapons by which Napoleon thereafter combated Great Britain, and impelled him into that insatiable career of conquest which ultimately occasioned his ruin. He at once perceived that it was in vain, at least for a very considerable time, to make any attempt to withstand the English at sea, and that the prospect of ultimately rivaling their power on that element could only be entertained after a costly construction of ships of war, during a long course of years, in all the harbours of Europe. Abandoning, therefore, all idea of renewing any maritime contest, till his preparations, every where set on foot, for the formation of a navy were completed, he turned his mind to the conversion of his power at land to such a course of policy as might strike at the root of the commercial greatness of England. Thence the CONTINENTAL SYSTEM, based on the project of totally excluding British goods and manufactures from all the European monarchies, which required for its completion the concurrence of all the continental powers, which could every where be enforced only by the most rigid police, and could succeed only through the intervention of universal dominion. From the moment that this ruling principle obtained possession of his mind, the conquest of Europe, or at least the subjection of all its governments to his control, became a matter of necessity; for if any considerable state were left out, the barrier would be incomplete, and through the chasm thus left in the defences, the enemy would speedily find an entrance. The termination of the maritime war, therefore, is not only an era of the highest importance, with reference to

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43.
Napoleon's
change of
system in
regard to the
naval war.

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the separate interests of England, but it is the commencement of that important change in the system of continental warfare which necessarily brought Napoleon to the alternative of universal dominion or total ruin.

44.
Reflections
on the growth
of the English
maritime
power.

Doubtless the highest praise is due to the long line of brave and illustrious men, who, during a series of ages, reared up this astonishing maritime power. It was not, like the empires of Napoleon or Alexander, constructed in a single lifetime; nor did it fall with the fortunes of the heroes who gave it birth. It grew, on the contrary, like the Roman power, through a long succession of ages, and survived the death of the most renowned chiefs who had contributed to its splendour. So early as the time of Edward III. the English navy had inflicted a dreadful wound on that of France; thirty thousand of the vanquished had fallen in a single engagement; and the victory of Sluys equalled in magnitude and importance, though from the frequency of subsequent naval triumphs it has not attained equal celebrity with, that of Cressy or Azincour. The freeborn intrepidity of Blake—the fire of Essex—the dauntless valour of Hawke, contributed to cement the mighty fabric. It grew and hardened with every effort made for its overthrow. The power of Louis XIV., the genius of Napoleon, were alike shattered against its strength: the victories of La Hogue and Trafalgar equally bridled, at the distance of a century from each other, the two most powerful monarchs of Europe; and the genius of Nelson only put the keystone in the arch which already spanned the globe. The world had never seen such a body of seamen as those of England during the Revolutionary war. Dauntless to their enemies, yet submissive to their chiefs—brave in action, yet cool in danger—impetuous in assault, yet patient in defence—capable of the utmost efforts of patriotic devotion, yet attentive to the most minute points of naval discipline—submissive to orders equally when facing the muzzles of an enemy's broadside, or braving the storms of the northern ocean—capable of enduring alike the vertical rays of the torrid zone, or the frozen severity of an arctic winter—cherishing, amidst the irregularities of naval life, the warmth of domestic affection; and nursing, amidst the solitude of the waves,

the ennobling sentiments of religious duty. By such virtues, not a transient, but an enduring fabric is formed. It is by such fortitude that a lasting impression on human affairs is produced.

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But amidst all our admiration of the character of the British navy, destined to rival in the annals of the world the celebrity of the Roman legions, we must not omit to pay a just tribute to the memory of their gallant and unfortunate, but not on that account less estimable antagonists. In the long and arduous struggle which for three centuries the French navy maintained with the English, they were called to the exercise of qualities not less worthy of admiration. Theirs was the courage which can resolutely advance, not to victory, but defeat; the heroism which knows how to encounter not only danger but obloquy; which can long and bravely maintain a sinking cause, uncheered by one ray of public sympathy; which, under a sense of duty, can return to a combat in which disaster only can be anticipated; and sacrifice not only life, but reputation, in the cause of a country which bestowed on success alone the smiles of general favour. Napoleon constantly lamented that his admirals, though personally brave, wanted the skilful combination, the daring energy, which distinguished the leaders of his land forces, and gave the English admirals such astonishing triumphs. But had he possessed more candour, or been more tolerant of misfortune, he would have seen that such daring can be acquired only in the school of victory; that, as self-confidence is its soul, so despondence is its ruin; and that, in reality, the admirals who encountered not only danger but disgrace in combating the arms of Nelson, were often more worthy of admiration than those who led his land forces to certain victory at Jena or Austerlitz.

45.
Character of
the French
navy.

As the English navy has thus risen by slow degrees to universal dominion, so the analogy of history leads to the conclusion, that great and durable results are to be produced by its agency. And, without presuming to scan too minutely the designs of Providence, in which we are merely blind though free agents, it may not be going too far to assert, that the ultimate object for which this vast power was created, is already conspicuous. The Roman

46.
Its probable
future influ-
ence on the
world.

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legions bequeathed to the world the legacy of modern Europe; its empires and monarchies are but provinces of their dominion, regenerated by the fierce energy of northern valour. The English navy will transmit to mankind the still more glorious inheritance of Transatlantic greatness. A new world has been peopled by its descendants, and imbued with its spirit: freedom, tempered by power, will follow in its footsteps: more closely than the march of the Roman legions will the career of civilisation follow the British flag. The era is fast approaching in this narrative, when another power, equally slow in its growth, equally permanent in its progress, will come before us, arising to greatness in the east of Europe. The Cross is inscribed on its banners: Wo to the Crescent! is the watch-cry of its people; and while the brilliant meteor of Napoleon, rising on the fleeting ascendant of passion and crime, is extinguished in blood, these two colossal empires, irresistible, the one by sea and the other by land, will each lay the foundations of the spread of Christianity through half the globe.

These defeats of the French naval squadrons were not the only maritime operations of this year. Before Mr Pitt's death, he had prepared an expedition, under Sir David Baird, consisting of five thousand men, for the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope; the naval armament being under the direction of Sir Home Popham. On the 4th January 1806, the expedition reached Table Bay; but the violence of the surf precluding the possibility of disembarking in that quarter, they were obliged to land in Leopard Bay, from whence they moved immediately towards the capital. On the 8th they came up with the Dutch forces, five thousand strong, chiefly cavalry, in battle array, upon an elevated plateau which the road crossed on the summit of the Blue Mountains. The Hollanders stood several discharges without flinching; but no sooner were preparations made for charging with the bayonet, than they broke and fled, leaving seven hundred killed and wounded on the field of battle; while the loss of the victors was only two hundred and twelve. This action decided the fate of the colony: Cape Town surrendered; ¹General Jansens, who had retired with three thousand men towards the Hottentot country, was induced by an honourable capitulation, which provided for his safe

47
Reduction of
the Cape of
Good Hope.
Jan. 8.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 233,
234. Dum xv.
69, 73.

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return to Europe with all his forces, to abandon a hopeless contest; and within eight days from the time when the troops were first landed, the British flag waved on all the forts, and this valuable colony was permanently annexed to the English dominions.

This well-concerted enterprise added an important settlement to the British colonial girdle, which already almost encircled the earth: but the facility with which it was conducted, inspired the commanders with an overweening confidence, which ultimately led to serious disasters. Sir Home Popham had at a former period been privy to certain designs of Mr Pitt for operations in concert with General Miranda in South America, and had even been appointed, in December 1804, to the Diadem of sixty-four guns, "for the purpose of co-operating with General Miranda, to the extent of taking advantage of any of his proceedings which might tend towards our attaining a position on the continent of South America favourable to the trade of this country."¹ This intention, however, had been afterwards abandoned, or at least suspended, in consequence of the urgent remonstrances of Russia against any such remote employment of the British forces; and when he arrived at the Cape, Sir Home had no authority, express or implied, to employ any part of the forces under his command on any other expedition. But his ardent imagination had been strongly impressed by the brilliant results, both to the nation and the officers engaged in the service, which might arise from such a destination of part of the force which had effected the reduction of the Cape of Good Hope; and having persuaded Sir David Baird, the governor of that settlement, to a certain extent to enter into his views, he set sail in the beginning of April from Table Bay, taking with him the whole naval force under his command, and fifteen hundred land troops. With these, and two companies which he had the address to procure from St Helena, he steered straight for the mouth of the Rio de la Plata.²

48.
Sir Home
Popham re-
solves to
attack
Buenos
Ayres.

¹ Lord Mel-
ville's evi-
dence in Sir
H. Popham's
trial.
March 9,
1807.

² Ann. Reg.
1806, 234,
235. Dum.
xv. 73, 75.

The expedition reached the neighbourhood of Buenos Ayres on the 24th June, and was immediately disembarked. General Beresford, who commanded the land forces, at once proceeded against that town, while the naval forces distracted the attention of the enemy, by threaten-

49.
Which falls.
25th June.

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¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 235,
236. Dum.
xv. 74, 75.

ing Monte Video, where the principal regular forces were collected. Buenos Ayres, chiefly defended by militia, was unable to withstand the energetic attack of the invaders ; and a capitulation was soon concluded, which guaranteed private property—a stipulation which the English commanders religiously observed, though cargoes of great value were lying afloat on the river, and might, by the established usages of war, have been declared good prize. But public stores to a great amount fell into the hands of the victors ; of which 1,200,000 dollars were forthwith forwarded to government, while quicksilver to double the amount was seized for the benefit of the captors.¹

50.
Embarrass-
ment of gov-
ernment on
this success.

Government were extremely embarrassed how to act when intelligence of this unlooked-for success reached the British Islands. Not that they felt any doubt as to the inexpediency and unhappy tendency of the enterprise ; for on the first information that the expedition was in contemplation, they had despatched orders to countermand its sailing ; which unhappily arrived too late to put a stop to its progress. But they were unable to stem or moderate the delirium of joy which pervaded the minds of the mercantile classes on receipt of the despatches. The English, subject beyond any other people perhaps of whom history makes mention, to periodical, though fortunately not very lasting fits of insanity, were suddenly seized with the most immoderate transports. Boundless fields of wealth, it was thought, were opened, endless markets for the produce of manufacturing industry discovered ; and those fabled regions which formed the Eldorado of Sir Walter Raleigh, appeared about to pour their inexhaustible treasures into the British Islands. Under the influence of these extravagant feelings, every principle of reason, every consideration of policy, every lesson of experience, was swept away : speculations the most extravagant were entered into, projects the most insensate formed, expectations the most ridiculous entertained ; and government, unable to withstand the torrent, were obliged to dissemble their real feelings, and give a certain countenance to ideas which could be fraught only with ruin to all who acted upon them.

² Ann. Reg.
1806, 237,
238.

But long before the cabinet of St James's were either required to come to a resolution in what manner they were to act in regard to their new acquisition, or the

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51.

It is retaken
by the South
Americans.
Aug. 4.

boundless consignments which were in preparation, could have crossed the Atlantic, the conquest itself had returned to the government of its former masters. Ashamed of their defeat by a handful of foreigners, and recovered from the consternation which the unwonted occurrence of an invasion had at first produced, the Spaniards began to entertain serious thoughts of expelling the intruders.

An insurrection was secretly organised in the city of Buenos Ayres, almost under the eyes of the English commanders, without their being aware of what was going forward: The militia of the surrounding districts were assembled: Colonel Linières, a French officer in the Spanish service, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in crossing over from Monte Video at the head of a thousand regular troops; and on the 4th August the small English garrison, assailed by several thousand men from without, found itself menaced with insurrection within the city. The state of the weather rendered embarkation impossible;

Aug. 12.

a desperate conflict ensued in the town; and the English troops, after sustaining for several hours an unequal conflict with the enemy, in greatly superior force in the streets, and a still more deadly because unseen foe in the windows and on the roofs of houses, were obliged to capitulate. The terms of the surrender were afterwards violated by the Spaniards, and the whole remaining troops, thirteen hundred in number, made prisoners of war, after having lost nearly two hundred in killed and wounded. Sir Home Popham, the author of these calamities, succeeded in making his escape with the squadron, and cast anchor off the mouth of the river, where he maintained a blockade till reinforcements enabled the British to resume the offensive, attended, in the end, with still more unfortunate circumstances in the succeeding year. General Miranda, whose projects against South America had been the remote cause of all these disasters, disappointed in his expectations of assistance both from the British and American governments, set sail from New York at the head of a most inadequate force of one sloop and two schooners; and after undergoing many hardships and landing on the Spanish Main, was obliged to reembark and make the best of his way back to Trinidad.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 240,
241.

Differences at this period arose which threatened to

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52.

Differences
with America
in regard to
neutral
rights.

involve the British government in a far more serious contest with the United States of North America. They originated in grievances which unquestionably gave the Americans much ground for complaint, although no fault could be imputed to the English maritime policy; and they were the necessary result of their having engrossed a large portion of the lucrative carrying trade between the belligerent powers. The first subject of complaint was the impressment of seamen said to be British in the American service. The next, the alleged violation of neutral rights, by the seizure and condemnation of vessels engaged in the carrying trade between France and her own or allied colonies. The first, though a practice of all others the most likely to produce feelings of irritation among those upon whom it was exercised, arose unavoidably from the similarity of habits and identity of language in the two states, which of course rendered desertion frequent from the one service to the other; and was a necessary consequence from the right of search which the American government, by a solemn treaty in 1794, had recognised, and which constituted the basis of the whole maritime laws of Europe. It was impossible to expect that when British officers, in the course of searching neutral vessels for contraband articles, came upon English sailors who had deserted to the service of these neutrals, and whom they recognised, they should not reclaim them from their own country. If abuses were committed in the exercise of this delicate right, that was a good reason for making regulations to check them as far as possible, and provide for a due investigation of the matter, but none for abrogating the privilege altogether.¹* The second arose from the decisions of the English Admiralty courts, which now declared good prize neutral vessels carrying colonial produce from the enemy's colonies to the mother state, though they had landed and paid duties in the neutral country,² contrary

¹ The *Essex*,
May 1805,
per Sir W.
Scott. Robin-
son's Rep. ii.
184.

² Case of
Polly, July
5, 1800. Rob.
ii. 368.

* On the part of the Americans it was contended, "that the practice of searching for and impressing seamen on board their vessels was not only derogatory to the honour of their flag as an independent nation, but led to such outrages and abuses, that while it continued, no lasting peace or amity could be expected with Great Britain. It continually happened that native Americans were impressed, and obliged to serve in the English navy on pretence of their being British-born subjects; and such was the similarity of language and external appearance between the two nations, that even with the fairest intentions such mistakes must frequently happen. A practice which leads to such abuses cannot be tolerated by an independent state. It is in vain to appeal to

to the former usage, which admitted that step as a break in the continuity of the voyage, and protected the cargo.

The ground of the distinction, as explained by Sir William Scott, was, that to bring the neutral within the exception, it was necessary that there should be a *bona fide* landing and payment of duties; and so it had been expressly stated in Lord Hawkesbury's declaration on the subject, issued in 1802; whereas, under the system of revenue laws established in the United States, this was not done. On the contrary, the payment of the duties was only secured by bonds, which were cancelled by debentures for the same sums the moment the goods were re-exported, which was usually done, without unloading, next day, so that the whole was a mere evasion, and cost only $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent on the amount of the sums nominally paid. It was strictly conformable to legal principle to refuse to recognise such an elusory proceeding as sufficient to break the continuity of the voyage, and permit the goods to set out on their travels anew, as from a neutral state;¹ but it was equally natural that the sufferers under this distinction should exclaim loudly against its severity,

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53.

Grounds of
conduct of
England as
explained by
Sir W. Scott.

¹ Robinson's
Reports, iii.
241, 249.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 246,
248.

abstract right, or the practice of other states; the close similarity of the Americans and English renders the exercise of it infinitely more grievous in their, than it could be in any other case. The American government are willing to concur in any reasonable measures to prevent British deserters from finding refuge on board the American ships; but they can no longer permit the liberty of their citizens to depend on the interested or capricious sentence of an English officer."

To this it was replied on the part of Great Britain, "That no power but her own could release a British subject from the allegiance which he owed to the government of his nativity; and that, provided she infringed not the jurisdiction of other independent states, she had a right to enforce their services wherever she found them: that no state could, by the maritime law, prevent its merchant vessels being searched for contraband articles; and if in the course of that search her subjects were discovered, who had withdrawn from their lawful allegiance, on what principle could the neutral refuse to give them up? It is impossible to maintain that a belligerent may search neutral vessels for articles of a certain sort, held contraband and belonging to that neutral, and not at the same time reclaim its own subjects, if simultaneously discovered. The right of impressment is a necessary corollary from the right of search; it is in truth the exercise of a still clearer privilege. The difficulty of distinguishing an Englishman from an American is no reason for abandoning the right of searching for subjects of the former state, whatever reason it may afford for discrimination and forbearance in the exercise of it. If the right is abused, the officer guilty of the wrong will meet with exemplary punishment; if the Americans can show that a native of the United States has by mistake been seized for a Briton, he will be immediately released; but it is impossible for Great Britain to relinquish for an instant a right essential to the existence of her navy, and the knowledge of which alone prevents her ships of war being deserted for the higher wages which the lucrative commerce of neutrals enables them to offer, as a bribe to the principal defenders of her independence. If such a change is ever to be made, it can only be on the neutrals providing some substitute for the present practice equally efficacious, and not more liable to abuse, which has never yet been done."—See *Ann. Reg.* 1806, 244, 245.

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and ascribe to the British courts inconsistent conduct, in first recognising as legal a trade from the enemy's colony to the mother state, interrupted by payment of duties at a neutral harbour, and then, after extensive capital had, on the faith of that recognition, been sunk in the traffic, declaring the vessels engaged in it good prize.

54.
Violent mea-
sures of
Congress.

April 18.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 247,
249.

To these serious and lasting subjects of discord, was added the irritation produced by an unfortunate shot from the British ship *Leander*, on the coast of America, which killed a native of that country, and produced so vehement a commotion, that Mr Jefferson issued an intemperate proclamation, forbidding the crew of that and some other English vessels from entering the harbours of the United States. Meetings took place in all the principal cities of the Union, at which violent resolutions on all the subjects of complaint were passed by acclamation. Congress caught the flame, and after some preliminary angry decrees, passed a non-importation act against the manufactures of Great Britain, to take effect on the 15th November following. The English people were equally loud in the assertion of their maritime rights, and every thing announced the commencement of a fresh Transatlantic war by a state already engaged with more than half of Europe.¹

55.
The commis-
sioners on
both sides
adjust the
differences.

But, fortunately for both countries, whose real interests are not more closely united than their popular passions are at variance, the adjustment of the matters in dispute was placed in wiser and cooler heads than the excited populace of either. Commissioners were sent from America to negotiate with Great Britain, and endeavour to obtain some clear and precise rule for regulating their trade with the enemy's colonies, not liable to be changed by orders of council or decisions of courts as to the intentions of parties. These commissioners were Mr Munroe and Mr Pinckney on the part of the United States, and Lords Holland and Auckland on that of Great Britain. The instructions of their respective governments were of the most conciliatory kind, and the gentlemen on both sides entered upon their important duties in a corresponding spirit. Under such auspices, the negotiation, how difficult and embarrassing soever, could hardly fail of being brought to a successful issue. With respect to the impressment of seamen, the subject was found to be surrounded with such

difficulties, that the American commissioners, in opposition to the letter of their instructions, found themselves constrained to be satisfied, in the mean time, with a pledge by the British government, that they would issue directions for the exercise of this right with the greatest delicacy and forbearance, and would afford immediate redress upon any representation of injury sustained by America, reserving the final discussion of the matter to a future opportunity. But on the other points in controversy a satisfactory adjustment was effected. A clear and precise rule was laid down for the regulation of the circuitous trade between the colonies and parent states of the enemy, which defined the difference between a continuous and interrupted voyage, and stipulated that, besides the goods being landed and the duties paid, there should remain, after the drawback, a duty of one per cent on European, and two per cent on colonial produce; and an extension of the maritime jurisdiction of the United States was agreed to, five miles from the shore of their territory. Thus, by good sense and moderation on both sides, were these difficult questions satisfactorily adjusted, and the British nation honourably extricated from an embarrassment which threatened, under far more perilous circumstances, to renew the dangers of the armed neutrality or the northern coalition.¹

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 248,
250. Art. 11
and 12,
Treaty.

While England was thus extending her naval dominion into every part of the globe, and asserting with equal forbearance and spirit the maritime rights essential to the preservation of the vast fabric, Napoleon was rapidly advancing in his career of universal terrestrial empire. Prussia was the first power which felt the humiliation to which these incessant advances led in all the adjoining states. The singular treaty has already been mentioned which was concluded by Count Haugwitz on the 15th December, whereby he substituted for the intended warlike defiance an alliance purchased by the cession of Hanover from the unconscious and neutral England. Great was the embarrassment of the cabinet of Berlin when the intelligence of this unexpected arrangement arrived. On the one hand, the object of their ambition for the last ten years seemed now about to be obtained, and the state to be bounded by an adjoining territory which would bring it an addition of nearly a million of souls. On the other,

56.
Continental
affairs. Cold-
ness between
France and
Prussia.

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Jan. 26.

¹ Harden-
berg's Letter,
Jan. 26, 1806,
to Mr Jack-
son. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
158. Hard. ix.
52, 53. Bign.
v. 223, 226.

some remains of conscience made them feel ashamed of thus partitioning a friendly power, and they were not without dread of offending Alexander by openly sharing in the spoils of his faithful ally. At length, however, the magnitude of the temptation and the terror of Napoleon prevailed over the King's better principles, and it was determined not to ratify the treaty unconditionally, but to send it back to Paris with certain modifications. As a colour to the transaction, and also perhaps as a salve to their own consciences, it was agreed to "accept the proposed exchange of Hanover for the Margravates, on condition that the completion of it should be deferred till a general peace, and the consent of the King of Great Britain in the mean time be obtained;" while it was represented to the English minister at Berlin that arrangements had been concluded with France for insuring the tranquillity of Hanover, which "stipulated expressly the committing of that country to the exclusive guard of the Prussian troops and to the administration of the king until the conclusion of a general peace." But not a word was said of any ulterior designs of definitely annexing Hanover to the Prussian dominions; and in the mean time the French troops were replaced by the Prussian in that electorate, a large part of the army was disbanded, and a proclamation to the same effect issued by the King on taking possession of that territory.¹

57.
Increasing
jealousies be-
tween the
two cabinets.
Prussia seizes
on Hanover.

Feb. 4.

But it was alike foreign to the character and the designs of Napoleon to admit any modifications, how trifling soever, in the treaties which he had concluded with the ministers of inferior powers. The utmost indignation, therefore, was expressed at St Cloud at the modifications proposed to be inserted in the treaty. "From that moment," says Bignon, "on the part of Napoleon the question was decided; all sincere alliance was become impossible between Prussia and him; it was regarded only as a suspected power, whose hollow friendship had ceased to have any value in his eyes." On the 4th February it was officially announced to Haugwitz, that "as the treaty of Vienna had not been ratified within the prescribed time by the Prussian government, the Emperor regarded it as no longer binding." This rigour had the desired effect; Prussia had not resolution enough to

resist ; and on the 15th February a new and still more disgraceful treaty was signed by Haugwitz at Paris, which openly stipulated not only the annexation of Hanover to the Prussian dominions, but the exclusion of the British flag from the ports of that electorate. It was ratified on the 26th, and immediately carried into execution. Count Schulenberg took possession of Hanover on the part of the Prussian monarchy, and immediately issued a proclamation, closing its harbours against English vessels. Finally on the 1st April a patent appeared, formally annexing the electorate to the Prussian dominions, on pretence that, when belonging to Napoleon by the right of conquest, it had been transferred to Prussia, in consideration of three of her provinces ceded to France.¹

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Feb. 15.

March 23.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 159.
Bign. v. 232,
234. Hard. ix.
107.

This system of seizing possession of the territories of neutral or friendly states, in order to meet the wishes or suit the inclinations of greater potentates, when bounding their dominions, to which Napoleon, through his whole administration, was so much inclined, had succeeded perfectly when the objects of spoliation were powers, like Venice or Naples, too weak to manifest their resentment ; but Prussia was egregiously mistaken when she applied it to Great Britain. So early as the 3d February, Count Munster, the Regent of Hanover, had protested against the occupation of that electorate by the Prussian forces, from having observed in the conduct of their generals various indications of an intention to do more than take possession of it for a temporary purpose. At the same time the mildest remonstrance, accompanied by a request of explanation, had been made by Mr Fox, when the intentions of the cabinet of Berlin became still more suspicious. But no sooner did intelligence arrive of the exclusion of the English flag from the harbours of the Elbe, and the Prussian proclamation appear announcing that they took possession of the country in virtue of the French right of conquest, than that spirited minister took the most decisive measures to show that perfidious government the dispositions of the power they had thought fit to provoke. The British ambassador was immediately recalled from Berlin : the Prussian harbours declared in a state of blockade : an embargo laid on all vessels of that nation in the British harbours ; while a message from the

58.

Measures of
retaliation by
Great Bri-
tain.

Feb. 3.

March 17.

April 23.

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May 14.

¹ Hard. ix.
207, 210.
Bign. v. 233.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 159,
161. Parl.
Deb. vi. 882,
886.

King to both houses of parliament announced his resolution "to assert the dignity of his crown, and his anxious expectation for the arrival of that moment when a more liberal and enlightened policy on the part of Prussia should remove every impediment to the renewal of peace and friendship with a power, with whom his majesty had no other cause of difference than that now created by these hostile acts." An order of council was soon after issued, authorising the seizure of all vessels navigating under Prussian colours; and such was the effect of these measures, that the Prussian flag was instantly swept from the ocean; and before many weeks had elapsed, four hundred of its merchant vessels had found their way into the harbours of Great Britain.¹

59.
Mr Fox's
speech on the
subject.

In the speech which he made shortly after in the House of Commons, Mr Fox drew in vivid colours, and depicted with all the force of his eloquence, the humiliating and disgraceful part which Prussia had taken in this transaction. "The Emperor of Russia," said he, "after he left Austerlitz, abandoned the whole direction of his troops that remained in Germany to the King of Prussia, and this country had promised him powerful assistance in pecuniary supplies. These were the means which he possessed of giving weight to his negotiations; and what use did he make of them? Why, to seize a part of the territories of those powers who had been supporting him in the rank and situation that had enabled him to negotiate on fair terms with the French Emperor. At first he pretended only to take interim possession of the electorate of Hanover, till the consent of its lawful sovereign could be obtained to its cession at a general peace; but latterly this thin disguise was laid aside, and he openly avowed that he accepted it in full sovereignty from France, to which it belonged by right of conquest. Such a proceeding rests upon no other conceivable foundation, but that worst emanation of the disorders and calamities of Europe in recent times—the principle of transferring the people of other states from one power to another, like so many cattle, upon the footing of mutual ambition or convenience. We may not at present be able to prevent the transfer; but let us protest solemnly against its injustice, and vigorously make use of the forces which Providence

has given us to make the guilty league feel the consequences of our just indignation. The pretext that Prussia received this territory from Napoleon, to whom it belonged by right of conquest, is as hollow as it is discreditable. It was merely occupied in a temporary way by the French troops; it formed no part of the French empire; above all, its cession had never been agreed to by this country—and where is there to be found an instance in history of such a cession of military acquisition pending the contest? The conduct of Prussia in this transaction is a compound of every thing that is contemptible in servility, with every thing that is odious in rapacity. Other nations have yielded to the ascendant of military power: Austria was forced, by the fortune of war, to cede many of her provinces; Prussia alone, without any external disaster, has descended at once to the lowest point of degradation—that of becoming the minister of the injustice and rapacity of a master.”¹

In consenting to this infamous transaction, the cabinet of Berlin were doubtless actuated by the desire to deprecate the wrath and conciliate the favour of the French Emperor. It is worth while to examine, therefore, whether that object was gained, and in what light their conduct was viewed by that dreaded conqueror. “From the moment,” says Bignon, “that the treaty of 15th February was signed, Napoleon did more than hate Prussia—he conceived for that power the most profound contempt. All his views from that day were based on considerations foreign to its alliance: he conceived new projects—he formed new plans, as if that alliance no longer existed. In the mean time, he pressed the execution of all the stipulations it contained favourable to France: he would not permit the delay of a single day.”² Hardenberg had the good fortune to escape the disgrace of being privy to these proceedings: he had, from his known hostility to Napoleon, been obliged to withdraw from the Prussian cabinet before they were finally consummated.³

The effects of this unmeasured contempt of Prussia soon appeared, in a series of measures which overturned the whole constitution of the Germanic empire, and ultimately brought that power into hasty and ill-fated collision with the French empire. On March 15, Murat,

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¹ Parl. Deb.
vi. 890, 892.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 161.

60.
Napoleon's
opinion of
Prussia in
this transac-
tion.

² Bign.
232.

³ Hard. ix
107.

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61.

His further
measures of
aggression on
Germany.

without any previous concert with the cabinet of Berlin, was invested with the duchies of Berg and Cleves, ceded to France, by the treaty of 15th February, by Bavaria, in exchange for the Prussian provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth, in Franconia. The establishment of a soldier of fortune, the brother-in-law of Napoleon, in the very heart of his Westphalian provinces, was not calculated to allay the now awakened jealousy of the Prussian government; and this feeling was strongly increased when the French troops, towards the end of April, took possession of the abbacies of Warden, Essen, and Elten, on pretence that they belonged to the duchy of Cleves, without any regard to the claims of Prussia to these territories, founded on a prior right. This irritation was augmented by the imperious conduct of the French generals in the north of Germany, who openly demanded a contribution of four million francs (£160,000) from the city of Frankfurt; and, in terms equally menacing, required a loan from the city of Hamburg to a still larger amount; while, in Bremen, every kind of merchandise suspected to be English was seized without distinction, and committed to the flames. Six millions of francs (£240,000) was the price at which the Imperial robber condescended, in a time of profound peace, to tender to the city of Hamburg and the Hanse Towns his protection. The veil which had so long hung before the eyes of the Prussian government now began to fall; they perceived, with indescribable pain, that their long course of obsequiousness to France had procured for them only the contempt of that power, and the hostility of its enemies.¹

¹ Bign. v.
247, 270.
Ann. Reg.
1806, 164.
Hard. ix. 136,
224, 225.
Bour. vii. 137,
158.

62.

Universal in-
dignation in
the north of
Germany.

No words can paint the mingled feelings of shame, patriotism, and indignation, which animated all ranks in Prussia, when the rapid course of events left no longer any doubt, not only that their rights and interests were totally disregarded by France, in favour of whom they had made so many sacrifices; but that they had sunk to this depth of degradation without any attempt to assert their dignity as an independent power. The Queen and Prince Louis, who had so long mourned in vain the temporising policy and degraded position of their country, now gave open vent to their indignation; nor did they appeal in vain to the patriotic spirit of the

people. The inhabitants of that monarchy, clear-sighted and intelligent beyond almost any other, as well as enthusiastic and brave, perceived distinctly the gulf into which their country was about to fall. One universal cry of indignation burst forth from all ranks. It was not mere warlike enthusiasm, but the profoundest feeling of national shame and humiliation which animated the people. The young officers loudly demanded to be led to the combat; the elder spoke of the glories of Frederick and Rosbach: an irresistible current swept away the whole nation. Publications, burning with indignant eloquence, issued from all the free cities in the north of Germany where a shadow even of independence was still preserved; and that universal fervour ensued which is the invariable forerunner, for good or for evil, of great events. Guided by wisdom and prudence, it might have led to the most splendid results; impelled by passion and directed by imbecility, it induced unheard-of disasters.¹*

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 165.
Hard. ix. 117,
119.

Strong as were the patriotic feelings which the conquests and rapacity of the French had awakened in a large portion of the German people, they were not as yet universal: the hour of the resurrection of the Fatherland had not arrived. By appealing to the blind ambition of some of their princes, and flattering the inconsiderate

63.
Formation of
the Confeder-
acy of the
Rhine.

* One of the most remarkable of these was a pamphlet published by the celebrated Gentz, which at the time produced a very great sensation. "The war hitherto conducted against France," said he, "was just and necessary in its origin, and certainly it has not become less so during its progress. If it has hitherto failed from false measures, are we to regard every thing as lost? Is Germany destined to become what Holland, Switzerland, Spain, and Italy now are? But how is our salvation to be effected? By assembling what is dispersed, raising what is fallen, resuscitating what is dead. We have had enough of the leagues of princes; they have proved as futile as they are precarious. There remains to us but one resource: that the brave and the good should unite; that they should form a holy league for our deliverance: that is the only alliance that can defy the force of arms, and restore liberty to nations, and peace to the world. You, then, who amidst the universal shipwreck have yet preserved the freedom of your souls, the honesty of your hearts; who have hearts capable of sacrificing your all for the good of your fellow-citizens, turn your eyes upon your country; behold it mutilated, bleeding, weighed down; but not destroyed: in all but the grave there is hope. It is neither to England nor Russia that we must look for our deliverance, how desirable soever the co-operation of these powers may be; it is for Germany alone that the honour of our deliverance is reserved. It is Germany which must raise itself from its ruins, and accomplish the general emancipation. We shall do more: we shall deliver France itself, and restore to that power a free and pacific existence, consistent with the independence of Europe." GENTZ, *Europe en 1806*; and HARD. ix. 122, 123. On the eve of the battle of Jena, what could appear more misplaced than this prophecy! yet how exactly it was accomplished at a future time!—a remarkable instance of the manner in which genius, piercing through the clouds of present events, can discern the ultimate changes in which they are to terminate.

Gentz's pam-
phlet on the
subject.

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feelings of many of their people, Napoleon had contrived to animate one portion of its inhabitants against the other ; and on this division of opinion he had formed the project of reducing the whole to servitude. The first design of the CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE had been formed, as already noticed, the year before, during the residence of the Emperor at Mayence ; but it was brought to maturity, from his witnessing the enthusiasm excited among the lesser states of Germany by the victories in which they had shared, gained under the standards of France over Austria, and the regal dignity to which these had elevated their sovereigns. France, on this occasion, played off with fatal effect the policy so uniformly followed by its chiefs since the Revolution, that of rousing one portion of the population in the adjoining states against the other, and raising itself, by their mutual divisions, to supreme dominion over both. As his differences with Russia assumed a more envenomed character, and the hostility of Prussia became more apparent, Napoleon felt daily more strongly the necessity of uniting the states in alliance with him into a durable confederacy, which should enable him at all times to direct their military resources to his own purposes. It was no small matter to have such an outwork beyond the great frontier rampart of the Rhine ; their contingents of troops would place nearly a fourth of the military force of Germany at his disposal ; and, what was to him perhaps of still greater importance, under the pretence of stationing the vast contingent of France in such a situation as to protect its allies, he might lay the whole expenses of two hundred thousand men on their resources.¹

¹ Hard. ix.
153, 155.
Bign. v. 300,
305. Lucches.
i. 124, 131.

64.

Powers admitted to the
Confederacy.

July 12.

Influenced by such desires on both sides, the negotiations for the conclusion of the treaty were not long of being brought to a termination. The plenipotentiaries of all the powers who were to be admitted into the confederacy assembled at Paris in the beginning of July ; and on the 12th of that month, the act of the confederation was signed. The members of it were—the Emperor of the French, the Kings of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, the Archbishop of Ratisbon, the Elector of Baden, the Grand-duke of Berg, the Landgrave of Hesse Darmstadt, the Princes of Nassau Weilberg, Nassau Usingen, Hohen-

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zollern Hechingen, Hohenzollern Sigmasingen, Salm Salm, Salm Kerburg, Isenberg Birchstein, Lichtenstein Darmberg, and Count de la Leyen. The Archduke Ferdinand, Grand-duke of Wurtzburg, acceded to the confederacy a short time afterwards. By the act of confederation, the states in alliance were declared to be severed for ever from the Germanic empire; rendered independent of any power foreign to the confederacy, and placed under the protection of the Emperor of the French. Any hostility committed against any of them was to be considered as a declaration of war against the whole.¹ Several of the allies received accessions of territory or dignity: the free towns of Frankfort and Nuremberg were handed over, the first to the Prince Primate, the second to the King of Bavaria: all the members of the confederacy were invested with the full sovereignty of their respective states, and received a gift of the foreign territories enclosed within their dominions.² Lastly, a separate article provided the military contingent which each of the confederates was to furnish for their common protection; which were, for France, two hundred thousand, and for the German states, fifty-eight thousand men. But subsequent experience soon proved that Napoleon received military aid to double the amount of these numbers from them all.³ *

Sept. 30.

¹ Arts. 1, 7, 12, and 35.

² Arts. 24, 25.

³ See Treaty, Ann. Reg. 1806, 818. Martens' Traités, viii. 480, 506.

65.

The Emperor renounces the crown of Germany.

This confederacy was by far the most important blow which Napoleon had yet levelled at the independence of the European states. It was no longer an inconsiderable power, such as Switzerland, Venice, or Holland, which received a master from the conqueror: the venerable fabric of the Germanic empire had been pierced to the heart, her fairest provinces had been reft from the empire of the Cæsars. The impression produced in Europe by this aggression was proportionally great: sixteen millions of

* The contingents were settled as follows:—

France,	200,000
Bavaria,	30,000
Wirtemberg,	12,000
Baden,	3,000
Berg,	5,000
Darmstadt,	4,000
Nassau, Hohenzollern, and others,	4,000
					258,000

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Aug. 1.

men were by a single stroke transferred from the empire to a foreign alliance; and profound pity was felt for the Emperor, the first sovereign of Christendom, who was thus despoiled of a large portion of the dominions which, for above a thousand years, had been enjoyed by his predecessors. Nor was this feeling of commiseration lessened by what immediately followed. On the 1st August notification was sent to the Diet of Ratisbon of the formation of the confederacy, both on the part of the Emperor of France and the coalesced princes. The former deemed it unnecessary to assign any reasons for his conduct; but the latter pleaded, as their excuse for violating their engagements to the empire, the inconsistency between their present situation and their ancient bonds, and the necessity, amidst the weakness of their former chief, of looking out for a new protector, who might possess power adequate to secure them from insult. Under such flimsy devices did these selfish princes conceal a dereliction of loyalty and desertion of their country, calculated to produce unbounded calamities to Germany, and which they themselves were destined afterwards to expiate with tears of blood. But how keenly soever the Emperor Francis might feel the open blow thus levelled at his dignity, and the formation of a separate and hostile state in the heart of his dominions, he was not in a situation to give vent to his resentment. Soult still held the battlements of Braunau; on one pretext or another the evacuation of the German states, which by the treaty of Presburg was to be effected at latest in three months, had been delayed; the French battalions were in great strength on the Inn; the prisoners made during the campaign had not been restored; while the dispirited Austrian troops had not yet recovered the rude shocks of Ulm and Austerlitz. Wisely yielding, therefore, to a storm which they could not prevent, the Imperial cabinet dissembled their feelings; and, justly considering this stroke as entirely subversive of the empire, the Emperor Francis, by a solemn deed, renounced the throne of the Cæsars, and declared himself the first of a new series of the Emperors of Austria.¹*

Aug. 6 and 9.
¹ Jom. ii. 240,
243. Bign. v.
317, 319.
Hard. ix. 157.
Martens, viii.
501.

* Napoleon set forth, in his communication to the Diet of Ratisbon announcing the Confederation of the Rhine,—“The German constitution is no longer but a shadow; the Diet has ceased to have any will of its own. His

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66.

Great sensation which these events produce at Berlin.

Though in appearance levelled at the Emperor Francis as chief of the empire, this violent dislocation of the Germanic body was in reality still more formidable to Prussia, from the close proximity of its frontier to the coalesced states. The sensation, accordingly, which it produced at Berlin was unbounded. All classes, from the cabinet of the King to the privates in the army, perceived the gulf which was yawning beneath their feet: they saw clearly that they were disregarded and despised, and reserved only for the melancholy privilege of being last devoured. The increasing aggressions of Napoleon or his vassals speedily made them aware that this was their destiny. Murat advanced claims to the principality of Embden, and the three Abbacies which formed part of the indemnity awarded to Prussia for its cessions in Franconia, as well as to the free cities of Hamburg and Bremen. The twenty-fourth article of the Confederation of the Rhine conferred on that military chief the sovereignty of all the German principalities of the House of Orange, and rendered its head, brother-in-law to the King, tributary to the vassal of Napoleon; while the injurious treatment to which the Prince of Latour and Taxis, brother-in-law of the Queen of Prussia, was exposed, was a fresh outrage to that monarch in the most sensitive part. To avoid, however, if possible, an immediate rupture with the court of Berlin, they were given to understand by the French Emperor, that if they were desirous to form a league of the states who were attached more or less to

Sept. 27.

majesty the Emperor and king can, therefore, no longer recognise its existence. He has accepted, in consequence, the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. In his pacific views, he declares that he will never carry his views beyond that river. He has hitherto been faithful to all his promises." The confederate princes declared,—"The results of the three last wars having proved that the Germanic body was really dissolved, the princes of the West and South have deemed it expedient to renounce all connexion with a power which has ceased to exist, and to range themselves under the banners of the Emperor of the French, who is bound alike by the interests of his glory and those of his empire to secure to them the enjoyment of external and internal tranquillity." With more truth and dignity the Emperor Francis said, in his act renouncing the throne of the empire:—"Being convinced of the impossibility of discharging any longer the duties which the Imperial throne imposed upon us, we owe it to our principles to abdicate a crown which could have no value in our eyes, when we were unable to discharge its duties and deserve the confidence of the Princes Electors of the empire. Therefore it is that, considering the bonds which unite us to the empire as dissolved by the Confederation of the Rhine, we renounce the Imperial crown, and by these presents absolve the Electors, Princes, and States, members of the Supreme Tribunal, and other magistrates, from the duties which unite them to us as their legal chief."—See HARD., ix. 159, 162.

Addresses of Napoleon and the Emperor Francis to the German States

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Oct. 3.

¹ Hard. ix.
167, 176.
Bign. v. 369,
390. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
167.

Prussia in the north of Germany, France would not oppose its formation. But they were informed shortly after, that the Hanse Towns, which Napoleon reserved for his own immediate protection, could not be permitted to join that northern confederacy; that Saxony could not be allowed to form a part of it against its will; while the Elector of Hesse was invited to join the confederacy of the Rhine, and on his refusing to comply, was struck at by a resolution which cut off his access to part of his own dominions.¹

67.
Fresh um-
brage of Prus-
sia at the
treaty of
France with
Russia. War-
like prepara-
tions of Prus-
sia.

But all these grievances, serious as they were, sank into insignificance compared to that which arose, when it was discovered by M. Luchhesini, the Prussian ambassador at Paris, that France had entered into negotiations with England on the footing of the restitution of Hanover to its lawful sovereign; that, while continually urging the cabinet of Berlin to look for indemnities for such a loss on the side of Pomerania, Napoleon had engaged to Russia, in the treaty signed with D'Oubril, its ambassador at Paris, to prevent them from depriving the King of Sweden of any part of his German dominions; and that while still professing sentiments of amity and friendship to Frederick William, he had offered to throw no obstacles in the way of the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, including the whole of Polish Prussia, in favour of the Grand-duke Constantine. Irritated beyond endurance by such a succession of insults, and anxious to regain the place which he was conscious he had lost in the estimation of Europe, the King of Prussia put his armies on the war footing, dispatched M. Krusemark to St Petersburg, and M. Jacobi to London, to endeavour to effect a reconciliation with these powers; opened the navigation of the Elbe; concluded his differences with Sweden; assembled his generals; and caused his troops to defile in the direction of Leipsic. The torrent of public indignation at Berlin became irresistible; the war party overwhelmed all opposition; in the general tumult the still small voice of reason, which counselled caution and preparation in the outset of so great an enterprise, was overborne. Prince Louis and his confederates openly boasted that Prussia, strong in the recollection of the Great Frederick, and the discipline he had bequeathed to his followers, was able,

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single-handed, to strike down the conqueror of Europe; the young officers repaired at night to sharpen their sabres on the window-sills of the French ambassador; warlike and patriotic songs resounded, amidst thunders of applause, at the theatres; and the Queen roused the general enthusiasm to the highest pitch, by displaying her beautiful figure on horseback in the streets of Berlin, at the head of her regiment of hussars, in the uniform of the corps.¹

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¹ Hard. ix.
176, 181.
Bign. v. 409,
415. Ann.
Reg. 1806,
167.

While Prussia, suddenly and violently awakening from the trance of ten years, was thus taking up arms and rushing headlong into a contest, single-handed, with the conqueror of southern Europe, negotiations of an important character, terminating in a resolution equally warlike, had taken place with Russia and England. The retreat of the Emperor Alexander and his army from the disastrous field of Austerlitz, had apparently extinguished all causes of discord between the vast empires of Russia and France. Their territories nowhere were in contact. The vast barrier of Germany, with its two thousand walled cities and forty millions of warlike inhabitants, severed them from each other. They had parted with mutual expressions of esteem, and the interchange of courteous deeds between the victor and the vanquished. The conclusion of the peace of Presburg, by releasing the Czar from all obligations towards his unfortunate ally, seemed to have still further removed the possibility of a rupture; while the withdrawing of Austria from the continental alliance left no rational ground for renewing the contest on account of any danger, how imminent soever, to the balance of power from the aggressions of Napoleon. But notwithstanding all these favourable circumstances, the secret ambition of these potentates again brought them into collision; and the quarter where the difference arose, indicated that it was the glittering prize of Constantinople which brought them to the fields of Eylau and Friedland.

68.
Renewed
causes of dis-
cord between
France and
Russia.

Cattaro, a small barren province situated to the south of Ragusa, on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, derives its value from the excellence of its harbour, which is the largest and safest in that sea, and the skill of its seamen, which has always secured them an honourable place in

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69.

Differences
about
Cattaro,
which is
occupied by
the Russians.

March 4.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 140,
150. Bign. v.
258, 262.
Hard. ix. 195,
195.

its naval transactions. By the treaty of Presburg, it had been provided that this province should be ceded by the Imperialists to the French within two months after its final ratification. When this period had expired, the French commissioners authorised to take possession had not arrived; and the Russian agent there, taking advantage of that circumstance, succeeded in persuading the inhabitants, who were almost all of Greek extraction, that their intended transference to France had fallen to the ground, and that they were at liberty to tender their allegiance to whom they chose. In pursuance of these instigations, the people, who are styled Montenegrins, and ardently desired the establishment of a power professing the Greek faith within their bounds, rose in a tumultuous manner, shut up the Austrian commander, who had only a slender garrison at his disposal, within the fortress, and commenced a strict investment, in which they were soon supported by a Russian man-of-war, which arrived from Corfu. After a short blockade, he surrendered the place to the insurgents, who immediately transferred it to the Russians, by whom it was occupied in force. But the circumstances attending the transaction were so suspicious, that the Austrian subaltern officers in the fortress protested against its conditions, and the governor was afterwards brought to a court-martial at Vienna for his conduct on this occasion, and sentenced to confinement in a Transylvanian fortress for life.¹

70.

The French
in return
seize Ragusa.
Actions in its
neighbour-
hood.

Nothing that has since transpired authorises the belief that Austria was privy to this transaction; nor does any motive appear which could induce her, for so trifling an object, to run the risk of offending the Emperor Napoleon, whose terrible legions were still upon the Inn. But no sooner did he receive intelligence of it, than Napoleon ordered Marshal Berthier to delay the evacuation of the fortress of Braunau, on the Austrian frontier, and the march of all the French troops towards the Rhine was countermanded. In this way the important object was gained of keeping a hundred and fifty thousand men still at free quarters on the German states. He made no effort to dispossess the Russians and Montenegrins from Cattaro; but, on the pretext that because the Austrians had failed in performing their obligations to him, he was at liberty

to look for an indemnity wherever he could find it, seized upon the neighbouring city of Ragusa, a neutral power with which he had no cause whatever of hostility. There Lauriston, who commanded the French garrison, was shortly after besieged by the Russians both by land and sea; but before any thing of moment could be transacted in that quarter, the Austrians, exhausted by the prolonged stay of such an immense body of men on their territory, made such energetic remonstrances to the cabinet of St Petersburg on the subject, that they agreed to the evacuation of Cattaro; and M. D'Oubril, who was despatched from the Russian cabinet to Paris, ostensibly to negotiate the exchange of prisoners, but really to conclude a treaty between the two powers, brought authority for its surrender to the French. But, in consequence of that ambassador having exceeded his instructions, the treaty which he concluded was not ratified by the Emperor Alexander; and as hostilities for that reason still continued, Lauriston was reduced to the last extremity in Ragusa, and saved from destruction only by the opportune arrival of Molitor, who advanced at the head of reinforcements from Dalmatia. The territory of Ragusa was now fully occupied by the French, and continued in their hands till the end of September, when it was invaded by a powerful body of Russians and Montenegrins. But these troops having been drawn out of their intrenchments by a skilful stratagem on the part of Marmont, were attacked and defeated with great loss, and even experienced some difficulty in regaining the fortresses of Castel Nuovo and Cattaro, from whence they had issued.¹

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May 27.

July 9.

July 6.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 150,
151. Bign.
v. 258, 265.
Hard. ix. 219,
221.

71.

D'Oubril con-
cludes a
treaty at
Paris be-
tween France
and Russia.

M. D'Oubril came to Paris by Vienna; but, notwithstanding his conferences with the English and Austrian ministers at that capital, he appears, when he arrived at Paris, to have misunderstood in an unaccountable manner his instructions. Talleyrand and the French ministers made such skilful use of the dependence of the negotiations with England, which Lord Yarmouth was at that moment conducting at Paris, and of the threat totally to destroy Austria if hostilities were resumed, that they induced in the Russian ambassador a belief that a separate peace with these powers was on the eve of signature, and that nothing but an instant compliance with the demands

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July 20.

of the Emperor could save Europe from dismemberment, and the Czar from all the consequences of a single-handed contest with Napoleon. Under the influence of these fears and misrepresentations, he suddenly signed a treaty as disgraceful to Russia as it was contrary to the good faith which she owed to Great Britain. Not content with surrendering the mouths of the Cattaro, the subject of so much discord, to France, without any other equivalent than an illusory promise that the French troops should evacuate Germany in three months, he stipulated also, in the secret articles, "that if, in the course of events, Ferdinand IV. should cease to possess Sicily, the Emperor of Russia should unite with the Emperor of France in all measures calculated to induce the court of Madrid to cede to the Prince-Royal of Naples the Balearic Isles, to be enjoyed by him and his successors with the title of king—the harbours of those islands being shut against the British flag during the continuance of the present war; that the entry to these isles should be closed against Ferdinand himself and his queen; and that the contracting parties should concur in effecting a peace between Prussia and Sweden, without the latter power being deprived of Pomerania." Ragusa also was to be evacuated, and the integrity of the Ottoman dominions guaranteed by both the contracting parties—a provision which forms a striking contrast to the agreement for the partition of that power concurred in within a year afterwards at Tilsit. Thus did Napoleon and D'Oubril concur in despoiling the King of Naples of the dominions which were still under his command, without any other indemnity than a nominal throne of trifling islands to his son; gift away Sicily, garrisoned by English troops, without consulting either the court of Palermo or the cabinet of London; dispose of the Balearic Islands, without the knowledge or consent of the King of Spain; and stipulate the retention of Pomerania by Sweden, at the very moment that France held out the acquisition of that duchy as an equivalent which should reconcile Prussia to the loss of Hanover.¹

¹ Martens, viii. 309, 472.
Hard. ix. 119, 120.
Bign. v. 325, 329.

M. D'Oubril seemed to be aware, at the time he signed this extraordinary treaty, that he had exceeded or deviated from his instructions; for no sooner was it concluded,

than he set off in person to render an account of it at St Petersburg, observing, at the same time—"I go to lay the treaty and my head at the feet of my Imperial master." In effect, before he reached the Russian capital, intelligence of the formation of the Confederation of the Rhine had arrived, which unexpected event greatly strengthened the influence of the party hostile to France. A change of ministry had ensued : Prince Adam Czartorinski, and the chiefs inclined for a separate accommodation, were displaced, and succeeded by the Baron Budberg, and the nobles who supported the English in opposition to the French alliance. The treaty was, in consequence of these events, formally disavowed by the Imperial government, as "entirely in opposition to the instructions which D'Oubril had received," though they professed their willingness to resume the negotiations on a basis which had been communicated to the cabinet of the Tuileries. By this disavowal, indeed, the Russian government was saved the dishonour which must for ever have attached to it had so disgraceful a treaty been unconditionally ratified ; but upon comparing the powers conferred on the ambassador by one ministry, with the refusal to ratify the treaty by its successor, it was difficult to avoid the inference, that the difference in reality arose from a change of policy in the Imperial cabinet, not any deviation from instructions on the part of its ambassador. And all reflecting men began to conceive the most serious apprehensions as to the consequences which might ensue to the liberties of Europe from the alliance of two colossal powers, which thus took upon themselves, without any authority, to dispose of inferior thrones, and partition the territories of weaker states.¹*

Aug. 25.

¹ Bign. v.
330, 344.
Hard. ix. 221,
222.

The rapid succession of more important events left no time for the advance of the fresh negotiations thus pointed at by the cabinet of St Petersburg. All eyes in Europe were turned to the conferences between France and Eng-

* The powers conferred on M. D'Oubril bore:—"We authorise, by these presents, M. D'Oubril to enter into negotiations with a view to the establishment of peace, with whoever shall be sufficiently authorised on the part of the French government, and to conclude and sign with them an act or convention on bases proper to consolidate peace between Russia and France, and to prepare it between the other belligerent powers ; and we promise on our imperial word to hold good and execute faithfully whatever shall be agreed to and signed by our said plenipotentiary, and to adhibit to it our imperial ratification in the terms that shall be specified." On the other hand, the act of disavowal

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73.
Opening of
negotiations
between
France and
England.

Feb. 10.

March 26.
1 Bign. v.
266, 269.
Hard. ix.
184, 187.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 92, 94.

74.

England
insists on
Russia being
a party to the
negotiation.
April 1.

land, which had been long in dependence at Paris; and the turn which they were now taking, left little hope that hostilities in every quarter could be brought to a termination. This celebrated negotiation took its rise from a fortuitous circumstance equally creditable to the government of both powers. An abandoned exile, in a private audience with Mr Fox, in February, had proposed to that minister to assassinate Napoleon. Either penetrating the design of this wretch, who had once been an agent of the police in Paris, or inspired by a generous desire to prevent the perpetration of so atrocious an offence, the English minister, after having at first dismissed him from his presence, had the assassin apprehended, and sent information to M. Talleyrand of the proposal. This upright proceeding led to a courteous reply from that minister, in which, after expressing his satisfaction at the new turn which the war had taken, which he regarded as a presage of what he might expect from a cabinet of which he fondly measured the sentiments according to those of Mr Fox, "one of the men who seem expressly made to feel the really grand and beautiful in all things," he repeated the passage in the exposition of the state of the empire by the Minister of the Interior, wherein Napoleon declared that he would always be ready to renew conferences with England on the basis of the treaty of Amiens. Mr Fox replied that he was inspired with the same sentiments; and thus commenced a negotiation under the most favourable of all auspices—mutual esteem on the part of the powers engaged in it.¹

The basis proposed by Mr Fox was, that the "two parties should assume it as a principle, that the peace was to be honourable to themselves and their respective allies."—"Our interests," says Talleyrand, "are easily reconciled, from this alone, that they are distinct. You are the masters of the sea. Your maritime forces equal those of all the kingdoms of the earth put together. We are a great con-

bore—"The pretended act of pacification concluded by M. D'Oubril has been submitted to a council specially summoned to that effect, and compared with the instructions which he had received here, and the instructions transmitted to him at Vienna before his departure from that town; and they found that M. D'Oubril, in signing that treaty, has not only deviated from the instructions he had received, but acted in a manner directly contrary to the sense and spirit of the orders themselves." The penalty inflicted on the ambassador, however, that of mere banishment to his estates, did not look as if there had been any very serious deviation from instructions.—See MARTENS' *Sup.* iv. 303, 312; and HARD. ix. 222.

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tinental power; but other nations have as great armies on foot as ourselves. If in addition to being omnipotent on the ocean from your own strength, you desire to acquire a preponderance on the Continent by means of alliances, peace is not possible." Talleyrand strongly urged the English minister to lay all the allies on either side out of view, and conclude a separate accommodation; but in this design he was unsuccessful. Mr Fox insisted, with honourable firmness, that Russia should be made a party to the treaty. "Do you wish us to treat," said he, "conjointly with Russia? We answer, Yes. Do you wish us to enter into a separate treaty, independent of that power? No." Finding the English minister immovable on this point, M. Talleyrand had recourse to equivocation; and it was agreed that the accession of the continental powers to the treaty should be obtained.¹

Despatch,
April 20.¹ Parl. Deb.
viii. 103, 108.
Bign. v. 267.
274.

The next step in the negotiation was to fix the basis on which the interests and honour of England and France themselves were to be adjusted. To ascertain this important point in a manner more satisfactory than could be done by the slow interchange of written communications, M. Talleyrand sent for Lord Yarmouth, one of the English travellers whom Napoleon had detained a prisoner ever since the rupture of the peace of Amiens, and proposed to him the basis on which France was willing to enter into an accommodation. These were the restitution of Hanover, which, after great difficulty, Napoleon was brought to agree to, and the retention of Sicily by England or its allies;* the recognition of the Emperor of France by England, and the guaranteeing of the integrity of the Ottoman dominions by France. These terms Lord Yarmouth justly considered as equivalent to the establishment of the principle of *uti possidetis*, and stated them as such in his communication made the same day to Mr Fox on the subject.²

75.
Basis of *uti*
possidetis
fixed.

June 13.

² Lord Yarmouth's
Commun.
Parl. Deb.
viii. 110.

* "I enquired," said Lord Yarmouth, "whether the possession of Sicily would be demanded, it having been so said. 'Vous l'avez,' he replied—'*nous ne vous la demandons pas; si vous la possediez, elle pourrait augmenter de beaucoup les difficultés.*' Considering this to be very positive, both from the words and the manner of delivering them, I conceived it would be improper to make further questions. We ask nothing of you (nous ne vous demandons rien,) amounting to an admission of *uti possidetis*, as applicable to his Majesty's conquests. Talleyrand concluded with these words:—'*Les sentiments de la France sont entièrement changés: l'aigreur qui caracterisait le commencement de cette guerre n'existe plus. Et ce que nous desirons le plus, c'est de pouvoir vivre en bonne intelligence avec une aussi grande puissance que la Grande Bretagne.*'—LORD YARMOUTH'S *Communication*, No. 12; *Parl. Deb.* viii. 110.

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76.

Which
France de-
parts from.
June 13.

June 16.

At the time when the proposals were made by the French government, no accommodation had been effected with Russia; and it was an object of the highest importance to induce Great Britain, on any terms, to accede to the basis of a negotiation. But when the next communication from Talleyrand was made, circumstances had entirely changed. D'Oubril had expressed his willingness to sign a separate peace on behalf of Russia, and Napoleon was resolved to take advantage of this circumstance to exact more favourable conditions than he had at first agreed to from the British government. When pressed, therefore, by Lord Yarmouth to adhere to the principle of *uti possidetis*, and in particular to agree to the King of Naples retaining Sicily, he replied, that though the sentiments of the Emperor in favour of peace had undergone no alteration, "yet that *some changes had taken place*, the possibility of which he had hinted at when I last saw him," alluding to the readiness of Russia to treat separately; and further mentioned that the Emperor had received reports from his brother and the general officers under his command, stating that *Naples could not be held without Sicily*, and the probability they saw of gaining possession of that island; that the restitution of Hanover for the honour of the British crown, the retention of Malta for the honour of the navy, and of the Cape of Good Hope for the interests of commerce, should be sufficient inducements to the cabinet of St James's to enter into the negotiation; that if a confidential communication had been made three months before, the questions both of Holland and Naples might have been arranged in the manner most satisfactory to Great Britain; but that now, when their dominions had been settled on the Emperor's brothers, any abandonment of any portion of them would be "considered by the Emperor as a retrograde measure, equivalent to an abdication." Lord Yarmouth continued to insist, in terms of Mr Fox's instructions, for the basis of *uti possidetis* as the one originally proposed by France, and to which Great Britain was resolved to adhere; that it was alone on the faith of this basis, more especially as applied to Sicily, that the conferences were continued; that any tergiversation or cavil, therefore, on that capital article would be considered as a breach of the principle

June 26.

of the negotiation in its most essential part; that full powers were now communicated to him to conduct it; but that the possession of Sicily was a *sine qua non*, without which it was useless to continue the conferences. Talleyrand upon this offered the *Hanse Towns* as an equivalent to the King of Naples for the loss of that island: and when this was refused, to give Dalmatia, Albania, and Ragusa as an indemnity to his Sicilian Majesty: looking out thus, according to the usual system of Napoleon, in every direction for indemnities at the expense of minor neutral states, rather than surrender one foot of his own acquisitions.¹

This clear departure on the side of France from the basis of the negotiation originally laid down by its own minister, and open avowal of the principle that neutral and weaker powers were to be spoliated in order to reconcile the pretensions of the greater belligerents, augured but ill for its ultimate success; and the notes which were interchanged gradually assumed a more angry character; but the conferences were still continued for a considerable time. Mr Fox, with the firmness which became a British minister, invariably insisted that Sicily should be retained by the King of England, and enjoined on Lord Yarmouth to demand his passports if this were not acceded to. The changes in Germany consequent on the confederation of the Rhine were admitted by Talleyrand, but offered to be modified, if peace with Great Britain were concluded. Mr Fox refused to be any party to the project of despoiling Turkey and Ragusa, independent and neutral states, to provide an equivalent for the abandonment of Sicily; but threw out a hope that by the cession of part of the Venetian States, with the city of Venice, from the kingdom of Italy to the King of Naples, an accommodation might be listened to. To this, as making the proposed equivalent come from his own allies, Napoleon would by no means consent. Advices were received at Paris that an army of thirty thousand men had been assembled at Bayonne. All the officers in that capital belonging to corps in Germany received orders instantly to join their respective regiments,² and the approaching signature of a separate treaty between

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July 1.

July 9.

¹ Lord Yarmouth's and Mr Fox's Despatches, June 19, July 1, 5, and 12. Parl. Deb. viii. 110, 115.

77.

Continuation of the negotiations, and gradual estrangement of the parties.

July 9.

July 19.

July 20.

² Mr Fox's and Lord Yarmouth's Desp. July 9, 18, 19, and 20. Parl. Deb. viii. 113, 125. Martens, viii. 472.

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78
Progress of
the negotia-
tion.
July 21.

France and Russia, in which the cession of Sicily in exchange for the Balearic Isles taken from Spain was a principal article, came to the knowledge of the British plenipotentiary.

The conclusion of the separate peace between Russia and France on the day following these communications, did not, of course, lessen the expectations of the latter power, though it removed all difficulty arising from the condition to which Great Britain had uniformly adhered, of making the cabinet of St Petersburg a party, either directly or in substance, to the pacification. But the demands of France did not rise in the manner that might have been expected after so great an advantage: she was still willing to allow Great Britain to retain Malta, the Cape, and her acquisitions in India, and to restore Hanover: full powers were given to Lord Yarmouth, which were exchanged with those of General Clark. Specific retention of Sicily by the King of Naples was no longer insisted for, it being agreed by Great Britain that an adequate equivalent, if provided by lawful means, should be accepted. Napoleon continued to urge the acquisition of the Hanse Towns, either by Prussia as a compensation for Hanover, or by his Sicilian Majesty; and held out the menace, that by not acceding to such an arrangement, the invasion of Portugal would be rendered inevitable, for which an army was already assembled at Bayonne. Nay, he even hinted at ulterior views in regard to the Spanish Peninsula, which the resistance of England would cause to be developed, as they had been in Holland and Naples. But, regardless of these threats, Mr Fox firmly insisted for the original basis of *uti possidetis*, as the only one which could be admitted; and as matters appeared as far as ever from an adjustment, Lord Lauderdale was sent to Paris with full powers to treat from the British government.¹

¹ Lord Yarmouth's and Mr Fox's Despatches, July 28, August 3, 1806. Parl. Deb. viii. 125, 138.

Under the auspices of this able nobleman, the negotiation was protracted two months longer without leading to any satisfactory result. The English minister continued incessantly to demand a return to the principle of *uti possidetis* as the foundation of the negotiation: and the French cabinet as uniformly

eluded or refused the demand, and insisted for the evacuation of Sicily by the English troops, and its surrender to Joseph, and the abandonment of all the maritime conquests of the war, with the exception of the Cape of Good Hope, by Great Britain. Lord Lauderdale in consequence repeatedly demanded his passports, and the negotiation appeared on the point of terminating, when intelligence was received in London of the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to ratify the treaty signed by M. D'Oubril. This important event made no alteration in the proposals of Great Britain, further than an announcement that any treaty now concluded must be with the concurrence of Russia: but it considerably lowered those of Napoleon, and Talleyrand announced that France "would make great concessions for the purpose of obtaining peace." These were afterwards explained to be the restoration of Hanover to Great Britain, the confirmation of its possession of Malta, the cession of the Cape, Tobago, and Pondicherry to its empire, and the grant of the Balearic Isles, with an annuity *from Spain*, in lieu of Sicily, as a compensation to the King of Naples. To these terms the English cabinet would by no means accede; and as there was no longer any appearance of an accommodation, Lord Lauderdale demanded and obtained his passports, nine days after Napoleon had set out from Paris to take the command of the army destined to act against Prussia.¹

Thus this negotiation, begun under such favourable auspices, both with England and Russia, broke off with both powers on the subject of the possession of Sicily and of the mouths of the Cattaro. Apparently these were very inconsiderable objects to revive so dreadful a contest, and bring the armies of the South and North of Europe to Eylau and Friedland; but in reality the secret ends which the hostile powers had in view, in contending for these distant possessions, were more considerable than might be at first imagined. It was not merely as an appanage of the crown of Naples that Napoleon so obstinately insisted on Sicily for his brother; it was as the greatest island in the Mediterranean, as opening the way to the command of that

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79.

The demands of France become more extravagant, and the negotiation is broken off.

Sept. 3.

Sept. 18.

Sept. 26.

October 6.

¹ Parl. Deb. viii. 173, 203. Bign. v. 343, 359. Lord Lauderdale's Desp. 26th Sept.

80.

Real views of the parties in this negotiation.

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inland sea, and clearing the route to Egypt and the Indies, that it became a paramount object of desire. It was not an obscure harbour on the coast of the Adriatic which brought the colossal empires of France and Russia into collision; it was a settlement on the skirts of Turkey, it was the establishment of a French military station within sight of the Crescent, which was the secret matter of ambition to the one party, and jealousy to the other. Thus, while Sicily and Cattaro were the ostensible causes of difference, India and Constantinople were the real objects in the view of the parties; and the negotiation broke off upon those eternal subjects of contention between England, Russia, and France, the empire of the seas and the dominion of continental Europe.¹

¹ Bign. v.
363, 365.

81.

State of
affairs at
Berlin. Prus-
sia's ultima-
tum, and pre-
parations for
war on both
sides.

² Bign. v.
403.

The intelligence of the refusal of Alexander to ratify D'Oubril's treaty with France excited an extraordinary transport at Berlin, which was much heightened when shortly after it became evident that the negotiations at Paris for an accommodation with Great Britain were not likely to prove successful. The war party became irresistible; a sense of national degradation had reached every heart; the Queen was daily to be seen on horseback at the head of her regiment in the streets of Berlin.² The enthusiasm was universal; but in the guards and officers of that distinguished corps it rose to a pitch approaching to frenzy; in proportion to the force with which the bow had long been bent one way, was the violence with which it now rebounded to the other. Wiser heads, however, saw little ground for rational confidence in this uncontrolled ebullition of popular effervescence; and even the heroic Prince Louis let fall some expressions indicating that he hoped for more efficient support in the field than the declaimers of the capital.* Lucchesini, who had so long conducted the Prussian diplomacy at the French capital, sent despatches to his government full of acrimonious complaints of the cabinet of the Tuileries, which either by accident or design fell

Aug. 26.

* He repeated with emphasis the lines of the Poet Gleims, in allusion to the warlike bards of Berlin:—

“Sie singen, laut im hohen chor,
Vom Tod, fürs Vaterland uns vor,
Doch Kommt ein einziger Husar,
So lauft die ganze Barden Schaar.”

into the hands of the French police, and were laid before Napoleon. He instantly demanded the recall of the obnoxious minister, who left Paris early in September, and was succeeded by Knobelsdorf, whose mission was mainly to protract matters, that the cabinet of Berlin might complete its preparations, and if possible gain time for the distant succours of Russia to arrive on the Elbe. But as the troops on both sides were hastening to the scene of action, and it was evident of how much importance it was that the strength of Russia should be thrown into the scale before a decisive conflict took place, Napoleon easily penetrated their design, and resolved himself to commence hostilities. His troops for some weeks past had been rapidly defiling from Braunau, the Inn, and the Necker towards the banks of the Elbe, and one hundred thousand men were approaching the Thuringian Forest. He set out, therefore, from Paris to put himself at their head on the night of the 26th September, conveyed the Guard by post to Mayence, and was already far advanced on his journey to the theatre of war, when the Prussian ultimatum was delivered at Paris by M. Knobelsdorf. Its conditions were ; 1st, That the French troops should forthwith evacuate Germany, commencing their retreat from the day when the King of Prussia might receive the answer of the Emperor, and continuing it without interruption. 2d, That the districts on the Wesel should be detached from the French empire. 3d, That no obstacles should be thrown in the way of the formation of a counter-league in the north of Germany. No stronger proof of the infatuation which had seized the cabinet of Berlin can be desired than the fact of their having, in the presence of Napoleon and the Grand Army, and without any present aid either from Russia, Austria, or England, proposed terms suitable rather to the day after the rout of Rosbach than the eve of the battle of Jena.¹

The public mind was violently excited at this period in Germany against the French, not merely by their prolonged stay beyond the Rhine, and the enormous expenses with which it was attended, but by a cruel and illegal murder committed by orders of Napoleon on a citizen of one of the free cities of the empire, who had sold a work hostile to his interests. Palm, a tradesman

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1806.

Sept. 3.

Sept. 7.

Sept. 26.

Oct. 1.

¹ Jom. ii.
274. Bign. v.
443. Hard. ix.
266.

82.

Murder of
Palm. Great
sensation
which it occa-
sioned.

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Aug. 12.

Aug. 25.

in Nuremberg, had been instrumental with many other booksellers in circulating the celebrated pamphlet by Gentz, already mentioned, in which the principle of resistance to French aggression was strongly inculcated, and another by Arndt, entitled "The Spirit of the Age," of a similar tendency, but in neither of which was any recommendation of assassination or illegal measures held forth. The others were fortunate enough to make their escape; but Palm was seized by the French soldiers, dragged before a military commission of French officers assembled by the Emperor's orders at Braunau, and there sentenced to be shot, which inhuman decree was immediately carried into execution, without his being so much as allowed to enter on his defence.* This atrocious proceeding, for which there is not a shadow of excuse, either in the nature of the publication charged, or in the law of nations, excited the most profound indignation in Germany. Men compared the loud declamations of the republican partisans in favour of the liberty of the press with this savage violation of it by their military chief;

Proceedings of
the military
commission by
which he was
condemned.

* The judgment of the military commission convicting Palm, and sentencing him to death, bore in its preamble:—"Considering that wherever there is an army, the first and most pressing duty of its chief is to watch over its preservation; that the circulation of writings tending to revolt and assassination, menaces not only the safety of the army, but that of nations; that nothing is more urgent than to arrest the progress of such doctrines, subversive alike of the law of nations and the *respect due to crowned heads*; injurious to the people committed to their government; in a word, subversive of all order and subordination—declares unanimously, That the authors, printers, publishers, and distributors of libels bearing such a character, should be considered as guilty of high treason, and punished with death." Such were the doctrines in which the frenzy of the French Revolution, which began by proclaiming war to the palace and peace to the cottage, the contest which opened by an invitation to the people of all countries to throw off the yoke of crowned heads, terminated! It is hard to say whether the barefaced falsehood, delusive sophistry, or cold-blooded cruelty of this infamous conviction are most conspicuous. The pamphlets which Palm had sold contained no doctrines whatever recommending assassination or any private crime. If they had, they were published not in the dominions of France, or by any person who owed allegiance to its Emperor, but in the free city of Nuremberg, in the heart of the German empire; and they were addressed, not to the subjects of Napoleon, but to Germans, aliens to his authority, and enemies of his government. The French armies, contrary to the express terms of the peace of Presburg, were remaining in and devouring the resources of that country, upon the hollow pretext that *Russia*, a separate power at war with France, had, in the usual course of hostility, conquered a town ceded by Austria to the French empire. The pamphlets published were nothing but appeals to the Germans to unite against this foreign oppression, and certainly never had men a more justifiable cause of hostility. Applying Napoleon's principles to himself, what punishment would they fix on the head of him who published proclamations calling on the Venetians, the Irish, and Swiss, to throw off the yoke of their respective governments, and avowed his intention, when he landed in England, to call on the whole subjects of the British empire to throw off the rule of their sovereign and parliament, and to establish annual parliaments and universal suffrage?—See BIGN. v. 337, 338.

and concluded, that the only freedom which they really had at heart was license for their own enormities, and the only system of government which was to be expected from their ascendancy, that of military violence. A dignified proclamation, issued about the same time by the Senate of Frankfort, after recounting the enormous contributions which they had paid to the Republican armies in 1796, 1799, 1800, and 1806, concluded with declaring their inability to preserve the independence of their country, which had been transferred to the Elector of Mayence, and recommending submission to the arms of France. Augereau replied to this proclamation by a stern requisition to have the authors of it delivered up to him in twenty-four hours: the fate of Palm was universally anticipated for the last magistrates of the state; but after they had been arrested, Napoleon, alarmed at the universal horror which that tragic event had excited, deemed it prudent to drop further proceedings.¹

The death of this unfortunate victim did not pass unrevenged, either upon Napoleon or the French people. It fell deep and profoundly on the generous heart of Mr Fox, whose enthusiastic hopes of the extension of general freedom by the spread of republican principles were thus cruelly belied by the deeds perpetrated by its leaders in the name of the French people, and contributed, perhaps more than any other circumstance, to produce that firm resolution to adhere to the basis originally laid down by Napoleon for the negotiations which ultimately led to their abandonment. The carnage of Spain, the catastrophe of Moscow, the conquest of France, the rock of St Helena, are thus directly associated with this deed of blood. The brave and the free thenceforward saw clearly, in every part of Europe, that no hope for public or private liberty remained but in a determined resistance to the aggressions of France: that slavery and chains followed in the rear of the tricolor flag. Napoleon has frequently said, that if Mr Fox had lived, peace would have been concluded, and all the subsequent misfortunes of his reign averted: but the truth of history must dispel the illusion, and the English annalist cannot permit the insidious praises of an enemy to tear from one of the brightest ornaments of his country the honour of having at last been

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1806.

Aug. 19.

Aug. 27.

¹ Hard. ix.
246, 250.
Bign. v. 337,
339.83.
Influence
which it had
on the rup-
ture of the
negotiation.

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awakened to a sense of the nature of revolutionary ambition, and possessed the magnanimity instantly to act upon the conviction.

84.
Mr Fox's
eyes are at
last opened to
the real
nature of the
war.

In his last instructions, dictated a few weeks before his death, to Lord Yarmouth, there is to be found the firmest resolution to insist on the original basis of the negotiation, and never to consent to any other: Earl Spencer, who succeeded him, had merely to follow out the path thus clearly chalked out.* In several of the speeches which he had delivered after he had obtained the direction of foreign affairs, is to be found a candid admission that his opinion as to the necessity and justice of the war had undergone a total alteration.† Thus the discord of earlier years was at length by this great man forgotten in the discharge of patriotic duty: the two lights of the age came finally to concur in the same policy. If Mr Pitt struggled for fifteen years, amidst difficulty and disaster, to carry on the war, it was Mr Fox who bequeathed the flood of glory in which it terminated to his successors; and after having

Last instructions of Mr Fox to Lord Lauderdale.

* "In the instructions," says Mr Fox in his last important official despatch, "given to Lord Lauderdale, the repeated tergiversations of France during the negotiation are detailed. It is from thence alone that any delay has arisen. The offers made through Lord Yarmouth were so clearly and unequivocally expressed, that the intention of the French government could not be doubted. But they were no sooner made than departed from. In the first conferences after his Lordship's return to France, Sicily was demanded; in the former, it had been distinctly disclaimed. This produced a delay attributable solely to France: our answer was immediate and distinct: the new demand was declared to be a breach of the principle of the proposed negotiation in its most essential parts. To obviate the cavil on the want of powers, full powers were sent to you, but with an express injunction not to use them till the French government should return to its former ground with respect to Sicily. M. Talleyrand, upon being informed of this determination, proposed to give the Hanse Towns in lieu of Sicily to the King of Naples. The moment this proposal was received here it was rejected; and the same despatch which conveyed that rejection carried out his Majesty's commands, if the demand for Sicily should still be persisted in, to demand his passports and return to England. M. Talleyrand upon this made fresh proposals, supported by Russia, as affording the means of preventing the meditated changes in Germany; and stated, 'that these changes were determined upon, but should not be published if peace took place.' That despatch was received here on the 12th, and on the 17th, in direct violation of these assurances, the German confederation treaties were both signed and published. Such are the unfounded pretences by which the French government seeks to attribute to delays on our part the results of its own injustice and repeated breach of promise." Such was Mr Fox's dying view of the negotiation up to the beginning of August; and it surely contains no confirmation of Napoleon's assertion, that if he had lived, peace would have been concluded. Its last stages, down to his death on 17th September, were conducted in strict conformity to the instructions he had given to Lord Lauderdale.—See Mr Fox's *Despatches, August 3d and 14th, 1806; Parl. Deb.* viii. 138, 164.

† In the debate on Mr Windham's military system, on April 3, 1806, Mr Fox said, with admirable candour:—"Indeed, by the circumstances of Europe, I am ready to confess that *I have been weaned from the opinions which I formerly held* with respect to the force which might suffice in time of peace: nor do I consider this as any inconsistency, because I see no rational prospect of any

spent the best part of his life in recommending less honourable and enlightened measures of concession to his country, in his last moments "nailed her colours to the mast."*

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The health of this illustrious man had for some weeks past been declining; and in the middle of July he was compelled to discontinue his attendance in parliament, though he was still assiduous in his duties at the Foreign Office. Notwithstanding all the efforts of medical skill, his complaint daily became more alarming. Symptoms of dropsy rapidly succeeded, and yielded only for a brief space to the usual remedies. On the 7th September he sank into a profound state of weakness, and on the 13th of the same month breathed his last, having entertained almost to the end of life confident hopes of recovery.¹ Thus departed from the scene of his greatness, within a few months after his illustrious rival, Charles Fox. Few men during life have led a more brilliant career, and none were ever the object of more affectionate love and admiration from a numerous and enthusiastic body of

85.
Death of Mr
Fox. His
character.

Sept. 13.

¹ Ann. Reg.
1806, 258

peace which would exempt us from the necessity of watchful preparation and powerful establishments. If we cannot obtain a safe and honourable peace, of which it is impossible in the actual state of affairs to be sanguine, and if we are not successful in carrying it on, we must be reduced to that state which I for one cannot contemplate without apprehension,—'toto divisos orbe Britannos,' and be left to our own resources and colonial possessions. In such an arduous and difficult struggle, demanding every effort and every exertion, or indeed under any system which we may act upon, a large army is indispensable."—*Parl. Deb.* vi. 715, 716.

* This memorable final coincidence of opinion between Pitt and Fox, on the necessity of continuing the war, is not the only instance of a similar approximation equally honourable to both parties. Ten years before, the two champions of the constitution and of revolution, Mr Burke and Sir James Mackintosh, the well-known author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, had in like manner come to view the origin of the convulsion in the same light. "The enthusiasm," said Mackintosh, in a letter to Burke, "with which I once embraced the instruction conveyed in your writings, is now ripened into solid conviction by the experience and conviction of more mature age. For a time, seduced by the love of what I thought liberty, I ventured to oppose, without ever ceasing to venerate, that writer who had nourished my understanding with the most wholesome principles of political wisdom. I speak to state facts, not to flatter: You are above flattery. I am too proud to flatter even you. Since that time a melancholy experience has undeceived me on many subjects, in which I was then the dupe of my own enthusiasm. I cannot say I even now assent to all your opinions on the present politics of Europe. But I can with truth affirm that I subscribe to your general principles, and am prepared to shed my blood in defence of the laws and constitution of my country." Burke answered from the bed of death:—"You have begun your opposition by obtaining a great victory over yourself; and it shows how much your own sagacity, operating on your own experience, is capable of adding to your own extraordinary talents and to your early erudition. It was the show of virtue, and the semblance of public happiness, which could alone mislead a mind like yours. A better knowledge of their substance alone has put you on the way that leads the most securely and certainly to your end." What words between such men!—See MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 87, 88.

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¹ Mackin-
tosh's Mem.
i. 324.

friends. Their attachment approached to idolatry. All his failings, and he had many, were forgotten in the generous warmth of his feelings, and the enthusiastic temper of his heart. "The simplicity," says Mackintosh, "of his character communicated confidence; the ardour of his eloquence roused enthusiasm; the gentleness of his manners inspired friendship."—"I admired," says Gibbon, "the powers of a superior man, as they were blended in his attractive character with the simplicity of a child. No human being was ever more free from any taint of malignity, vanity, or falsehood.¹" Nothing can more strongly mark the deep impression made by this part of Mr Fox's character than the words of Burke, pronounced six months after all intercourse between them ceased: "To be sure, he is a man made to be loved!"*

86.
His vices
and failings.

A man of pleasure in every sense of the word; dissipated and irregular in private life; having ruined his private fortune at the gaming-table, and often emerging from such haunts of vice to make his greatest appearances in parliament, yet he never rose without, by the elevation of his sentiments, and the energy of his language, exciting the admiration, not only of his partisans, but his opponents. The station which he occupied in the British parliament was not that merely of the leader of a powerful and able party. He was at the head of the friends of freedom in the human race. To his words the ardent and enthusiastic every where turned as to those of the gifted spirit entrusted with their cause. To his support the oppressed and destitute universally looked as their last and best refuge in periods of disaster. "When he pleaded," says Chateaubriand, "the cause of humanity, he reigned—he triumphed. Ever on the side of suffering, his eloquence acquired additional power from his gra-

* The convivial talents of Fox were great, as may well be believed from his so long being the idol of the brilliant circle of wits and beauties who in his early days did homage to the rising sun of the Prince of Wales. With men his conversation often partook of the licentious character of the fashionable and unscrupulous society in which he lived; but in the company of elegant women no man was more scrupulously well-bred, or often more felicitous in the delicate expression of flattery. On one occasion when he was at a supper at the house of the young and beautiful Duchess of Devonshire, a sort of game went round in which each gentleman presented the lady next him with a piece of fruit with an impromptu line or verse: "Come, Mr Fox," said the Duchess, "you have given me nothing as yet: what are you thinking of?" He immediately took a bunch of grapes and presented it to the Duchess with the inscription, "*Je plains jusqu' à l'ivresse.*"

titious exertions in behalf of the unfortunate. He crept even to the coldest heart. A sensible alteration in the tone of the orator discovered the man. In vain the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept."

Mr Fox was the greatest debater that the English parliament ever produced: he has been styled by a most competent judge "the most Demosthenian orator who has appeared since the days of Demosthenes."* Without the admirable arrangement and lucid order which enabled Mr Pitt to trace, through all the details of a complicated question, the ruling principle which he wished to impress upon his audience, he possessed a greater power of turning to his own advantage the incidents of a debate or admissions of an antagonist, and was unrivalled in the power and eloquence of his reply. In the outset of his speech he often laboured under a hesitation of expression, and was ungainly or awkward in manner; but as he warmed with the subject, his oratory became more rapid, his delivery impassioned, and, before it closed, the enraptured senate often hung in breathless suspense on his words. He was an accomplished classical scholar, and was master of an extraordinary power of turning to the best advantage the information which he possessed, or had gained during the debate. But his habits were too desultory—his indolence too great—his love of pleasure too powerful, to permit him to acquire extensive knowledge.† Respectable as a historian, the fragment on the annals of the Revolution which he composed is justly admired, from the purity of its style and the manliness of its sentiments; but the pen was too cold an instrument to convey the fervid bursts of his eloquence, and the reader will look in vain for the impassioned flow of the parliamentary orator. It is in the debates of the House of Commons that his real greatness is to be seen; and a vigorous intellect will seldom receive higher gratification than from studying the vehement declamation—the powerful and fervent reasoning—by which his great speeches there are distinguished.

* Sir James Mackintosh.

† No man more frequently quoted or referred to Adam Smith; but he had never read the "Wealth of Nations."

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88.

His fame is
on the
decline as a
just thinker.

But all this notwithstanding, the fame of Mr Fox is on the decline, not from a diminished sense of his genius, but an altered view, among the thinking few at least, of his principles. With the extinction of the generation which witnessed his parliamentary efforts—with the death of the friends who were captivated by his social qualities, his vast reputation is sensibly diminishing. Time, the mighty agent which separates truth from falsehood—experience, which dispels the most general illusions—suffering, which extinguishes the warmest anticipations when unfounded in human nature, have separated the wheat from the chaff in his principles. In so far as he sought to uphold the principles of general freedom, and defend the cause of the unfortunate and oppressed, in whatever country—in so far as he protected in legislation the freedom of the press, and stopped the infamous traffic in human flesh, his efforts will ever command the respect and sympathy of mankind. But in so far as he sought to advance this cause by advocating the principles of democratic power—in so far as he supported the wild projects of the French revolutionists, and palliated when he could not defend their atrocious excesses—in so far as he did his utmost to transfer to this country the same destructive doctrines, and, under the name of Reform, sought to give an entrance here to Jacobin fanaticism and infidel zeal—in so far as he counselled peace and recommended concession, when peace would have been the commencement of civil warfare, and concession a crouching to revolutionary ambition—he supported principles calculated to destroy all the objects which he himself had in view, and induce the very tyranny against which the thunders of his eloquence were directed.

89.
Reasons of
this change.

The doctrines, that all abuses are owing to power being confined to a few hands—that the extension of political influence to the lower classes is the only antidote to the evil—that virtue, wisdom, and intelligence will be brought to bear on public affairs when those classes are intrusted with their direction—and that the growth of democratic ascendancy is the commencement of social regeneration,—are sometimes amiable, from the philanthropy of those who support them, and always will be popular, from the agreeable flattery they convey to the

multitude. They are liable to only one objection—that they are altogether visionary and chimerical, founded on a total misconception of human nature, and a fatal forgetfulness of the character of the vast majority of men, who are in every rank swayed by selfishness or stimulated by passion. They invariably lead, when put in practice, to results diametrically the reverse of what were held forth or expected by their supporters. Abuses, by the introduction of a democratic régime, it is soon found, instead of being diminished, are multiplied tenfold; tyranny, instead of being eradicated, is enormously increased; personal and social security, instead of being established, is kept in perpetual jeopardy; the weight of public opinion, instead of an antidote to evil, becomes its greatest promoter, by being exerted in favour of those by whom its enormities are perpetrated.* It is by the opposing influence of these powers that the blessings of general freedom are secured under a constitutional monarchy; no hope remains of its outliving the spring-flood which drowns the institutions of a state, when these antagonist forces are brought for any length of time to draw in the same direction.

The liberties of England long survived the firm resistance which Mr Pitt opposed to revolutionary principles; but those of France perished at once, and perhaps for ever, under the triumph in which Mr Fox so eloquently exulted on the other side of the Channel. Taught by this

90.
His errors as
a political
philosopher.

* "In the contests of the Greek commonwealth," says Thucydides, "those who were esteemed the most depraved, and had the least foresight, invariably prevailed; for, being conscious of this weakness, and dreading to be overreached by those of greater penetration, they went to work hastily with the sword and poniard, and thereby got the better of their antagonists, who were occupied with more refined schemes."—"In turbis atque seditionibus," says the Roman annalist, "pessimo cuique plurima vis; pax et quies bonis artibus aluntur."—"Enfin je vois," said the French demagogue when going to the scaffold, "que dans les révolutions l'autorité toujours reste aux plus scélérats."—"A democratic republic," said the British statesman, "is not the government of the few by the many, but of the many by the few; with this difference, that the few who are thus elevated to power are the most worthless and profligate of the community." "Democracy," says the author of the *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*, "is the most monstrous of all governments, because it is impossible at once to act and to control; and consequently the sovereign power is there left without any restraint whatever. That form of government is the best which places the efficient direction in the hands of the aristocracy, subjecting them in its exercise to the control of the people at large." What a surprising coincidence between the opinions of such men in such distant ages! He is a bold speculator who, on such a subject, differs from the concurring authority of Thucydides, Sallust, Danton, Mr Pitt, and Sir James Mackintosh.—THUCYDIDES, l. iii. c. 39; SALLUST, *de Bello Cat.*; RIOUFFE, 67; *Parl. Hist.* xxx. 902; MACKINTOSH'S *Memoirs*, i. 92

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great example, posterity will not search the speeches of Mr Fox for historic truth, or pronounce him gifted with any extraordinary political penetration. On the contrary, it must record with regret, that the light which broke upon Mr Burke at the outset of the Revolution, and on Mr Pitt before its principal atrocities began, only shone on his fervent mind when descending to the grave. It can only award to him, during the greater part of his career, the praise of an eloquent debater, a brilliant sophist, but not that of a profound thinker or a philosophic observer. But recollecting the mixture of weakness in the nature of all, and the strong tendency of political contention to dim the clearest intellect and warp the strongest judgment, it will, while it condemns a great part of his principles, do justice to his motives and venerate his heart,—it will indulge the pleasing hope, that a longer life would have weaned him from all, as he honourably admits it had done from many, of his earlier delusions ; and admire the magnanimous firmness with which, on the bed of death, he atoned for his past errors, by bequeathing, in a moment of extraordinary gloom, the flag of England unlowered to his successors.

APPENDIX.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Note A, p. 8.

THIS state paper, the most remarkable in the whole revolutionary war, as containing the principles which were constantly maintained and finally brought to a successful issue by Great Britain, deserves to be quoted at greater length than is possible in the abridged narrative of the text:—

“From the Report of Prince Czartouriski, and the confidential communications received from the cabinet of St Petersburg, his Majesty perceives with the highest satisfaction that the sentiments of the Emperor, in regard to the deliverance and security of Europe, and its future independence, agree entirely with his own. The King, in consequence, is desirous of entering into the fullest and most unreserved explanations on every point which relates to that great object, and to form the closest union with the Emperor, in order that, by their united efforts, they may secure the aid and co-operation of the other powers of the Continent, in proportions corresponding to their ability, to take a part in the great and important enterprise on which the future safety of Europe is entirely dependent.

“With these designs the first point is, to fix as precisely as possible the objects which are to be kept in view by the coalesced powers.

“It appears from the explanation which has been given of the intentions of the Emperor, with which those of the King are entirely conformable, that these objects may be divided into three heads:—1. To rescue from French domination the countries which that power has conquered since the commencement of the Revolution, and to reduce it to the limits by which it was bounded before the Revolution. 2. To make, in regard to the territories so taken from France, such arrangements as may at once provide for their own tranquillity and happiness, and establish a barrier against the future projects of aggrandisement of that power. 3. To establish, on the restoration of peace, a system of mutual convention and guarantee for the security of the different powers, and establish in Europe a general system of public rights.

“The first and second of these objects are announced in the most general terms; but neither the one nor the other can be considered in detail without considering the nature and extent of the means at their disposal for carrying them into execution. The first is certainly that which the wishes of the Emperor and King would wish to see established in its fullest extent, without any modification or exception; and nothing less can completely satisfy the views which they have formed for the deliverance of Europe. If it were possible to unite to Great Britain and Russia the two other great powers of the Continent, there seems no doubt that such an assemblage of forces would be at their disposal as would enable them to accomplish all that they desire. But if, as there is too much reason to fear, it shall be found impossible to make Prussia enter

into the views of the confederacy, it may be doubted whether it will be possible to carry on in all parts of Europe the operations necessary to secure the first object in its full extent.

"The second object involves within itself more than one object of the highest importance. The views and sentiments of his Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, in striving to bring about this concert, are pure and disinterested. Their chief object in regard to the countries which may be conquered from France, is to re-establish, as much as possible, their ancient rights, and to secure the well-being of their inhabitants: but in pursuing that object, they must not lose sight of the general security of Europe, on which, indeed, that well-being is mainly dependent.

"It follows from this principle, that if any of these countries are capable of re-establishing their independence, and placed in a situation where they are capable of defending it, such an arrangement would be entirely conformable to the spirit of the proposed system. But among the countries at present subjected to the dominion of France, there are others to whom such a system is wholly inapplicable, either from their ancient relations having been so completely destroyed, that they cannot be re-established; or because they are so situated, that their independence could only be nominal, and equally incompatible with their own security, or that of Europe in general. Happily the greater number stand in the first predicament. If the arms of the Allies should be crowned with such success as to despoil France of all the conquests she has made since the Revolution, it would certainly be their first object to re-establish the United Provinces and Switzerland, and the territories of the King of Sardinia and Naples, as well as the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany; but those of Genoa, of the Italian Republic, including the three Legations, as well as Parma and Placentia, the Austrian Low Countries, and the German Provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, belong to the second denomination. As to the Italian provinces which have been mentioned, experience has demonstrated, that they have neither disposition nor resources to resist the aggressions of France; the King of Spain has too largely participated in the system, of which so large a portion of Europe has been the victims, to render it necessary to take into consideration the ancient rights of his family: and the last measures of Genoa, and of some of the other Italian states, give them no title to appeal either to the justice or generosity of the Allies. It is evident, besides, that these little sovereignties have no means of maintaining their independence, and that their separate existence can serve only to weaken and paralyse the force, which as much as possible should be concentrated in the hands of the principal power of Italy.

"It is needless to dwell particularly on the situation of the Low Countries. The events which have taken place forbid the possibility of their being restored to the House of Austria; it follows, therefore, that some new arrangements must be made in regard to that country; and it is evident that it can never exist as an independent power. The same considerations apply to the States on the left bank of the Rhine; they have been detached from the empire; and their owners received indemnities in the interior of Germany. It appears, therefore, no ways repugnant to the most sacred principles of justice and public morality, to make, in regard to these countries, such dispositions as the general interests of Europe require; and it is evident, that, after all the blood which has been shed, there exist no other means of re-establishing the peace of Europe on a durable foundation. It is fortunate that such an arrangement, essential in itself to the object which is proposed, may be made to contribute in the most powerful manner to bring about the means by which it may be effected.

"It is certainly a matter of the highest importance, if not of absolute necessity, to secure the efficacious and vigorous co-operation of Austria and Prussia; but there is little reason to hope that either of these powers will embark in the common cause, unless they have the prospect of an advantage to indemnify them for their exertions. For these reasons, his Majesty is clearly of opinion, that nothing could so much contribute to the general security, as by giving Austria additional strength to resist the designs of France on the side of Italy, and putting Prussia in a similar situation in the Low Countries. In Italy, reasons of policy require that the strength of the King of Sardinia should be increased, and that Austria should be placed in a situation to furnish him with prompt assistance in case of attack. With this view, it is indispensable that the territories now forming the Republic of Italy should be given to other sovereigns. In making the distribution, a proper augmentation must be given to the King of Sardinia; and his possessions, as well as those of the grand-duchy of Tuscany, which it is proposed to revive, be brought in contact with those of Austria; and for those ends, the Ligurian Republic, to all appearance, must be united to Piedmont.

"Such territorial arrangements would go far to secure the future repose of Europe, by forming a more powerful barrier against the ambition of France than has yet existed; but to render that security complete, it appears necessary that there should be concluded, at the period of a general pacification, a general treaty, by which the European powers should mutually guarantee each others' possessions. Such a treaty would lay the foundation in Europe of a system of public right, and would contribute as much as seems possible to repress future enterprises directed against the general tranquillity; and above all, to render abortive every project of aggrandisement, similar to those which have produced all the disasters of Europe since the calamitous era of the French Revolution." —SCHOELL, vii. 59; JOMINI, *Vie de Napoleon*, i. 471, 478.

In all these varied projects, there is not a syllable, either about territorial acquisition to Great Britain, or the infliction upon France of any part of that system of spoliation which she had so liberally applied to other states. The whole project breathes only a spirit of justice, philanthropy, and moderation; it contemplates restitution, and restitution only where that was practicable; and where it was not, such new arrangements as the interest of the people in the territories to be disposed of, and the general safety of Europe, required. The world has since had abundant reason to experience the prophetic wisdom of these arrangements, in all cases where they were subsequently carried into execution, and to lament the deviation made from them, particularly in the final destruction of Poland and Belgium.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

Note B, p. 9.

FINANCIAL DETAILS OF GREAT BRITAIN FOR 1805.

INCOME, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary.

Malt and personal estate duties,	£2,750,000
War taxes,	8,300,000
New war do.	1,150,000
Property tax,	6,300,000
Surplus consolidated fund,	4,000,000
Lottery,	300,000
Surplus, 1804,	1,192,000
Loan, England,	20,000,000
	<hr/> £43,992,000

Permanent.

Customs,	£8,357,000
Excise,	20,604,000
Stamps,	3,354,000
Land and assessed taxes,	5,309,000
Post office,	924,000
Pensions and salaries,	49,000
Do.,	61,000
Smaller taxes,	32,000

	38,690,000
Deduct war customs and excise,	8,300,000
	<hr/> 30,390,000

Total extraordinary and permanent income,	<hr/> £74,382,000
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EXPENDITURE, GREAT BRITAIN.

Extraordinary Charges.

Navy,	.	.	.	£15,035,000	
Army,	.	.	.	18,616,000	
Ordnance,	.	.	.	4,846,000	
Miscellanies,	.	.	.	6,450,000	
<hr/>					44,947,000


Permanent Charges.


Interest of debt,	.	.	.	£19,193,000	
Sinking fund,	.	.	.	6,835,000	
Civil List, &c.	.	.	.	1,337,000	
Other payments,	.	.	.	727,000	
<hr/>					28,092,000


Total extraordinary and permanent charges, exclusive of
Ireland, £73,039,000


—See *Parliamentary Debates*, iii. 546-550, and Appendix, 230 ; *Annual Register*, 1805, 592, App. to Chronicle.

END OF VOL. IX.









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